"The best and most vivid account of the German collapse." Hugh Trevor-Roper, The Sunday Times
“Ambitiously enough this volume was begun with a threefold object — to tell the story of the defeat of the German Wehrmacht in the West, to suggest some of the causes that brought about that defeat, and finally to show how men, both great and small, react to the overwhelming, psychological experience of defeat itself.”
Milton Shulman’s Defeat in the West is a detailed and thorough account of the reasons behind Germany’s loss of World War 2.
Among these reasons, Shulman firmly places the responsibility for the magnitude of lost lives at the feet of Adolf Hitler. A combination of the Fuhrer’s military ineptness, his refusal to take advice and his unique position of power made victory in WWII much less likely for Germany.
Shulman also gives an account of the major military mistakes made by the German Army — beginning a war with Russia on the eastern front, declaring war on the U.S., and the decisive losses in North Africa.
Defeat in the West is an important addition to WWII military history and a must-read for those interested in the subject.
“An evaluation of the causes of German defeat, analyzed from interrogations of senior German officers, and a pre-D-day study of the German army, by an officer of the Intelligence Staff of the First Canadian Army.” Kirkus Reviews
"His account of the strange relations between Hitler and the German General Staff is most revealing." The Canadian Historical Review
"The sources that he has utilized are impressive. They consist essentially of Anglo-American intelligence summaries, which often incorporated captured German documents, of the published records of the Nuremberg Trial, and of his own and other interrogations of German officers." Saturday Review
Milton Shulman (1 September 1913 – 24 May 2004) was a Canadian author, film and theatre critic. He joined the Canadian Army in 1944 as a major and by the war's end he was an intelligence officer with the First Canadian Army. He interviewed many of the captured German generals in the following months and years including Gerd von Rundstedt and Kurt Meyer. As a result of these interviews he wrote the classic Second World War military history Defeat in the West.
Ez a könyv részben háborús munka, ami Normandiától a német vereségig követi végig a nyugati front eseményeit, részben pedig elmekórtani tanulmány: hogyan lehetséges, hogy szakképzett, profi tisztek hagyták magukat ide-oda ugráltatni egy látványosan beszámíthatatlan békagyík által, aki tulajdonképpen tizedesi rangnál magasabb rendfokozatot nem is tudott felmutatni. A maga korlátozott céljait Shulman tökéletesen teljesíti, bár néhol leegyszerűsítő, néhol sematikus, és ami azt illeti, lényegesen több térképmellékletet is el tudtam volna viselni. Legnagyobb erénye, hogy forrásként felhasználja a német hadvezetés krémjével készített személyes interjúkat, így mintegy belülről-közelről látjuk a Wermacht totális összeomlásának dübörgő crescendóját. (Ezt úúúúgy le akartam írni…) Sajnos az utolsó oldalon belefutottam egy shulman-i gondolatba, miszerint a tény, hogy a 2003-as iraki háború idején a németek szembehelyezkedtek az amerikai-brit koalícióval, arra engedtet következtetni, hogy birodalmi ambícióikat még nem adták fel. No, hát ez a marhaság akkora gyomrosként ért, lendületből le is csippentettem fél csillagot. Pedagógiailag. Amúgy fontos és érdekes könyv.
For a book this dated I was pleasantly surprised at how good it was. An analysis of the campaigns in the west (1944-45) from the perspective of the German struggle. Complete and utter collapse - absolute defeat - significantly due to the total power and paranoia of Hitler. Just why the German officer corps stuck with him for so long is also addressed by the author. An interesting read.
This is a book written fairly quickly after the war and heavily based on interviews and documents from the German Generals who were left that had defended the West. As a result, it is a bit slanted in perspective, and it makes some assumptions that I would consider invalid.
The most critical assumptions are that the Germans had opportunities to win the war that they failed to exploit. The first of these "opportunities" that it addresses is the failure to destroy the BEF at Dunkirk. Maybe that was an opportunity lost, but there is nothing to indicate that doing so would have won the war for Germany. The second of these "opportunities" was the failure to invade England, which seems a bit ridiculous. Where was Germany supposed to come up with the naval capabilities to actually run a cross-channel amphibious operation? Operation Overlord in 1944 demonstrated just how time-consuming and difficult such an operation was - what gives any indication that Germany had the resources to conduct such an operation in 1940? The third "opportunity" or mistake was attacking the Soviet Union. And while I certainly agree that was a mistake, I don't see that not doing so would have won the war for Germany. And so on - Gibralter, Crete, the USA, El Alamein, etc. ... the assumptions are made that Germany could have won the war, and I'm not sure that is actually a set of valid assumptions, depending on how you define "won the war". It certainly was not a valid assumption if we go by Hitler's goals, his requirement for "lebensraum".
