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Battle of the Atlantic
A major reinterpretation of the most important military campaign of the Second World War.
288 pages, Hardcover
First published April 1, 2003
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August 15, 2025
"The German attack on shipping complicated effective management of the Allied war effort, but for all its drama it had no appreciable influence on the outcome of the war." So ends Marc Milner's readable, accessible, and excellently written primer on the Battle of the Atlantic, which he describes as "the longest, most complex and most fascinating campaign of the Second World War."
Milner begins by summarising the situation as war broke out in September 1939. He contends that the Royal Navy had remembered the most important lessons from trade defence and fighting U-boats in the First World War: the importance of air power and the importance of convoys. He also argues that, despite the initial lack of escort vessels, inter-war naval spending had been correctly targeted, "The bedrock of the whole system of trade defence in the North Atlantic was the British Home Fleet. Its superior force of battleships, aircraft carriers, cruisers and destroyers checked the main power of the German navy and made it a fugitive presence at sea. This had been understood clearly by the Admiralty in the inter- war years. Battlefleets could not be improvised in times of crisis, as the smaller escorts of the anti- submarine fleet could. So, the limited inter-war budgets had been wisely spent." Gaps and mistakes are also highlighted, particularly the over-estimation of the capabilities of sonar technology: "the potential of asdic was assumed, its real limitations were poorly understood, and enormous faith was placed upon it to solve the submarine problem in war." A couple of other important initial points are the fact that raiding by German capital ships tied down a huge quantity of Allied naval and air power (however ineffective such raiding was in absolute terms), and the importance of naval intelligence to allow convoys to be routed and re-routed so as to avoid danger.
He then moves on to consider the first 'happy time' in 1940 to 1941, concluding that: "The period from spring 1940 until spring 1941 represents the only time during the war when the Germans could have achieved a decisive strategic result in the Atlantic. Throughout this period, Britain was menaced by a hostile European shore from North Cape to the Biscay and was uniquely vulnerable to blockade. This had happened only once before in all of British history, a century and a half earlier when Napoleon ruled the continent. Nothing in British pre- war planning had anticipated this. The Germans had simply to make Britain's sea- lanes untenable and smash her ports from the air. With the right combination of punches, the British would be either knocked- out or put down on the mat for a count. Either outcome- a clear decision or a technical knock- out- constituted a German victory. Fortunately for the British, however, nothing in German pre- war planning allowed for such an eventuality either, and, although the events of 1940 and early 1941 produced some high drama, the Germans lacked the force needed at the time to deliver the knock- out punch." From March to December 1941, the momentum swung back in favour of the Allies, particularly as the "increasing involvement of the US as an 'ally' of Britain in early 1941 put the goal of a decisive strategic result in the Atlantic out of reach for the Germans." Ultra-intelligence made a significant contribution during this period, as did increasing quantity and competency in the anti-submarine defence of convoys - including a significant increase in the number of escorts available from all sources, improvements in the range and number of aircraft, and key improvements in command, control, technique, equipment and training of escorts."
While this made U-boat operations around convoys more precarious, the entry of the USA into the war in December 1941 ushered in a 'Second Happy Time' as the U-boat campaign off the US coast began in earnest. In hindsight, the failure of the USA to immediately adopt Allied convoy practices is baffling, and is seen in the shipping losses experienced: "Until the end of 1941 the Allies had lost an average of 2.1 million tons of shipping per year to all causes. During 1942, losses to Allied merchant shipping skyrocketed to some 7.2 million tons. In fact, the total tonnage lost in 1942 accounts for more than a third of over 19 million tons lost to enemy action around the world during the whole war. U-boats alone accounted for 6.1 million of this in 1942, mostly in the Atlantic, an average of almost half a million tons per month in the first half of 1942." As catastrophic as these losses seemed at the time, "the numbers fell far short of the 800,000 tons per month Dönitz estimated needed to be sunk to achieve decisive results." As during the first happy-time, Milner notes that the U-Boats ability to inflict a decisive defeat on Allied shipping was hampered both by the limited numbers of U-Boats available, and by the poor quality of their torpedoes.
By the summer of 1942 the momentum again started to shift away from Dönitz and his Wolf Packs, this time permanently: "What worried Dönitz by the summer of 1942 was that his U- boats' success since 1939 was largely the result of exploiting weaknesses in the enemy's defence...Only bold new tactics and a reliance on surface manoeuvrability for all phases of the campaign, coupled with successful efforts to extend the operational range of U- boats, accounted for the remarkable success to date...while Germany built a huge fleet of U- boats which relied on unimpeded surface manoeuvrability to accomplish their goals, the Allies built a sound defensive system that progressively denied them that mobility." This continued until May 1943, which was "a catastrophic month for the U-boat fleet. No fewer than forty- one submarines were sunk, the single highest loss rate of any month in the war. One of them carried Dönitz's only son to a watery grave. They were swarmed by aircraft and hounded by well- equipped warships at every turn, especially when the British drove convoy after convoy through their waiting packs in order to bring them to battle...On 24 May, Dönitz admitted tactical defeat and recalled the Wolf Packs from the mid- Atlantic."
Milner notes that "historians of the Second World War usually abandon the story of the Atlantic at this stage. However, the struggle between the U-boat and anti-submarine forces was just beginning to enter its most interesting phase...Apart from the overwhelming superiority of Allied weaponry and sensors the key to this second and final victory, the one which drove the U- boats down and made them fugitives for much of the rest of the war, was superb intelligence...Victory over the U- boats was so complete by autumn 1943 that in late October the British Admiralty announced the cancellation of virtually all their escort- building programmes.
