What does it mean to be responsible for our actions? In this brief and elegant study, Giorgio Agamben traces our most profound moral intuitions back to their roots in the sphere of law and punishment. Moral accountability, human free agency, and even the very concept of cause and effect all find their origin in the language of the trial, which Western philosophy and theology both transform into the paradigm for all of human life. In his search for a way out of this destructive paradigm, Agamben not only draws on minority opinions within the Western tradition but engages at length with Buddhist texts and concepts for the first time. In sum, Karman deepens and rearticulates some of Agamben's core insights while breaking significant new ground.
Giorgio Agamben is one of the leading figures in Italian and contemporary continental philosophy. He is the author of Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life; Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive; Profanations; The Signature of All Things: On Method, and other books. Through the 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s he treated a wide range of topics, including aesthetics, literature, language, ontology, nihilism, and radical political thought.
In recent years, his work has had a deep impact on contemporary scholarship in a number of disciplines in the Anglo-American intellectual world. Born in Rome in 1942, Agamben completed studies in Law and Philosophy with a doctoral thesis on the political thought of Simone Weil, and participated in Martin Heidegger’s seminars on Hegel and Heraclitus as a postdoctoral scholar.
He rose to international prominence after the publication of Homo Sacer in 1995. Translated into English in 1998, the book’s analyses of law, life, and state power appeared uncannily prescient after the attacks on New York City and Washington, DC in September 2001, and the resultant shifts in the geopolitical landscape. Provoking a wave of scholarly interest in the philosopher’s work, the book also marked the beginning of a 20-year research project, which represents Agamben’s most important contribution to political philosophy.
Early on in Karman, Agamben recounts an old Rabbinic story in which Satan, 'the accuser', finds himself standing condemned before God. Sentenced to the eternal darkness, Satan nonetheless objects to the Almighty: "Lord of the world, all the power you have demonstrated by descending into the flames to condemn me really does not belong to you: above you, there is another Power" - the power, of course, of God's own accusatory power, which in Agamben's retelling, is nothing other than the ultimate subject of judgment: it is judgement itself that stands in judgement, calling for the creation of a new world free from all powers of accusation. It's a little parable - one among a delightful few invoked in Agamben's 'brief treatise' - but one which nicely encapsulates the book's critical trajectory, which aims to answer a question posed by Kafka in the only epigraph that begins the book: "How can a human being be guilty?".
If such a question rings odd to modern ears, Agamben invites us to recall a time in which certain actions simply bore corresponding consequences, without, for all that, imputing the status of 'guilt' upon the agents of those actions. That is, actions were simply associated with other actions (an infraction with a penalty, say), without implicating the subject of those actions in discourses of 'guilt', 'culpability', and 'responsibility' (guilt was not 'interiorised' within a subject). As the story told here goes however, it was just this link - between agent and action - that was progressively forged in the passage to modernity, one which weaved an ever strengthening bond between both and culminating in our present day understanding of subjectivity and agency. If for an ancient like Socrates, evil was the result of (mere?) ignorance then, for us - in the wake of our post-Christian inheritance - is evil nothing less than a free act of the will, exercised by subjects both responsible and culpable.
While this is not a tale wholly without precedent - Nietzsche told a similar one in his Genealogy of Morals - it's in Agamben's singular focus on the law and the juridicial roots of responsibility that sets his own account apart. Indeed, for Agamben, it's not the sphere of morality so much as legality which has come to define our present-day relationship to action. In fact, in what can't but be a studiously effected omission, Nietzsche's name is entirely absent from Karman, testifying, I reckon, to what can only be a calculated distancing. In this respect it might be unsurprising that it's Plato - Nietzsche's arch philosophical adversary - who is here drawn upon in depth, with Agamben finding in him (along with Benjamin and, yes, Buddhism [Karma-n...]) the resources to think otherwise about the 'mystery of human action' (if anything it's Aristotle, with his anti-Platonism, whom Agamben credits with setting in motion the infernal train of guilt, with historical waypoints in both Augustine and Kant along the way).
Oh, also, Agamben more or less eviscerates the concept of the 'will', which, to say the least, is not very Nietzschean either. So as usual, there's just quite a bit going on in this 'brief treatise', and while it stands perfectly fine on its own, I'd super recommend reading it alongside Opus Dei, which also similarly deals with themes of action, ethics, and law. Finally, for those who have read The Use of Bodies, Karman can also be seen as fleshing out of Agamben's little note in §1.13, critiquing Hannah Arendt's conflation (in The Human Condition) of the sphere of politics with the sphere of action. In all senses then, is Karman just a juicy little book, packed with a philosophical punch well in excess of its seeming slightness.
Agamben offers an interesting excursion through the idea of action, means and ends, the idea of culpability and the subject, and the notion of play and gesture that opens the aporia of causa/culpa by creating moments of 'pure means'.
Short and sweet. Really should be reading Derrida for my paper but this is a lot of fun (never choose Derrida for your interlocutor even if you find his ideas fun lol) A better explanation of inoperativity, as negation of work, in his Homo Sacer projects. But it’s also interesting to see some interpret this non-work as anti-revolutionary and therefore conservative, for they in doing so exactly becomes Agamben’s object of criticism: trying to find an intention for such and such a political action. But reading a bit about Derrida and Foucault I can discern their influences on Agamben: Derrida’s rereading/misreading and Foucault’s dispositif. One wonders what is the next move? Yes, dancing is a great example of beauty as intentionless gesture, what else can it be? The part about the non-establishment of subject is also an interesting topic, maybe Deleuze or Merleau Ponty has thought about this, both being rebels in their fields?
