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Furchtbare Juristen: Die Unbewältigte Vergangenheit Unserer Justiz
Traducción de Carlos Armando Figueredo.
¿Qué pasa cuando la justicia deja de ser independiente y se hace política? ¿Qué ocurre cuando la justicia se pliego a los amos del poder en un país?
En la Alemania nazi cuando la "justicia" se plegó a los amos del poder, millones de seres humanos murieron en una guerra absurda y fueron perseguidos, martirizados y asesinados seis o siete millones de ciudadanos, hombres, mujeres y niños inocentes. Centenares de miles de seres humanos fueron condenados por jueces y fiscales que actuaban, aparentemente, bajo el imperio de la Ley.
Los juristas del horror, de Ingo Müller, es un libro que todo ser humano debería leer para que nunca más la justicia de politice y se coloque en situación de servilismo frente a un Poder Ejecutivo intransigente y antidemocrático. No hay justificación alguna para que en nombre de una revolución se le haga tanto daño a los seres humanos.
Ha sido un best seller en Alemania, Inglaterra y Estados Unidos.
¿Qué pasa cuando la justicia deja de ser independiente y se hace política? ¿Qué ocurre cuando la justicia se pliego a los amos del poder en un país?
En la Alemania nazi cuando la "justicia" se plegó a los amos del poder, millones de seres humanos murieron en una guerra absurda y fueron perseguidos, martirizados y asesinados seis o siete millones de ciudadanos, hombres, mujeres y niños inocentes. Centenares de miles de seres humanos fueron condenados por jueces y fiscales que actuaban, aparentemente, bajo el imperio de la Ley.
Los juristas del horror, de Ingo Müller, es un libro que todo ser humano debería leer para que nunca más la justicia de politice y se coloque en situación de servilismo frente a un Poder Ejecutivo intransigente y antidemocrático. No hay justificación alguna para que en nombre de una revolución se le haga tanto daño a los seres humanos.
Ha sido un best seller en Alemania, Inglaterra y Estados Unidos.
319 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1987
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373 people want to read
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February 1, 2025
Justice Robert Utter, one of my heroes, encouraged me to read this book and credits it as prompting him to resign from the Washington State Supreme Court. https://www.sos.wa.gov/legacy/stories.... He could no long stomach tinkering with the machinery of death; of being a willing participant in administering power whose morality he doubted. I have meant to read it for many years. The fact Justice Utter’s span draws short finally inspired me to do it.
It is a very troubling book about men who participated in a great evil as its willing and often eager accomplices. There are a few moments of grace; of people who said no, but very few and very ineffectual. An attorney who simply refused to vote for the Nazi party in the mid 1930s was disbarred. (66).
But very, very few. Muller clearly has no patience for the idea that attorneys and judges were unwilling participants in a great evil. As early as 1933, courts were solemnly embracing the principle that some people weren’t people. For example, in a civil case about whether a director became civilly dead to justify voiding his contract with a studio, the court observed: “The earlier (liberal) view of personal rights made no fundamental distinction among human beings on the basis or sameness or difference in blood . . . According to the National Socialist world view, however, only individuals of German heritage (and those placed on an equal legal footing with them) should be treated as persons with full legal rights within the German Reich.’” (116).
The courts were also happy to remove children because the state did not like their parents’ ideology. “The Petty Court of Berlin-Lichterfeld found that ‘the danger posed to children by a Communistic or atheistic upbringing warrants their removal from their parents,’ while the Petty Court of Wilster put into a state home all children whose fathers had not sent them to join the Hitler Youth, since ‘anyone keeping his children out of the Hitler Youth . . . is abusing his parental authority.”’ (139).
One of the creepiest things in the book was a reproduction of a bill sent to the family of an executed man:
(149). As someone who has worked on Legal Financial Obligations cases, this is supremely creepy. Though I cannot imagine we’d bill the survivors for their relative’s execution.
So much of this book was creepy because it’s like a crazy house mirror of reflections of things closer to home. For example, “On December 12, 1941, Hitler decreed that “persons accused of acts posing a threat to the security of occupying troops were either to be executed within a week or deported to Germany with the utmost secrecy, and without being given any opportunity to inform their relatives. . . . It was generally referred to as the ‘Night and Fog Decree’ (or “Night and Fog Order”) – an appropriate name, since in German the common phrase ‘by night and fog’ (bei Nacht und Nebel) suggests clandestine and illicit action, as well as the fact that kidnapped prisoners were supposed to vanish without a trace. In official correspondence, they were always referred to as “NN prisoners”: the abbreviation stood both for the prisoners under the Nacht und Nebel decree and for the Latin phrase non nominator (‘not named’), because their identity was not to be disclosed.” (170). I learned recently from Justice Charles Johnson that in the early days in my own progressive state, police departments often would have prisoners they would not admit they had; not to the prisoner’s family; not to the prisoner’s lawyers. Can’t get a habeas writ to order the production of a non nominator; these people disappeared. It’s not what the Nazis did. But it’s not so far away either.
