Enduring the Whirlwind: The German Army and the Russo-German War 1941-1943

Wolverhampton Military Studies

by Gregory Liedtke

Despite the best efforts of a number of historians, many aspects of the ferocious struggle between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union during the Second World War remain obscure or shrouded in myth. One of the most persistent of these is the notion - largely created by many former members of its own officer corps in the immediate postwar period - that the German Army was a paragon of military professionalism and operational proficiency whose defeat on the Eastern Front was solely attributable to the amateurish meddling of a crazed former Corporal and the overwhelming numerical superiority of the Red Army. A key pillar upon which the argument of German numerical-weakness vis-à-vis the Red Army has been constructed is the assertion that Germany was simply incapable of providing its army with the necessary quantities of men and equipment needed to replace its losses. In consequence, as their losses outstripped the availability of replacements, German field formations became progressively weaker until they were incapable of securing their objectives or, eventually, of holding back the swelling might of the Red Army. This work seeks to address the notion of German numerical-weakness in terms of Germany's ability to replace its losses and regenerate its military strength, and assess just how accurate this argument was during the crucial first half of the Russo-German War (June 1941-June 1943). Employing a host of primary documents and secondary literature, it traces the development and many challenges of the German Army from the prewar period until the invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941. It continues on to chart the first two years of the struggle between Germany and the Soviet Union, with a particular emphasis upon the scale of German personnel and equipment losses, and how well these were replaced. It also includes extensive examinations into the host of mitigating factors that both dictated the course of Germany's campaign in the East and its replacement and regeneration capabilities. In contrast to most accounts of the conflict, this study finds that numerical-weakness being the primary factor in the defeat of the Ostheer - specifically as it relates to the strength and condition of the German units involved - has been overemphasized and frequently exaggerated. In fact, Germany was actually able to regenerate its forces to a remarkable degree with a steady flow of fresh men and equipment, and German field divisions on the Eastern Front were usually far stronger than the accepted narratives of the war would have one believe.

Genres: History, World War II, War, Military History, Nonfiction, Military Fiction, European History

608 pages, Kindle Edition

Published September 19, 2016

Reviews

[Al Lock · Rating 4 out of 5]

Very well researched (given the limitations of the records available), very dense historical reconsideration of the German logistics and manpower situation regarding the Eastern Front and the Army of the East for the first two years of the War in the East. The author is basically suggesting that there has been an extensive bias in the histories of that time and place that are unduly impacted by the accounts of German officers post-WWII and that the actual facts show that the failures of the German Army in the East are not so much due to lack of manpower or failures of German industry, but to failures on the battlefield (and also that the Germans actually won on the battlefield far more than they are credited with during that time period).

Although the author does a good job of supporting his point of view in regards to production, he points out himself the limitations of the rail network that was used to support the army in the East. It doesn't really matter if sufficient weapons were produced if they couldn't then get to the units that needed them. I'm not sure that he does as good a job in regards to manpower, as that seems to be a more jumbled mess (in terms of the German records).

Overall, an interesting read, if you are interested in historical detail at this level.

[Dave · Rating 2 out of 5]

Enduring the Whirlwind is a non-fiction book which seeks to lay to rest some of the mythology around the German battle on the Eastern Front. While it doesn't cover any new ground, its contention is that there is a narrative set by previous historians about the Russian's numerical advantage being the primary reason for the Wehrmacht's loss.

I found that Liedtke had a very dry style of writing, and at times it felt more as though it was history written by an accountant. He seeks to counter the traditional narrative by laying out the dates and data for each unit in the front. The result is a very impersonal, and rather tedious read.

While I acknowledge that the author may well have a point, I found that it was somewhat lost amidst the statistics. I think I would have abandoned this book long before I finished if it wasn't an audiobook. I am afraid that this is one for the completists, while readers looking for a more boots-on-the-ground viewpoint should look elsewhere.

[Arya Tabaie · Rating 3 out of 5]

Basically a long wehraboo debunking article. The author argues (with a barrage of statistics) that the German army wasn't this flawless and brilliantly led force that only lost because of how much "Asiatic hordes" were thrown at them or because they were so often micromanaged by a half-mad corporal. In fact, through 1941 and most of 1942, they were able to make good their losses in manpower as well as equipment. Many of the disastrous decisions on the German side furthermore had been made in full agreement between Hitler and his high command. Not only that, but in quite a few cases of disagreement, Hitler was in the right, considering a bigger strategic picture that the narrow minded officers refused to see.

