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The Royal Navy in Eastern Waters: Linchpin of Victory, 1935–1942
How British naval power in the Indian Ocean played a critical early role in “Commands the reader's attention. . . . a history game-changer.” —Warship, Naval Books of the Year This new work tells the compelling story of how the Royal Navy secured the strategic space from Egypt in the west to Australasia in the East through the first half of the Second World War—and explains why this contribution, made while Russia’s fate remained in the balance and before American economic power took effect, was so critical. Without it, the war would certainly have lasted longer and decisive victory might have proved impossible. After the protection of the Atlantic lifeline, this was surely the Royal Navy’s finest achievement, the linchpin of victory. The book moves authoritatively between grand strategy, intelligence, accounts of specific operations, and technical assessment of ships and weapons. It challenges established perceptions of Royal Navy capability and will change the way we think about Britain’s role and contribution in the first half of the war. The Navy of 1939 was stronger than usually suggested and British intelligence did not fail against Japan. Nor was the Royal Navy outmatched by Japan, coming very close to a British Midway off Ceylon in 1942. And it was the Admiralty, demonstrating a reckless disregard for risks, that caused the loss of Force Z in 1941. The book also lays stress on the key part played by the American relationship in Britain’s Eastern naval strategy. Superbly researched and elegantly written, it adds a hugely important dimension to our understanding of the war in the East.
921 pages, Kindle Edition
First published March 31, 2017
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70 people want to read
About the author
Andrew Boyd
6 books8 followersAndrew Boyd CMG, OBE, DPhil, FRHistS was educated at Britannia Royal Naval College Dartmouth and St John’s College, Oxford. He served as a submariner in the Royal Navy before joining the British Diplomatic Service in 1980. He received his DPhil from the University of Buckingham in 2015 where he remains a senior research fellow - www.buckingham.ac.uk/research/hri/fel.... He is the author of the widely acclaimed books,The Royal Navy in Eastern Waters published by Seaforth in 2017, and British Naval Intelligence through the Twentieth Century, also with Seaforth, in August 2020. His latest book Arms for Russia and the Naval War in the Arctic 1941 - 1945 was published in September 2024. He is a Fellow of the Royal Historical Society.
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Displaying 1 - 7 of 7 reviews
April 9, 2017
This is honestly one of the best books I have ever read, and I am glad that it is the 50th book I finished this year! Much has been written about the naval wars in the Atlantic, Mediterranean, and Pacific theaters of World War 2. Less has been written about the war in the Indian Ocean, and Andrew Boys fills this gap with a description of a British grand strategy that defended the Indian Ocean and the Eastern Empire, stretching from East Africa and Egypt, through the Middle East and India, to the Malay Barrier and Australasia. In the process, he debunks many myths and misconceptions about the abilities of the Royal Navy and the British in general in defending this vast region of the globe. The book covers the period from 1935, when the United Kingdom started seeing a real threat from all three Axis powers (Germany, Italy, and Japan) to the end of 1942, when all threats to the core of the Eastern Empire had vanished. The following paragraph from the book gives a good introductory summary:
“The importance of the war potential of this wider eastern empire and the role of the Royal Navy in securing it is the central theme of this book. With American help, the Royal Navy had to find a way of countering the existential threats to this empire war potential from both east and west. In meeting these threats, the campaigns it fought in the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean were both essential and interdependent, and they indirectly influenced the Atlantic outcome too. In a global war for survival, securing the overall war potential of this eastern empire space and denying it to the Axis powers ultimately mattered more than holding any specific territory, event Singapore. This is the measure against which Royal Navy performance in the East should be judged.”
Chapter 1 covers the evolution of the Royal Navy from 1935-1939, as it sought a strategy to fight a war against three enemies. Despite misconceptions of a naval power in decline in the interwar years, it was still the largest navy in the world, and backed by the largest shipbuilding industry. The Royal Navy produced about as many ships in each category as the combined Axis powers (except submarines), and it was an innovator in the areas of anti-submarine warfare and carrier warfare (especially in radar, reconnaissance, night strikes, and the armored carrier). In 1939, the Royal Navy’s objective of an offensive war in Europe and a defensive war in the East was an achievable objectively, especially with the help of the French navy against the Italians. In fact, the Royal Navy was able to survive and achieve its objectives even with the Fall of France and the loss of the French Navy, a remarkable achievement.
Chapter 2 covers the evolution of Royal Navy strategy for fighting its three enemies simultaneously. As the threat from Germany and Italy grew, the Royal Navy modified its commitment to send a fleet to the Far East immediately after a Japanese attack to a pledge to do so if absolutely necessary, while considering the needs in the Mediterranean and Middle East. This of course made the Dominions, especially Australia, suspicious, but it was a more flexible strategy allowed by possession of the Suez Canal, allowing the Royal Navy to shuttle forces between the Eastern Mediterranean and the Far East as necessary.
Chapter 3 covers the change in British strategy after the disastrous Fall of France and the entry of Italy into the war. During this period, the British decided to maintain a forward defense in both boundaries of their eastern empire: Egypt and Singapore. The major commitment to the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East, which many have denigrated as a sideshow, was done in order to protect the Middle East Oil and the Persian Corridor route to Russia, and to keep the important neutrals Turkey, Spain, and Vichy France out of the Axis camp, which would have disastrous repercussions on the Middle East and the Battle of the Atlantic. The British, in holding Egypt, succeeded in their forward defense of the western boundary, but this was done at the cost of reinforcements to the eastern boundary. The British did not have enough resources to defend Egypt and Singapore, especially since the increase of Japanese air power with their occupation of French Indochina forced the British to hold Malaya and Sumatra if Singapore was not to be made untenable by Japanese air attack. This, combined with the Admiralty’s fixation on holding Singapore as an end in itself, instead of as a means to protect the Eastern Empire, meant that the defense of the Far East would suffer serious setbacks.