Slightly further way from Pugetopia, but not nearly far enough, is torture and the proper response to those who torture on behalf of the state. He quotes at length from the minutes of a meeting at the Ministry of Justice and the Gestapo, June 4, 1937. ‘“It has been recognized by government leaders at the highest levels that more rigorous interrogations are necessary and indispensable. In such cases, it would be nonsensical to prosecute the officers carrying out the interrogation for exceeding their authority. However, public prosecutors must carry out the letter of the law and have no possibility of choosing to prosecute or not as they may judge fit. . . .
I’ve read the Bybee memo, where now-Judge Bybee articulated a legal justification for torture. It’s horrifying. We tortured. It’s what we did. And justified doing in dry legalistic language. The woman who trained me to do my job now works for Judge Bybee. And Nazi judges were hired back after the Reich fell. As the author said with admirable dryness, “In appointing Nazi jurists to new positions after the war, those responsible often showed a lack of tact.” (215).
This book is relentless. It is not like Hannah Ardent’s Eichmann in Jerusalem; it is not a deep moral meditation on how evil flourishes among normal people, caught up in some grand evil. It’s more like a relentless set of rigorously arranged set of index cards, detailing evil things done by judges and lawyers. Paragraph by paragraph, page by page. Until they couldn’t do it any more, and retired, and took their pensions.
Well worth the time.
P.S.: Great article on Justice Utter: http://www.theolympian.com/2014/02/17...
It is a very troubling book about men who participated in a great evil as its willing and often eager accomplices. There are a few moments of grace; of people who said no, but very few and very ineffectual. An attorney who simply refused to vote for the Nazi party in the mid 1930s was disbarred. (66).
But very, very few. Muller clearly has no patience for the idea that attorneys and judges were unwilling participants in a great evil. As early as 1933, courts were solemnly embracing the principle that some people weren’t people. For example, in a civil case about whether a director became civilly dead to justify voiding his contract with a studio, the court observed: “The earlier (liberal) view of personal rights made no fundamental distinction among human beings on the basis or sameness or difference in blood . . . According to the National Socialist world view, however, only individuals of German heritage (and those placed on an equal legal footing with them) should be treated as persons with full legal rights within the German Reich.’” (116).
The courts were also happy to remove children because the state did not like their parents’ ideology. “The Petty Court of Berlin-Lichterfeld found that ‘the danger posed to children by a Communistic or atheistic upbringing warrants their removal from their parents,’ while the Petty Court of Wilster put into a state home all children whose fathers had not sent them to join the Hitler Youth, since ‘anyone keeping his children out of the Hitler Youth . . . is abusing his parental authority.”’ (139).
One of the creepiest things in the book was a reproduction of a bill sent to the family of an executed man:
Sample itemized bill sent to prisoner’s relatives:
Item_____________Marks_____Pfennigs
Death Sentence Fee____300
Mailing costs________2________70
Fee for attorney______81________60
(149). As someone who has worked on Legal Financial Obligations cases, this is supremely creepy. Though I cannot imagine we’d bill the survivors for their relative’s execution.
So much of this book was creepy because it’s like a crazy house mirror of reflections of things closer to home. For example, “On December 12, 1941, Hitler decreed that “persons accused of acts posing a threat to the security of occupying troops were either to be executed within a week or deported to Germany with the utmost secrecy, and without being given any opportunity to inform their relatives. . . . It was generally referred to as the ‘Night and Fog Decree’ (or “Night and Fog Order”) – an appropriate name, since in German the common phrase ‘by night and fog’ (bei Nacht und Nebel) suggests clandestine and illicit action, as well as the fact that kidnapped prisoners were supposed to vanish without a trace. In official correspondence, they were always referred to as “NN prisoners”: the abbreviation stood both for the prisoners under the Nacht und Nebel decree and for the Latin phrase non nominator (‘not named’), because their identity was not to be disclosed.” (170). I learned recently from Justice Charles Johnson that in the early days in my own progressive state, police departments often would have prisoners they would not admit they had; not to the prisoner’s family; not to the prisoner’s lawyers. Can’t get a habeas writ to order the production of a non nominator; these people disappeared. It’s not what the Nazis did. But it’s not so far away either.
Slightly further way from Pugetopia, but not nearly far enough, is torture and the proper response to those who torture on behalf of the state. He quotes at length from the minutes of a meeting at the Ministry of Justice and the Gestapo, June 4, 1937. ‘“It has been recognized by government leaders at the highest levels that more rigorous interrogations are necessary and indispensable. In such cases, it would be nonsensical to prosecute the officers carrying out the interrogation for exceeding their authority. However, public prosecutors must carry out the letter of the law and have no possibility of choosing to prosecute or not as they may judge fit. . . .
