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Barbarossa: The Russian German Conflict
The classic account of the war on the Eastern Front between the Russians and the Germans - the greatest clash of arms the world has ever seen.
Carefully researched and beautifully written, this book is a classic of military history. Alan Clark vividly narrates the course of the dramatic and brutal war between the German and Russians on the Eastern Front during the Second World War. From the invasion of Russia mounted on Midsummer's Day 1941 and the German Army's advance to the outskirts of Moscow, to the terrible turning point of Stalingrad and the eventual defeat of the Nazis at the Fall of Berlin after the hard years of fighting and advance by the Red Army, this is epic history narrated by a master.
783 pages, Kindle Edition
First published February 1, 1966
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About the author
Alan Clark
130 books21 followersAlan Clark was an English Conservative MP, historian and diarist.
Librarian Note: There is more than one author in the GoodReads database with this name. See this thread for more information.
Librarian Note: There is more than one author in the GoodReads database with this name. See this thread for more information.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 79 reviews
January 29, 2020
Classics should earn their sobriquet by a timeless value, not by remaining in print. Clark's uneven coverage continues to plague WWII Eastern Front overviews such as Absolute War* : to Moscow ! Hold Stalingrad ! Forward at Kursk ! And in between ? A mere 20 pages until the gates of Berlin, squarely in the spirit of the Cold War:
"The second front which had been so essential an adjunct to Soviet policy while it promised to weaken the west and relieve the pressure on the Red Army was now an impediment to the advance of communism in Europe".
His views on Hitler vs. OKH lean towards the unorthodox. On one hand, "It is certainly paradoxical to find Hitler, whose own contempt for the professional soldiers was unbounded and who never ceased to exalt the ties of party over the scruples of caste, express so orthodox a view on the corrupting effect of politics on a military system.". On the other hand, "One man, the Fűhrer, rose to the occasion" to order a stand, rather than a cut-to-pieces retreat. Generally curious to see him rated as at his peak, while his generals were at their most independent.
Also, Clark doesn't seem to believe that Barbarossa was undertaken in the firm belief that six weeks or so would see the demise of the Soviet forces west of the Urals. "This monstrous awe inspiring war of movement was but a few weeks old. To say that the general staff was bewildered would be to overstate, but it is certainly true that its meticulous professional competence left little room for the imagination required to cope with such a gigantic opportunity". In five days they were halfway to Leningrad, in spite of reinforcements sipped from Minsk. In the south, between the Priet marches & the Carpathians, the spoon feeding of militia reserves slowed things down a bit.
Not that he cannot offer (for his time) avant-garde insights, synthesize the great battles, nor write a notable quotable in the middle. Below I've kept his prime paragraphs on the tactical evolution of the Soviets in 1936-1941, the aftermath of Kiev and the situation on the eve of Stalingrad & Kursk.
On the face of it, the post-purge tactical reintegration of tanks as infantry support had 3 good reasons: the Americans embraced a similar combined arms concept, it proved to work against fixed defence lines in Spain & those deep penetration talk columns were motti'd up good by the Finns. Plus, it fitted well with the traditional concept of the Russian steamroller. Even Zhukov at Nomonhan threw rigidly cooperated artillery weight.
The Kiev encirclement cost the USSR a third of its pre-war army (600.000) & by end of September the strategic objectives were reached: Leningrad isolated, Donetz occupied. "The bear was dead but he would not lie down". They had 2.5 million casualties; the entire Russian strength estimate from the start, artillery and machines included. What then was holding the Red Army up? Perhaps Ivan's individual behaviour should've been judged more ominous. Units fighting their way out of encirclement, instead of the customary French passivity. Simulating wounded shooting Lantsers in back. Wounded who suffer in silence. "If as Hitler claimed the will was all important the Germans had already lost the war. The Wehrmacht was living by the sword. If and when the sword would blunt..." The victory at Kiev had encouraged many of the general staff to believe that one more Kessel would finish the Russians off and that they could winter in Moscow, with 75% of the German army and all the Panzer arranged against a weak army of reservists and horse-drawn cannon. (In the rear German brutality started to trigger "partisans" who had no desire to return to face execution). "There is no doubt that Stalin's nerve gave way on occasion vb. All that Lenin created we have lost for ever" but.. the dictator of all the Russians had too many enemies to risk altering the status quo." (Plus intelligence showed a transfer of Siberian armies was plausible)
Jump forward two months to February 42, with both sides more or less patched up to their original numerical strength, but with Russian industrial output halved. The head-on at Kharkov, together with the secondary push at Sebastopol, depleted Russian armour from 5:1 to 1:10 (?). By the autumn, the Eastern front had doubled in length.
"Certainly by any standard other than that of the Soviet formation opposing them the German order of battle looked formidable: the number of Panzer divisions had been raised from ten to seventeen, by ruthlessly stripping the rest of the front of its armoured protection... Once again the old blitzkrieg formula was fed into the computer with little regard for the changed conditions save a simple arithmetic increase in the strength of the respective components." They had only 35 miles for each pincer to go to blow up the basket.
* Absolute War: Soviet Russia in the Second World War by Christopher Bellamy
"The second front which had been so essential an adjunct to Soviet policy while it promised to weaken the west and relieve the pressure on the Red Army was now an impediment to the advance of communism in Europe".
His views on Hitler vs. OKH lean towards the unorthodox. On one hand, "It is certainly paradoxical to find Hitler, whose own contempt for the professional soldiers was unbounded and who never ceased to exalt the ties of party over the scruples of caste, express so orthodox a view on the corrupting effect of politics on a military system.". On the other hand, "One man, the Fűhrer, rose to the occasion" to order a stand, rather than a cut-to-pieces retreat. Generally curious to see him rated as at his peak, while his generals were at their most independent.
Also, Clark doesn't seem to believe that Barbarossa was undertaken in the firm belief that six weeks or so would see the demise of the Soviet forces west of the Urals. "This monstrous awe inspiring war of movement was but a few weeks old. To say that the general staff was bewildered would be to overstate, but it is certainly true that its meticulous professional competence left little room for the imagination required to cope with such a gigantic opportunity". In five days they were halfway to Leningrad, in spite of reinforcements sipped from Minsk. In the south, between the Priet marches & the Carpathians, the spoon feeding of militia reserves slowed things down a bit.
Not that he cannot offer (for his time) avant-garde insights, synthesize the great battles, nor write a notable quotable in the middle. Below I've kept his prime paragraphs on the tactical evolution of the Soviets in 1936-1941, the aftermath of Kiev and the situation on the eve of Stalingrad & Kursk.
On the face of it, the post-purge tactical reintegration of tanks as infantry support had 3 good reasons: the Americans embraced a similar combined arms concept, it proved to work against fixed defence lines in Spain & those deep penetration talk columns were motti'd up good by the Finns. Plus, it fitted well with the traditional concept of the Russian steamroller. Even Zhukov at Nomonhan threw rigidly cooperated artillery weight.
The Kiev encirclement cost the USSR a third of its pre-war army (600.000) & by end of September the strategic objectives were reached: Leningrad isolated, Donetz occupied. "The bear was dead but he would not lie down". They had 2.5 million casualties; the entire Russian strength estimate from the start, artillery and machines included. What then was holding the Red Army up? Perhaps Ivan's individual behaviour should've been judged more ominous. Units fighting their way out of encirclement, instead of the customary French passivity. Simulating wounded shooting Lantsers in back. Wounded who suffer in silence. "If as Hitler claimed the will was all important the Germans had already lost the war. The Wehrmacht was living by the sword. If and when the sword would blunt..." The victory at Kiev had encouraged many of the general staff to believe that one more Kessel would finish the Russians off and that they could winter in Moscow, with 75% of the German army and all the Panzer arranged against a weak army of reservists and horse-drawn cannon. (In the rear German brutality started to trigger "partisans" who had no desire to return to face execution). "There is no doubt that Stalin's nerve gave way on occasion vb. All that Lenin created we have lost for ever" but.. the dictator of all the Russians had too many enemies to risk altering the status quo." (Plus intelligence showed a transfer of Siberian armies was plausible)
Jump forward two months to February 42, with both sides more or less patched up to their original numerical strength, but with Russian industrial output halved. The head-on at Kharkov, together with the secondary push at Sebastopol, depleted Russian armour from 5:1 to 1:10 (?). By the autumn, the Eastern front had doubled in length.
"Certainly by any standard other than that of the Soviet formation opposing them the German order of battle looked formidable: the number of Panzer divisions had been raised from ten to seventeen, by ruthlessly stripping the rest of the front of its armoured protection... Once again the old blitzkrieg formula was fed into the computer with little regard for the changed conditions save a simple arithmetic increase in the strength of the respective components." They had only 35 miles for each pincer to go to blow up the basket.
