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Toward a General Theory of Human Judgment
This is a reproduction of a book published before 1923. This book may have occasional imperfections such as missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. that were either part of the original artifact, or were introduced by the scanning process. We believe this work is culturally important, and despite the imperfections, have elected to bring it back into print as part of our continuing commitment to the preservation of printed works worldwide. We appreciate your understanding of the imperfections in the preservation process, and hope you enjoy this valuable book.
182 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1951
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October 19, 2024
A BOOK OF THE “METAPHYSICS OF THE HUMAN PROCESS”
Justus Buchler (1914-1991) was an American philosopher, author and professor, who taught at Columbia University and SUNY at Stony Brook.
He wrote in the Preface to the Dover edition of this book [originally published in 1951], “This book… is the original and perhaps still the most desirable entrance to what I have since called a metaphysics of the human process. Its concepts aim to discern the broadest and deepest aspects of human functioning.” (Pg. vii) He said in the original Preface, “I might have described this essay as a metaphysics of utterance, were it not for the mischievous associations of the former term and the narrowness of the provinces suggested by the latter. For me the present title is of equivalent import, and it is probably less offensive if more prosaic. These pages attempt to lay a conceptual foundation for the understanding of such phenomena as symbolism and language, meaning and representation, communication and method.” (Pg. xi)
He explains in the first chapter, “The interplay of the human individual’s activities and dimensions, their unitary direction, constitutes a process which I shall call ‘proception.’ The term is designed to suggest a moving union of seeking and receiving, of forward propulsion and patient absorption. Proception is the composite, directed activity of the individual. Any instance of his functioning, any event in his history enters into the proceptive function.” (Pg. 4)
He states, “When we consider that species of communication wherein an individual alone utilizes and interprets signs, or communicates with himself---I shall call this reflexive communication---we see at once that any attempt to determine an instance of sign-manipulation is relative to some cross section of the proceptive domain… When I speak of ‘reflexive communication’ I am not simply using a verbose equivalent for ‘reflection.’” (Pg. 31)
He says, “The judgments of man are not only commentaries on the world; they are the only devices by which process is arrested and appropriated. They are crystallized manipulations. But they function also to render nature assimilable. The world of judgments is not just nature pictured---the metaphysical difficulty inhering in such an account is notorious---but nature, as it were, in process of self-illumination. Judgment, however, is more than the vehicle by which life distinctively human is made possible. It is the means by which nature allows the individual to transcend himself. Through each product the individual is literally multiplied. In reflexive communication he multiplies the dimensions of his individuality.” (Pg. 52-53)
He observes, “Philosophy effects a distinctive realization: that the categorical struggle to encompass structures of indefinitely greater breadth is both inevitable and valid. The philosopher comes to see that one perspective can excel or embrace but not annul another. Those who are most truly liberated by the philosophic spirit are likely to be most subject to the compulsion of other philosophies.” (Pg. 81)
He points out, “it is a simple fact that meh err, but the correlative fact to be associated with the notion of perspective is that men can be and usually are ignorant of the properties of their own perspectives. The most, then, that can be said---although it is extremely important, and far different from the view that no one can judge erroneously---is that for ANY judgment SOME validating perspective can be determined or defined.” (Pg. 158-159)
He asserts, “it is sometimes asserted by theists that certain types of explanatory apparatus like that of science … are unfitted to ‘see’ what a theistic perspective would permit us to see, for instance theistic design and contrivance. The problem of evidence is a thorny one… Nor can we ignore the fact that the alleged evidence for theism of one kind or another is psychologically compelling in many perspectives. And yet one thing seems clear. The compulsion effected by experimental investigation is inevitably universal, while the compulsion effected by theistic faith is not. Many of those who share a theistic perspective differ with respect to its implications, and even among those who concur the compulsion is as often as not intermittent and unpredictable.
"The conclusion indicated, whatever its meaning, seems to be that psychological compulsion of the so-called religious type is primarily a function of individual make-up, while experimental compulsion is primarily a function of discoverable relations among natural complexes… There seems, it is true, to be no way by which a moral estimate of science and of universal compulsion can itself be made universal. Theists or scientists themselves may disparage the moral value of science or minimize the significance of its philosophical implications. But there is much less room to deny the differences between the perspectives of sanguine theology and the experimental spirit.” (Pg. 162-163)
He asks, “How is it possible to show that the progressive faith of the scientific attitude is superior to blind or partisan faith? One elementary consideration imposes itself… that the term ‘superior’ cannot be used by itself but always requires the qualification ‘in such-and-such a respect.’ The expression ‘superior in all respects is nonsense… When we specify the moral or other grounds for judgments of superiority we are identifying a perspective in terms of which the value in question is affirmed. Superior ‘to me’ means ‘in my proceptive domain.’ … ‘Superior to far as I can see’ may tacitly refer to the floating rather than to the gross domain.” (Pg. 165)
He suggests, “Reason is a form of love, as love (in an equally just perspective) is a form of reason. It is love of inventive communication. Nothing is more foundational for all value than query, and reason is devotion to query.” (Pg. 198)
This “forgotten” book still has value for contemporary students of philosophy.