Question 1: For which offenses are more rigorous interrogations permissible?
There was general agreement that, in principle, interrogations of this kind may be undertaken in cases where charges involve the immediate interests of the state. These are chiefly treason and high treason. Representatives of the Gestapo expressed the opinion that a more rigorous interrogation could also be considered in cases of Jehovah’s Witnesses, explosives, and sabotage.”’ (178-79).
I’ve read the Bybee memo, where now-Judge Bybee articulated a legal justification for torture. It’s horrifying. We tortured. It’s what we did. And justified doing in dry legalistic language. The woman who trained me to do my job now works for Judge Bybee. And Nazi judges were hired back after the Reich fell. As the author said with admirable dryness, “In appointing Nazi jurists to new positions after the war, those responsible often showed a lack of tact.” (215).
This book is relentless. It is not like Hannah Ardent’s Eichmann in Jerusalem; it is not a deep moral meditation on how evil flourishes among normal people, caught up in some grand evil. It’s more like a relentless set of rigorously arranged set of index cards, detailing evil things done by judges and lawyers. Paragraph by paragraph, page by page. Until they couldn’t do it any more, and retired, and took their pensions.
Well worth the time.
P.S.: Great article on Justice Utter: http://www.theolympian.com/2014/02/17...
Read
January 9, 2022This book is for a niche audience—readers with a legal background and an interest in history. Originally written in 1987, it is an indictment of the German judiciary in the lead up to the Third Reich, its twelve-year period, and its aftermath.
I’d describe it as the “driest book of horror” I’ve read. It is brimming with examples of unspeakable injustices that all types of German courts at all levels waged against victims under their reach. Muller describes how courts bent over backwards to interpret, re-interpret, or make up already brutal Nazi laws to reach the most severe punishment. In my view, the chapters on “race crimes” were among the most appalling. Take, for example, the Jewish painter who in 1939 looked across the street at a non-Jewish girl “if not importunately, then at least so as to attract notice.” The court sentenced him to a month-long prison term. Then, there was the example of a 67-year-old Jewish shop owner who maintained a friendship with a younger non-Jewish woman. On evidence as compelling as their mutual preference of a particular cigarette brand, their frequenting a cafe together, and her not reacting when someone called her a “Jew’s tart,” he was “easily” sentenced to death. Decisions were arbitrary and punishments were swift and harsh. After the war, German courts—staffed heavily from jurists who were around during, if not advocates for, the Nazi era—declined to impose severe punishments on the worst offenders. Meanwhile, the government overwhelmingly granted for Nazi jurists pensions and promotions. Meanwhile, victims of Nazi injustice were regularly denied reparations or rehabilitation. It took six years for a postwar German court to give reparations a then-16-year-old boy who a German court sentenced to a prison term because he had the audacity to like jazz. This was one of the few success stories Muller relays.
Throughout the book, Muller lays out the facts of each horrifying case by pulling quotations from the case documents, letting the words of German jurists to speak for themselves. I wish he provided more insight into the “so what?” of each case. The book’s organization struck me as odd. There are 30 short chapters, and most lacked a conclusory paragraph describing how the litany of examples tie together. I think this could have helped the reader. The writing is very technical and a little obtuse—filled with passive voice, for example—which is perhaps a result of a verbatim translation. Despite these shortcomings, I’d say this book is approachable to a non-lawyer and an important read for anyone interested in what the German judiciary did during this period, how they did it, and how they largely got away with it.
I’d describe it as the “driest book of horror” I’ve read. It is brimming with examples of unspeakable injustices that all types of German courts at all levels waged against victims under their reach. Muller describes how courts bent over backwards to interpret, re-interpret, or make up already brutal Nazi laws to reach the most severe punishment. In my view, the chapters on “race crimes” were among the most appalling. Take, for example, the Jewish painter who in 1939 looked across the street at a non-Jewish girl “if not importunately, then at least so as to attract notice.” The court sentenced him to a month-long prison term. Then, there was the example of a 67-year-old Jewish shop owner who maintained a friendship with a younger non-Jewish woman. On evidence as compelling as their mutual preference of a particular cigarette brand, their frequenting a cafe together, and her not reacting when someone called her a “Jew’s tart,” he was “easily” sentenced to death. Decisions were arbitrary and punishments were swift and harsh. After the war, German courts—staffed heavily from jurists who were around during, if not advocates for, the Nazi era—declined to impose severe punishments on the worst offenders. Meanwhile, the government overwhelmingly granted for Nazi jurists pensions and promotions. Meanwhile, victims of Nazi injustice were regularly denied reparations or rehabilitation. It took six years for a postwar German court to give reparations a then-16-year-old boy who a German court sentenced to a prison term because he had the audacity to like jazz. This was one of the few success stories Muller relays.