* Absolute War: Soviet Russia in the Second World War by Christopher Bellamy
March 31, 2016
The Eastern Front WAS WW2 in Europe, the other theatres of operation were mere sideshows.
This book relates the gargantuan struggle on the Ostfront. It was utterly brutal, with little regard for civilians or the rules of war. The hitherto invincible German army up against the huge expanse and resources of Russia.
The initial assault in June 41 destroyed the Russian defences and promised an easy victory as German tanks ripped through the borderlands. The ill prepared Russian army (foolishly decapitated by Stalin in the purges of 37/38) disintegrated, and millions of soldiers were taken prisoner. But amidst the euphoria of victory there were some ominous signs - Chief of Staff Halder "we expected 200 divisions, we have already counted 360". The Germans were halted in front of Moscow by a combination of a very harsh winter, their own dithering and desperate defence bolstered by the arrival of fresh veteran troops from the Siberian garrison.
Even so, the bulk of the Russian army is gone, 60% of industry is in enemy hands, as is much of the population and agricultural capacity.
1942. The next year opened in similar vein, with the focus turning to the south. Again the Germans broke through, and the Ukraine was taken - with the glittering prize of the Baku oilfields tantalisingly close - only for this advantage to be dissipated in a pointless and vainglorious attempt to take Stalingrad. The defeat at Stalingrad was the turning point of the war. From there the options available to the German army gradually closed in.
1943 and 1944 sees the Germans being forced back, gradually at first but with increasing pace as the Russian advantage in men and material becomes more and more pronounced. There are some limited successes (often defensive battles to extracate themselves from danger).
Finally 1945 sees the war brought home to Germany with a vengeance, as Berlin is stormed and the German people experience retribution at the hands of a victorious army with scores to settle.
The numbers involved in this struggle are almost unimaginable, millions of combatants fight and die, civilians bear the brunt as always (perhaps 20 million die) and the map of Europe is changed forever as the eastern border of Germany is moved westwards.
This book is very good on the grand strategic sweep of the campaign. It dissects the ebbs and flows of the war skillfully and provides a good insight into the politcs behind the frontlines. I had known that Stalin and Hitler were homicidal megalomaniacs prone to interfering in military matters, but I had not appreciated the extent to which the inherent structural fault lines of the Nazi regime with its competing power centres detracted from the war effort.
I found this a very good history of this important war. Very approachable and enjoyable.
4/5 stars
This book relates the gargantuan struggle on the Ostfront. It was utterly brutal, with little regard for civilians or the rules of war. The hitherto invincible German army up against the huge expanse and resources of Russia.
The initial assault in June 41 destroyed the Russian defences and promised an easy victory as German tanks ripped through the borderlands. The ill prepared Russian army (foolishly decapitated by Stalin in the purges of 37/38) disintegrated, and millions of soldiers were taken prisoner. But amidst the euphoria of victory there were some ominous signs - Chief of Staff Halder "we expected 200 divisions, we have already counted 360". The Germans were halted in front of Moscow by a combination of a very harsh winter, their own dithering and desperate defence bolstered by the arrival of fresh veteran troops from the Siberian garrison.
Even so, the bulk of the Russian army is gone, 60% of industry is in enemy hands, as is much of the population and agricultural capacity.
1942. The next year opened in similar vein, with the focus turning to the south. Again the Germans broke through, and the Ukraine was taken - with the glittering prize of the Baku oilfields tantalisingly close - only for this advantage to be dissipated in a pointless and vainglorious attempt to take Stalingrad. The defeat at Stalingrad was the turning point of the war. From there the options available to the German army gradually closed in.
1943 and 1944 sees the Germans being forced back, gradually at first but with increasing pace as the Russian advantage in men and material becomes more and more pronounced. There are some limited successes (often defensive battles to extracate themselves from danger).
Finally 1945 sees the war brought home to Germany with a vengeance, as Berlin is stormed and the German people experience retribution at the hands of a victorious army with scores to settle.
The numbers involved in this struggle are almost unimaginable, millions of combatants fight and die, civilians bear the brunt as always (perhaps 20 million die) and the map of Europe is changed forever as the eastern border of Germany is moved westwards.
This book is very good on the grand strategic sweep of the campaign. It dissects the ebbs and flows of the war skillfully and provides a good insight into the politcs behind the frontlines. I had known that Stalin and Hitler were homicidal megalomaniacs prone to interfering in military matters, but I had not appreciated the extent to which the inherent structural fault lines of the Nazi regime with its competing power centres detracted from the war effort.
I found this a very good history of this important war. Very approachable and enjoyable.
4/5 stars
February 4, 2018
Barbarossa by Alan Clark was published over half a century ago and is still a classic of the Nazi / Soviet military struggle on the Eastern Front. Don't let the title fool you. This account is much more than just the initial invasion of Russia by the Wehrmacht. It recounts the entire war in Eastern Europe. This masterpiece focuses on the major strategic aspects of the fighting primarily from the German perspective - from the initial German invasion and the turning point at Stalingrad to the final collapse of the German forces and the Soviet's sweep through Poland and into Berlin.
The account is definitely lopsided with the predominance of the discussion focusing on the German perspective. This is due to the period in which it was written. It would be another 40 years before the Soviet archives opened and historians could begin to review the details from a Russian viewpoint. Never-the-less this is a fantastic introduction to the early successes, mid-war stresses and finally the total collapse of the Nazi war machine.
The author provides some biographical background on the primary participants with a focus on the German leadership. Of particular interest are the quoted exchanges between Hitler and various members of the German General Staff giving some direct insight into the interaction of the personalities involved and the atmosphere surrounding those meetings.
In addition to the military aspect of the account, Alan Clark includes the economic particulars driving the strategy and battles. As an example, Clark discusses Albert Speer's production of tanks, close working relationship with Colonel General Guderian and the design and fielding of the new generation of tanks - the Panthers and Tigers. Challenges with keeping the mechanized forces fueled is discussed from both a logistical perspective early in the war and how the petroleum shortage at the end of the war impacted operations.
Diplomatic aspects of the war are also part of the narrative. Of particular interest was Clark's assessment of how Ribbentrop was viewed by many of the German General Staff - which was at best a bumbling fool. Another fascinating insight is Clark's documentation of Himmler's take on how he (Himmler) was viewed by the Western Powers. According to Clark Himmler believed he was viewed in a positive light by the Western Powers. Himmler truly thought he could negotiate a peace with the West, and even went as far as hoping the West would participate in the fight against Communism, i.e. the Soviets, in the East. It seems the Nazi leadership were living in quite the fantasy world at the conclusion of the war.
Overall I would recommend this book to anyone with an interest in the fighting on the Eastern Front. Written in a style that is easy to read this comprehensive study continues to be a valuable contribution to the collection of WW II knowledge.
The account is definitely lopsided with the predominance of the discussion focusing on the German perspective. This is due to the period in which it was written. It would be another 40 years before the Soviet archives opened and historians could begin to review the details from a Russian viewpoint. Never-the-less this is a fantastic introduction to the early successes, mid-war stresses and finally the total collapse of the Nazi war machine.
The author provides some biographical background on the primary participants with a focus on the German leadership. Of particular interest are the quoted exchanges between Hitler and various members of the German General Staff giving some direct insight into the interaction of the personalities involved and the atmosphere surrounding those meetings.
In addition to the military aspect of the account, Alan Clark includes the economic particulars driving the strategy and battles. As an example, Clark discusses Albert Speer's production of tanks, close working relationship with Colonel General Guderian and the design and fielding of the new generation of tanks - the Panthers and Tigers. Challenges with keeping the mechanized forces fueled is discussed from both a logistical perspective early in the war and how the petroleum shortage at the end of the war impacted operations.
Diplomatic aspects of the war are also part of the narrative. Of particular interest was Clark's assessment of how Ribbentrop was viewed by many of the German General Staff - which was at best a bumbling fool. Another fascinating insight is Clark's documentation of Himmler's take on how he (Himmler) was viewed by the Western Powers. According to Clark Himmler believed he was viewed in a positive light by the Western Powers. Himmler truly thought he could negotiate a peace with the West, and even went as far as hoping the West would participate in the fight against Communism, i.e. the Soviets, in the East. It seems the Nazi leadership were living in quite the fantasy world at the conclusion of the war.
Overall I would recommend this book to anyone with an interest in the fighting on the Eastern Front. Written in a style that is easy to read this comprehensive study continues to be a valuable contribution to the collection of WW II knowledge.
March 20, 2010
This book was first published in 1965. I read it in 1968 and we teenage, burgeoning WWII fans liked it. There were few books available at the time that covered something outside the USA battles. This on the Russian front really got us interested.