The book also goes into very extensive detail about the overview of the campaigns in the west - always crediting the Allied Generals as smarter, better, etc. - something we know now that isn't really accurate - the Allied Generals made lots of mistakes, and got their share of luck (as did the Germans). Not all the blame lays at Hitler's feet (although certainly a lot does).
Worth reading (especially the first section), but important to remember what the sources are (captured German Generals looking to blame the dead for their own failures for the most part), and that it was written just after WWII, so it isn't exactly a critical viewpoint.
This is an interesting book, but probably not a good choice if you are looking for a comprehensive WWII book. It is both dated (both good and bad), and not comprehensive. It focuses on the European theater, and only the Western Front of that theater. You will hear about the Soviets ("Russians" in the book) but will not follow them. The first couple chapters and the last chapter are probably a good enough read for most people, as it gives the author's general remarks. Since he had interviewed many German generals and German military officers, and had firsthand knowledge of the Western Front, the book is a good way to see the point of view shortly after the end of WWII. Given the short period of time, you can see what people thought at the time, rather than a more detached view that you can see in works on WWII that were produced more recently. Overall, it gives a good structure (and one way) of understanding how Germany lost WWII.
As I said, it's almost more interesting as a window to how people viewed WWII in the past, than as a WWII history guide. It covers battles fine, but I wouldn't consider it riveting reading. It's also interesting to see that Shulman expected Germany to remain economically weak, given the Wirtschaftswunder (German economic miracle) that followed, and how Germany would change from a society structured under the Nazis to a strongly democratic nation today. It just proves how hard it is to predict the future.
This is more like two-and-a-half stars, but I couldn't bring myself to rate it as low as I did The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany. It’s not of much value to the serious scholar, but it makes a decent factual introduction for the lay reader or hobbyist. It challenges some of the common myths about the Wehrmacht, although without examining motivations with much depth. It’s OK, in short.
The best part of the book is probably the introduction by Sir Ian Jacob, written for the 1947 edition. In it, he acknowledged that it was too early for “definitive volumes” on the Germany army to be produced, and that historians will have a monumental wealth of information to sift through for decades in the German archives. Why put out a book so early? Because, Sir Ian tells us, “the world does not stand still,” and people want to know what is known about the German high command at the earliest possible opportunity. Hence, he advises taking this as an “interim study,” until better books are written. He also quite accurately predicts the growth of the “myth of the clean Wehrmacht” and hopes that books such as this one, written from the allied side based on intelligence reports and interviews with German officers in prison, will help to stave off its post-War glorification.
This, however, serves to call into question Ballantine’s mercenary decision to publish a new edition in 1968. By this time, scholars were getting a handle on the material, and works published that challenged older perceptions far more effectively. Milton Shulman, to his credit, did revise his original text in light of spending more time with the documentation he had produced for the original, and apparently correcting some inaccuracies that had been found in the interim, but by and large, this text carries with it the attitudes and perceptions of an immediate post-War analysis, even going so far as to refer to Hitler as a “paper hanger.”
Why this edition, then? In the 1960s, in the wake of Cornelius Ryan’s success with The Longest Day, there was increasing demand for World War II nostalgia materials and popular military history. And, to be fair, compared with the bulk of that material, Shulman’s work is at least based on direct contact with primary sources. Shulman had worked with Canadian military intelligence, and he interviewed several of the most important leaders himself. Sometimes what they said is of interest, as in the rather harsh portrait given of Erwin Rommel by Franz Halder and other associates. As opposed to the honorable, almost knightly image in many popular military history books, here Rommel emerges as brash and foolhardy, someone who sacrificed men in the pursuit of his own glory. Shulman must be credited, at least, with presenting a controversial view.
I would still tend to guard against recommending this book, when so much else has been written about the war and the German command, but it may be worth seeking out for those interested in tracing its popular historiography.