Chapter 4 covers British talks with the Americans over a common naval strategy in the Atlantic and the Pacific. Due to the “Germany First” strategy, and the American perception that the British were seriously threatened by the Battle of the Atlantic, an “Atlantic Substitution” strategy was agreed upon. This would entail American warships relieving Atlantic escorts, allowing the relieved British warships to head to the Far East to deal with the Japanese. Unfortunately, this left insufficient American ships in the Pacific to mount a credible deterrent against the Japanese, especially after Pearl Harbor. The British overestimated the US Navy’s ability to cover two oceans, and this overconfidence would play a role in the Admiralty maintaining an offensive strategy without the forces to back it up in December 1941.
Chapter 5 covers the British intelligence on the Japanese forces in the Far East in mid-1941, as well as the Royal Navy’s capacity to counter them. In fact, the British had a pretty accurate estimate of Japanese forces, with the main flaw being in its underestimation of Japanese air power. As for the Royal Navy’s available forces, it did have a shortage of fleet destroyers, as well as battleships and carrier tied up in repair, though on the other hand, the German and Italian navies lost 40% of their surface fleets so far and British merchant shipping was higher than at the start of the war. Thus, though Force H at Gibraltar was the only force available immediately, but it could soon by joined by the capital ships under repair. One major weakness was the Fleet Air Arm’s numbers and quality in the East, though the quality difference between them and Japanese planes has been overstated. Furthermore, despite narratives of weak British multi-carrier doctrine, the Royal Navy was a major innovator in air defense, and Force H was the first consolidated fast carrier task force. The Pedestal convoy operation involved 4 British aircraft carriers which had to defend against submarines, surface forces, and over 600 aircraft. Though the convoy and the escorts took major losses, most of this was from U-boats and E-boats, while the German and Italian air units did not cause as much damage. This amazing defense against an overwhelming air attack would probably have not been achievable by the US or Japanese navies. The British had sufficient intelligence and capabilities to help defend against the Japanese.
Chapter 6 covers the Royal Navy’s reinforcement of the Far East and its attempt at deterring Japan towards the end of 1942. During this period, the Admiralty shifted from a prior strategy of holding interior lines in the Indian Ocean to a forward offensive strategy of basing a major fleet at Singapore, with an advanced base in Manila to harass Japan’s line of communications in the South China Sea. This was done because it thought that, combined with the American Asiatic Fleet in the Philippines and the Dutch Fleet in the East Indies, the Allies had the resources to make this offensive strategy possible. This seems ludicrous in hindsight, but the Allied did not know exactly when Japan would attack until right before Pearl Harbor. If the attack was delayed until March 1942, the Americans would have sent large reinforcements to the Philippines, which could have combined with British reinforcements to Force Z to deter or counter a Japanese attack better than was done in December 1941.
Chapter 7 covers the causes and consequences of the dispatch and destruction of Force Z, the Prince of Wales and Repulse in December 1941. It was the Admiralty, not Churchill, that decided to send Force Z all the way to Singapore, instead of keeping it in Ceylon, where it would still act as a deterrent without being in danger. In December 1941, the Admiralty’s strategy of a forward defense of the Malay Barrier was impossible, as shown by events. Despite this failure, the sinking of Force Z was not as catastrophic as the common narrative suggests. Even if it had survived, it could not have saved Singapore or the Dutch East Indies. At best, it would have enhanced the capability of Sommerville’s Eastern Fleet, not an insignificant improvement, but in the end, the Eastern Fleet achieved its objective anyway. After the loss of Force Z, the Admiralty made a distinction between dispensable interests, namely Southeast Asia and the East Indies, and areas critical to the war effort, namely Australasia and the Indian Ocean. While the forward defense of the eastern boundary failed, the Royal Navy’s defense of the core of its Eastern Empire ultimately succeeded.
Chapter 8 covers the importance of the Indian Ocean to the Allied war effort and the role played by the Royal Navy in protecting it. In 1942, the Eastern Empire was under threat from three directions: from the Germans and Italians in Egypt, from the Germans in the Caucasus, and from the Japanese in Burma and the Eastern Indian Ocean. Loss of the Abadan oil fields could have led to a reduction of 20-25% in the British war effort. Furthermore, though the Persian Corridor route accounted for about a quarter of Lend-Lease to Russia throughout the war, it was 40-50% in 1942 with pauses in the Arctic convoys. Without this route, the Soviet economy and war effort could have collapsed, or at least suffered much more greatly. The Eastern Fleet was supposed to be a fleet in being to defend the Indian Ocean. Given this goal, Sommerville acted recklessly during the Indian Ocean Raid by closing with Nagumo’s 5 carrier force, and by detaching 2 cruisers and the small carrier Hermes, which were easily sunk. Despite his recklessness, he had the chance to sink 2 carriers in a night carrier attack (where the British were masters and the Japanese were inexperienced) when they separated from the rest of Nagumo’s force during the battle. Even in our timeline, British carrier planes were able to attack the Japanese carriers without being detected beforehand, though they all missed. One or more lucky hits could have sunk a carrier: at Midway, a single bomb hit was enough to cripple the carrier Akagi and force her scuttling. In any case, despite the serious losses, the Eastern Fleet was still mostly intact, and would be reinforced by further units later in 1942, including modern battleships and a 3rd fleet carrier. These would have made a Japanese invasion of Ceylon very difficult. After Midway, the Japanese threat to the Indian Ocean evaporated, so parts of this fleet were sent to Madagascar and Mediterranean operations. Thus, the Eastern Fleet achieved its strategic objective.
