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Heidegger's Crisis: Philosophy and Politics in Nazi Germany
"Heidegger's Crisis" shows not only how the Nazis exploited philosophical ideas & used philosophers to gain public acceptance, but also how German philosophers played into the hands of the Nazis. Hans Sluga describes the growth, from WWI onward, of a powerful right-wing movement in German philosophy, in which nationalistic, antisemitic & antidemocratic ideas flourished.
Preface
Heidegger's Moment of Decision
Fichte, Nietzsche & the Nazis
The Politics of Crisis
The German Mission
Nation & Race
The Philosophical Radicals
The Philosophical Conservatives
Ideology after 1933
The True Order Debated
The Aftermath
Notes
Index
Preface
Heidegger's Moment of Decision
Fichte, Nietzsche & the Nazis
The Politics of Crisis
The German Mission
Nation & Race
The Philosophical Radicals
The Philosophical Conservatives
Ideology after 1933
The True Order Debated
The Aftermath
Notes
Index
296 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1993
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Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews
November 23, 2013
I picked up this book primarily because of knowing Thomas Sheehan when he taught at Loyola University Chicago, taking his course on Being and Time and reading some of his materials on Heidegger and the Nazis as well as some other materials related to various streams of thought within the international fascist movement.
The part I most liked about Sluga's work was his simple description of those persons, organizations and journals which became caught up in the Nazi party and state. Contrary to the description given of the book, Sluga treats Nazism as being more than just a right-wing movement. Indeed, he clearly distinguishes between a left and a right wing, the one being more socialist and workerist, the other being more elitist, both in the party as a whole and in terms of its members in the professional of philosophy. This distinction is important. Nazism evolved, changing its character over time and attracting a variety of adherents driven by diverse interests.
I also liked Sluga's overview of how the traditions of German philosophy and its major figures were appropriated or ignored by various Nazi intellectuals. One major objection, though. Sluga tremendously overemphasizes the importance of the doctrine of the eternal return in attempting to differentiate Nietzsche's beliefs from those claiming to appropriate him for National Socialism. While Nietzsche would have abhored the Nazi state and rejected the appropriation of his ideas to their causes, his doctrine of the eternal return, and their rejection of it, would not have been a very important reason. The doctrine was definitely not central to Nietzsche's thinking.
What I didn't like was Sluga's treatment of Heidegger. For one thing, I question how well he understands the philosopher. His prose, usually clear and straightforward, becomes turgid and confusing when he begins to describe Heidegger's thinking--a sign of an only partial understanding. Furthermore, he barely begins to address all of the material available about Heidegger's involvements with Nazism, focusing almost entirely on his rectorial address and a single interview late in life. While the book is appropriately subtitled a survey of "Philosophy and Politics in Nazi Germany" it is misleading to have entitled in "Heidegger's Crisis". Better, more thorough, books about that are available.
The part I most liked about Sluga's work was his simple description of those persons, organizations and journals which became caught up in the Nazi party and state. Contrary to the description given of the book, Sluga treats Nazism as being more than just a right-wing movement. Indeed, he clearly distinguishes between a left and a right wing, the one being more socialist and workerist, the other being more elitist, both in the party as a whole and in terms of its members in the professional of philosophy. This distinction is important. Nazism evolved, changing its character over time and attracting a variety of adherents driven by diverse interests.
I also liked Sluga's overview of how the traditions of German philosophy and its major figures were appropriated or ignored by various Nazi intellectuals. One major objection, though. Sluga tremendously overemphasizes the importance of the doctrine of the eternal return in attempting to differentiate Nietzsche's beliefs from those claiming to appropriate him for National Socialism. While Nietzsche would have abhored the Nazi state and rejected the appropriation of his ideas to their causes, his doctrine of the eternal return, and their rejection of it, would not have been a very important reason. The doctrine was definitely not central to Nietzsche's thinking.