Throughout the book, Muller lays out the facts of each horrifying case by pulling quotations from the case documents, letting the words of German jurists to speak for themselves. I wish he provided more insight into the “so what?” of each case. The book’s organization struck me as odd. There are 30 short chapters, and most lacked a conclusory paragraph describing how the litany of examples tie together. I think this could have helped the reader. The writing is very technical and a little obtuse—filled with passive voice, for example—which is perhaps a result of a verbatim translation. Despite these shortcomings, I’d say this book is approachable to a non-lawyer and an important read for anyone interested in what the German judiciary did during this period, how they did it, and how they largely got away with it.
August 21, 2022
Dass die westdeutschen Gerichte von Nazi-Richtern nur so wimmelten, war ein beliebtes Propaganda-Thema in der DDR, das ich, quasi unbesehen, mitsamt vielen anderen Behauptungen nach der Wende relativierte. Ja, die Fälle Filbinger und Globke waren auch mir bekannt. Aber dass die Nachkriegsjuristen sich praktisch durchweg aus den Verbrechern der Nazijustiz rekrutierten, konnte ich mir nicht vorstellen.
Nun muss ich die Relativierung relativieren: Es war alles noch schlimmer. Die Justiz verkaufte sich von Beginn an an die NSDAP. Die wenigen Liberalen und Sozialisten wurden ausgesondert. Jüdische Anwälte und Professoren verloren ihre Jobs (und später bekanntermaßen ihr Leben). Mit Rechtsprechung hatte das, was in den nazideutschen Gerichten stattfand, nur mehr die äußere Form gemein. Unschuldsvermutungen, Abwägungen, differenzierte Urteile, all das wurde der Politik untergeordnet. Die Kunst bestand dann nur noch darin, die haarsträubenden Urteile in juristisches Vokabular zu kleiden. Einem Zwangsarbeiter etwas zu essen gegeben? Todesstrafe. Eine Jüdin gestreichelt? Todesstrafe. Nach einigen wenigen Freisprüchen landeten die kurz zuvor Angeklagten oft in den Händen der Gestapo. Todesurteile wurden von einigen Militärrichtern in Norddeutschland sogar noch Tage nach der Kapitulation ausgesprochen (und unverzüglich vollstreckt).
Eine Entnazifizierung, die diesen Namen verdient, gab es nicht. Und dieselbe Bande, die die verbrecherischen Urteile damals fällte, sprach dann die Urteile über sich selbst.
Das dunkle Kapitel der bundesdeutschen Justiz löste sich nur biographisch und literarisch.
Nun muss ich die Relativierung relativieren: Es war alles noch schlimmer. Die Justiz verkaufte sich von Beginn an an die NSDAP. Die wenigen Liberalen und Sozialisten wurden ausgesondert. Jüdische Anwälte und Professoren verloren ihre Jobs (und später bekanntermaßen ihr Leben). Mit Rechtsprechung hatte das, was in den nazideutschen Gerichten stattfand, nur mehr die äußere Form gemein. Unschuldsvermutungen, Abwägungen, differenzierte Urteile, all das wurde der Politik untergeordnet. Die Kunst bestand dann nur noch darin, die haarsträubenden Urteile in juristisches Vokabular zu kleiden. Einem Zwangsarbeiter etwas zu essen gegeben? Todesstrafe. Eine Jüdin gestreichelt? Todesstrafe. Nach einigen wenigen Freisprüchen landeten die kurz zuvor Angeklagten oft in den Händen der Gestapo. Todesurteile wurden von einigen Militärrichtern in Norddeutschland sogar noch Tage nach der Kapitulation ausgesprochen (und unverzüglich vollstreckt).
Eine Entnazifizierung, die diesen Namen verdient, gab es nicht. Und dieselbe Bande, die die verbrecherischen Urteile damals fällte, sprach dann die Urteile über sich selbst.
Das dunkle Kapitel der bundesdeutschen Justiz löste sich nur biographisch und literarisch.
August 25, 2024
Schon lange kein so frustrierendes Buch mehr gelesen
August 13, 2021
Los Juristas del Horror. La Justicia de Hitler. (1987) de Ingo Muller.
La defensa del Estado Nazis se impuso frente a los valores jurídicos de separación de poderes, seguridad jurídica y racionalidad. El sistema judicial fue un instrumento más del despota, y el servilismo fiscal y jurisdiccional un brazo cruel del tirano.
Las leyes y sentencias soportaron el avance de la barbarie. Enemigos del pueblo y traidores fueron conceptos manidos usados para condenar a muerte.