Thousands of books have been written about World War II and I've read quite a few. However, this book stands out amongst them. The author was part of the team that interviewed German POWs and heard their side of the story about World War II. We get to hear the views of many high-ranking German military officers about their plans, the actions they took, and the reasons why they failed in the West. The interviews alone are worth the price of this book as the experiences are still fresh in the minds of the German POWs -- experiences that aren't colored by time or revisionist historians.
This is a remarkable study of Germany's defeat in the West and a worthy addition to any history or military buff's collection.
PS: As we marched closer and closer to May 1945, I couldn't help but to notice the utter helplessness I felt while reading this book. One could almost feel the final death spasms of the Wehrmacht as the Allies pressed forward. By the end of the book, I felt as exhausted and as beaten as the Wehrmacht. Not sure if that was the author's intent but it adds an emotional and real impact to the book.
PPS: The casualty and surrender statistics in this book boggle the mind. On average, the Wehrmacht was losing thousands of soldiers a day...A DAY...to the Allies -- either as POWs, wounded, or dead. The numbers are quite stunning.
Probably written too soon after WWII. (The author obvioulsy was ignorant of Ultra when condeming German decision making process and praising the genius of the allied command.) But be that as it may, the author has an obvious hard on for the German Officer Corps, claiming the war was essentially lost because of their ignorance, fear and discipline. He dismisses over whelming allied material superiority, manpower, technology, geo-political concerns, and his hypocritical admiration for the Red Army and leadership of Stalin, to repeatedly state his over simplified thesis.
On the positive side numerous interesting anecdotes and reports of interviews and letters are included.
The author interviewed top level German generals following the conclusion of the war, and builds upon this to provide the reader with a view from the "other side of the hill" and gives the reader a glimpse into the German perspective of the war, how they fought, how they tried to stay alive when compared to the mentality of the officers in charge and the increasing executions behind the frontline. In addition, the author details why Germany was defeated and argues it was due to old stand military traditions coupled with the shroud of ignorance the German fighting men were kept under by the regime. Despite the positives, and the interesting arguments, the ending of the book indicates that the author has not gotten over the war or his feelings he developed for Germans through it, which leads one to wonder about the bias of the work.
The author certainly did his research, and he had access to perhaps more documents and more players in the Reich than any other. However, Germany's fear of Russia was prophetic, if prophesied by a people who had become as dangerous to the world at that time as Russia. Perhaps the French and the British would have been better advised not to declare war on Germany. As it turned out, France was occupied for four years, Britain lost her empire, and the USSR emerged an evil super power, far more dangerous than Germany was. Most all of the European powers had engaged in savage wars of aggression in the last two thousand years. Today, Germany is one of America's most trusted allies. Prophecy is a very difficult, and often inaccurate art.
I will grudgingly accept that this book was written in 1947 and republished in 2017. However as informative as it is from the German perceptive this author leaves out one very important fact. The Wehrmacht not only sanctioned but actively precipitated in the Holocaust. There is almost no mention of this fact. A fact that was well known in 1947 but was, by this time, being swept under the rug because no one wanted to hear or read of it. There were bigger fish to fry by this time. Namely getting Nazi scientists, who were also war criminals, out of Germany and into the United States before Russia could get them. A good look from a war stand point but even in 1947 the entire truth should have been told.
The author was one of the Allied interrogators who interviewed captured German officers at the end of World War II. Shulman's account of the war on the Western Front reflects the perspectives of these interviews, and offers an interesting inside look at the snake pit that was Hitler's high command. The work suffers from a few flaws, as the author allows the anger and contempt he clearly felt towards the Germans (understandable for a British officer writing in 1946) to affect his analysis. Shulman also did not have the benefit of later historians with full access to military and intelligence archives, so his work is best regarded as an early, partial take on the problems that later historians were able to tackle much more comprehensively.
I have read a good many books about WW2. This book is one of the best I have read that allows a general reader to easily follow the flow of the “Big Picture”of events without getting bogged down by too much unit data and push-pull detail of unit action and movement.
With small personal asides, the author keeps your interest, revealing comments made by the principles, mostly German, whom he interviewed immediately after the war. Many books that attempt to describe the strategic choices made and some of the tactical moves get bogged down in too much detail. This book weaves its way through these obstacles in an engaging manner, making this an enjoyable read.