The following couple of paragraphs explain the effectiveness of the Eastern Fleet in 1942:
“The Royal Navy was overstretched in 1942, but it faced an inescapable commitment in the eastern theatre for the first half of that year. If the Axis had secured control of the Indian Ocean, denying Britain the resources of India and Australasia, and cutting the supply lines to the Middle East and Russia, while giving Germany potential control of Persian oil, the Allied task would have been immeasurably harder. Indeed, clear victory might have been impossible. The Royal Navy had to counter this risk. It had just enough latent strength in modern ships, modern technology, fighting effectiveness, and global support and experience, to do this, provided it had enough time to redeploy the necessary forces.
“The weakness of Royal Navy forces off Ceylon in April 1942 reflected temporary limitations and was not representative of what the Royal Navy could do if required. Its ability, successively though 1942 to deploy a significant Eastern Fleet; plan major reinforcements for that fleet; project a substantial expeditionary force 7000 miles from the United Kingdom to seize Madagascar in May; mount the complex Pedestal operation at the other end of Africa, using some of the same forces, just two months later; and finally to mobilise 160 warships, including seven carriers, for Torch, demonstrates that the picture of Royal Navy power being in decline is overdone. The Royal Navy remained a strong and resilient force with global reach. Somerville undoubtedly hazarded his fleet at Ceylon, but came close to inflicting serious damage on the IJN.”
Before I conclude my review, I’d like to note a fascinating Annex with tables showing warship construction by the major naval powers (UK, US, Japan, Germany, and Italy) from 1930-1942. These tables show that British warship production matched or exceeded the combined production of the 3 Axis powers in every category except battleships (with a match if the two 1927 battleships Nelson and Rodney are included), fleet carriers (5 British vs 6 Japanese), and submarines (countered by vastly more production of destroyers, destroyer escorts, and anti-sub vessels), though 5 of the 6 light and escort carriers that match Japan’s 6 were Lend-Leased from the US. Furthermore, the Royal Navy produced more ships than the US Navy in all categories except battleships (5 vs 6) and destroyers (exactly equal), and light and escort carriers, even producing 5 fleet carriers to 3 American carriers. Perhaps Britannia no longer ruled the waves, but it matched production of its combined enemies and of its eventually dominant ally, and its construction program, especially its ASW ships, was a much better investment than that made by the Germans, who produced U-boats too slowly, and the Japanese, who failed as ASW, which was fatal for a maritime empire.
These final paragraphs provide a good conclusive summary of the book:
“Above all, the contribution of the British Empire and that of the Royal Navy in safeguarding the Middle East and the Indian Ocean from the Axis between spring 1941 and winter 1942 has been understated. It has been overshadowed by later American strength, once it was properly mobilised from 1943 onward, and the dominant contribution of the Russian army to breaking German land power. Yet British control of the area from Egypt in the west, through the Indian Ocean to Ceylon, and thence to Australasia, was critical in containing Germany’s military potential during this period. Britain needed the resources and strategic leverage of this eastern empire to ensure her own survival as an effective fighting power, to wear down Germany and Italy by denying them oil and expending their air power, to and later to ensure the survival of her vital Russian ally through the Persian supply route. This empire contribution made while Russia’s fate was still in the balance, and before American potential could take effect, was fundamental to future Allied victory. It was the empire’s last great gift to Britain. It was delivered by many without much choice, but still in the hope of a better world after the war.
“The Royal Navy held prime responsibility for securing the war potential of this space from the existential threats facing it at both ends. The initial British defeats to Japan at sea were not in themselves a sign of imperial failure, nor did they mean that Britain must abandon sea areas previously considered vital. They were temporary, albeit avoidable, setbacks eclipsed by long term strategic success in securing what mattered most in the East. After the protection of the Atlantic lifeline, this was the Royal Navy’s greatest achievement in the war.”
The only issue I have with the book is that I would have liked to have seen a discussion of the Royal Navy’s efforts in the East from 1943-1945. Fortunately, there are excellent books on these later years, including David Hobbs’ “The British Pacific Fleet: The Royal Navy's Most Powerful Strike Force.”
“The importance of the war potential of this wider eastern empire and the role of the Royal Navy in securing it is the central theme of this book. With American help, the Royal Navy had to find a way of countering the existential threats to this empire war potential from both east and west. In meeting these threats, the campaigns it fought in the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean were both essential and interdependent, and they indirectly influenced the Atlantic outcome too. In a global war for survival, securing the overall war potential of this eastern empire space and denying it to the Axis powers ultimately mattered more than holding any specific territory, event Singapore. This is the measure against which Royal Navy performance in the East should be judged.”
Chapter 1 covers the evolution of the Royal Navy from 1935-1939, as it sought a strategy to fight a war against three enemies. Despite misconceptions of a naval power in decline in the interwar years, it was still the largest navy in the world, and backed by the largest shipbuilding industry. The Royal Navy produced about as many ships in each category as the combined Axis powers (except submarines), and it was an innovator in the areas of anti-submarine warfare and carrier warfare (especially in radar, reconnaissance, night strikes, and the armored carrier). In 1939, the Royal Navy’s objective of an offensive war in Europe and a defensive war in the East was an achievable objectively, especially with the help of the French navy against the Italians. In fact, the Royal Navy was able to survive and achieve its objectives even with the Fall of France and the loss of the French Navy, a remarkable achievement.
Chapter 2 covers the evolution of Royal Navy strategy for fighting its three enemies simultaneously. As the threat from Germany and Italy grew, the Royal Navy modified its commitment to send a fleet to the Far East immediately after a Japanese attack to a pledge to do so if absolutely necessary, while considering the needs in the Mediterranean and Middle East. This of course made the Dominions, especially Australia, suspicious, but it was a more flexible strategy allowed by possession of the Suez Canal, allowing the Royal Navy to shuttle forces between the Eastern Mediterranean and the Far East as necessary.