La escandalosa violación de principios básicos del derecho, y la obediencia y alineación a la visión del fhurer y su gobierno son retratados de forma dramática.
Federación de abogados, academia, filósofos, juristas, doctrinarios y constitucionalistas, por voluntad o terror actuaron al servicio del dictador o se abstuvieron para evitar la muerte.
Aberraciones discriminatorias contra abogados no plegados a la lealtad por el fhurer, con mecanismos groseros y sistemas perversos, coartaron la libertad e independencia de la profesión de abogado.
Una purga en la judicatura instaló funcionarios serviles, indiferentes, acomodaticios y pusilánimes.
Se redujo la estructura judicial y la sometieron a un perpetuo estado de emergencia, quemaron libros incómodos, interpretaron el derecho a su medida para tipificar delitos y perseguir a los enemigos.
Por derecho se aprobó el asesinato masivo de discapacitados, la esterilizaciónón, la eutanasia forzada, la pérdida de derechos civiles (matrimonio, adopciones, arrendamiento), expulsión de judíos de la judicatura y organismos públicos, y la politización aberrante de todo acto jurídico en nombre de la protección del pueblo y la defensa del Estado.
El expediente de traición se utilizó para acallar toda voz de protesta crítica o resistencia, y aplastar a la oposición y las libertades. Se utilizó el nombramiento de defensores públicos alineados con jueces y fiscales, pero nunca con los derechos de sus defendidos. El ejecutivo asumió poderes especiales para legislar.
El sistema jurídico y las instituciones permitieron la persecución racial, bárbara e inclemente de los judíos, bajo razonamientos construidos y enarbolados por profesionales al servicio sumiso y abyecto del fhurer y su partido.
Una justicia servil y una legislación infame fue creada con el avance del totalitarismo alemán, sustentando los más brutales actos en normas y decisiones judiciales, creadas y dictadas por sus títeres técnicos que justificaban cada crimen.
Todo esto y más nos demuestra este libro ocurrió en tiempos de Hitler. Por bien documentado y escrito es un texto que todos debemos leer y releer para aprender a detectar los avances autocráticos y totalitarios que en ocasiones se subestiman hasta ver a los países hundidos en la tragedia.
La defensa del Estado Nazis se impuso frente a los valores jurídicos de separación de poderes, seguridad jurídica y racionalidad. El sistema judicial fue un instrumento más del despota, y el servilismo fiscal y jurisdiccional un brazo cruel del tirano.
Las leyes y sentencias soportaron el avance de la barbarie. Enemigos del pueblo y traidores fueron conceptos manidos usados para condenar a muerte.
La escandalosa violación de principios básicos del derecho, y la obediencia y alineación a la visión del fhurer y su gobierno son retratados de forma dramática.
Federación de abogados, academia, filósofos, juristas, doctrinarios y constitucionalistas, por voluntad o terror actuaron al servicio del dictador o se abstuvieron para evitar la muerte.
Aberraciones discriminatorias contra abogados no plegados a la lealtad por el fhurer, con mecanismos groseros y sistemas perversos, coartaron la libertad e independencia de la profesión de abogado.
Una purga en la judicatura instaló funcionarios serviles, indiferentes, acomodaticios y pusilánimes.
Se redujo la estructura judicial y la sometieron a un perpetuo estado de emergencia, quemaron libros incómodos, interpretaron el derecho a su medida para tipificar delitos y perseguir a los enemigos.
Por derecho se aprobó el asesinato masivo de discapacitados, la esterilizaciónón, la eutanasia forzada, la pérdida de derechos civiles (matrimonio, adopciones, arrendamiento), expulsión de judíos de la judicatura y organismos públicos, y la politización aberrante de todo acto jurídico en nombre de la protección del pueblo y la defensa del Estado.
El expediente de traición se utilizó para acallar toda voz de protesta crítica o resistencia, y aplastar a la oposición y las libertades. Se utilizó el nombramiento de defensores públicos alineados con jueces y fiscales, pero nunca con los derechos de sus defendidos. El ejecutivo asumió poderes especiales para legislar.
El sistema jurídico y las instituciones permitieron la persecución racial, bárbara e inclemente de los judíos, bajo razonamientos construidos y enarbolados por profesionales al servicio sumiso y abyecto del fhurer y su partido.
Una justicia servil y una legislación infame fue creada con el avance del totalitarismo alemán, sustentando los más brutales actos en normas y decisiones judiciales, creadas y dictadas por sus títeres técnicos que justificaban cada crimen.
Todo esto y más nos demuestra este libro ocurrió en tiempos de Hitler. Por bien documentado y escrito es un texto que todos debemos leer y releer para aprender a detectar los avances autocráticos y totalitarios que en ocasiones se subestiman hasta ver a los países hundidos en la tragedia.