Para quienes gustan de escudriñar en las etimologías, en las orígenes y relaciones entre las relaciones humanas, la constitución de las instituciones y en aprender sobre estas visiones filosóficas del derecho y la moral judeo-cristiana. Un excelente libro que despeja caminos para investigar. Me sirvió para entender los fines en sí mismos, de los medios limpios.
Il termine causa indica sia il processo, sia ciò che ha scatenato il processo. Da questo elemento Agamben inizia la sua ricerca sull'azione o meglio: sulla possibilità di attribuire a qualcuno una volontà di agire.
L'attribuzione di un'azione a qualcuno è problema giuridico: quando l'azione rompe con la norma, solo allora ci si pone il problema di chi ha compiuto cosa e soprattutto perché. In sostanza, la volontà è un problema posto da chi cerca il colpevole di un crimine. La volontà è un fatto giuridico.
Agamben riprende l'annoso problema della legge: quest'ultima, mostrando cosa è vietato dà concezione dell'azione malvagia. La legge pone il male e poi lo nega. Questo legame tra il delitto e la legge è osservabile in una delle forme giuridiche più antiche: la legge del taglione. Sostanzialmente, la legge del taglione duplica il crimine: la differenza tra il primo e il secondo è che il secondo non ha conseguenze. Solo successivamente la legge si è evoluta, cercando di rafforzare questo suo potere di porre fine alle conseguenze di un'azione malvagia, a beneficio della comunità.
L'intuizione più geniale del testo è la proposta di considerare crimen e karman parole che derivano dalla stessa radice: in sostanza, entrambe dovrebbero significare un'azione che ha delle conseguenze. Sulla base di questo concetto, secondo Agamben, si è fondato non solo il diritto, ma tutta l'etica occidentale. L'azione che ha delle conseguenze è un concetto che pone numerosi altri concetti: causa, persona, volontà, fine, scopo.
Scardinare questo concetto significa proporre una nuova visione dell'agire umano: Agamben trova nel concetto di gesto questa nuovo tipo di azione. Il gesto è l'azione che allontana da sé qualsiasi opera, un'azione che non contempla nessun tipo di fine. Quindi, si annulla quel raddoppiamento rappresentato dal fine da raggiungere e dai mezzi per farlo. Annullare il dispositivo dell'azione che ha delle conseguenze significa annullare l'intera macchina dell'imputabilità: il soggetto non precede, bensì segue il crimine poiché è il processo, l'accusa, la "causa" che va alla ricerca di esso.
Il testo termina aprendo a una prospettiva misteriosa: riflettere sulla fondazione di una politica di mezzi puri.
Qui abbiamo un Agamben un po' più libero, ma non meno rigoroso: il breve trattato, ricco di spunti, sembra essere il desiderio di abbandonare la vecchia strada per andare alla ricerca di una nuova, misteriosa e difficile da scorgere.
This was a super interesting take on the limitations and/or consequences of action. Agamben begins the treatise discussing the disconnect between causa and culpa (action/responsibility); noting that in the ancient world there was no separation ie. an action was considered wrong if the consequence was bad. There was no internal mechanism (intent etc.). This separation is where law and morality lie. The author continues on through the historical development of this terrain in what he describes as the movement from “I can” to “I will” to “I must”. Starting with “I can” - Aristotle developed his ethics through the idea of potentiality. I can potentially do an action or I can potentially not do the action. Either way I am responsible for my choice. (Notice how there is no category for shit that just happens). Christianity built on this by replacing the potential with the will. The home of choice and culpability lies in each persons will to do something. You will to do it or you will to not do it. Lots of theological arguments in here… but this gradually moves into I must do the action. The treatise follows this up with a pretty strong critique of Aristotle‘s notion of the good - the good or purpose of humans is to idealise the end that is not a means to another end - The most complete end. Agamben uses Schopenhauer’s critique of Kant - action only happens in a duality between means and end to dispel Kant’s notion of end in itself and final end being two seperate things. The book finally ends with an appeal to ‘gesture’ (actions with no purpose - no product, a means with no end). All in all a pretty intriguing read.
Another fascinating - if short - book where Agamben probes, "the question of the autonomy of human actions." Exploring the place and problem of freedom and guilt, he exfoliates the "aura of holiness" from the law. As always, he remains interested in beginnings and endings, edges and thresholds.
Fascinating and provocative. There is a history of guilt that also bubbles at the edges of these pages...
A slow burn until part three when his ideas coalesce around the dance (pun intended) of will and action. As always I am mesmerized by his ability to skirt the edge of esotericism. I always have the feeling that he is hinting at a personal occult world…. This makes for especially interesting reading for people involved in such things, especially those with a Thelemic orientation.
Agamben's short monograph on the philosophy of action is vast and erudite in its scope. Moving from Latin etymology to law to ethics to metaphysics from Ancient Greek Philosophy to Indian philosophy to Kant to 19th century linguistics -- this was an intriguing work.