Chapter 3 covers the change in British strategy after the disastrous Fall of France and the entry of Italy into the war. During this period, the British decided to maintain a forward defense in both boundaries of their eastern empire: Egypt and Singapore. The major commitment to the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East, which many have denigrated as a sideshow, was done in order to protect the Middle East Oil and the Persian Corridor route to Russia, and to keep the important neutrals Turkey, Spain, and Vichy France out of the Axis camp, which would have disastrous repercussions on the Middle East and the Battle of the Atlantic. The British, in holding Egypt, succeeded in their forward defense of the western boundary, but this was done at the cost of reinforcements to the eastern boundary. The British did not have enough resources to defend Egypt and Singapore, especially since the increase of Japanese air power with their occupation of French Indochina forced the British to hold Malaya and Sumatra if Singapore was not to be made untenable by Japanese air attack. This, combined with the Admiralty’s fixation on holding Singapore as an end in itself, instead of as a means to protect the Eastern Empire, meant that the defense of the Far East would suffer serious setbacks.
Chapter 4 covers British talks with the Americans over a common naval strategy in the Atlantic and the Pacific. Due to the “Germany First” strategy, and the American perception that the British were seriously threatened by the Battle of the Atlantic, an “Atlantic Substitution” strategy was agreed upon. This would entail American warships relieving Atlantic escorts, allowing the relieved British warships to head to the Far East to deal with the Japanese. Unfortunately, this left insufficient American ships in the Pacific to mount a credible deterrent against the Japanese, especially after Pearl Harbor. The British overestimated the US Navy’s ability to cover two oceans, and this overconfidence would play a role in the Admiralty maintaining an offensive strategy without the forces to back it up in December 1941.
Chapter 5 covers the British intelligence on the Japanese forces in the Far East in mid-1941, as well as the Royal Navy’s capacity to counter them. In fact, the British had a pretty accurate estimate of Japanese forces, with the main flaw being in its underestimation of Japanese air power. As for the Royal Navy’s available forces, it did have a shortage of fleet destroyers, as well as battleships and carrier tied up in repair, though on the other hand, the German and Italian navies lost 40% of their surface fleets so far and British merchant shipping was higher than at the start of the war. Thus, though Force H at Gibraltar was the only force available immediately, but it could soon by joined by the capital ships under repair. One major weakness was the Fleet Air Arm’s numbers and quality in the East, though the quality difference between them and Japanese planes has been overstated. Furthermore, despite narratives of weak British multi-carrier doctrine, the Royal Navy was a major innovator in air defense, and Force H was the first consolidated fast carrier task force. The Pedestal convoy operation involved 4 British aircraft carriers which had to defend against submarines, surface forces, and over 600 aircraft. Though the convoy and the escorts took major losses, most of this was from U-boats and E-boats, while the German and Italian air units did not cause as much damage. This amazing defense against an overwhelming air attack would probably have not been achievable by the US or Japanese navies. The British had sufficient intelligence and capabilities to help defend against the Japanese.
Chapter 6 covers the Royal Navy’s reinforcement of the Far East and its attempt at deterring Japan towards the end of 1942. During this period, the Admiralty shifted from a prior strategy of holding interior lines in the Indian Ocean to a forward offensive strategy of basing a major fleet at Singapore, with an advanced base in Manila to harass Japan’s line of communications in the South China Sea. This was done because it thought that, combined with the American Asiatic Fleet in the Philippines and the Dutch Fleet in the East Indies, the Allies had the resources to make this offensive strategy possible. This seems ludicrous in hindsight, but the Allied did not know exactly when Japan would attack until right before Pearl Harbor. If the attack was delayed until March 1942, the Americans would have sent large reinforcements to the Philippines, which could have combined with British reinforcements to Force Z to deter or counter a Japanese attack better than was done in December 1941.
Chapter 7 covers the causes and consequences of the dispatch and destruction of Force Z, the Prince of Wales and Repulse in December 1941. It was the Admiralty, not Churchill, that decided to send Force Z all the way to Singapore, instead of keeping it in Ceylon, where it would still act as a deterrent without being in danger. In December 1941, the Admiralty’s strategy of a forward defense of the Malay Barrier was impossible, as shown by events. Despite this failure, the sinking of Force Z was not as catastrophic as the common narrative suggests. Even if it had survived, it could not have saved Singapore or the Dutch East Indies. At best, it would have enhanced the capability of Sommerville’s Eastern Fleet, not an insignificant improvement, but in the end, the Eastern Fleet achieved its objective anyway. After the loss of Force Z, the Admiralty made a distinction between dispensable interests, namely Southeast Asia and the East Indies, and areas critical to the war effort, namely Australasia and the Indian Ocean. While the forward defense of the eastern boundary failed, the Royal Navy’s defense of the core of its Eastern Empire ultimately succeeded.
Chapter 8 covers the importance of the Indian Ocean to the Allied war effort and the role played by the Royal Navy in protecting it. In 1942, the Eastern Empire was under threat from three directions: from the Germans and Italians in Egypt, from the Germans in the Caucasus, and from the Japanese in Burma and the Eastern Indian Ocean. Loss of the Abadan oil fields could have led to a reduction of 20-25% in the British war effort. Furthermore, though the Persian Corridor route accounted for about a quarter of Lend-Lease to Russia throughout the war, it was 40-50% in 1942 with pauses in the Arctic convoys. Without this route, the Soviet economy and war effort could have collapsed, or at least suffered much more greatly. The Eastern Fleet was supposed to be a fleet in being to defend the Indian Ocean. Given this goal, Sommerville acted recklessly during the Indian Ocean Raid by closing with Nagumo’s 5 carrier force, and by detaching 2 cruisers and the small carrier Hermes, which were easily sunk. Despite his recklessness, he had the chance to sink 2 carriers in a night carrier attack (where the British were masters and the Japanese were inexperienced) when they separated from the rest of Nagumo’s force during the battle. Even in our timeline, British carrier planes were able to attack the Japanese carriers without being detected beforehand, though they all missed. One or more lucky hits could have sunk a carrier: at Midway, a single bomb hit was enough to cripple the carrier Akagi and force her scuttling. In any case, despite the serious losses, the Eastern Fleet was still mostly intact, and would be reinforced by further units later in 1942, including modern battleships and a 3rd fleet carrier. These would have made a Japanese invasion of Ceylon very difficult. After Midway, the Japanese threat to the Indian Ocean evaporated, so parts of this fleet were sent to Madagascar and Mediterranean operations. Thus, the Eastern Fleet achieved its strategic objective.