What I didn't like was Sluga's treatment of Heidegger. For one thing, I question how well he understands the philosopher. His prose, usually clear and straightforward, becomes turgid and confusing when he begins to describe Heidegger's thinking--a sign of an only partial understanding. Furthermore, he barely begins to address all of the material available about Heidegger's involvements with Nazism, focusing almost entirely on his rectorial address and a single interview late in life. While the book is appropriately subtitled a survey of "Philosophy and Politics in Nazi Germany" it is misleading to have entitled in "Heidegger's Crisis". Better, more thorough, books about that are available.
November 18, 2024
WERE HEIDEGGER’S ACTIONS SOMEWHAT ‘JUSTIFIED’ BY GERMANY’S HISTORICAL SITUATION?
Philosophy professor Hans Sluga wrote in the Preface to this 1993 book, “What we need in this field is ... [for] both philosophers and politicians to come to understand that their interactions are inevitably shaped by their ongoing historical relation. My book tries to explore these issues by examining the role that philosophy played in Nazi Germany… I will devote considerable time to describing the web of interaction between philosophy and politics in the Nazi period and in the years leading up to it… My account begins with Heidegger’s entry into politics in 1933… I want to show that it … defines a turning point in the relation of German philosophy as a whole to the politics of its time. These developments were accompanied for Heidegger and his colleagues by an acute sense of uncertainty… My intention is to embed the story of Heidegger’s personal crisis in an account of the crisis that enveloped German philosophy in general… I argue .. that historical events should make us rethink the whole question of philosophy’s relation to politics.” (Pg. viii-ix)
He begins the first chapter, “Martin Heidegger’s inauguration as rector of Freiburg University … took place four months after Hitler came to power… the occasion… was largely staged by Heidegger himself and is likely to reveal the private intentions behind his sudden political activism… It was he who chose to express his commitment … as an ‘inauguration,’ an act of augury and divination, a reading of omens, a moment of decision and destiny.” (Pg. 1)
He outlines, “Heidegger’s political engagement raises troubling questions about the connection between his philosophical thought and his political commitment. All attempts to settle them, however, have produced ambivalent results. First of all, the debate has so far been conducted in a factional spirit. Heidegger’s critics have used the historical method to tear at the fabric of his philosophy, and his defenders have sought to insulate the philosophy … from his unfortunate political engagement… The discussion … is also marred by useless moralizing. Some interpreters seem mainly concerned with freeing Heidegger from moral guilt, which others are busy calculating his exact degree of culpability… a third problem … lies in the individualizing and psychologizing direction of the debate. Interpreters speak as if Heidegger’s political engagement were primarily a problem of character and biography… Nothing said so far is meant to deny that there are difficult questions in the Heidegger case. On the contrary, Heidegger’s actions raise very specific questions about the linkage of philosophy and politics. But those questions cannot be answered adequately if we continue in the tracks laid out so far.” (Pg. 5-6)
He reports, “He had begun his rectorial address with the bold assertion of what he called his ‘commitment to the SPIRITUAL leadership of this institution of higher learning.’ … he clearly wanted to link himself to the German idealists for whom spirit (Geist) had been a crucial notion… In appropriating a central term from the political rhetoric of the time… Heidegger was also expressing an acceptance of the essentially undemocratic idea of messianic leadership that the Nazis had made their own. This is evident as well from the fact that he introduced this self-same principle of governance into the university, telling his students that the Führer, Adolf Hitler, alone should be their reality and law. Even after the war, Heidegger expressed antipathy to democratic forms of government.” (Pg. 25)
He notes, “[Nietzsche’s] ‘The Birth of Tragedy’ became a frequently cited text during the Nazi years… For those Nazis who were primarily German nationalists… this early phase was quite naturally of the greatest interest. Nietzsche’s subsequent criticism of all things German, his identification with French culture, his antinationalism and his rejection of antisemitism, were suspect for such readers and difficult to handle.” (Pg. 45)