November 4, 2017
HIGHEST RECOMMENDATION!
Humans, it seems, have been far more successful at creating Hell on Earth than Heaven. Those few who have or do attain it do so at the cost of perpetuating an ongoing hellish struggle for the vast majority of humanity.
This would seem to be a jumping off point for an essay on the dismal state of things, which I could easily do, but won't.
Mass delusion, in any case, has never gone away, as we can well ascertain -- those of us who've stepped back to observe the corrosive effects of fantasies perpetuated by religion, governments, corporate interests, and millions of the gullible, can well see it in the face of apparent mass blindness. The extent to which people shoot themselves in the foot against their own interests has no longer become surprising, but expected.
But, there I go again. Artlessly I'm trying to say that history doesn't really change; the present is a litany of the same mistakes, operating at varying levels of severity. In World War II, on the eastern front, we see that severity as its utmost.
On the whims of such delusion was begat the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941 -- an act that led to a four-year titanic struggle almost too enormous to grasp with attendant human suffering too pervasive to imagine.
The four-year war between Germany and Russia, we can safely say, consituted the *real* struggle of the second world war, but saying that makes me leery and a little guilty in light of the heroic acts and the suffering endured in the other theaters of battle, some by a hair-thin collection of men and women who still walk among us. When and if you happen to be privileged enough to encounter one of them, make sure to thank them profusely.
In my opinion, the battles on the eastern front in WWII constitute the most fascinating era in the history of humanity. The battles of Stalingrad, Moscow, Kursk and Leningrad alone contain enough material to keep an avid reader busy and rapt for one's entire lifetime.
In 1964 when Alan Clark put the finishing touches on this masterpiece of historical literature, he stood alone in the English-language publishing world. Till then, no one had written in the English language a comprehensive overview of this epochal theater of the war. Since then, many have been scribed, yet even with all the things revealed by subsequent scholarship and the opening of Russian archives, this one still stands tall, and I can't imagine there being a better and more compelling treatment of the subject in print.
Clark's treatment is balanced, though heavily dependent on German military sources, and his insights into what happened and what *might* have happened in differing circumstances provide ample fodder for rumination and debate. Particularly fascinating is his examination of the dirty ways of German politics behind the war, the back-stabbing and shifting alliances and the territorialism. It all comes very fast and thick and is best taken without concerning yourself overmuch with remembering all the detail -- same for the vast amount of detail on troop movements therein.
Clark does a yeoman job of deflating or tackling myths that had grown up around the commission of the war, particularly the tendency among military enthusiasts to fete the German generals at the expense of Hitler's own almost supernatural genius at counterintuitive tactics.
For those interested in the atrocities committed on both sides, both in military and "pacification" senses, Clark provides plenty of grisly detail, also.
Although I would consider this a primer text, I'd also classify it as one best tackled by those at a "moderate," rather than beginner, level understanding of the war, due to its heavy detail. This is not to say the book is dry. It is just as much a fine and lively work of war literature as it is a litany of fact.
So far, one of the five best books on the war I have read.
(KR@KY 2017)
Humans, it seems, have been far more successful at creating Hell on Earth than Heaven. Those few who have or do attain it do so at the cost of perpetuating an ongoing hellish struggle for the vast majority of humanity.
This would seem to be a jumping off point for an essay on the dismal state of things, which I could easily do, but won't.
Mass delusion, in any case, has never gone away, as we can well ascertain -- those of us who've stepped back to observe the corrosive effects of fantasies perpetuated by religion, governments, corporate interests, and millions of the gullible, can well see it in the face of apparent mass blindness. The extent to which people shoot themselves in the foot against their own interests has no longer become surprising, but expected.
But, there I go again. Artlessly I'm trying to say that history doesn't really change; the present is a litany of the same mistakes, operating at varying levels of severity. In World War II, on the eastern front, we see that severity as its utmost.
On the whims of such delusion was begat the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941 -- an act that led to a four-year titanic struggle almost too enormous to grasp with attendant human suffering too pervasive to imagine.
The four-year war between Germany and Russia, we can safely say, consituted the *real* struggle of the second world war, but saying that makes me leery and a little guilty in light of the heroic acts and the suffering endured in the other theaters of battle, some by a hair-thin collection of men and women who still walk among us. When and if you happen to be privileged enough to encounter one of them, make sure to thank them profusely.
In my opinion, the battles on the eastern front in WWII constitute the most fascinating era in the history of humanity. The battles of Stalingrad, Moscow, Kursk and Leningrad alone contain enough material to keep an avid reader busy and rapt for one's entire lifetime.
In 1964 when Alan Clark put the finishing touches on this masterpiece of historical literature, he stood alone in the English-language publishing world. Till then, no one had written in the English language a comprehensive overview of this epochal theater of the war. Since then, many have been scribed, yet even with all the things revealed by subsequent scholarship and the opening of Russian archives, this one still stands tall, and I can't imagine there being a better and more compelling treatment of the subject in print.
Clark's treatment is balanced, though heavily dependent on German military sources, and his insights into what happened and what *might* have happened in differing circumstances provide ample fodder for rumination and debate. Particularly fascinating is his examination of the dirty ways of German politics behind the war, the back-stabbing and shifting alliances and the territorialism. It all comes very fast and thick and is best taken without concerning yourself overmuch with remembering all the detail -- same for the vast amount of detail on troop movements therein.
Clark does a yeoman job of deflating or tackling myths that had grown up around the commission of the war, particularly the tendency among military enthusiasts to fete the German generals at the expense of Hitler's own almost supernatural genius at counterintuitive tactics.
For those interested in the atrocities committed on both sides, both in military and "pacification" senses, Clark provides plenty of grisly detail, also.
Although I would consider this a primer text, I'd also classify it as one best tackled by those at a "moderate," rather than beginner, level understanding of the war, due to its heavy detail. This is not to say the book is dry. It is just as much a fine and lively work of war literature as it is a litany of fact.
So far, one of the five best books on the war I have read.
(KR@KY 2017)
September 21, 2021
When I was a kid the book to read on this topic was RUSSIA AT WAR by Alexander Werth. I hate to say it, but in some ways this book is even better. It has more of the big picture, and more analysis of the generals on both sides and the tactical decisions they made. It's also a little bit shorter and more concise. But RUSSIA AT WAR is still a classic. Werth wrote a much more exhaustive day by day account. He was an eyewitness, a journalist on the scene, and much of his book is based on conversations he had with real-life soldiers, refugees, and diplomats while the war was still going on.
January 18, 2015
This is not a novel. Barbarossa is an intense, graphic history of the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941. It was first published in 1965 and as far as I know is still the standard for this particular period. The savagery and cruelty of the war on the Russian front is brought to the reader in crisp, unadulterated prose that leaves you breathless and horrified at the extent of the barbarism which took place. Any one interested in military history should read this book. Anyone who thinks war is a good thing should be strapped down and have this book read to them.
December 3, 2013
I read this book in grade school, which caused a minor scandal with the librarian, who told me I was too young to read it. Of course, I read the whole thing. Alan Clark's first English-language account of the Russian-German conflict of WWII is so vivid and gripping, it stays in my mind after all these years. A classic.
November 28, 2011
I was blown away by this classic book on WW2,its truly fantastic and really opened my eyes to the war really being a war between Nazis and Soviets. I think its a must read. As another reviewer has said Hitler comes across as been let down by squabbling factions within high command.
November 21, 2016
The book has three dimensions, all excellent. There is firstly the military history itself; secondly the background history to the conflict such as the analysis of the psychology of Hitler and his Generals; and thirdly the work of an artist: the narrative, drama, suspense, tragedy and epic of the story. On the last dimension it is interesting that Clark in his introduction refers to the books’ heroes belonging to the classical tradition rather than the modern Western tradition of “good” and “bad”. The imaginative power of the book - the epic feel of the greatest war in history, the tantalising closeness to Moscow, the mythic echoes of Napoleon’s campaign - is such that it transcends the military history genre. It is also amusing that Clark the self-opinionated, outspoken libertine peeks out from time to time from under the mask of the serious historian....
This is an extract from a review at http://monthlybookgroup.wordpress.com/. Our reviews are also to be found at http://monthlybookgroup.blogspot.com/
This is an extract from a review at http://monthlybookgroup.wordpress.com/. Our reviews are also to be found at http://monthlybookgroup.blogspot.com/
July 12, 2014
Though some have called it “dated,” I find this book to be timeless in its highly detailed presentation of the catastrophic invasion of the Soviet Union by the Wehrmacht in 1941. This book breathes life into a subject that was briefly covered in some of my school classrooms years ago. To read about the sub-zero temperatures and their effects on soldiers and their gear will make any reader more appreciative of the comfortable life they now enjoy. The valiant persistence of the Russian soldiers despite the onslaught by a better-organized foe is pointed out very well by the author. Today we are inundated with historical books and Hollywood depictions of the American battles with Hitler’s forces, and this book adds an important chapter to the global conflicts that were part of World War II. I find this book so interesting that I have given it to a couple of my friends. They, too, found it difficult to put down once they began reading it.