The following couple of paragraphs explain the effectiveness of the Eastern Fleet in 1942:
“The Royal Navy was overstretched in 1942, but it faced an inescapable commitment in the eastern theatre for the first half of that year. If the Axis had secured control of the Indian Ocean, denying Britain the resources of India and Australasia, and cutting the supply lines to the Middle East and Russia, while giving Germany potential control of Persian oil, the Allied task would have been immeasurably harder. Indeed, clear victory might have been impossible. The Royal Navy had to counter this risk. It had just enough latent strength in modern ships, modern technology, fighting effectiveness, and global support and experience, to do this, provided it had enough time to redeploy the necessary forces.
“The weakness of Royal Navy forces off Ceylon in April 1942 reflected temporary limitations and was not representative of what the Royal Navy could do if required. Its ability, successively though 1942 to deploy a significant Eastern Fleet; plan major reinforcements for that fleet; project a substantial expeditionary force 7000 miles from the United Kingdom to seize Madagascar in May; mount the complex Pedestal operation at the other end of Africa, using some of the same forces, just two months later; and finally to mobilise 160 warships, including seven carriers, for Torch, demonstrates that the picture of Royal Navy power being in decline is overdone. The Royal Navy remained a strong and resilient force with global reach. Somerville undoubtedly hazarded his fleet at Ceylon, but came close to inflicting serious damage on the IJN.”
Before I conclude my review, I’d like to note a fascinating Annex with tables showing warship construction by the major naval powers (UK, US, Japan, Germany, and Italy) from 1930-1942. These tables show that British warship production matched or exceeded the combined production of the 3 Axis powers in every category except battleships (with a match if the two 1927 battleships Nelson and Rodney are included), fleet carriers (5 British vs 6 Japanese), and submarines (countered by vastly more production of destroyers, destroyer escorts, and anti-sub vessels), though 5 of the 6 light and escort carriers that match Japan’s 6 were Lend-Leased from the US. Furthermore, the Royal Navy produced more ships than the US Navy in all categories except battleships (5 vs 6) and destroyers (exactly equal), and light and escort carriers, even producing 5 fleet carriers to 3 American carriers. Perhaps Britannia no longer ruled the waves, but it matched production of its combined enemies and of its eventually dominant ally, and its construction program, especially its ASW ships, was a much better investment than that made by the Germans, who produced U-boats too slowly, and the Japanese, who failed as ASW, which was fatal for a maritime empire.
These final paragraphs provide a good conclusive summary of the book:
“Above all, the contribution of the British Empire and that of the Royal Navy in safeguarding the Middle East and the Indian Ocean from the Axis between spring 1941 and winter 1942 has been understated. It has been overshadowed by later American strength, once it was properly mobilised from 1943 onward, and the dominant contribution of the Russian army to breaking German land power. Yet British control of the area from Egypt in the west, through the Indian Ocean to Ceylon, and thence to Australasia, was critical in containing Germany’s military potential during this period. Britain needed the resources and strategic leverage of this eastern empire to ensure her own survival as an effective fighting power, to wear down Germany and Italy by denying them oil and expending their air power, to and later to ensure the survival of her vital Russian ally through the Persian supply route. This empire contribution made while Russia’s fate was still in the balance, and before American potential could take effect, was fundamental to future Allied victory. It was the empire’s last great gift to Britain. It was delivered by many without much choice, but still in the hope of a better world after the war.
“The Royal Navy held prime responsibility for securing the war potential of this space from the existential threats facing it at both ends. The initial British defeats to Japan at sea were not in themselves a sign of imperial failure, nor did they mean that Britain must abandon sea areas previously considered vital. They were temporary, albeit avoidable, setbacks eclipsed by long term strategic success in securing what mattered most in the East. After the protection of the Atlantic lifeline, this was the Royal Navy’s greatest achievement in the war.”
The only issue I have with the book is that I would have liked to have seen a discussion of the Royal Navy’s efforts in the East from 1943-1945. Fortunately, there are excellent books on these later years, including David Hobbs’ “The British Pacific Fleet: The Royal Navy's Most Powerful Strike Force.”
February 5, 2022
If you are looking for a minute-by-minute analysis of the loss of Force Z (Prince of Wales and Repulse) look elsewhere - many authors have covered that disaster in detail. Boyd steps back for a strategic view, and rappels down the cliff of time to get the perspective of 'then'. What did the decision makers know and not? What uncertainties did they have to take account of? What were the 'unknown unknowns'?
The timeframe of this weighty book is interesting. In the author's view 1935 was when the Royal Navy first began to plan seriously for a two-hemisphere war, and by the end of 1942 the fruits of the 1938-9 building programme were coming on stream and the point of greatest danger was past.
The RN did not have the capacity to confront three first-rank enemies in five theatres and two hemispheres simultaneously. Its strategy was therefore to rely on the support of allies - France in the western Mediterranean and the US and Dutch navies in the East. The collapse of France and (later) Pearl Harbour and the initial ineffectiveness of the US submarine arm changed the picture.
Then there were the uncertainties. Would Japan attack British interests only, allowing the US to stay neutral? Would Russia hold out?
Naval Intelligence had a surprisingly accurate picture of Japanese capacity and intentions. The Admiralty was faced with two choices: to focus on the defence of the Indian Ocean trade routes and accept that Singapore was ultimately expendable, or commit to an aggressive strategy northward from Singapore in support of the US Eastern Fleet.