He points out, “The idea of a great and unique crisis could play its symbolic role in the Nazi system, of course, only because the Germans were ready to accept the idea as a symbol of their condition; they were predisposed to experience their time as a decisive moment… The German sense of crisis in the 1930s was, however, in no way conjectural. Those who possessed it were certain that they were living at a moment of crisis and that it was both unique and of world-historical significance.” (Pg. 64-65)
He suggests, “Given the crimes the Nazis committed against the Jews and other minority groups, it may be difficult to accept that racial theory was for them only a means to justify their belief in German privilege. But unless we credit that, we will not understand why philosophers who had no sympathy for biological racism could feel in tune with the aspirations of National Socialism.” (Pg. 103)
He observes, “It would be easy to … conclude that Heidegger’s political thought is clearly disjointed from his political commitment and that his defenders have been right all along… Such reasoning is too one-sided, however. When Heidegger did finally get politically involved, he himself claimed to have done so in the name of his philosophy, and it is evident … that he was drawing on philosophical concepts and categories to explain his commitment.” (Pg. 138)
He outlines, “Three factors made philosophical engagement with the Nazi worldview problematic. The first and most important was that the worldview itself … claim[ed] for itself part of the function that philosophy previously maintained as its own…. The second factor that made the relation between philosophy and the Nazi worldview problematic was that the latter was philosophical only in the most general sense… The third factor … was that the [Nazi worldview] had its origin in nonphilosophical sources, and so other authorities could claim to be more qualified to speak than the philosophers.” (Pg. 194-195)
He records, “Heidegger responded to [Bruno] Bauch’s assertions with increasingly bitter counterattacks. In 1935 he told the audience in his lectures on metaphysics: ‘The works being peddled about nowadays as the philosophy of National Socialism---but have nothing to do with the inner truth and greatness of this movement (namely the encounter between global technology and modern man)---have all been written by men fishing in the troubled waters of ‘values’ and ‘organic unities.’ … This controversy contributed to Heidegger’s increasing preoccupation with Nietzsche and the question of nihilism.” (Pg. 214-215)
He summarizes, “As time went on, Heidegger became more and more doubtful that National Socialism could fulfill the promise it had once held for him… In his lectures he turned more and more to a critique of technological thinking, and this included a critique of the Nazi system. Even then, however, his criticism remained cautiously veiled behind the curtains of elusive language. Heidegger never denounced Nazism in open terms. He never officially broke with the Nazi system and even in old age could believe that National Socialism had once held the promise of a fruitful encounter with the question of planetary technology---but ‘those people were much too limited in their thinking to gain a really explicit relationship to what is happening today.’” (Pg. 219)
In 1966, “Heidegger had finally agreed to talk [in an interview with Der Spiegel] about his political involvement in 1933… Although friends and former students had often urged Heidegger to speak up about his political past, he had resisted all such suggestions. When he finally agreed to this interview, he did so only on the condition that it would be … kept under lock and key until after his death. Heidegger had always opposed the idea that he should make some kind of public confession, and he was not going to make one now… He also expressed the fear that any statement … might kindle a debate that would stymie his hard-won ability to do philosophical work again… he was most afraid … that such a debate would cause young people to ‘put his books aside with irritation and suspicion .’ Such self-serving justifications of his silence have understandably enraged Heidegger’s critics, and so have the bias and inaccuracies of the account he gave in Der Spiegel… another thing stands out… Heidegger’s determination not to be drawn back into politics. Where he had once asserted the congruence of philosophy and politics, he was now evidently keeping them sharply apart.” (Pg. 234-235)
He concludes, “Heidegger’s actions and inactions in those years were symptomatic of the condition of the whole of German philosophy and, indeed, of the state of German society… To anyone growing up in those years with a sense of curiosity about the recent past, those were familiar and foreseeable evasions. An entire society had devoted itself to the task of forgetting, and the philosophers were only too willing to participate in the communal act of erasure.” (Pg. 244)
This moderately ‘sympathetic’ historical perspective of Heidegger’s actions will appeal to some, but be bitterly rejected by others.