August 22, 2013
It was a war of attrition like no other, between two absolute dictators like no others.
From the unlikely non-agression pact that paved the way for the start of World War II, Adolf Hitler and Josef Stalin were jockeying for the optimum position leading up to June 22, 1941, the start of Operation 'Barbarossa'...the Nazi German invasion of the Soviet Union.
This book takes the helm from the opening salvo to the final shells blasting around the Berlin chancellory almost five years later, at a cost of millions of lives...soldiers and civilians alike. Alan Clark delves into the operation with such precision and tenacity as to exclude practically everything else going on around the world stage, using them only to re-set the timeline in the bloody earth of the Russian front.
For the purist war chronicaller and those amazed by the most astounding evil men do to men.
From the unlikely non-agression pact that paved the way for the start of World War II, Adolf Hitler and Josef Stalin were jockeying for the optimum position leading up to June 22, 1941, the start of Operation 'Barbarossa'...the Nazi German invasion of the Soviet Union.
This book takes the helm from the opening salvo to the final shells blasting around the Berlin chancellory almost five years later, at a cost of millions of lives...soldiers and civilians alike. Alan Clark delves into the operation with such precision and tenacity as to exclude practically everything else going on around the world stage, using them only to re-set the timeline in the bloody earth of the Russian front.
For the purist war chronicaller and those amazed by the most astounding evil men do to men.
August 21, 2018
Poorly sourced, pre-access to anything Soviet.
January 11, 2026
“Vaulting ambition, which o’erleaps itself
And falls on th’other.”‘ — ‘‘Shakespeare, ‘Macbeth’’
There are histories that catalogue events and histories that reveal character. Alan Clark’s ‘Barbarossa’ belongs to the second kind. It is not merely a military account of Operation Barbarossa—the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941—but a study in catastrophic self-deception.
Rereading it in 2026, long after the dust has settled and the ideological corpses have been counted, feels less like studying a campaign than witnessing the collapse of reason under the weight of certainty.
Clark writes with a voice that is at once lucid and unforgiving. His prose does not inflate heroism or soften consequence. Instead, it exposes how power mistakes momentum for destiny. ‘Barbarossa’ becomes, almost against itself, a tragedy in the classical sense: an action propelled by pride, sustained by illusion, and concluded by inevitability.
From the first pages, one senses that this is not a book about tactics alone. It is about the fatal intoxication of clarity—when a state, an army, or a civilisation convinces itself that complexity can be solved by force.
Barbarossa begins with confidence. That is its most dangerous quality. Clark shows how the Wehrmacht entered the Soviet Union with extraordinary operational skill, a doctrine honed in Poland and France, and a belief—shared across the German command—that history itself had tilted in their favour.
Early successes seemed to confirm the theory. Soviet formations shattered; prisoners poured westward; maps were redrawn at speed.
Yet Clark is careful to show how this confidence was epistemological, not moral. The Germans ‘believed’ they understood the enemy. They had read Russia as a problem of terrain and incompetence.
They mistook early collapse for terminal weakness. Like Shakespeare’s Caesar, they were warned—by logistics officers, by intelligence analysts, by weather—but they dismissed caution as cowardice.
“He is a dreamer; let us leave him.”‘ — ‘‘Shakespeare, ‘Julius Caesar’’
Barbarossa’s opening act is drenched in that fatal scorn. The enemy is reduced to stereotype; the land is abstracted into lines on a map.
Clark’s great strength is his ability to show how this abstraction corrodes judgment. The invasion is planned as if the Soviet Union were France with forests. History, culture, ideology, endurance—none of these are allowed to intrude.
This is not merely military error; it is philosophical failure.
In ‘Paradise Lost’, Milton gives us Satan’s defining flaw: not rebellion, but certainty.
“To be weak is miserable,
Doing or suffering.”‘ — ‘‘Milton, ‘Paradise Lost’’
The German leadership—Hitler foremost, but not alone—believed weakness resided only in the enemy. Clark is particularly incisive here. He refuses the comforting myth that Barbarossa failed exclusively because of Hitler’s interference. The rot was deeper. It lay in the assumption that war could deliver final solutions to historical questions.
Clark shows how ideology warped intelligence. Reports that contradicted expectation were ignored or reinterpreted. Soviet resilience was explained away as temporary. Losses were dismissed as noise. The campaign was structured around an end-state that existed only in German imagination: a Soviet collapse before winter.
This is where ‘Barbarossa’ transcends operational history and enters tragedy. The invasion becomes a wager against reality itself. And reality, as ever, refuses to cooperate.
One of Clark’s quiet achievements is his attention to geography—not as scenery, but as active resistance. Russia is not merely vast; it is indifferent. Roads dissolve into mud. Distances mock timetables. Winter arrives not as a surprise but as a verdict.
Here, the ancient texts speak with uncanny relevance. In the ‘Mahabharata’, armies that ignore the rhythms of land and season invite disaster. Bhishma warns repeatedly that force divorced from timing is self-destruction.
‘“Kalaḥ pacati bhūtāni”
‘Time ripens all beings.’ — ‘‘Mahabharata’’
The German command treated time as an instrument; Russia treated it as a weapon. Clark shows how delays compounded, how logistics frayed, how machines failed, and how soldiers—brilliant, disciplined, exhausted—were consumed by a campaign that refused to end.
One of the most haunting aspects of ‘Barbarossa’ is Clark’s portrayal of German incomprehension toward the Soviet soldier. The Red Army is initially depicted—by German commanders—as a clumsy mass, badly led, politically compromised.
Clark does not deny Soviet failures. He documents them in detail. But he also shows how German contempt blinded them to a deeper truth: the Soviet state had fused fear, ideology, and survival into a brutal cohesion.
This is where the ‘Bhagavad Gita’ offers a stark contrast. Krishna tells Arjuna that action without understanding binds one to illusion.
“Karmanye vadhikaraste,
Ma phaleshu kadachana.”
‘You have a right to action alone,
Never to its fruits.’ — ‘‘Gita 2.47’’
The German leadership obsessed over outcomes—territory seized, armies destroyed—without understanding the ‘nature’ of the struggle.
The Soviet soldier was not fighting for territory; he was fighting for existence. Clark captures this transformation as the war progresses: panic hardens into resistance, chaos into discipline, and terror into resolve.
Barbarossa did not merely underestimate Soviet numbers. It misunderstood Soviet psychology.
Clark does not dwell sentimentally on atrocity, but he does not avert his gaze. The invasion was accompanied by ideological extermination: Jews, commissars, and civilians were marked for death as policy. This was not incidental brutality; it was strategic conviction.
Here Shakespeare’s language becomes unavoidable.
“I am in blood
Stepped in so far that, should I wade no more,
Returning were as tedious as go o’er.”— ‘‘Macbeth’’
The Germans crossed moral thresholds early and irrevocably. Clark suggests—without sermonising—that this violence poisoned operational logic. An army that treats populations as expendable forfeits intelligence, cooperation, and legitimacy. Barbarossa became not just a war against an army but against a people.
The ‘Mahabharata’ again stands in judgment. Even in war, dharma restrains annihilation. When those restraints vanish, victory becomes meaningless.
“Adharmaḥ abhibhavati”
‘When unrighteousness prevails, ruin follows.’
Clark is unsparing in his depiction of German command dysfunction. Rivalries, conflicting objectives, ideological interference—these erode coherence as the campaign advances. The German system, superb at manoeuvre warfare, proves brittle under prolonged strain.
Sun Tzu warns against precisely this illusion.
“There is no instance of a country having benefited from prolonged warfare.”
Barbarossa was conceived as a short war. When it became a long one, the German command lacked the conceptual flexibility to adapt. Clark shows how decisions were made to preserve narratives rather than realities.
Retreats were delayed to save face. Positions were held to satisfy doctrine, not necessity.
This is perhaps the book’s most chilling lesson: when ideology replaces feedback, collapse is only a matter of time.
By the time winter descends, Barbarossa has already failed. Clark resists the cliché that cold defeated Germany. Cold merely revealed the truth. The campaign had exhausted its moral and material reserves.
Men froze because supply lines had broken; supply lines broke because plans were fantasies.
Milton again resonates:
“The mind is its own place, and in itself
Can make a Heaven of Hell, a Hell of Heaven.”