The reader will need to keep track of a heady list of assessments, conferences and agreements. Boyd's argument is that, far from the conventional picture of Churchill bullying a reluctant Admiralty into a desperate gamble, there was a deliberate change of strategy from defensive to aggressive in the last quarter of 1941 - without the resources to implement it.
Having dealt with Force Z from a purely strategic perspective Boyd goes on to a more detailed description of Somerville's inconclusive dance with a greatly superior Japanese fleet off Ceylon (Sri Lanka) in April 1942. Admitting the mistakes made, he argues that with just a modicum of luck it could have been a British Midway.
Overall the book provides a refreshing perspective on one of the lesser known aspects of WW2. Boyd argues convincingly that the Indian Ocean and eastern Mediterranean were critical to the Allied war effort by assuring supplies of Persian oil to the east, Imperial troops and supplies to the European and Mediterranean theatres, and above all keeping the southern supply route to Russia open.
Given the timeframe and geographic focus I find it odd that he doesn't mention the Battle of the Java Sea. My other reservation is the frequency with which the expressions 'might have', 'could have', and 'would have' crop up. Surely these open up his flank to a carping historian (no such creature!) complaining about speculation.
The book is well produced and written with a plate section containing 26 well-chosen illustrations.
The timeframe of this weighty book is interesting. In the author's view 1935 was when the Royal Navy first began to plan seriously for a two-hemisphere war, and by the end of 1942 the fruits of the 1938-9 building programme were coming on stream and the point of greatest danger was past.
The RN did not have the capacity to confront three first-rank enemies in five theatres and two hemispheres simultaneously. Its strategy was therefore to rely on the support of allies - France in the western Mediterranean and the US and Dutch navies in the East. The collapse of France and (later) Pearl Harbour and the initial ineffectiveness of the US submarine arm changed the picture.
Then there were the uncertainties. Would Japan attack British interests only, allowing the US to stay neutral? Would Russia hold out?
Naval Intelligence had a surprisingly accurate picture of Japanese capacity and intentions. The Admiralty was faced with two choices: to focus on the defence of the Indian Ocean trade routes and accept that Singapore was ultimately expendable, or commit to an aggressive strategy northward from Singapore in support of the US Eastern Fleet.
The reader will need to keep track of a heady list of assessments, conferences and agreements. Boyd's argument is that, far from the conventional picture of Churchill bullying a reluctant Admiralty into a desperate gamble, there was a deliberate change of strategy from defensive to aggressive in the last quarter of 1941 - without the resources to implement it.
Having dealt with Force Z from a purely strategic perspective Boyd goes on to a more detailed description of Somerville's inconclusive dance with a greatly superior Japanese fleet off Ceylon (Sri Lanka) in April 1942. Admitting the mistakes made, he argues that with just a modicum of luck it could have been a British Midway.
Overall the book provides a refreshing perspective on one of the lesser known aspects of WW2. Boyd argues convincingly that the Indian Ocean and eastern Mediterranean were critical to the Allied war effort by assuring supplies of Persian oil to the east, Imperial troops and supplies to the European and Mediterranean theatres, and above all keeping the southern supply route to Russia open.
Given the timeframe and geographic focus I find it odd that he doesn't mention the Battle of the Java Sea. My other reservation is the frequency with which the expressions 'might have', 'could have', and 'would have' crop up. Surely these open up his flank to a carping historian (no such creature!) complaining about speculation.
The book is well produced and written with a plate section containing 26 well-chosen illustrations.
January 20, 2018
A very insightful, thorough book that looks at British naval strategy in the Indian Ocean and the Pacific. It starts pre-war and explains the British naval strategy as well as the factors that impacted the strategy. It runs through 1942, explaining how that strategy changed, played out, and was influenced by key events during this period - the sinking of Force Z, the loss of Singapore, and Nagumo's raid on Ceylon.
If you are looking for a narrative history of the Royal Navy during this period, you will probably be disappointed, but if you are looking for a book that addresses strategy, you will really appreciate this book.
If you are looking for a narrative history of the Royal Navy during this period, you will probably be disappointed, but if you are looking for a book that addresses strategy, you will really appreciate this book.
August 1, 2019
Extremely detailed
Long but very well argued book that challenges much of the conventional narrative on the far East naval war. Quite convincing too. Only complaint is so many footnotes. They gentle author justify his claims but they get in the way of the trading experience.
Long but very well argued book that challenges much of the conventional narrative on the far East naval war. Quite convincing too. Only complaint is so many footnotes. They gentle author justify his claims but they get in the way of the trading experience.
January 19, 2019
Took a little longer for me to finish it. Very academic and dry, but superbly enlightening. Goes over the fluctuations of the british strategies to face the japanese, to protect the indian ocean communications, singapore, the ship building programs, etc etc. Shows, for example, how good the british intel on the japanese developments in 1941 was, their number of aircrafts, the sudden halt of all their merchant fleets, the building of airfields in indochina, the arrival of 100k men in there, and so on and so on.
Also details the diplomacy between the british and the americans, results of the ABC talks, their quite quick agreement on an atlantic first strategy, the americans refusing to safe guard the indian ocean, and them keeping a defensive stance in the pacific, and how the two countries were focused on deterrence strategy, such as with the deployment of b 17's to the philippines
It goes over the whole Force Z plan, and it shows how unlike most accounts, it was the admiralty and not Churchill that had a sudden change of heart by later 1941, and were keen on an offensive stance from Singapore even with the limited resources they would have by december 1941. For most of the years before that, the whole british plan went about a defensive stance in singapore until a reasonable force could arrive, air cover could be guaranteed, and american assistance assured. Despite all the information being available on the strenght of the japanese air and naval forces that could be expected, and all the mediterranean experience, Pound and Phillips pushed for having an eastern fleet on singapore acting offensively, focused on the R class battleships, that were even by their account very outdated, and with minimum air cover.