Philosophy professor Hans Sluga wrote in the Preface to this 1993 book, “What we need in this field is ... [for] both philosophers and politicians to come to understand that their interactions are inevitably shaped by their ongoing historical relation. My book tries to explore these issues by examining the role that philosophy played in Nazi Germany… I will devote considerable time to describing the web of interaction between philosophy and politics in the Nazi period and in the years leading up to it… My account begins with Heidegger’s entry into politics in 1933… I want to show that it … defines a turning point in the relation of German philosophy as a whole to the politics of its time. These developments were accompanied for Heidegger and his colleagues by an acute sense of uncertainty… My intention is to embed the story of Heidegger’s personal crisis in an account of the crisis that enveloped German philosophy in general… I argue .. that historical events should make us rethink the whole question of philosophy’s relation to politics.” (Pg. viii-ix)
He begins the first chapter, “Martin Heidegger’s inauguration as rector of Freiburg University … took place four months after Hitler came to power… the occasion… was largely staged by Heidegger himself and is likely to reveal the private intentions behind his sudden political activism… It was he who chose to express his commitment … as an ‘inauguration,’ an act of augury and divination, a reading of omens, a moment of decision and destiny.” (Pg. 1)
He outlines, “Heidegger’s political engagement raises troubling questions about the connection between his philosophical thought and his political commitment. All attempts to settle them, however, have produced ambivalent results. First of all, the debate has so far been conducted in a factional spirit. Heidegger’s critics have used the historical method to tear at the fabric of his philosophy, and his defenders have sought to insulate the philosophy … from his unfortunate political engagement… The discussion … is also marred by useless moralizing. Some interpreters seem mainly concerned with freeing Heidegger from moral guilt, which others are busy calculating his exact degree of culpability… a third problem … lies in the individualizing and psychologizing direction of the debate. Interpreters speak as if Heidegger’s political engagement were primarily a problem of character and biography… Nothing said so far is meant to deny that there are difficult questions in the Heidegger case. On the contrary, Heidegger’s actions raise very specific questions about the linkage of philosophy and politics. But those questions cannot be answered adequately if we continue in the tracks laid out so far.” (Pg. 5-6)
He reports, “He had begun his rectorial address with the bold assertion of what he called his ‘commitment to the SPIRITUAL leadership of this institution of higher learning.’ … he clearly wanted to link himself to the German idealists for whom spirit (Geist) had been a crucial notion… In appropriating a central term from the political rhetoric of the time… Heidegger was also expressing an acceptance of the essentially undemocratic idea of messianic leadership that the Nazis had made their own. This is evident as well from the fact that he introduced this self-same principle of governance into the university, telling his students that the Führer, Adolf Hitler, alone should be their reality and law. Even after the war, Heidegger expressed antipathy to democratic forms of government.” (Pg. 25)
He notes, “[Nietzsche’s] ‘The Birth of Tragedy’ became a frequently cited text during the Nazi years… For those Nazis who were primarily German nationalists… this early phase was quite naturally of the greatest interest. Nietzsche’s subsequent criticism of all things German, his identification with French culture, his antinationalism and his rejection of antisemitism, were suspect for such readers and difficult to handle.” (Pg. 45)
He points out, “The idea of a great and unique crisis could play its symbolic role in the Nazi system, of course, only because the Germans were ready to accept the idea as a symbol of their condition; they were predisposed to experience their time as a decisive moment… The German sense of crisis in the 1930s was, however, in no way conjectural. Those who possessed it were certain that they were living at a moment of crisis and that it was both unique and of world-historical significance.” (Pg. 64-65)
He suggests, “Given the crimes the Nazis committed against the Jews and other minority groups, it may be difficult to accept that racial theory was for them only a means to justify their belief in German privilege. But unless we credit that, we will not understand why philosophers who had no sympathy for biological racism could feel in tune with the aspirations of National Socialism.” (Pg. 103)