February 26, 2023
Das Buch (oder dessen Neuauflage) sollte ausnahmslos jeder deutsche Jurist gelesen haben.
Natürlich hatte ich eine grobe Vorstellung von der Justiz in Nazi-Deutschland und dem späteren Umgang mit dieser Vergangenheit. Aber die Vielzahl an Beispielen, die der Autor auf einen einprasseln lässt, hat eine ganz andere Wirkung, als wenn man mal einen Aufsatz zu dem Thema liest oder eine Dokumentation über einen Einzelfall schaut.
Natürlich hatte ich eine grobe Vorstellung von der Justiz in Nazi-Deutschland und dem späteren Umgang mit dieser Vergangenheit. Aber die Vielzahl an Beispielen, die der Autor auf einen einprasseln lässt, hat eine ganz andere Wirkung, als wenn man mal einen Aufsatz zu dem Thema liest oder eine Dokumentation über einen Einzelfall schaut.
January 17, 2021
Erschreckendes Buch, dass das Ausmaß der Gräueltaten dieser Zeit, die von der Justiz begangen wurden zeigt. Man fühlt sich nicht gut wenn man es liest, aber es ist umso wichtiger es zu lesen. Es wurde mir empfohlen mit den Worten: "Wenn man das liest stellt man fest, dass man gar nicht so viel essen kann, wie man kotzen möchte." Genau so ist es.
February 9, 2016
Ingo Muller, no livro "Hitler's Justice: The Courts of the Third Reich", analisando fatos, julgados, e leis do período de ascensão e queda do Nazismo traz argumentos suficientes para responder a indagação: como foi possível?
Ao contrário do que é lecionado na faculdade de direito, em documentários e filmes sobre a Segunda Guerra Mundial, as afirmações de que "Hitler chegou ao poder legalmente", "não tocou em armas", "não aplicou golpe de estado", "foi eleito pelas urnas", tratam-se de inverdades que até então eu digeria, mesmo sob a desconfiança da impossibilidade de que as atrocidades cometidas por Hitler tivessem amparo legal.
Como foi possível expulsar os judeus de suas casas, tomar seus bens, retirar seus direitos, criar os campos de concentração - de extermínio - sem que o Poder Judiciário se manifestasse? O Legislativo aprovou essas leis? Em algum lugar faltava a legalidade! E é exatamente o que o livro comprova.
Hitler e seu Partido Nacional Socialista dos Trabalhadores Alemães cometeram vários atos criminosos antes de chegarem ao poder. No entanto, devido à complacência de setores do Judiciário, simpáticos à ideologia Nazista, passaram impunes. Em poucas palavras, é correto afirmar que o crescimento, e ascensão ao poder do Nazismo não aconteceria se não fosse a cooperação desses juízes, professores de direito, procuradores etc., que esqueceram (ou deixaram de lado) que a aplicação da lei não deve ser influenciada por ideologias políticas particulares.
É sabido que Hitler aprovou vários decretos retirando os direitos dos judeus, dos "não-alemães" e de todo aquele que mostrasse qualquer simpatia pelos judeus. Todavia, o que o autor prova, por meio de exaustivos julgados, é que o Poder Judiciário se curvou por inteiro às atrocidades defendidas por Hitler e seus ministros.
É a partir dessa parte do livro que é preciso ter estômago forte para não regurgitar de desgosto, isso porque Ingo desmascara vários autores conhecidos como os pilares jurídicos da "legalidade Nazista", entre eles, Carl Schmitt, bem conhecido na área jurídica internacional por sua teoria da constituição em sentido político, que de forma bem resumida, afirma que a Constituição seria a decisão política fundamental do povo. Só esquece-se de afirmar que a teoria foi criada para embasar a "decisão fundamental do povo em prol do nazismo", e que para Carl, o guardião da Constituição deveria ser o Reich (ao contrário da teoria de Hans Kelsen - que era judeu - que afirmava que o guardião deveria ser um tribunal constitucional, semelhante ao que é o Supremo Tribunal Federal hoje no Brasil).
E mais, é a partir da leitura de alguns julgados, lucidamente dramatizados no livro, que se entende a importância de certas normas expressas na nossa Constituição. Afinal, é quando se lê que: um judeu foi condenado por um "ouvir dizer" - hearsay - de um cachorro (sim, o acusado foi condenado com fundamento no medo que demonstrou quando viu o cachorro, e, também, pelo "testemunho" do cachorro que rosnou quando viu o acusado); centenas de acusados foram condenados por "crimes" que à época em que foram "consumados" não haviam sido aprovados ainda (sim, foram condenados por um ato praticado anos antes da aprovação da lei estabelecendo que o ato era crime); e que em determinado julgamento, quando os juízes em dúvida sobre certo dispositivo da lei, não havia sequer uma cópia da lei original em todo o tribunal; é que se entende a essência do "não há crime sem lei anterior que o defina, nem pena sem prévia cominação legal"; "... aos acusados em geral são assegurados o contraditório e ampla defesa, com os meios e recursos a ela inerentes"; "todos são iguais perante a lei...." etc.
Adiante, novamente contrastando com o que se conta nos "documentários do Discovery Channel", esses juristas não foram punidos por esses atos, a defesa de que "cumpriam a lei" foi acolhida para a grande maioria. Aliás, outro caminho seria impossível, vez que, 90% dos juízes e juristas do governo nazista, após serem destituídos pelas forças aliadas, foram restituídos a seus cargos, e com indenização e pensão referentes ao período em que foram destituídos ou aposentados. Em sentido diametralmente oposto, negou-se pensão, auxílio, indenização ou qualquer coisa do gênero a grande parte dos judeus, "não-alemães" e injustiçados durante o governo nazista.
Assim, o livro retrata um capítulo vergonhoso para o sistema jurídico Alemão, mas que perto de completar 90 anos, ainda é tema atual, pois ainda hoje, se tem notícias de atitudes que parecem repetir o que ocorreu naquela época, bem como, os "presos de Guantánamo", a defesa de menos direito para os acusados, e até, recentemente, um projeto de lei que defende que a conta do preso seja mandado para a família pagar (o livro traz cópias de contas das execuções da pena de morte dos judeus enviadas às famílias).
Por fim, o livro é essencial para qualquer pessoa, operador do direito ou não, que tenha interesse em aprender sobre o que realmente aconteceu durante esse período. Se é certo que para saber do futuro é preciso estudar o passado, com a leitura desse livro, arduamente alguém se levantaria para condenar o garantismo.
Ao contrário do que é lecionado na faculdade de direito, em documentários e filmes sobre a Segunda Guerra Mundial, as afirmações de que "Hitler chegou ao poder legalmente", "não tocou em armas", "não aplicou golpe de estado", "foi eleito pelas urnas", tratam-se de inverdades que até então eu digeria, mesmo sob a desconfiança da impossibilidade de que as atrocidades cometidas por Hitler tivessem amparo legal.
Como foi possível expulsar os judeus de suas casas, tomar seus bens, retirar seus direitos, criar os campos de concentração - de extermínio - sem que o Poder Judiciário se manifestasse? O Legislativo aprovou essas leis? Em algum lugar faltava a legalidade! E é exatamente o que o livro comprova.
Hitler e seu Partido Nacional Socialista dos Trabalhadores Alemães cometeram vários atos criminosos antes de chegarem ao poder. No entanto, devido à complacência de setores do Judiciário, simpáticos à ideologia Nazista, passaram impunes. Em poucas palavras, é correto afirmar que o crescimento, e ascensão ao poder do Nazismo não aconteceria se não fosse a cooperação desses juízes, professores de direito, procuradores etc., que esqueceram (ou deixaram de lado) que a aplicação da lei não deve ser influenciada por ideologias políticas particulares.
É sabido que Hitler aprovou vários decretos retirando os direitos dos judeus, dos "não-alemães" e de todo aquele que mostrasse qualquer simpatia pelos judeus. Todavia, o que o autor prova, por meio de exaustivos julgados, é que o Poder Judiciário se curvou por inteiro às atrocidades defendidas por Hitler e seus ministros.
É a partir dessa parte do livro que é preciso ter estômago forte para não regurgitar de desgosto, isso porque Ingo desmascara vários autores conhecidos como os pilares jurídicos da "legalidade Nazista", entre eles, Carl Schmitt, bem conhecido na área jurídica internacional por sua teoria da constituição em sentido político, que de forma bem resumida, afirma que a Constituição seria a decisão política fundamental do povo. Só esquece-se de afirmar que a teoria foi criada para embasar a "decisão fundamental do povo em prol do nazismo", e que para Carl, o guardião da Constituição deveria ser o Reich (ao contrário da teoria de Hans Kelsen - que era judeu - que afirmava que o guardião deveria ser um tribunal constitucional, semelhante ao que é o Supremo Tribunal Federal hoje no Brasil).
E mais, é a partir da leitura de alguns julgados, lucidamente dramatizados no livro, que se entende a importância de certas normas expressas na nossa Constituição. Afinal, é quando se lê que: um judeu foi condenado por um "ouvir dizer" - hearsay - de um cachorro (sim, o acusado foi condenado com fundamento no medo que demonstrou quando viu o cachorro, e, também, pelo "testemunho" do cachorro que rosnou quando viu o acusado); centenas de acusados foram condenados por "crimes" que à época em que foram "consumados" não haviam sido aprovados ainda (sim, foram condenados por um ato praticado anos antes da aprovação da lei estabelecendo que o ato era crime); e que em determinado julgamento, quando os juízes em dúvida sobre certo dispositivo da lei, não havia sequer uma cópia da lei original em todo o tribunal; é que se entende a essência do "não há crime sem lei anterior que o defina, nem pena sem prévia cominação legal"; "... aos acusados em geral são assegurados o contraditório e ampla defesa, com os meios e recursos a ela inerentes"; "todos são iguais perante a lei...." etc.