Also describes the indian ocean raid, how Sommervile reacted to it, and the results of that encounter. In the end Sommervile made some major mistakes, with the intel the attack would occur on april 2, he deployed rather badly to it, and if the japanese attack had indeed happened then he would have been trapped between ceylon and Port T to the southwest (the base of his fleet and not known about by the japanese). It probably would have ended in disaster. However, once the attack didnt come he retired to Port T, but later on would send 3 of his smaller ships, Hermes (the carrier from 1924) and two cruisers, to resume their assignments in ceylon. The japanese attack started on april 5, and they found the three and sunk them. Sommervile put to sea though, and his main fleet was not sighted by the japanese at all, and he came very close to have a night attack upon the japanese carriers. He was perfectly positioned, in air range and without them having a clue, but the intel that arrived to him was then confusing and the attack didnt come through. The chances of success would have been quite good.
The author shows though, that despite the temporally retreat to kenya, the eastern fleet was keen on defending the communications in the indian ocean in 1942. Indeed, Sommervile spent 50% of the time in 1942 acting in and aroud Ceylon. By July the british had three fleet carriers in the fleet and 2 modern battleships, plus 2 R class battleships. By september at the latest the admiralty was planning to have four fleet carriers and six modern or modernized capital ships in the theatre (plus the R class ones). This shows that when the threat was the greatest to the indian ocean, the british focused on defending it first (and weakened the mediterranean quite greatly). However by autumn the british force had diminished to 1 fleet carrier and 1 battleship under Sommervile, and the british did not recover the eastern fleet strenght from mid 1942 until 1944. This was simply because of midway, it took the threat of a full japanese assault through the indian ocean away. With the threat gone the british refocused on the mediterranean, just two months later most british vessels were there to cover Operation Pedestal, and later on Operation torch, which had two thirds of the naval forces being british.
The book also goes over things such as the importance of the persian route to the USSR, the rather distorted views that british shipbuilding was outdated in the 1930s compared to the "height" of british power before WW1 (the author shows that during four years in the 1930s the output was actually greater than all the years preceeding ww1 but 1909, IIRC).
Some good couple dozen meetings are all mentioned, countless names thrown about, so someone not keen on ww2 might get quite a bit confused. The bulk of the book is about the plans, the ways the british took to counter the expected threats world wide, the informations that they had, and etc. The last two chapters proper, some 80 pages, that go over the actual fighting in the indian ocean, and the book stops in the ending of 1942. Id say 5 out of 5 given all the new stuff that i learned, and it does quite a revolutionary assesment on the topic.
Also details the diplomacy between the british and the americans, results of the ABC talks, their quite quick agreement on an atlantic first strategy, the americans refusing to safe guard the indian ocean, and them keeping a defensive stance in the pacific, and how the two countries were focused on deterrence strategy, such as with the deployment of b 17's to the philippines
It goes over the whole Force Z plan, and it shows how unlike most accounts, it was the admiralty and not Churchill that had a sudden change of heart by later 1941, and were keen on an offensive stance from Singapore even with the limited resources they would have by december 1941. For most of the years before that, the whole british plan went about a defensive stance in singapore until a reasonable force could arrive, air cover could be guaranteed, and american assistance assured. Despite all the information being available on the strenght of the japanese air and naval forces that could be expected, and all the mediterranean experience, Pound and Phillips pushed for having an eastern fleet on singapore acting offensively, focused on the R class battleships, that were even by their account very outdated, and with minimum air cover.
Also describes the indian ocean raid, how Sommervile reacted to it, and the results of that encounter. In the end Sommervile made some major mistakes, with the intel the attack would occur on april 2, he deployed rather badly to it, and if the japanese attack had indeed happened then he would have been trapped between ceylon and Port T to the southwest (the base of his fleet and not known about by the japanese). It probably would have ended in disaster. However, once the attack didnt come he retired to Port T, but later on would send 3 of his smaller ships, Hermes (the carrier from 1924) and two cruisers, to resume their assignments in ceylon. The japanese attack started on april 5, and they found the three and sunk them. Sommervile put to sea though, and his main fleet was not sighted by the japanese at all, and he came very close to have a night attack upon the japanese carriers. He was perfectly positioned, in air range and without them having a clue, but the intel that arrived to him was then confusing and the attack didnt come through. The chances of success would have been quite good.
The author shows though, that despite the temporally retreat to kenya, the eastern fleet was keen on defending the communications in the indian ocean in 1942. Indeed, Sommervile spent 50% of the time in 1942 acting in and aroud Ceylon. By July the british had three fleet carriers in the fleet and 2 modern battleships, plus 2 R class battleships. By september at the latest the admiralty was planning to have four fleet carriers and six modern or modernized capital ships in the theatre (plus the R class ones). This shows that when the threat was the greatest to the indian ocean, the british focused on defending it first (and weakened the mediterranean quite greatly). However by autumn the british force had diminished to 1 fleet carrier and 1 battleship under Sommervile, and the british did not recover the eastern fleet strenght from mid 1942 until 1944. This was simply because of midway, it took the threat of a full japanese assault through the indian ocean away. With the threat gone the british refocused on the mediterranean, just two months later most british vessels were there to cover Operation Pedestal, and later on Operation torch, which had two thirds of the naval forces being british.
The book also goes over things such as the importance of the persian route to the USSR, the rather distorted views that british shipbuilding was outdated in the 1930s compared to the "height" of british power before WW1 (the author shows that during four years in the 1930s the output was actually greater than all the years preceeding ww1 but 1909, IIRC).
Some good couple dozen meetings are all mentioned, countless names thrown about, so someone not keen on ww2 might get quite a bit confused. The bulk of the book is about the plans, the ways the british took to counter the expected threats world wide, the informations that they had, and etc. The last two chapters proper, some 80 pages, that go over the actual fighting in the indian ocean, and the book stops in the ending of 1942. Id say 5 out of 5 given all the new stuff that i learned, and it does quite a revolutionary assesment on the topic.