German leadership attempted to will success into existence. Reality answered with frost.
Alan Clark’s prose deserves special mention. It is elegant without indulgence, sceptical without cynicism. He neither romanticises nor trivialises. There is an English restraint here—a refusal to shout—that makes the condemnation sharper.
Unlike later Eastern Front histories dense with statistics, ‘Barbarossa’ reads almost like moral archaeology. Clark excavates assumptions. He allows readers to see how catastrophe is assembled piece by piece, decision by decision.
The book’s enduring power lies in its refusal to moralise overtly. It trusts the reader to recognise hubris when it appears. And hubris appears everywhere.
What makes ‘Barbarossa’ disturbingly contemporary is its pattern. A powerful state convinces itself that complexity is weakness. It substitutes doctrine for understanding. It mistakes initial success for destiny. It silences doubt. It crosses moral thresholds in the name of efficiency. And then it is surprised—genuinely surprised—when resistance hardens.
This is not uniquely German. It is human.
The ancient texts knew this. Shakespeare knew it. Milton knew it. Clark, writing history rather than drama, arrives at the same conclusion: power unmoored from humility becomes self-destructive.
Reading ‘Barbarossa’ is an unsettling experience because it implicates the reader. It asks whether we, too, mistake clarity for truth. Whether we prefer clean narratives to messy realities. Whether we believe force can solve what understanding refuses to confront.
Trust me, you will close the book not with horror, but with recognition. The failure of Barbarossa was not technical. It was metaphysical. It was the belief that the world would conform to theory.
Krishna’s warning echoes across the centuries:
“Vināśāya ca duṣkṛtām”
‘Destruction follows those who act without wisdom.’
Alan Clark’s ‘Barbarossa’ is not merely a history of a failed invasion. It is a meditation on the limits of power, the danger of certainty, and the cost of forgetting that war is not an equation but a human catastrophe.
To read it is to watch ambition overleap itself—and fall.
Most recommended.
And falls on th’other.”‘ — ‘‘Shakespeare, ‘Macbeth’’
There are histories that catalogue events and histories that reveal character. Alan Clark’s ‘Barbarossa’ belongs to the second kind. It is not merely a military account of Operation Barbarossa—the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941—but a study in catastrophic self-deception.
Rereading it in 2026, long after the dust has settled and the ideological corpses have been counted, feels less like studying a campaign than witnessing the collapse of reason under the weight of certainty.
Clark writes with a voice that is at once lucid and unforgiving. His prose does not inflate heroism or soften consequence. Instead, it exposes how power mistakes momentum for destiny. ‘Barbarossa’ becomes, almost against itself, a tragedy in the classical sense: an action propelled by pride, sustained by illusion, and concluded by inevitability.
From the first pages, one senses that this is not a book about tactics alone. It is about the fatal intoxication of clarity—when a state, an army, or a civilisation convinces itself that complexity can be solved by force.
Barbarossa begins with confidence. That is its most dangerous quality. Clark shows how the Wehrmacht entered the Soviet Union with extraordinary operational skill, a doctrine honed in Poland and France, and a belief—shared across the German command—that history itself had tilted in their favour.
Early successes seemed to confirm the theory. Soviet formations shattered; prisoners poured westward; maps were redrawn at speed.
Yet Clark is careful to show how this confidence was epistemological, not moral. The Germans ‘believed’ they understood the enemy. They had read Russia as a problem of terrain and incompetence.
They mistook early collapse for terminal weakness. Like Shakespeare’s Caesar, they were warned—by logistics officers, by intelligence analysts, by weather—but they dismissed caution as cowardice.
“He is a dreamer; let us leave him.”‘ — ‘‘Shakespeare, ‘Julius Caesar’’
Barbarossa’s opening act is drenched in that fatal scorn. The enemy is reduced to stereotype; the land is abstracted into lines on a map.
Clark’s great strength is his ability to show how this abstraction corrodes judgment. The invasion is planned as if the Soviet Union were France with forests. History, culture, ideology, endurance—none of these are allowed to intrude.
This is not merely military error; it is philosophical failure.
In ‘Paradise Lost’, Milton gives us Satan’s defining flaw: not rebellion, but certainty.
“To be weak is miserable,
Doing or suffering.”‘ — ‘‘Milton, ‘Paradise Lost’’
The German leadership—Hitler foremost, but not alone—believed weakness resided only in the enemy. Clark is particularly incisive here. He refuses the comforting myth that Barbarossa failed exclusively because of Hitler’s interference. The rot was deeper. It lay in the assumption that war could deliver final solutions to historical questions.
Clark shows how ideology warped intelligence. Reports that contradicted expectation were ignored or reinterpreted. Soviet resilience was explained away as temporary. Losses were dismissed as noise. The campaign was structured around an end-state that existed only in German imagination: a Soviet collapse before winter.
This is where ‘Barbarossa’ transcends operational history and enters tragedy. The invasion becomes a wager against reality itself. And reality, as ever, refuses to cooperate.
One of Clark’s quiet achievements is his attention to geography—not as scenery, but as active resistance. Russia is not merely vast; it is indifferent. Roads dissolve into mud. Distances mock timetables. Winter arrives not as a surprise but as a verdict.
Here, the ancient texts speak with uncanny relevance. In the ‘Mahabharata’, armies that ignore the rhythms of land and season invite disaster. Bhishma warns repeatedly that force divorced from timing is self-destruction.
‘“Kalaḥ pacati bhūtāni”
‘Time ripens all beings.’ — ‘‘Mahabharata’’
The German command treated time as an instrument; Russia treated it as a weapon. Clark shows how delays compounded, how logistics frayed, how machines failed, and how soldiers—brilliant, disciplined, exhausted—were consumed by a campaign that refused to end.
One of the most haunting aspects of ‘Barbarossa’ is Clark’s portrayal of German incomprehension toward the Soviet soldier. The Red Army is initially depicted—by German commanders—as a clumsy mass, badly led, politically compromised.
Clark does not deny Soviet failures. He documents them in detail. But he also shows how German contempt blinded them to a deeper truth: the Soviet state had fused fear, ideology, and survival into a brutal cohesion.
This is where the ‘Bhagavad Gita’ offers a stark contrast. Krishna tells Arjuna that action without understanding binds one to illusion.
“Karmanye vadhikaraste,
Ma phaleshu kadachana.”
‘You have a right to action alone,
Never to its fruits.’ — ‘‘Gita 2.47’’
The German leadership obsessed over outcomes—territory seized, armies destroyed—without understanding the ‘nature’ of the struggle.
The Soviet soldier was not fighting for territory; he was fighting for existence. Clark captures this transformation as the war progresses: panic hardens into resistance, chaos into discipline, and terror into resolve.
Barbarossa did not merely underestimate Soviet numbers. It misunderstood Soviet psychology.
Clark does not dwell sentimentally on atrocity, but he does not avert his gaze. The invasion was accompanied by ideological extermination: Jews, commissars, and civilians were marked for death as policy. This was not incidental brutality; it was strategic conviction.
Here Shakespeare’s language becomes unavoidable.
“I am in blood
Stepped in so far that, should I wade no more,
Returning were as tedious as go o’er.”— ‘‘Macbeth’’
The Germans crossed moral thresholds early and irrevocably. Clark suggests—without sermonising—that this violence poisoned operational logic. An army that treats populations as expendable forfeits intelligence, cooperation, and legitimacy. Barbarossa became not just a war against an army but against a people.
The ‘Mahabharata’ again stands in judgment. Even in war, dharma restrains annihilation. When those restraints vanish, victory becomes meaningless.
“Adharmaḥ abhibhavati”
‘When unrighteousness prevails, ruin follows.’
Clark is unsparing in his depiction of German command dysfunction. Rivalries, conflicting objectives, ideological interference—these erode coherence as the campaign advances. The German system, superb at manoeuvre warfare, proves brittle under prolonged strain.
Sun Tzu warns against precisely this illusion.
“There is no instance of a country having benefited from prolonged warfare.”
Barbarossa was conceived as a short war. When it became a long one, the German command lacked the conceptual flexibility to adapt. Clark shows how decisions were made to preserve narratives rather than realities.
Retreats were delayed to save face. Positions were held to satisfy doctrine, not necessity.
This is perhaps the book’s most chilling lesson: when ideology replaces feedback, collapse is only a matter of time.
By the time winter descends, Barbarossa has already failed. Clark resists the cliché that cold defeated Germany. Cold merely revealed the truth. The campaign had exhausted its moral and material reserves.
Men froze because supply lines had broken; supply lines broke because plans were fantasies.
Milton again resonates:
“The mind is its own place, and in itself
Can make a Heaven of Hell, a Hell of Heaven.”