Justus Buchler (1914-1991) was an American philosopher, author and professor, who taught at Columbia University and SUNY at Stony Brook.
He wrote in the Preface to the Dover edition of this book [originally published in 1951], “This book… is the original and perhaps still the most desirable entrance to what I have since called a metaphysics of the human process. Its concepts aim to discern the broadest and deepest aspects of human functioning.” (Pg. vii) He said in the original Preface, “I might have described this essay as a metaphysics of utterance, were it not for the mischievous associations of the former term and the narrowness of the provinces suggested by the latter. For me the present title is of equivalent import, and it is probably less offensive if more prosaic. These pages attempt to lay a conceptual foundation for the understanding of such phenomena as symbolism and language, meaning and representation, communication and method.” (Pg. xi)
He explains in the first chapter, “The interplay of the human individual’s activities and dimensions, their unitary direction, constitutes a process which I shall call ‘proception.’ The term is designed to suggest a moving union of seeking and receiving, of forward propulsion and patient absorption. Proception is the composite, directed activity of the individual. Any instance of his functioning, any event in his history enters into the proceptive function.” (Pg. 4)
He states, “When we consider that species of communication wherein an individual alone utilizes and interprets signs, or communicates with himself---I shall call this reflexive communication---we see at once that any attempt to determine an instance of sign-manipulation is relative to some cross section of the proceptive domain… When I speak of ‘reflexive communication’ I am not simply using a verbose equivalent for ‘reflection.’” (Pg. 31)
He says, “The judgments of man are not only commentaries on the world; they are the only devices by which process is arrested and appropriated. They are crystallized manipulations. But they function also to render nature assimilable. The world of judgments is not just nature pictured---the metaphysical difficulty inhering in such an account is notorious---but nature, as it were, in process of self-illumination. Judgment, however, is more than the vehicle by which life distinctively human is made possible. It is the means by which nature allows the individual to transcend himself. Through each product the individual is literally multiplied. In reflexive communication he multiplies the dimensions of his individuality.” (Pg. 52-53)
He observes, “Philosophy effects a distinctive realization: that the categorical struggle to encompass structures of indefinitely greater breadth is both inevitable and valid. The philosopher comes to see that one perspective can excel or embrace but not annul another. Those who are most truly liberated by the philosophic spirit are likely to be most subject to the compulsion of other philosophies.” (Pg. 81)
He points out, “it is a simple fact that meh err, but the correlative fact to be associated with the notion of perspective is that men can be and usually are ignorant of the properties of their own perspectives. The most, then, that can be said---although it is extremely important, and far different from the view that no one can judge erroneously---is that for ANY judgment SOME validating perspective can be determined or defined.” (Pg. 158-159)
He asserts, “it is sometimes asserted by theists that certain types of explanatory apparatus like that of science … are unfitted to ‘see’ what a theistic perspective would permit us to see, for instance theistic design and contrivance. The problem of evidence is a thorny one… Nor can we ignore the fact that the alleged evidence for theism of one kind or another is psychologically compelling in many perspectives. And yet one thing seems clear. The compulsion effected by experimental investigation is inevitably universal, while the compulsion effected by theistic faith is not. Many of those who share a theistic perspective differ with respect to its implications, and even among those who concur the compulsion is as often as not intermittent and unpredictable.
"The conclusion indicated, whatever its meaning, seems to be that psychological compulsion of the so-called religious type is primarily a function of individual make-up, while experimental compulsion is primarily a function of discoverable relations among natural complexes… There seems, it is true, to be no way by which a moral estimate of science and of universal compulsion can itself be made universal. Theists or scientists themselves may disparage the moral value of science or minimize the significance of its philosophical implications. But there is much less room to deny the differences between the perspectives of sanguine theology and the experimental spirit.” (Pg. 162-163)
He asks, “How is it possible to show that the progressive faith of the scientific attitude is superior to blind or partisan faith? One elementary consideration imposes itself… that the term ‘superior’ cannot be used by itself but always requires the qualification ‘in such-and-such a respect.’ The expression ‘superior in all respects is nonsense… When we specify the moral or other grounds for judgments of superiority we are identifying a perspective in terms of which the value in question is affirmed. Superior ‘to me’ means ‘in my proceptive domain.’ … ‘Superior to far as I can see’ may tacitly refer to the floating rather than to the gross domain.” (Pg. 165)
He suggests, “Reason is a form of love, as love (in an equally just perspective) is a form of reason. It is love of inventive communication. Nothing is more foundational for all value than query, and reason is devotion to query.” (Pg. 198)
This “forgotten” book still has value for contemporary students of philosophy.
July 11, 2014
A fascinating, if arduous slog through ideas that bridge Charles Perice and Matthew Lipman.
Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews