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Very Short Introductions #542
Analytic Philosophy: A Very Short Introduction
Originating in the pioneering work of Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, G. E. Moore, and Ludwig Wittgenstein in the four decades around the turn of the twentieth century, analytic philosophy established itself in various forms in the 1930s. After the Second World War, it developed further in North America, in the rest of Europe, and is now growing in influence as the dominant philosophical tradition right across the world, from Latin America to East Asia.
In this Very Short Introduction Michael Beaney introduces some of the key ideas of the founders of analytic philosophy by exploring certain fundamental philosophical questions and showing how those ideas can be used in offering answers. Considering the work of Susan Stebbing, he also explores the application of analytic philosophy to critical thinking, and emphasizes the conceptual creativity that lies at the heart of fruitful analysis. Throughout, Beaney illustrates why clarity of thinking, precision of expression, and rigour of argumentation are rightly seen as virtues of analytic philosophy.
In this Very Short Introduction Michael Beaney introduces some of the key ideas of the founders of analytic philosophy by exploring certain fundamental philosophical questions and showing how those ideas can be used in offering answers. Considering the work of Susan Stebbing, he also explores the application of analytic philosophy to critical thinking, and emphasizes the conceptual creativity that lies at the heart of fruitful analysis. Throughout, Beaney illustrates why clarity of thinking, precision of expression, and rigour of argumentation are rightly seen as virtues of analytic philosophy.
130 pages, Paperback
First published November 16, 2017
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Displaying 1 - 23 of 23 reviews
February 6, 2022
This review is more about the topic — analytical philosophy — than about the book itself.
I'm currently about a third of the way into a philosophy degree with the OU and scouting for what to study next. After reading A Very Short Introduction to Analytical Philosophy, I am absolutely positive that I do not want to study analytical philosophy.
The book dives straight into **doing** analytical philosophy rather than **learning** analytical philosophy. My impression, after 5 chapters is that the work of analytic philosophers is impressive — in the way that a man who builds a model of Westminster Abbey out of cocktail sticks or someone who reconstructed the Indian Railway system circa 1904 in his attic might be impressive.
My first thought is that it's cool that someone is able to do this stuff. My second thought is to question their life choices and wonder why anyone might want to spend so much of their life doing this stuff. My final thought is to decide that I would never want to do this myself.
The final chapter offers the hope that there are other ways of doing philosophy that don't require me to leave the ordinary world behind. Gilbert Ryle, here I come.
https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/6...
In that regard, I guess the book is a triumph. I read a very short introduction and learned that I don't want to read any more.
I'm currently about a third of the way into a philosophy degree with the OU and scouting for what to study next. After reading A Very Short Introduction to Analytical Philosophy, I am absolutely positive that I do not want to study analytical philosophy.
The book dives straight into **doing** analytical philosophy rather than **learning** analytical philosophy. My impression, after 5 chapters is that the work of analytic philosophers is impressive — in the way that a man who builds a model of Westminster Abbey out of cocktail sticks or someone who reconstructed the Indian Railway system circa 1904 in his attic might be impressive.
My first thought is that it's cool that someone is able to do this stuff. My second thought is to question their life choices and wonder why anyone might want to spend so much of their life doing this stuff. My final thought is to decide that I would never want to do this myself.
The final chapter offers the hope that there are other ways of doing philosophy that don't require me to leave the ordinary world behind. Gilbert Ryle, here I come.
https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/6...
In that regard, I guess the book is a triumph. I read a very short introduction and learned that I don't want to read any more.
April 29, 2024
Beaney, Michael. Analytic Philosophy: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford University Press, 2017.
This is not merely an introduction to analytic philosophy. It is a fine introduction to modern philosophy, even to philosophy as a whole, in general. Because of the highly technical nature of analytic philosophy, this review cannot cover everything in the book. Some important matters, such as Russell’s “Set Paradox,” will have to be omitted.
Things and Kinds of Things
We begin with Gottlob Frege. If someone asks the question, “How many things are in the universe?”, how would you answer? Admittedly, it is impossible to answer, but it does illustrate a point. We can explain by a simpler example. If I show you a book, how many things am I showing you? Let us say the book has 150 pages. We attribute the number 150 not to the book itself, but to the concept “page of this book.” This concept has 150 instances (Beaney 9). For Frege, “number statements are assertions about concepts.” More specifically, a concept is “a property of a thing” (10). The “property of x” is a logical property.
Not only do we have “things” and “kinds of things,” but Kinds of things can be divided into objects and concepts. An object falls under a concept. A first-level concept is that under which an object falls. The second-level concept is one that falls within a first-level concept (11). For Frege, a number statement states that a first-level concept falls within a second level concept, and a second level concept instantiates a certain number of instances to the first-level concept.
Example: This book has 150 pages.
Translation: “The first level concept ‘page of this book’ falls within the second-level concept ‘has 150 instances” (11).
Moving on, a class or set is an extension of a concept (12).
How Can We Speak of What Does Not Exist?
Problem: Unicorns are one-horned animals.
Existential Statements
We know that unicorns, for example, do not exist. But they do exist in our minds, so what do we do with the word “exist?” Remembering Frege’s claim that “number statements are assertions about concepts,” we need new tools to express that (26ff). They are universal and existential quantifiers, noted thus:
“Unicorns do not exist”
Becomes
– (∃x) Ux
Which Beaney explains to mean, “It is not the case that there are some unicorns.” Therefore, “When we make an existential claim, then, we are not attributing a first-level concept to an object, but a second level concept to a first-level concept” (27).
Applied to theology, this means the ontological argument is unsound. An existential claim is an instantiation of concepts, not objects. God, a first-level concept, can be (and should be) defined as exemplifying all the great-making properties.But is this the same thing as exemplifying existence?
Beaney gives a simpler explanation. If I say “the class of unicorns is a subset of the class of animals,” am I saying unicorns really exist? No, “for are talking about (ultimately) about concepts, not classes” (37). What we mean, phrased in quantificational logic, is
(∀x) (Hx → Ax)
“For all x, if x is a unicorn, then x is an animal.” In other words, anything that falls under the concept unicorn falls under the concept animal.”
Do You Know What I Mean?
Sense and Reference
Hesperus is Phosphorus.
Both of these, one the evening star.and one the morning, refer to the planet Venus, but in different senses.
Evaluation
I am skipping the section on Wittgenstein and language-games, important as it is. That (probably) deserves and has its own book. Rather, I will spend some time analyzing Beaney’s take on the analytic-continental divide.
As students of philosophy today are grudgingly admitting, the divide between analytic and continental styles is not airtight. True, but it is still there. It is certainly the case that analytics aim for precision while continentals tend to reduce things to metaphors and “play.” That said, analytics are often very reluctant to explain modal and symbolic logic.
The next row is certainly accurate. Continentals, most notoriously with John Caputo’s claim that logic was a white man’s enterprise, are skeptical of reason.
The realist/idealist paradigm is odd. If by “realist” Beaney means focused on a real, external world, he is correct. If he means Platonic realism, which I do not think he does, he is incorrect.
The apolitical/political divide is certainly accurate, with exceptions. Bertrand Russell, for example, lobbied for numerous globalist fronts. Continentals, often taking their cues from Marx and French Communist radicals, are certainly more focused on politics.
Conclusion
I knew something about analytic philosophy before reading this book, having even read Frege. Beaney did a find job explaining all the parts I could not understand from Frege.
This is not merely an introduction to analytic philosophy. It is a fine introduction to modern philosophy, even to philosophy as a whole, in general. Because of the highly technical nature of analytic philosophy, this review cannot cover everything in the book. Some important matters, such as Russell’s “Set Paradox,” will have to be omitted.
Things and Kinds of Things
We begin with Gottlob Frege. If someone asks the question, “How many things are in the universe?”, how would you answer? Admittedly, it is impossible to answer, but it does illustrate a point. We can explain by a simpler example. If I show you a book, how many things am I showing you? Let us say the book has 150 pages. We attribute the number 150 not to the book itself, but to the concept “page of this book.” This concept has 150 instances (Beaney 9). For Frege, “number statements are assertions about concepts.” More specifically, a concept is “a property of a thing” (10). The “property of x” is a logical property.
Not only do we have “things” and “kinds of things,” but Kinds of things can be divided into objects and concepts. An object falls under a concept. A first-level concept is that under which an object falls. The second-level concept is one that falls within a first-level concept (11). For Frege, a number statement states that a first-level concept falls within a second level concept, and a second level concept instantiates a certain number of instances to the first-level concept.
Example: This book has 150 pages.
Translation: “The first level concept ‘page of this book’ falls within the second-level concept ‘has 150 instances” (11).
Moving on, a class or set is an extension of a concept (12).
How Can We Speak of What Does Not Exist?
Problem: Unicorns are one-horned animals.
Existential Statements
We know that unicorns, for example, do not exist. But they do exist in our minds, so what do we do with the word “exist?” Remembering Frege’s claim that “number statements are assertions about concepts,” we need new tools to express that (26ff). They are universal and existential quantifiers, noted thus:
“Unicorns do not exist”
Becomes
– (∃x) Ux
Which Beaney explains to mean, “It is not the case that there are some unicorns.” Therefore, “When we make an existential claim, then, we are not attributing a first-level concept to an object, but a second level concept to a first-level concept” (27).
Applied to theology, this means the ontological argument is unsound. An existential claim is an instantiation of concepts, not objects. God, a first-level concept, can be (and should be) defined as exemplifying all the great-making properties.But is this the same thing as exemplifying existence?
Beaney gives a simpler explanation. If I say “the class of unicorns is a subset of the class of animals,” am I saying unicorns really exist? No, “for are talking about (ultimately) about concepts, not classes” (37). What we mean, phrased in quantificational logic, is
(∀x) (Hx → Ax)
“For all x, if x is a unicorn, then x is an animal.” In other words, anything that falls under the concept unicorn falls under the concept animal.”
Do You Know What I Mean?
Sense and Reference
Hesperus is Phosphorus.
Both of these, one the evening star.and one the morning, refer to the planet Venus, but in different senses.
Evaluation
I am skipping the section on Wittgenstein and language-games, important as it is. That (probably) deserves and has its own book. Rather, I will spend some time analyzing Beaney’s take on the analytic-continental divide.
As students of philosophy today are grudgingly admitting, the divide between analytic and continental styles is not airtight. True, but it is still there. It is certainly the case that analytics aim for precision while continentals tend to reduce things to metaphors and “play.” That said, analytics are often very reluctant to explain modal and symbolic logic.
The next row is certainly accurate. Continentals, most notoriously with John Caputo’s claim that logic was a white man’s enterprise, are skeptical of reason.
The realist/idealist paradigm is odd. If by “realist” Beaney means focused on a real, external world, he is correct. If he means Platonic realism, which I do not think he does, he is incorrect.
The apolitical/political divide is certainly accurate, with exceptions. Bertrand Russell, for example, lobbied for numerous globalist fronts. Continentals, often taking their cues from Marx and French Communist radicals, are certainly more focused on politics.
Conclusion
I knew something about analytic philosophy before reading this book, having even read Frege. Beaney did a find job explaining all the parts I could not understand from Frege.
July 27, 2021
This is wonderful introduction. It is a clearly written pedagogical text, and yet, it is not repetitive. To me, it felt concise and precise. It basically follows five philosophers crucial to the initiation of analytic philosophy: Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, Moore, and Stebbing. Each philosopher is used to introduce a notion or development in analytic philosophy, such that by the end of the first five chapters, you have a strong conception of some of the basic things that analytic philosophers care about. The final chapter explores some larger themes (e.g., what is analysis?), some of the more modern movements within analytic philosophy, and some critical questions from Continental philosophy. Overall, I really enjoyed this one.
October 10, 2023
من توفيق الله وحده أني قرأت هذا الكتاب بعد كتاب (معيار العلم) للإمام الغزالي، إذ إن قراءة معيار العلم وهو كتاب في فن المنطق، قد يسر لي الكثير مما في الكتاب والذي هو في أصله مفاهيم من علم المنطق.
الغريب أن الإمام الغزالي في كتابه قد ناقش مشكلات منطقية حيرت الفلاسفة التحليلين وقد أجاب عنها الإمام الغزالي بنفس ما أجابوا، أو العكس هو الصحيح.
فمثلا مسألة الكلام عن غير الموجودات، وكيف يتسنى التعبير عنها، فقد أجاب عنها الغزالي بأن الكلام عنها هو (شرح) (للاسم) وليس (حدا)(تعريفا) له، إذ أن الكلام عنه كلام عن (تصور)(مفهوم)، فإذا أثبتنا وجوده بالبرهان، تحول (الشرح) إلى (,حد,) وتحول (التصور) إلى (تصديق).
وهذه هي نفس الطريقة مع اختلاف الألفاظ التي توصل إليها الفلاسفة التحليلين وبالأخص برتراند راسل في نظريته للأوصاف، والذي حل المشكلة بأن قال أن الكلام عن (غير الموجود ) هو كلام عن (مفاهيم) لا عن موجودات حقيقية، فالقول أن (وحيد القرن غير موجود) هو كلام عن (مفهوم) غير محصل تحته(موضوع) فلا مانع من الكلام عنه.
وحتى في الفصل الذي تكلم عن (ستيبنج) ودعوتها للتفكير النقدي والتخلص من أخطاء التفكير، نجد ان الغزالي قد اوضح في فصل مستقل الأخطاء التي قد تتسلل إلى التفكير دون وعي والتي تبدو للوهلة الأولى منطقية ولكن مع التدقيق في المقدمات نجد المشكلة.
الغريب أن الإمام الغزالي في كتابه قد ناقش مشكلات منطقية حيرت الفلاسفة التحليلين وقد أجاب عنها الإمام الغزالي بنفس ما أجابوا، أو العكس هو الصحيح.
فمثلا مسألة الكلام عن غير الموجودات، وكيف يتسنى التعبير عنها، فقد أجاب عنها الغزالي بأن الكلام عنها هو (شرح) (للاسم) وليس (حدا)(تعريفا) له، إذ أن الكلام عنه كلام عن (تصور)(مفهوم)، فإذا أثبتنا وجوده بالبرهان، تحول (الشرح) إلى (,حد,) وتحول (التصور) إلى (تصديق).
وهذه هي نفس الطريقة مع اختلاف الألفاظ التي توصل إليها الفلاسفة التحليلين وبالأخص برتراند راسل في نظريته للأوصاف، والذي حل المشكلة بأن قال أن الكلام عن (غير الموجود ) هو كلام عن (مفاهيم) لا عن موجودات حقيقية، فالقول أن (وحيد القرن غير موجود) هو كلام عن (مفهوم) غير محصل تحته(موضوع) فلا مانع من الكلام عنه.
وحتى في الفصل الذي تكلم عن (ستيبنج) ودعوتها للتفكير النقدي والتخلص من أخطاء التفكير، نجد ان الغزالي قد اوضح في فصل مستقل الأخطاء التي قد تتسلل إلى التفكير دون وعي والتي تبدو للوهلة الأولى منطقية ولكن مع التدقيق في المقدمات نجد المشكلة.
July 7, 2025
Maybe in another lifetime, I will be more sympathetic to this tradition of scholarship. I respect some of its strengths, but can never dive deeper into this. Appreciate the book for trying its best tho.
Read
February 16, 2021A pleasantly clear and brief introduction into what I still think a daunting subject, maybe a bit too brief but it gives a good idea of what can be encountered in the range of what is called analytic philosophy. That I still don't really understand what to expect is mostly because I have no clear overview (if such a thing is possible) of the history of philosophy nor do I know anything about the philosophy of logic - which I think gives a better grasp of some of the things laid out in this booklet even though no such knowledge is strictly necessary as Michael Beaney does attempt to make this accessible. That I didn't find all of it accessible is also due to not being the most abstract driven person and because an introduction is just an introduction, meaning for me that the contents of the book, when you don't actively want to extend your reading and/or don't do something to make the information your own - it just dissolves into thin air, or at least, it feels like that.
June 6, 2022
What is the book about?
Michael Beaney presents the most relevant figures in the history of Analytic philosophy, introduces to their main ideas that contributed to the rise of Analytic philosophy and explains what Analytical philosophy is by way of analysing the term analysis, differentiating it from Continental philosophy and evaluating it.
Can I recommend it?
Yes! Anyone who is (somewhat) unfamiliar with the Analytic-Continental distinction and/or wants to know what analysis comes down to, this is the perfect book for you.
Beaney succeeds realising the virtues of analytic philosophy by writing with clarity of thought, precision of expression and systematicity. He has written a truly simple introduction to the philosophical methodology of analysis that holds the promise of revealing anything promised to reveal stated above. In particular, now I truly know what Analytic philosophy is, which is not the happy result one can always expect whenever some author promises to clarify the meaning of a term or concept.
This book has inspired me to strive to be an analytic philosopher practicing all her virtues right off from the start of my academic career. I also want to draw from the virtues of Continental philosophy, namely historicism to be able to understand my own position better.
What have I learned?
What is Analytic philosophy?
It is characterised by
- logic and critical thinking
- its virtues: clarity of thought, precision of expression, conceptual creativity, fruitfulness, systematicity and rigour of argumentation (while rigour promotes the former two)
- decompositional analysis: breaking down a term’s meaning or a state of affairs into its constituent parts that are easier to handle, and identifying things we already know that may help us
- regressive analysis: working back to first principles and identifying things we already know that may help us
- interpretive or transformational analysis: reformulating problems and components to open up new approaches
It is criticised for its
- ahistoricism: proposing successful new concepts and solutions involves
-> making clear how they are related to other concepts and solutions, both past and present, and how they can be separated from them
-> identifying one’s presuppositions which often go unnoticed if historical understanding of one’s paradigm misses
-> being able to establish and defend them, which is partly done by placing them into a historical context
- scientism: every science makes certain presuppositions which can only be examined through other methods than those of science itself, partly because they are metaphysical.
What is Naturalism?
- strong: Everything can ultimately be explained by the natural sciences. Similar to scientism.
- weak: There is nothing over and above the natural world, nothing supernatural.
- Non-naturalism: Not everything can be defined scientifically, e.g. “good”.
What did Susan Stebbing say?
- same level or logical analysis: reformulation of a sentence that is logically “equivalent” (Every economist is fallible → If you are an economist, you are fallible)
- new level or metaphysical analysis: referring to what is out there (Every economist is fallible → Marx is fallible, Keynes is fallible, …)
- Thinking to some Purpose: only analyse as metaphysically as you need to, not more
- Slipping away from the point: During an argument one may tacitly, accidentially change the meaning of a term
What did Peter Strawson say?
- Connective Analysis: Proper analysis is connective in that it elucidates a concept by exposing the complex connections to other concepts.
- Descriptive Metaphysics: clarifying the fundamental conceptual framework by means of which we think about the world
What did Derrida say?
- margins of philosophy: What philosophers mean can often be clarified by examining the words in places where inofficial thinking takes place, that is in footnotes, letters, casual remarks, prefaces.
What did Frege say?
- Sense and Reference
-> Sense (Intension): the part of the term’s meaning that denotes the concept
-> Reference (Extension): the part of the term’s meaning that refers to the objects in the external world that fall under the concept
- Senselessness (Sinnlosigkeit) and Nonsense (Unsinn)
-> senseless: logical propositions are senseless because they do not “say” anything about the world like empirical propositions and also because one does not understand what they mean (”No concepts are objects”)
-> nonsense: logical propositions may be senseless but they are not nonsense because they still “show” a certain truth, that is a condition for sentences to have sense (”Either it rains or it does not rain” — a tautology)
Who have been the central historical figures?
- Vienna Circle
- Bertrand Russel
- Gottlob Frege
- Ludwig Wittgenstein
- Rudolf Carnap
- G. E. Moore
- Susan Stebbing
- Quine
Michael Beaney presents the most relevant figures in the history of Analytic philosophy, introduces to their main ideas that contributed to the rise of Analytic philosophy and explains what Analytical philosophy is by way of analysing the term analysis, differentiating it from Continental philosophy and evaluating it.
Can I recommend it?
Yes! Anyone who is (somewhat) unfamiliar with the Analytic-Continental distinction and/or wants to know what analysis comes down to, this is the perfect book for you.
Beaney succeeds realising the virtues of analytic philosophy by writing with clarity of thought, precision of expression and systematicity. He has written a truly simple introduction to the philosophical methodology of analysis that holds the promise of revealing anything promised to reveal stated above. In particular, now I truly know what Analytic philosophy is, which is not the happy result one can always expect whenever some author promises to clarify the meaning of a term or concept.
This book has inspired me to strive to be an analytic philosopher practicing all her virtues right off from the start of my academic career. I also want to draw from the virtues of Continental philosophy, namely historicism to be able to understand my own position better.
What have I learned?
What is Analytic philosophy?
It is characterised by
- logic and critical thinking
- its virtues: clarity of thought, precision of expression, conceptual creativity, fruitfulness, systematicity and rigour of argumentation (while rigour promotes the former two)
- decompositional analysis: breaking down a term’s meaning or a state of affairs into its constituent parts that are easier to handle, and identifying things we already know that may help us
- regressive analysis: working back to first principles and identifying things we already know that may help us
- interpretive or transformational analysis: reformulating problems and components to open up new approaches
It is criticised for its
- ahistoricism: proposing successful new concepts and solutions involves
-> making clear how they are related to other concepts and solutions, both past and present, and how they can be separated from them
-> identifying one’s presuppositions which often go unnoticed if historical understanding of one’s paradigm misses
-> being able to establish and defend them, which is partly done by placing them into a historical context
- scientism: every science makes certain presuppositions which can only be examined through other methods than those of science itself, partly because they are metaphysical.
What is Naturalism?
- strong: Everything can ultimately be explained by the natural sciences. Similar to scientism.
- weak: There is nothing over and above the natural world, nothing supernatural.
- Non-naturalism: Not everything can be defined scientifically, e.g. “good”.
What did Susan Stebbing say?
- same level or logical analysis: reformulation of a sentence that is logically “equivalent” (Every economist is fallible → If you are an economist, you are fallible)
- new level or metaphysical analysis: referring to what is out there (Every economist is fallible → Marx is fallible, Keynes is fallible, …)
- Thinking to some Purpose: only analyse as metaphysically as you need to, not more
- Slipping away from the point: During an argument one may tacitly, accidentially change the meaning of a term
What did Peter Strawson say?
- Connective Analysis: Proper analysis is connective in that it elucidates a concept by exposing the complex connections to other concepts.
- Descriptive Metaphysics: clarifying the fundamental conceptual framework by means of which we think about the world
What did Derrida say?