German leadership attempted to will success into existence. Reality answered with frost.
Alan Clark’s prose deserves special mention. It is elegant without indulgence, sceptical without cynicism. He neither romanticises nor trivialises. There is an English restraint here—a refusal to shout—that makes the condemnation sharper.
Unlike later Eastern Front histories dense with statistics, ‘Barbarossa’ reads almost like moral archaeology. Clark excavates assumptions. He allows readers to see how catastrophe is assembled piece by piece, decision by decision.
The book’s enduring power lies in its refusal to moralise overtly. It trusts the reader to recognise hubris when it appears. And hubris appears everywhere.
What makes ‘Barbarossa’ disturbingly contemporary is its pattern. A powerful state convinces itself that complexity is weakness. It substitutes doctrine for understanding. It mistakes initial success for destiny. It silences doubt. It crosses moral thresholds in the name of efficiency. And then it is surprised—genuinely surprised—when resistance hardens.
This is not uniquely German. It is human.
The ancient texts knew this. Shakespeare knew it. Milton knew it. Clark, writing history rather than drama, arrives at the same conclusion: power unmoored from humility becomes self-destructive.
Reading ‘Barbarossa’ is an unsettling experience because it implicates the reader. It asks whether we, too, mistake clarity for truth. Whether we prefer clean narratives to messy realities. Whether we believe force can solve what understanding refuses to confront.
Trust me, you will close the book not with horror, but with recognition. The failure of Barbarossa was not technical. It was metaphysical. It was the belief that the world would conform to theory.
Krishna’s warning echoes across the centuries:
“Vināśāya ca duṣkṛtām”
‘Destruction follows those who act without wisdom.’
Alan Clark’s ‘Barbarossa’ is not merely a history of a failed invasion. It is a meditation on the limits of power, the danger of certainty, and the cost of forgetting that war is not an equation but a human catastrophe.
To read it is to watch ambition overleap itself—and fall.
Most recommended.
August 17, 2021
In my opinion, when it comes to ”old” history books, they fall into one of three categories. The first consists of those classic works which the writers from later generations can aspire to equal but which will never be surpassed. Chandler’s “Campaigns of Napoleon”, Oman’s “A History of Peninsular War”, Delbruck’s “Art of War” – they’re all old, dusty and yet, somehow, still the measurestock against which every later work on the subject will be measured against. Then we have books that were the best that could be written at the time they were published, but didn’t stand the test of time. It may be that the later research or newly discovered materials made them outdated or that newer publications do better job illuminating the subject matter. Or maybe they were written “too soon”, with close proximity of the events diminishing historian’s objectivity and clarity of thought. Finally, there is a third category – history books which, regardless of the best intentions of the author, are disclosed by passage of time as waste of time and effort. Books in this final category are exposed by works that follow them as flawed, or in worst cases, as figments of author’s imagination rather than actual history books.
When read in 2020, Alan Clark's "Barbarossa" lands somewhere in-between second and third category. Time-point at which it has been written has a lot to do with it. When it was first published in 1965, Western World relied on translations of self-serving memoirs of German generals as primary pillars of wisdom and knowledge about what took place on Eastern Front during World War 2. Whatever trickled through from Soviet Union and passed the language barrier was automatically regarded as official propaganda, hardly to be relied on. And so, with Manstein’s “Lost Victories” and Guderian’s “Panzer Leader” as primary sources of information and almost complete lack of reliable material from “from the other side of the hill” to act as a counter-balance, this book was perhaps “the best we can do at this time” synthesis of what “West” could find out about East Front in mid-sixties.
Things have however moved along since 1965 and my harsh and frank opinion is that “Barbarossa” doesn’t have much to offer to modern student of history of World War 2. Author’s coverage of actual events at the front is spotty and confused. German operations are covered in reasonable detail, but as soon as focus switches to the Red Army, the narrative becomes generic and bland. As one progresses throughout the book, it becomes clear that author has very vague picture of what was going on at Stavka, but it doesn’t stop him from having an opinion about Red Army’s operational capabilities. At one point, when writing about Soviet spring offensive against Army Group South in 1943 he writes: “This plan was typical of all of Russian’s major operations in the East (with one brilliant exception of Stalingrad), being unimaginative, lacking in finesse, and dictated by the size of their forces and limitations of the subordinate commanders.” Considering the fact that starting with late 1943, Zhukov, Chuikov, Koniev, Rokossovsky and a bunch of other Sovjet generals outfought and outmanouvered their German counterparts on pretty regular basis, such "conclusions" have to be regarded as pretty ignorant. Unfortunately, this book is filled with them.
With Red Army held in such low regard, it is perhaps not surprising that the author is forced to look for alternative explanation for Germany’s ultimate defeat. This he finds first and foremost in Hitler’s strained relationship with Wehrmacht’s highest leadership as well as in the internal infighting between Nazi cronies. About half of the book is dedicated to a deep analysis of those two topics. How relevant it is for the subject handled in this volume I will leave for reader to decide. Personally, I was unimpressed by it and couldn’t help but wonder if I was reading a history book or Nazi gossip column.
It will hardly come as a surprise if I round up this review by saying that in 2020 there is no real reason for picking up this book other than as a curiosity. The way I see it its only remaining value consists of the fact that it illustrates perfectly how seriously limited and warped Western understanding of Eastern Front was at the height of Cold War. Historians that followed Clark – Glantz, Ericson, Forczyk, Buttar to name a few – had access to better material and were possibly more open-minded. It is hardly surprising that their work is of much better quality that “Barbarossa” and should be preferred before this book by any student of World War 2.
When read in 2020, Alan Clark's "Barbarossa" lands somewhere in-between second and third category. Time-point at which it has been written has a lot to do with it. When it was first published in 1965, Western World relied on translations of self-serving memoirs of German generals as primary pillars of wisdom and knowledge about what took place on Eastern Front during World War 2. Whatever trickled through from Soviet Union and passed the language barrier was automatically regarded as official propaganda, hardly to be relied on. And so, with Manstein’s “Lost Victories” and Guderian’s “Panzer Leader” as primary sources of information and almost complete lack of reliable material from “from the other side of the hill” to act as a counter-balance, this book was perhaps “the best we can do at this time” synthesis of what “West” could find out about East Front in mid-sixties.
Things have however moved along since 1965 and my harsh and frank opinion is that “Barbarossa” doesn’t have much to offer to modern student of history of World War 2. Author’s coverage of actual events at the front is spotty and confused. German operations are covered in reasonable detail, but as soon as focus switches to the Red Army, the narrative becomes generic and bland. As one progresses throughout the book, it becomes clear that author has very vague picture of what was going on at Stavka, but it doesn’t stop him from having an opinion about Red Army’s operational capabilities. At one point, when writing about Soviet spring offensive against Army Group South in 1943 he writes: “This plan was typical of all of Russian’s major operations in the East (with one brilliant exception of Stalingrad), being unimaginative, lacking in finesse, and dictated by the size of their forces and limitations of the subordinate commanders.” Considering the fact that starting with late 1943, Zhukov, Chuikov, Koniev, Rokossovsky and a bunch of other Sovjet generals outfought and outmanouvered their German counterparts on pretty regular basis, such "conclusions" have to be regarded as pretty ignorant. Unfortunately, this book is filled with them.
With Red Army held in such low regard, it is perhaps not surprising that the author is forced to look for alternative explanation for Germany’s ultimate defeat. This he finds first and foremost in Hitler’s strained relationship with Wehrmacht’s highest leadership as well as in the internal infighting between Nazi cronies. About half of the book is dedicated to a deep analysis of those two topics. How relevant it is for the subject handled in this volume I will leave for reader to decide. Personally, I was unimpressed by it and couldn’t help but wonder if I was reading a history book or Nazi gossip column.
It will hardly come as a surprise if I round up this review by saying that in 2020 there is no real reason for picking up this book other than as a curiosity. The way I see it its only remaining value consists of the fact that it illustrates perfectly how seriously limited and warped Western understanding of Eastern Front was at the height of Cold War. Historians that followed Clark – Glantz, Ericson, Forczyk, Buttar to name a few – had access to better material and were possibly more open-minded. It is hardly surprising that their work is of much better quality that “Barbarossa” and should be preferred before this book by any student of World War 2.
June 15, 2013
As a casual reader, I found this book tough-going but ultimately rewarding. Most of what I'd learnt at school about WW2 concerned the western front, so most of the battles described in detail in Barbarossa necessitated lengthy pauses while I scoured google maps to get a more accurate sense of location. However, to judge this book as a purely factual history 'textbook' on the eastern conflict would be egregiously missing the point. What makes Barbarossa most rewarding is Alan Clark's unique writing style, wit and personality which are stamped on the numerous side anecdotes and tangental observations that briefly (but frequently) give the reader some breathing space while remaining relevant to the context of military history. The clash of personalities between Hitler and his generals, the piercing insights into the motives and ambitions of various players such as Himmler, and the revealing conversations recorded by stenographers are just some of the less obvious aspects which make this book an absorbing - if not altogether easy - read.
December 15, 2016
Published in 1965, thus predating the revelation of the Ultra secret, this summation of the Russian Front is nevertheless still valuable and enduring. The writing is delightfully clear and decisive, freed from today's historian's overwrought obligation to make the reader understand the Nazis were bad. We get it; we wouldn't be reading such material otherwise. Alan Clark was writing at a time when that didn't need to be said, and his assessments of the Nazi leadership are astute and razor sharp. The weakest point in the narrative is the battle of Kursk; he glosses it and hurries on, but that can be overlooked. On the downside, this is old school history writing; almost everything is handled at command and political leadership level, virtually nothing from the man in the street's perspective, the maps are poor, and there are no photos to help a reader identify a name with a face.
Bearing that in mind, it is well worth the reading.
Bearing that in mind, it is well worth the reading.
June 20, 2011
This was a very detailed account of German-Russian battles during WWII culminating in the fall of Germany. Alan Clark does a great job in organizing the material and providing insight into the motivations of each side. For those who were taught that the Germans were beaten by the winter and the Russians burning all the towns before the Germans could resupply, this book will take you deeper into what really happened.
July 28, 2014
The first of many volumes that I have read on the German invasion of Russia. For a single volume it presented a thorough view of the start of the campaign. Subsequent books by authors like Glantz and Erickson have had greater access to soviet sources, but this book is still on my shelves and has been re-read from time to time.
October 4, 2011
Excellent study of German command problems and conflicts. How keeping his followers at odds with each other cost Hitler in the long run. Clark has a more favorable evaluation of Hitler as commander than many other writers.
September 7, 2007
Painful. That so many were sacrificed for so little and so few ......
September 6, 2019
At the remove of more than fifty years from publication, and only twenty from the events it recounts, Barbarossa seems itself an historical object. The reader is regularly reminded that what are now orthodoxies about the Second World War were then in formation and contention. Because of dynamics of the Cold War, German participants and perspectives were much more available than Soviet ones, and archives, especially those of the Kremlin, were closed. The Eichmann trial was recently past.
A particular example of this is his relation to the myth of the German army’s ‘clean war’: as he wrote this myth was still being promulgated, and certainly not received the thorough demolition it deserved. Former Wehrmacht officers were still publishing memoirs and adding to oral histories, while also consulting for NATO.
Clark is fascinated by, and often admiring of the Wehrmacht. But unlike many who admire this army, he loses sight neither of the purpose to which it was being put, nor the means by which it had been built up and supplied. He admiration waxes:
But then he pulls himself in:
Another recurring counter to Wehrmacht-worship is the frequency with which he notes that all good decisions are claimed by the professionals, all the bad attributed to Hitler, noting especially that the dictator’s stand-fast orders were sometimes exactly what the larger situation required.
Clark unsurprisingly indulges in the frequent British/conservative trope of blaming Roosevelt for the Soviet domination of Europe, without really offering anything concrete about how this was to have been accomplished, or recognition that British attempts to shape the post-war world were dramatic failures in the places, especially the middle east, where their ‘vision’ was implemented.
A particular example of this is his relation to the myth of the German army’s ‘clean war’: as he wrote this myth was still being promulgated, and certainly not received the thorough demolition it deserved. Former Wehrmacht officers were still publishing memoirs and adding to oral histories, while also consulting for NATO.
Clark is fascinated by, and often admiring of the Wehrmacht. But unlike many who admire this army, he loses sight neither of the purpose to which it was being put, nor the means by which it had been built up and supplied. He admiration waxes:
An element of tragedy pervades the German defeat in Zitadelle. Perilously close to annihilation at Moscow, dreadfully mauled at Stalingrad, this magnificent army had twice recovered. Now, once more invigorated, overhauled, equipped with new and formidable weapons, it was to throw away the prospect of victory in a series of trivial errors and miscalculation whose sum was disastrous. If “tragedy” is too strong a word, no observer can avoid a sense of frustration at the persistent abuse of this wonderful machine.
But then he pulls himself in:
And so it is all the more important to remember that just as the Nazi state rested on a basis of total brutality and corruption, so the parts of the army machine. The actual weapons with which it fought, Tigers, Panthers, Nebelwerfers, Solothurns, Schmeissers, came from the darkened sheds of Krupp and Daimler-Benz; where slave labor toiled eighteen hours a day; cowering under the lash, sleeping six to a “dog kennel” eight feet square, starving or freezing to death at the whim of their guards.
Another recurring counter to Wehrmacht-worship is the frequency with which he notes that all good decisions are claimed by the professionals, all the bad attributed to Hitler, noting especially that the dictator’s stand-fast orders were sometimes exactly what the larger situation required.
Clark unsurprisingly indulges in the frequent British/conservative trope of blaming Roosevelt for the Soviet domination of Europe, without really offering anything concrete about how this was to have been accomplished, or recognition that British attempts to shape the post-war world were dramatic failures in the places, especially the middle east, where their ‘vision’ was implemented.
February 20, 2022
"What an appalling moment... No battle in history compares with it." Clark
Originally written in 1965, author (and Tory politician) Allan Clark decided to stand by his original text for the 1995 reprint of Barbarossa. Having just finished reading it, I can see why. It's excellent.
Now, about 50 years after it was first written, one might pick apart certain aspects - he seems to buy into Heinz 'Achtung Panzer' Guderian's personal renderings of events rather uncritically, for example - but in broad terms Clark's account seems to have withstood the test of time admirably.
At around 460 pages this is, by contemporary standards, a slightly old-fashioned in-depth treatment of, primarily, the military side of this mammoth campaign. Having recently read a more wide-ranging but very succinct account by German historian Christian Hartman, Clark's lengthier and more detailed old-school rendering was the perfect way to really get deeper into this gargantuan subject (at least on the military history side).
Whilst Clark does address the conflict from both sides, he definitely leans the weight of his coverage more to the German perspective. My title quote captures the mixture of awed excitement mingled with horror that both author and readers may feel when these two profligately cruel ideological empires clashed.
For the German's, after the initial euphoria of 'kick-off', it's somewhat surprising how soon the rot set in, in terms of things starting to go wrong for Axis forces. As many have remarked, the Germans may have read accounts of Napoleon in Russia, but they appear to have failed to learn from them.
For the vast bulk of this moderately large book Clark remains fixed on the military side of things. Only by occasional brief mentions, and in a slightly more focussed way near the end, do we hear of the appalling atrocities that were perpetrated within the Dante-esque inferno of the Ostfront. Clark puts this aspect across with succinct eloquence at various points, noting (p.193) that this was the theatre 'where the septic violence of Nazism festered openly', in (p.316) 'scenes of not so much medieval as of pre-Roman barbarism'.
Whilst some of this - for example the activities of the notorious SS Dirlewanger - necessarily makes for disturbing reading, Clark's general history of the war on the Ostfront is, overall, tremendously gripping, and (dare I say it of such a huge charnel house?) very enjoyable, when read in the comfort of a peacetime armchair. Of course one vehemently hopes - or at least I do - never to live through anything of this sort. But reading about it is exciting, informative, and, one hopes, salutary.
Originally written in 1965, author (and Tory politician) Allan Clark decided to stand by his original text for the 1995 reprint of Barbarossa. Having just finished reading it, I can see why. It's excellent.
Now, about 50 years after it was first written, one might pick apart certain aspects - he seems to buy into Heinz 'Achtung Panzer' Guderian's personal renderings of events rather uncritically, for example - but in broad terms Clark's account seems to have withstood the test of time admirably.
At around 460 pages this is, by contemporary standards, a slightly old-fashioned in-depth treatment of, primarily, the military side of this mammoth campaign. Having recently read a more wide-ranging but very succinct account by German historian Christian Hartman, Clark's lengthier and more detailed old-school rendering was the perfect way to really get deeper into this gargantuan subject (at least on the military history side).
Whilst Clark does address the conflict from both sides, he definitely leans the weight of his coverage more to the German perspective. My title quote captures the mixture of awed excitement mingled with horror that both author and readers may feel when these two profligately cruel ideological empires clashed.
For the German's, after the initial euphoria of 'kick-off', it's somewhat surprising how soon the rot set in, in terms of things starting to go wrong for Axis forces. As many have remarked, the Germans may have read accounts of Napoleon in Russia, but they appear to have failed to learn from them.
For the vast bulk of this moderately large book Clark remains fixed on the military side of things. Only by occasional brief mentions, and in a slightly more focussed way near the end, do we hear of the appalling atrocities that were perpetrated within the Dante-esque inferno of the Ostfront. Clark puts this aspect across with succinct eloquence at various points, noting (p.193) that this was the theatre 'where the septic violence of Nazism festered openly', in (p.316) 'scenes of not so much medieval as of pre-Roman barbarism'.
Whilst some of this - for example the activities of the notorious SS Dirlewanger - necessarily makes for disturbing reading, Clark's general history of the war on the Ostfront is, overall, tremendously gripping, and (dare I say it of such a huge charnel house?) very enjoyable, when read in the comfort of a peacetime armchair. Of course one vehemently hopes - or at least I do - never to live through anything of this sort. But reading about it is exciting, informative, and, one hopes, salutary.
June 10, 2020
This is accurately described as the "classic account of the Eastern Front."
Clark has a highly readable style and that almost disguises the sheer depth of the academic research that went into this book. Written in the 1960s it does show it's age somewhat and is no longer the defiinitve account in the English language of what is the most merciless, brutal (not too mention the largest) conflict in human history. More modern accounts do exist and perhaps it is to John Erikson's Road to Stalingrad/Berlin books that we must now look to for the deifintive account. That though does not discredit this account which has retained a strong reputation for good reason.
The book is only 500 odd pages long which is not very long to describe a conflict of unparallelled viciousness and bloodletting waged over four years. Clark tells an incredibly human story using the voices of those who were involved wherever possible. We see the brutality, the horror, the idiocy and the pathos in equal measure. Clark makes no attempt to downsize the malevolence of what occurred but leaves you in no doubt of what (ever decreasing) humanity was involved too.
Clark achieves what must be the zenith of any "Popular History" in that he teaches the reader a lot without ever really making it read like a chore to read.
Very much recommended
Clark has a highly readable style and that almost disguises the sheer depth of the academic research that went into this book. Written in the 1960s it does show it's age somewhat and is no longer the defiinitve account in the English language of what is the most merciless, brutal (not too mention the largest) conflict in human history. More modern accounts do exist and perhaps it is to John Erikson's Road to Stalingrad/Berlin books that we must now look to for the deifintive account. That though does not discredit this account which has retained a strong reputation for good reason.
The book is only 500 odd pages long which is not very long to describe a conflict of unparallelled viciousness and bloodletting waged over four years. Clark tells an incredibly human story using the voices of those who were involved wherever possible. We see the brutality, the horror, the idiocy and the pathos in equal measure. Clark makes no attempt to downsize the malevolence of what occurred but leaves you in no doubt of what (ever decreasing) humanity was involved too.
Clark achieves what must be the zenith of any "Popular History" in that he teaches the reader a lot without ever really making it read like a chore to read.
Very much recommended
February 23, 2023
Nearly six decades after its initial publication, Alan Clark’s Barbarossa has withstood time as a tour de force military history of the Eastern Front in WWII. With undaunted scope and incisive assessment, Clark leaves no stone unturned in his probing of the many moving pieces in what he calls the “greatest and longest land battle ever fought.” From the Winter campaign in Moscow in 1941 to the fall of Berlin in 1945, Clark sheds light on the contentious relationship between Hitler and the German General Staff; reassesses Hitlers’s military acumen, penchant for technical detail, and strategic judgement throughout the campaign (sometimes blameworthy, but other times not); scrutinizes German generals for perceived missed opportunities or mistaken decision; and laments the needless excesses of a continent-wide conflict. Clark also examines the simple but effective manufacturing of Russian tanks and artillery, admires the raw and tenacious spirit of the Russian defense, and commends the prudence of Russian command for knowing when to wait and when to land their punches. With a zestful but critical pen, Clark has brought the conflict back under a microscope, reassessing how the shots should have been called and ascribing either praise or censure to those who participated in the monumental misadventure.
August 8, 2017
Got this book on loan from my brother in law. Excellent and thorough descriptions and analysis of the entire eastern front of the war including historical factors, diplomatic efforts and of course the military campaigns. At its best analyzing not only the details and strategies of the generals, but also the behind the scenes machinations of the "Diodachi" (those high level nazis who were constantly maneuvering for power - Goebbels, Bormann, Himmler, Goering, etc.). Not quite as good trying to relate personal stories of ordinary soldiers and citizens. Almost as if the author thought "well this is what works for band of brothers..." Really focuses on Hans Guderian and his struggles trying to keep the German armies from falling apart as the war turned against them, and how he appears to be one of the few who actually stood up to Hitler and spoke the truth and lived to tell about it.
It's a long book so you have to really be interested.
It's a long book so you have to really be interested.
January 9, 2018
Great read on the decisive Eastern Front, utilizing several main examples/events that acted as turning points one way or the other. I particularly liked that the author also included oft-harrowing examples of the barbarism exhibited by both sides. Why? Because THAT is what made the whole eastern conflict virtually incomprehensible to all Western countries (US definitely included). Countries that glorify their involvement in battles that required "large sacrifices" of a few thousand soldiers over a several-month period. This is not to say that the life of any soldier has little value - rather, it just speaks to how vastly different the Eastern Front was compared to the rest of the war.
My only main criticism: there really needs to be more maps, particularly when the author pulls the curtain back and mentions a good number of names and places in quick succession, with no real explanation or indicator that would give the average reader concrete clues to actual locations.
My only main criticism: there really needs to be more maps, particularly when the author pulls the curtain back and mentions a good number of names and places in quick succession, with no real explanation or indicator that would give the average reader concrete clues to actual locations.
July 10, 2017
Good run down on the Russo-German front in WWII. Written in 1964, Clark lacks both declassified Allied documents and anything from the Russians. Nevertheless, he illustrates the strategic and operational moves in the east.
While focused on the German perspective due to the availability of source material, he is even handed. The idea that most shocked me was the notion that the Germans generals would have succeeded if they executed Hitler's plan vigorously instead of dragging their feet. Something I hadn't considered. The other major insight Clark describes well is the series of attacks to culmination. The possibility of a serious Russian setback remained even in 1945.
Overall an easy read (and better if you have a map to follow) and worth it.
While focused on the German perspective due to the availability of source material, he is even handed. The idea that most shocked me was the notion that the Germans generals would have succeeded if they executed Hitler's plan vigorously instead of dragging their feet. Something I hadn't considered. The other major insight Clark describes well is the series of attacks to culmination. The possibility of a serious Russian setback remained even in 1945.
Overall an easy read (and better if you have a map to follow) and worth it.
June 3, 2021
A detailed study of the Nazi invasion of Russia. The author is good about explaining who the character are and about what acronyms and technical terms mean. It is generously footnoted as well.
The author has a clear viewpoint, too, which I appreciated but did not necessarily agree or disagree with: his view was that Hitler's commands was a wiser and cagier commander in chief than his reputation. He also doesn't think much of Roosevelt's diplomatic work as the war ended.
I could have really used more maps in this book, though; many of the maps included do not show cities/rivers mentioned in the text. The book includes quite a few verbatim transcripts of meetings of military officials with Hitler, too.
The author has a clear viewpoint, too, which I appreciated but did not necessarily agree or disagree with: his view was that Hitler's commands was a wiser and cagier commander in chief than his reputation. He also doesn't think much of Roosevelt's diplomatic work as the war ended.
I could have really used more maps in this book, though; many of the maps included do not show cities/rivers mentioned in the text. The book includes quite a few verbatim transcripts of meetings of military officials with Hitler, too.
July 7, 2021
Not exactly what I was looking for, but good enough to satiate my WW2 Eastern Front thirst.
Its so brutal. I had heard reference to how the Germans acted in the east, but this brought more of it to light. Apart from terrorizing the citizens, more than 3 million Russian POWs were killed. Starve to death, worked to death, the Germans didn't care.
From a technology standpoint, it is crazy that no Russian infantry unit had motorized support. Just horses pulling carts. In 1941! Its also clear that Russia broke the Nazi's military stregnth. The US loves to brag about winning WW2, but Russia did so much more heavy lifting, and paid such a higher cost.
Its so brutal. I had heard reference to how the Germans acted in the east, but this brought more of it to light. Apart from terrorizing the citizens, more than 3 million Russian POWs were killed. Starve to death, worked to death, the Germans didn't care.
From a technology standpoint, it is crazy that no Russian infantry unit had motorized support. Just horses pulling carts. In 1941! Its also clear that Russia broke the Nazi's military stregnth. The US loves to brag about winning WW2, but Russia did so much more heavy lifting, and paid such a higher cost.
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