April 13, 2020
The Royal Navy in Eastern Waters is a good book, but it is not a discussion of RN operations in the Indian Ocean and Pacific from 1935-1942. Rather, it’s a well-constructed and convincing argument that the Indian Ocean, necessary for communication with India and Australia, was always a high priority in British war planning, and that Britain planned for and largely, other than for a short window (in no small part due to heavy losses in December 1941 in the Mediterranean and the Far East), was able to provide a credible defence for the area (with US support in other theatres).
The book does examine, in some detail, the near-encounter between the British and Japanese fleets during Operation C in April 1942, but by-and-large the discussion covers pre-war construction and planning, early war planning, strategic factors, intelligence and liaison with the US, then actual deployment to the Indian Ocean and Far East in the lead-up to and after the outbreak of war with Japan.
It is generally very well-researched and well-written, with only a few minor typos. Remarkably easy to read for a work that spends most of its time talking about plans and various committees, which is a credit to the author.
The Royal Navy in Eastern Waters is explicitly written as a ‘counterpoint’ to a ‘declinist’ school of thought on British and Royal Navy capabilities and intentions in the interwar period and during WW2. It’s up-front about this in the introduction, and makes numerous references to this throughout the text, and so is best seen as part of a broader discussion on the subject. It is at its best when discussing the elements of Admiralty and British war planning (which is most of the book). It’s still solid, but not as strong, when it comes to discussing the pros and cons of Somerville’s and Nagumo’s behaviour in the Indian Ocean, with in this reader’s opinion not respecting the impact of the ‘fog of war’ on decision-making.
The book is generally very well balanced (unlike the blurb on Amazon, the book itself is far more honest about the chance of Somerville making a successful night strike on Nagumo’s force). However, on a few occasions Boyd does lean towards overcompensating for the mistakes made by the declinists, particularly (but not only) in the first chapter describing the RN’s rearmament program. Serious errors of judgement by the RN, like not requiring dual-purpose main armament for destroyers, are only mentioned briefly. On the other hand, the author (in this readers’ view) overstates the relative capability of HACS relative to the Mk 37 (although it is understandable that the author pushed this, given the hatchet-job done on RN AA fire control in WW2 in some works).
Because of its focus on planning and priorities, it’s not for everyone (although the quality of writing and discussion is high and accessible), but for those interested in a deeper understanding of British and RN strategy in the Far East (or more broadly) in the first half of WW2, and the importance of the Indian Ocean, it provides an interesting and well-argued perspective.
The book does examine, in some detail, the near-encounter between the British and Japanese fleets during Operation C in April 1942, but by-and-large the discussion covers pre-war construction and planning, early war planning, strategic factors, intelligence and liaison with the US, then actual deployment to the Indian Ocean and Far East in the lead-up to and after the outbreak of war with Japan.
It is generally very well-researched and well-written, with only a few minor typos. Remarkably easy to read for a work that spends most of its time talking about plans and various committees, which is a credit to the author.
The Royal Navy in Eastern Waters is explicitly written as a ‘counterpoint’ to a ‘declinist’ school of thought on British and Royal Navy capabilities and intentions in the interwar period and during WW2. It’s up-front about this in the introduction, and makes numerous references to this throughout the text, and so is best seen as part of a broader discussion on the subject. It is at its best when discussing the elements of Admiralty and British war planning (which is most of the book). It’s still solid, but not as strong, when it comes to discussing the pros and cons of Somerville’s and Nagumo’s behaviour in the Indian Ocean, with in this reader’s opinion not respecting the impact of the ‘fog of war’ on decision-making.
The book is generally very well balanced (unlike the blurb on Amazon, the book itself is far more honest about the chance of Somerville making a successful night strike on Nagumo’s force). However, on a few occasions Boyd does lean towards overcompensating for the mistakes made by the declinists, particularly (but not only) in the first chapter describing the RN’s rearmament program. Serious errors of judgement by the RN, like not requiring dual-purpose main armament for destroyers, are only mentioned briefly. On the other hand, the author (in this readers’ view) overstates the relative capability of HACS relative to the Mk 37 (although it is understandable that the author pushed this, given the hatchet-job done on RN AA fire control in WW2 in some works).
Because of its focus on planning and priorities, it’s not for everyone (although the quality of writing and discussion is high and accessible), but for those interested in a deeper understanding of British and RN strategy in the Far East (or more broadly) in the first half of WW2, and the importance of the Indian Ocean, it provides an interesting and well-argued perspective.
February 13, 2024
An analogy, if I may: if I wrote a history of the defenses of Washington D.C. in the Civil War and said that they were essential to victory because they guarded the capital, that would be true, but deeply misleading. The Confederates never had the numbers or the siege train or a serious opportunity to besiege those fortifications, so just how much their existence was a "linchpin" of Union victory is quite debatable. Ditto the British position in the Indian Ocean.
I'll add a hobbyhorse of mine: the need of modern historians to find scapegoats for Churchill's mistakes. In this case, Dudley Pound. And the treatment here of James Somerville is also appalling. For such a deeply researched work, of such breadth, to fall back on a knee-jerk defense (deference?) of Churchill while serving officers get mercilessly second-guessed shows an inability to think beyond the confines of both conventional wisdom and displays the bad habit of military historians to Monday Morning Quarterback. As a fellow practitioner, I protest.
I'll add a hobbyhorse of mine: the need of modern historians to find scapegoats for Churchill's mistakes. In this case, Dudley Pound. And the treatment here of James Somerville is also appalling. For such a deeply researched work, of such breadth, to fall back on a knee-jerk defense (deference?) of Churchill while serving officers get mercilessly second-guessed shows an inability to think beyond the confines of both conventional wisdom and displays the bad habit of military historians to Monday Morning Quarterback. As a fellow practitioner, I protest.
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