He observes, “It would be easy to … conclude that Heidegger’s political thought is clearly disjointed from his political commitment and that his defenders have been right all along… Such reasoning is too one-sided, however. When Heidegger did finally get politically involved, he himself claimed to have done so in the name of his philosophy, and it is evident … that he was drawing on philosophical concepts and categories to explain his commitment.” (Pg. 138)
He outlines, “Three factors made philosophical engagement with the Nazi worldview problematic. The first and most important was that the worldview itself … claim[ed] for itself part of the function that philosophy previously maintained as its own…. The second factor that made the relation between philosophy and the Nazi worldview problematic was that the latter was philosophical only in the most general sense… The third factor … was that the [Nazi worldview] had its origin in nonphilosophical sources, and so other authorities could claim to be more qualified to speak than the philosophers.” (Pg. 194-195)
He records, “Heidegger responded to [Bruno] Bauch’s assertions with increasingly bitter counterattacks. In 1935 he told the audience in his lectures on metaphysics: ‘The works being peddled about nowadays as the philosophy of National Socialism---but have nothing to do with the inner truth and greatness of this movement (namely the encounter between global technology and modern man)---have all been written by men fishing in the troubled waters of ‘values’ and ‘organic unities.’ … This controversy contributed to Heidegger’s increasing preoccupation with Nietzsche and the question of nihilism.” (Pg. 214-215)
He summarizes, “As time went on, Heidegger became more and more doubtful that National Socialism could fulfill the promise it had once held for him… In his lectures he turned more and more to a critique of technological thinking, and this included a critique of the Nazi system. Even then, however, his criticism remained cautiously veiled behind the curtains of elusive language. Heidegger never denounced Nazism in open terms. He never officially broke with the Nazi system and even in old age could believe that National Socialism had once held the promise of a fruitful encounter with the question of planetary technology---but ‘those people were much too limited in their thinking to gain a really explicit relationship to what is happening today.’” (Pg. 219)
In 1966, “Heidegger had finally agreed to talk [in an interview with Der Spiegel] about his political involvement in 1933… Although friends and former students had often urged Heidegger to speak up about his political past, he had resisted all such suggestions. When he finally agreed to this interview, he did so only on the condition that it would be … kept under lock and key until after his death. Heidegger had always opposed the idea that he should make some kind of public confession, and he was not going to make one now… He also expressed the fear that any statement … might kindle a debate that would stymie his hard-won ability to do philosophical work again… he was most afraid … that such a debate would cause young people to ‘put his books aside with irritation and suspicion .’ Such self-serving justifications of his silence have understandably enraged Heidegger’s critics, and so have the bias and inaccuracies of the account he gave in Der Spiegel… another thing stands out… Heidegger’s determination not to be drawn back into politics. Where he had once asserted the congruence of philosophy and politics, he was now evidently keeping them sharply apart.” (Pg. 234-235)
He concludes, “Heidegger’s actions and inactions in those years were symptomatic of the condition of the whole of German philosophy and, indeed, of the state of German society… To anyone growing up in those years with a sense of curiosity about the recent past, those were familiar and foreseeable evasions. An entire society had devoted itself to the task of forgetting, and the philosophers were only too willing to participate in the communal act of erasure.” (Pg. 244)
This moderately ‘sympathetic’ historical perspective of Heidegger’s actions will appeal to some, but be bitterly rejected by others.
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May 29, 2012I found this a philosophically astute and fair-minded study of the interplay between the National Socialist movement and some of the prominent movements and figures of German philosophy in the 1930s. Even if it's a little heavy on the intellectual history, it's not nearly so as it could have been (a fact of which the author is well aware), and the ultimate philosophical questions toward which it points are of enduring interest.
May 5, 2010
Seriously underrated.
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