- margins of philosophy: What philosophers mean can often be clarified by examining the words in places where inofficial thinking takes place, that is in footnotes, letters, casual remarks, prefaces.
What did Frege say?
- Sense and Reference
-> Sense (Intension): the part of the term’s meaning that denotes the concept
-> Reference (Extension): the part of the term’s meaning that refers to the objects in the external world that fall under the concept
- Senselessness (Sinnlosigkeit) and Nonsense (Unsinn)
-> senseless: logical propositions are senseless because they do not “say” anything about the world like empirical propositions and also because one does not understand what they mean (”No concepts are objects”)
-> nonsense: logical propositions may be senseless but they are not nonsense because they still “show” a certain truth, that is a condition for sentences to have sense (”Either it rains or it does not rain” — a tautology)
Who have been the central historical figures?
- Vienna Circle
- Bertrand Russel
- Gottlob Frege
- Ludwig Wittgenstein
- Rudolf Carnap
- G. E. Moore
- Susan Stebbing
- Quine
January 5, 2023
The book stays true to its name: it makes a good run down of basic ideas of Frege, Russel, Wittgenstein, Moore, Carnap, Stebbing and some other pioneers of the analytic approach. However, the author's audience (specified in the introduction) is very culturally specific in this one and it does affect it stylistically.
Sometimes it simplifies complex topics or even patronizes you. The book is full of dumb half-jokes and comparisons. Some of the pictures are there... just for the sake of the not so funny a quip (at best).
That's not to say that the book is bad or the subject is badly presented. M. Beaney genuinely grabs your attention and makes you think with him, pulling you through the most important topics, albeit not always properly structured.
Overall a good and engaging overview.
Sometimes it simplifies complex topics or even patronizes you. The book is full of dumb half-jokes and comparisons. Some of the pictures are there... just for the sake of the not so funny a quip (at best).
That's not to say that the book is bad or the subject is badly presented. M. Beaney genuinely grabs your attention and makes you think with him, pulling you through the most important topics, albeit not always properly structured.
Overall a good and engaging overview.
April 7, 2025
تتميز الفلسفة التحليلية بالتزامها الشديد بالدقة، والوضوح، والصرامة، مع التركيز على الإبداع والفعالية المنهجية. وهذا يختلف عن الفلسفة التقليدية التي تميل إلى بناء المفاهيم والقضايا بصورة نهائية، دون تفكيكها إلى عناصرها الأولية.
ويعتبر وضع معايير محددة في تحديد المفاهيم واستخداماتها ضرورة أساسية في الفلسفة التحليلية، لضمان الانضباط وتحقيق نتائج واضحة. ولذلك، تتضمن النقاشات الفلسفية المنضبطة معايير محددة تحدد نطاق المفاهيم، مما يسهم في زيادة وضوح التفكير والأفكار.
وبناءً على ذلك، تميز الفلسفة التحليلية بين التعبيرات ذات المعنى والتعبيرات التي لا تحمل معنى. وقد تفرعت مدارس فلسفية متعددة في النظر إلى الموضوعات ذات الدلالة، مثل القابلية للتحقق، والقابلية للقياس، والقابلية للتجربة. في المقابل، توجد مذاهب مثالية تفتقر إلى معايير ضابطة للمعنى واللامعنى.
ويعتبر وضع معايير محددة في تحديد المفاهيم واستخداماتها ضرورة أساسية في الفلسفة التحليلية، لضمان الانضباط وتحقيق نتائج واضحة. ولذلك، تتضمن النقاشات الفلسفية المنضبطة معايير محددة تحدد نطاق المفاهيم، مما يسهم في زيادة وضوح التفكير والأفكار.