Excellent book on Germany`s struggle to control the areas of France and Western Europe won in 1940.In this overview the causes are laid out to Hitler, discipline, and ignorance. The tomb is divided into two books, which are then divided into parts and chapters. Book one is The Road To Defeat, and the second is Defeat In The West.
In book one the conquest of France, etc is closely considered, then numerous German errors are covered, then the Allied invasion is examined, followed by the decline and demise of the German army in the west.
Great book, easy to read, and lots to think about. AD2
I found this to be an excellent account of the WWII battle in the west, from an allied perspective. I hadn't previously read of the campaign in detail so this provided me with a more thorough picture of the allies success and the German miscalculations. Of course, the book is dated and opinionated, written soon after the war's end. But it provided this reader with an understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the German effort.
A thorough history of the German WWII General staff. Basically, they sold their souls to Hitler and once captured by him their own loyalties and goals created their ultimate demise. The author certainly has his prejudices and these are not hidden. However, much of the book was researched within 1-3 years of the war's end. So emotions were still heated. The author proposes the seeds of Germany's defeat were likely planted by late 1940 and by December 1941 for sure. Overall, a worthy read WWII history enthusiasts.
Though flawed by what I assume is a less than efficient proof reading step after reproduction using optical scanning methods (example: General Jodl, not 'Jodi'), this book provides in one otherwise we'll written place a clothe naive summary of the underlying flaws in the German war effort and nation during WWII.. it does a much better presentation of events on the griund during the period from D-Day to surrender.
This book is well written. It concentrates on the German war strategies which Hitler conceived and insisted be implemented. The horrors of the war on the local population, particularly on the Jewish and other minorities are not dealt with in any manner as this is ostensibly a story of how the forces were dominated by a fear of displaying Hitler and how this led to defeat. A very good read.
This is an easy to read book written right after WWII. It covers mainly the Western theatres of the European war although the author does give a very basic outline of the Ost theatre. I found this to be pleasantly easy to read and covers some of the major battles in depth that is not overwhelming yet surprisingly detailed. The maps I first thought were too simple but they got the job done - kind of like this book. Recommend!
If you want to read an outstanding single volume "Readers Digest" version of this conflict in Europe, this is it. Couldn't put it down. Would have liked to seen more on Patton and Canadian 1st armys action to secure Antwerp, but so be it. Shows little bias I suppose.
I found that this book, being extremely well researched, informed the reader of many aspects of the war of which I had seen little of before. The format and detail provided a superb examination of events whilst maintaining the interest of the reader. An excellent book which I would recommend to others
You keep thinking you know most of World War 2 with Germany. This book clarified the type of men the senior German officers were. Dead set on following orders. Few of these men cared about Hitler, just their personal ambition. I always thought many of these men were better military leaders.
An incredible and very detailed look at the many reasons for the defeat of Nazi Germany in the west. Punctures the myth of the "good" German soldier. Rommel's myth especially withers, as it should. Von Rundsted and Kesslering appears to have been one of the few with any brains at all.
Written soon after the conclusion of the war the book is interesting if you know more than the typical reader. The book does correct some misunderstandings form reading too much quick or cheap history - but also justifies British failures during and after Normandy. A good read
A bit dated for the this era, but useful for anyone seriously interested in WW II. The ending conclusion is now dated and proven wrong. It is very important that people study and remember the why and how the Germans started and the Allies ended it.
A book that young people should read in order to learn that stupidity and power are poor bedfellows.Unfortunately we are still among war mongers and power idiots who drag peaceful people into conflict for no good reason.Unfortunately the USA is one of the worst.They do this by sticking their nose where it does not belong."WHEN THE HELL ARE WE GOING LEARN""
A very interesting read for me, I particularly found fascinating the interviews of german officers shortly after the war and letter extracts from german soldiers in the field during it until the final defeat of the Wehrmacht.
Good, unbiased account of German Army tactics during WWII. Almost nothing about the German navy and Air Force. Written soon after the war it offers suggestions for what to do with post-war Germany.
Very well written and detailed book on the German defeat in the West. The only issue I have with the book is in the authors conclusions in the final chapter yet they are understandable considering when they were written.
A good read ,on a personal note it took me a long time to read as there is so much information to grasp,but saying that it's a very comprehensive book ,enjoyed it no end