Complaining constantly of German generals corrupting the Western view of the Eastern Front with their self congratulatory post-war memoirs, the author suggests that the chief reasons for Germany's loss were misallocation of resources allocated to rearmament during both the Third Reich and Weimar Republic era, poor military intelligence and smug underestimation of the enemy, poor logistics and that the simple reason that the Red Army was just... better.

This was in all honesty pretty much all I got from the book. If you are like me, interested mainly in general historical aspects of the war and not trying to become a brilliant staff officer 90 years ago, you can save yourself some trouble and just take my word that this dude has done his homework.

[Vladimiro Sousa · Rating 3 out of 5]

I like it. I agree with a critic I read in Goodreads that there are too many numbers presented, which for an audiobook is no simple task to concentrate on the detail they represent. Still, I got a better idea about the situation and the central argument of the book. It is an interesting point and the numbers presented do support the idea. It is not a romance. It is an exercise of sociology doctrine.

[Mark · Rating 5 out of 5]

Interesting review of the data

A strategic overview of the German War in the East. The author discusses if the Germans were so outnumbered as their Post war narratives would like you to believe they were.

[Darren Jonahtan Mc Nelis · Rating 3 out of 5]

Interesting book about how all the stats were set in favour of the Germans at the start of the war but how a badly managed and organised forces can grumble. The book feels like it was written by an accountant with all the dates, times and figures.

Bit an interesting take on it all the same

[hans wempe · Rating 5 out of 5]

Very good

I liked this book very much. Great details about fighting. It reads easy for hours. A great read for everyone.

[Mark · Rating 3 out of 5]

A statistical review of the war in the east up to 1943, the author presents his argument as a challenge to the long held orthodoxy that the Germans lost the war due to numerical deficiencies in men and equipment. Presenting well researched figures the author demonstrates that the army in the East was in fact reconstituted in several occasions, and that generally equipment was in excess of listed requirements on paper.

However, this is also a weakness of the argument, which does not consider whether listed strengths were enough to achieve objectives. Nor are wider strategic and tactical issues considered in assessing the failures of the campaigns.

This is an interesting read that should be considered as part of the narrative of the eastern front, but those looking for an overview of battles and soldiers’ experience will need to look elsewhere.

[Rachel · Rating 4 out of 5]

Rather dry read

This is basically about the material and personnel numbers and supply of the German Aries in the Eastern theatre of WWII. Some numbers of the Russian armies are also included. Just the nature of the book's subject matter lend to being a dry read. It actually has facts and analyze I have not read before and found interesting such as how the Germans supplied so much material and personnel so quickly and the problem with rail transport. Just for that reason I have an extra star.

[Nick Cowan · Rating 3 out of 5]

Awkward one, the prologue states that the problem with the analysis of the eastern front is that it basically runs along the idea that the russians didn't win, the nazis lost, and that this gives too little credit to the russians. However, the book then spends the whole time taking about how the nazis where complacent, struggled with supply lines and were able to field massive armies in relatively ahort times and then pull them back... so the book doesn't quite live up to its goal.

[Steve Barney · Rating 3 out of 5]

I did gain a different perspective with regard to the German - Russian battles of the east in World War 2 over what is normally prescribed. That is, the German forces and leadership were not necessarily superior in their tactics and ability to fight than the Russians. That the only reason they lost was due to the overwhelming size of the Russian army, and a crazy Hitler dictating poor strategy. Instead the author points out that a lot of that history has been tainted as it was primarily obtained from German accounts, since information was not forth coming from Russia immediately after the war and longer term due to the Cold War.

It is a very persuasive argument that he certainly gives data to support and prove. But there in also lies my reason for not enjoying the book all that much.

The author painstakingly lists statists of losses of troops and equipment for every encounter and for various dates. Then lists statistics of German production of war materials and recruitment of additional soldiers for numerous dates. He’s proving that the Germans had the manpower and material to win. But wow, the detail. I mean dozens of lists dozens of times throughout the book of how many men were killed, wounded, captured, or missing for each side. How many rifles were lost, how many tanks, large howitzers, small howitzers, motorcycles, other vehicles, small mortars, large mortars, of each type of machine guns. Then how many of those (again, by each item) were resupplied each time. On and on and on. Proved too much for me.

[LorenzoFrijters · Rating 4 out of 5]

Very well written book that thoroughly uncovers some wrong preconceptions about the German Army in WW2.