وبناءً على ذلك، تميز الفلسفة التحليلية بين التعبيرات ذات المعنى والتعبيرات التي لا تحمل معنى. وقد تفرعت مدارس فلسفية متعددة في النظر إلى الموضوعات ذات الدلالة، مثل القابلية للتحقق، والقابلية للقياس، والقابلية للتجربة. في المقابل، توجد مذاهب مثالية تفتقر إلى معايير ضابطة للمعنى واللامعنى.
September 9, 2020
Stella introduction. And for someone like me, who's done several intro philosophy of language classes in the past, a great refresher. Great overall approach and demonstration of (some of) the strengths of so-called analytic philosophy (illustrated through discussion of the projects of Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, G.E. Moore, Susan Stebbing- who I haven't read or heard of before.. touching also on others)while also rejecting the antagonism in the so-called analytic / continental divide. My only complaint is about the chattiness/conversational style of the writing - some of those puns and narratives are just too much.
August 1, 2018
Cuatro personajes célebres del tema:Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, G. E. Moore y Ludwig Wittgenstein y sus ideas acerca del tema, uno de creciente influencia en todas partes. Lo he leído motivado por mi interés en el pensamiento crítico, el razonamiento correcto, la claridad de exposición, el análisis adecuado y ese tipo de cosas tan escasas en tiempos de Internet.
Demasiado elevado para mi notable ignorancia, pero con algunas ideas sencillas que se me han quedado. Un muy breve libro para reales especialistas.
Demasiado elevado para mi notable ignorancia, pero con algunas ideas sencillas que se me han quedado. Un muy breve libro para reales especialistas.
November 29, 2020
i luv เลย คือ Beaney เปิดประเด็นด้วยการตั้งคำถามทางปรัชญาโดยไล่ไปทีละบท แล้วก็นำความคิดของ Great thinkers สาย Analytic มาเป็นกรอบใช้อธิบายต่อคำถามในแต่ละบท (มี Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein และ Stebbing) อย่างเช่น How many things are there? Beaney ก็เอา idea ของ Gottlob Frege มาช่วยตอบไรงี้ อื้มสนุกดี อ่านง่าย แต่กินพลังงานสมองพอสมควร มันต้องทำความเข้าใจ logic ดีๆ อ่านข้ามแล้วจะมึนเลย อีกอย่าง feel like อ่านพวกทฤษฎีคณิตศาสตร์ lol
April 29, 2021
I'm assuming analytic philosophy is excruciatingly boring rather than that this book is. It is frequently dull, nearly always pointless and almost invariably trivial. The final summation says it all. In order to make his point he ends up with dictionary definitions first in English and then in Latin. The book clearly sets out analytic philosophy but there is nothing there when it is set out.
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July 3, 2021tbh, i was just looking for a little overview of the theorists and their ideas. instead, i was armed with the tools to take on the actual texts. i’m not sure what to say. it’s like taking a sip of beer when you think you grabbed your water glass. it’s not what i expected, but when i realized what it was, it ended up being so much better.
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August 20, 2020Adopts a mostly pedagological approach to introducing Analytic Philosophy. To be expected, I suppose, but a historical approach would have been helpful.
July 21, 2021
A clear and fascinating presentation of the complex ideas of the founders of analytic philosophy and a brief overview of later contributors, a great example of a very short introduction.
October 5, 2021
Top stuff. Engaging and comprehensive.
August 9, 2022
Read a dozen of Oxford’s Short Introductories but this one is just utter crap.
December 25, 2022
I could not find in it a clear history of analytical philosophy neither a clear survey of its main achievements and subfields.
March 21, 2023
Well-written overview of the field.
May 3, 2024
Philosophy is clearly not difficult enough for this lot, who decided that it could be solved with mathematics 🙀 I think they’re on to a loser there but 4 stars for trying to explain it clearly.
December 26, 2025
Wow, very much suprisingly good for the A Very Short Introduction-series. From Frege all the way to Davidson.
February 25, 2021
Analytical Philosophy is new to me and i don't know why but everything new in philosophy frightens me xD
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