Adiante, novamente contrastando com o que se conta nos "documentários do Discovery Channel", esses juristas não foram punidos por esses atos, a defesa de que "cumpriam a lei" foi acolhida para a grande maioria. Aliás, outro caminho seria impossível, vez que, 90% dos juízes e juristas do governo nazista, após serem destituídos pelas forças aliadas, foram restituídos a seus cargos, e com indenização e pensão referentes ao período em que foram destituídos ou aposentados. Em sentido diametralmente oposto, negou-se pensão, auxílio, indenização ou qualquer coisa do gênero a grande parte dos judeus, "não-alemães" e injustiçados durante o governo nazista.
Assim, o livro retrata um capítulo vergonhoso para o sistema jurídico Alemão, mas que perto de completar 90 anos, ainda é tema atual, pois ainda hoje, se tem notícias de atitudes que parecem repetir o que ocorreu naquela época, bem como, os "presos de Guantánamo", a defesa de menos direito para os acusados, e até, recentemente, um projeto de lei que defende que a conta do preso seja mandado para a família pagar (o livro traz cópias de contas das execuções da pena de morte dos judeus enviadas às famílias).
Por fim, o livro é essencial para qualquer pessoa, operador do direito ou não, que tenha interesse em aprender sobre o que realmente aconteceu durante esse período. Se é certo que para saber do futuro é preciso estudar o passado, com a leitura desse livro, arduamente alguém se levantaria para condenar o garantismo.
February 4, 2024
Final Score: 3.5 / 5
January 18, 2015
How the German legal profession abandoned the rule of law, notably in the special tribunals (Special Courts and People's Courts) in Weimar and Nazi Germany. Muller notes that this trend pre-dated Hitler, that the laws enabling it were in the name of national security, that it followed the replacement of liberal with conservative judges over several decades, pre-Hitler, and that the judges had come to accept public affairs as a "friend or foe" paradigm with no room for loyal political opposition.
1933 and post-9/11 are not identical, of course. The 1933 Reichstag Fire Decree suspended numerous civil-liberty sections of the republic's constitution itself, and for all citizens of the republic, while the US, post-9/11, simply removed a class of enemy combatants from normal criminal or military jurisdiction. However, the Weimar courts had created courts of special jurisdiction, and types of national-security offenses, long before 1933. Hitler merely took this trend, and the state-necessity doctrine, to its next logical level, and Mr. Muller is very good at putting this in its context. The injustices pre- and post-dated Hitler.
U.S. readers should remember that the German legal system had considerable differences with Anglo-American jurisprudence, with the latter's greater reliance on precedent-based case law, neutral judges, and independent defense counsel. Still, here we see how a once-proud legal system turned rule of law into a blood-stained rule of force, dressed in legal robes. A valuable, if chilling, work.
1933 and post-9/11 are not identical, of course. The 1933 Reichstag Fire Decree suspended numerous civil-liberty sections of the republic's constitution itself, and for all citizens of the republic, while the US, post-9/11, simply removed a class of enemy combatants from normal criminal or military jurisdiction. However, the Weimar courts had created courts of special jurisdiction, and types of national-security offenses, long before 1933. Hitler merely took this trend, and the state-necessity doctrine, to its next logical level, and Mr. Muller is very good at putting this in its context. The injustices pre- and post-dated Hitler.
U.S. readers should remember that the German legal system had considerable differences with Anglo-American jurisprudence, with the latter's greater reliance on precedent-based case law, neutral judges, and independent defense counsel. Still, here we see how a once-proud legal system turned rule of law into a blood-stained rule of force, dressed in legal robes. A valuable, if chilling, work.
August 19, 2014
No podemos permitir que se vuelva a repetir las memorias más oscuras de la humanidad, por tanto, estudiarlo es, también, una necesidad que engloba muchas sociedades. El futuro jurista, los conocedores del Derecho, aficionados al tema, abogados y jueces deberían ser los primeros en reflexionar los errores que comprende un sistema de ''justicia'' que como relata el texto sirve para satisfacer las ocurrencias de un cabo fracasado, fanático, desequilibrado, demagogo, populista y carismático, llamado Adolf Hitler. Permitirlo de nuevo es un despropósito para el bien común que tanto persigue el Derecho.
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