I was expecting to find this book on economic policy rather heavy-going but it is anything but. I found it hard to put down the book. The book is a tour de force. The prose is limpid, witty, ironic; Reddy is a marvelous raconteur.
Three aspects of the book stand out: the melange of economic, social, political, sociological, and administrative forces that marked the post-independence period that spanned Reddy's career; the story of the author's development through his childhood and youth, his years as an administrator, as a policy maker during the period of India's balance of payments crisis in 1991, and as Reserve Bank (RBI) Governor; and the accounts of the accomplishments and foibles of such illustrious Indians as N.T.Rama Rao (NTR), Rangarajan, Jalan, Jaswant Singh, and Chidambaram.
The first aspect relates to the complex web of economic, social, political and administrative narratives that determined developments in Andhra Pradesh, and the country as a whole. The emphasis is on economic policy, particularly the macroeconomic, financial, and regulatory reforms that began in the 1990s and transformed the role of the Reserve Bank and its relationship with the Central Government; but the account is not merely economic, it reveals how economics and politics were intertwined.
The second aspect concerns the author's personal development. he came from middle class rural gentry, had a checkered childhood, was mainly schooled in run-of -the-mill institutions, attended average colleges, and went on to enroll in Osmania University's PhD program. While in graduate school he prepared for the IAS, passed with flying colors, and opted for the Andhra Pradesh cadre, developing a reputation for integrity and for "being difficult," as in his face-offs with landlords in Ongole, and Mr. 10 %, the samiti president in Hyderabad district. However, all the while he was focused on learning and honing his skills, both at home and abroad. One of the highlights of his career was his term as Secretary, Planning, in the government of the colorful actor-politician NTR (and thereby hangs many a tale). During his time with NTR he oscillated between government work and academic pursuits. It was at this time that he realized that the failures of the "state" and the "market" warranted a new approach, with a focus on the evolving interface between the two, as well as on the political economy of India, reflected in the neglect of the interests of ordinary citizens, the "soft state," and the "tyranny of the ten percent" (comprising the industrial houses, the rentier class, and organized labor).
These insights were put to good use when, in September 1990, on the eve of India's balance of payments crisis, he joined the central government's Ministry of Finance and took charge of Balance of Payments matters in the Department of Economic Affairs. A string of poor economic policies (persistent budget and balance of payments deficits, mounting external debt) combined with external shocks and internal political upheavals o precipitate the crisis: the First Gulf war, the steep rise in oil prices, the slow demise of the Soviet Union, frequent changes in the ruling parties in power, and the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi. For Reddy, fate beckoned. In the Finance Ministry and his next incarnation in the Commerce Ministry, he threw himself into the design and implementation of measures to manage the crisis and the reforms that followed (among others severe import compression, negotiations with the IMF, the devising of the dual exchange rate and the subsequent unified exchange, the decision to allow Indian businesses to undertake overseas investments). From being an administrator, Reddy was transformed into a full-fledged policy practitioner-an economic wonk. His efforts did not go unnoticed. In September 1996, he was asked to become a deputy governor in the RBI.
So began his career as a central banker and so began the story of an amazing succession of reforms that he spearheaded while working with two RBI Governors, Rangarajan and Jalan. Some of these reforms helped transform the RBI form an arm of the central government to a more independent federal institution. As deputy governor, he attempted to change the silo culture of the RBI to a more collegial one, initiating greater interaction with stakeholders and specialists in state governments, banks, business, academia, and the money and securities markets. He also worked on reforms that affected the ordinary citizen (the liberalization of gold imports through legal channels and the reform of the draconian Foreign Exchange Regulations) and improved the operations of the RBI (a move away from the automatic monetization of government deficits and the adoption of an objective rule for the sharing of RBI profits with the government, which helped to restore the integrity of the RBI's balance sheet).
As Governor, he broadened the RBI's goals to encompass financial stability, in addition to price stability and growth. To foster financial and exchange rate stability he focused on the capital account, built up foreign exchange reserves, managing the impact of capital flows on inflation through sterilization. To promote price stability, he sought to influence expectations by announcing an indicative, but flexible, inflation target (which riled the Finance Minister). He thought the RBI could foster growth by favoring returns to savers, redirecting credit to agriculture, and pushing to improve the governance of banks by specifying governance standards, emphasizing monitoring to discourage risky banking, and insisting on regulatory compliance. The urban cooperative banks were strengthened; Sahara, a dubious deposit-taking non-banking institution was wound up; and several private banks shaken up. He kept a sharp eye on expansionary global forces, possible asset bubbles, and the overheating of the economy (to the discomfort of the Finance Minister), weighing interest rate increases against other credit tightening measures. Thus India successfully avoided the global contagion of 2008-09. Nevertheless political pressures led to massive waivers of loans to farmers, limited the reform of public sector banks and agricultural cooperative banks, and delayed measures to prevent overheating, so that when Reddy left the Governorship in September 2008, inflation was gaining ground, and despite tightening money and credit policies, credit growth was at a historic high.
The third aspect of the book, which may be of interest to Indian readers, concerns the accounts of NTR, who despite his eccentricities, succeeded in effecting institutional changes that had powerful impacts on economic and social structures in Andhra Pradesh, disrupting patterns of feudal dominance. India has had a series of great RBI Governors. Reddy worked with two of them, Rangarajan and Jalan, and was himself one of the pantheon. Finally he describes his interactions with two Finance Ministers: Jaswant Singh, a gentleman and statesman with a clear vision of the country's future directions; and Chidambaram, a man of eloquence, meticulous attention to detail, quick to grasp the essentials of an argument, and dogged in the pursuit of his ideas.
Throughout the book, what shines through are Reddy's integrity, his plain-speaking, his indomitable urge to learn, and his readiness to seize the day (as witness his advice to Rangarajan, "autonomy is seldom granted. It has to be seized."), and his refusal to be cowed by diversity. In the words of W.H. Auden, Reddy could, when "beleaguered by the same negation and despair, show an affirming flame."