While this marks the end of the German attempt to achieve a strategic result against Allied shipping, the U-boat fleet continued to be a formidable tactical force through to the end of the war - and one which Milner argues was never completely and decisively defeated. In part, he argues that that is a result of shifting Naval priorities on the part of the Allies, who were increasingly looking to the Pacific and the anticipated battle for the Japanese home islands. It is also noteworthy that the attempt to disrupt the Normandy campaign was a complete failure, as was the hope of shifting the strategic balance with the introduction of the type XXI boat. On the positive side, from the German perspective, improved technology meant that U-boats had much more effective torpedoes and were able to operate submerged for the majority of the time - innovations that we should again be grateful did not emerge two or three years earlier.
In the end, the losses sustained by the U-boat fleet are eye watering: "Of the 830 U-boats that participated in operations during the war (a total of 1,162 were built), no fewer than 696 were destroyed by the Allies, an operational loss rate of 83.9 per cent. Personnel losses were equally staggering. Of the 40,900 men who served in U-boats between 1939 and 1945, 25,870 died with their submarines, giving the U-boat service a fatal casualty rate of sixty-three per cent - the highest of any service during the war. When the 5,000 prisoners of war are added to this tally, the total casualty rate for the U- boat service jumps to seventy-six per cent. Despite all this, the U- boat service remained bowed but not broken when the war ended in early May 1945."
With hindsight, Milner concludes that the Battle of the Atlantic was never the crisis it was perceived to be at the time: "The German attack on shipping was dramatic and dangerous, and it had a profound impact on Britain's long-term economic viability. But it was also ultimately futile...It seems, in the end, the Atlantic war was not within Germany's power to win - unless the Allies committed such colossal errors as to defeat themselves. But they did not. The British got the basic defensive system right in the early stages of the war, and had the time they needed to build up resources. The Allies even survived the carnage of early 1942, thanks in large measure to the power of American industry: something the Germans vastly underestimated."
This is an exceptional introduction to the Battle of the Atlantic, covering the main features and considerations of the campaign, and the links to the wider war. As with so much in the history of the Second World War, it underlines the fundamental inability of Germany to win a protracted conflict with the Allies however much things seemed, at the time, to hang in the balance. That only underlines the tragedy of the war, and the appreciation we should have for those who fought to win it.
Milner begins by summarising the situation as war broke out in September 1939. He contends that the Royal Navy had remembered the most important lessons from trade defence and fighting U-boats in the First World War: the importance of air power and the importance of convoys. He also argues that, despite the initial lack of escort vessels, inter-war naval spending had been correctly targeted, "The bedrock of the whole system of trade defence in the North Atlantic was the British Home Fleet. Its superior force of battleships, aircraft carriers, cruisers and destroyers checked the main power of the German navy and made it a fugitive presence at sea. This had been understood clearly by the Admiralty in the inter- war years. Battlefleets could not be improvised in times of crisis, as the smaller escorts of the anti- submarine fleet could. So, the limited inter-war budgets had been wisely spent." Gaps and mistakes are also highlighted, particularly the over-estimation of the capabilities of sonar technology: "the potential of asdic was assumed, its real limitations were poorly understood, and enormous faith was placed upon it to solve the submarine problem in war." A couple of other important initial points are the fact that raiding by German capital ships tied down a huge quantity of Allied naval and air power (however ineffective such raiding was in absolute terms), and the importance of naval intelligence to allow convoys to be routed and re-routed so as to avoid danger.
He then moves on to consider the first 'happy time' in 1940 to 1941, concluding that: "The period from spring 1940 until spring 1941 represents the only time during the war when the Germans could have achieved a decisive strategic result in the Atlantic. Throughout this period, Britain was menaced by a hostile European shore from North Cape to the Biscay and was uniquely vulnerable to blockade. This had happened only once before in all of British history, a century and a half earlier when Napoleon ruled the continent. Nothing in British pre- war planning had anticipated this. The Germans had simply to make Britain's sea- lanes untenable and smash her ports from the air. With the right combination of punches, the British would be either knocked- out or put down on the mat for a count. Either outcome- a clear decision or a technical knock- out- constituted a German victory. Fortunately for the British, however, nothing in German pre- war planning allowed for such an eventuality either, and, although the events of 1940 and early 1941 produced some high drama, the Germans lacked the force needed at the time to deliver the knock- out punch." From March to December 1941, the momentum swung back in favour of the Allies, particularly as the "increasing involvement of the US as an 'ally' of Britain in early 1941 put the goal of a decisive strategic result in the Atlantic out of reach for the Germans." Ultra-intelligence made a significant contribution during this period, as did increasing quantity and competency in the anti-submarine defence of convoys - including a significant increase in the number of escorts available from all sources, improvements in the range and number of aircraft, and key improvements in command, control, technique, equipment and training of escorts."
While this made U-boat operations around convoys more precarious, the entry of the USA into the war in December 1941 ushered in a 'Second Happy Time' as the U-boat campaign off the US coast began in earnest. In hindsight, the failure of the USA to immediately adopt Allied convoy practices is baffling, and is seen in the shipping losses experienced: "Until the end of 1941 the Allies had lost an average of 2.1 million tons of shipping per year to all causes. During 1942, losses to Allied merchant shipping skyrocketed to some 7.2 million tons. In fact, the total tonnage lost in 1942 accounts for more than a third of over 19 million tons lost to enemy action around the world during the whole war. U-boats alone accounted for 6.1 million of this in 1942, mostly in the Atlantic, an average of almost half a million tons per month in the first half of 1942." As catastrophic as these losses seemed at the time, "the numbers fell far short of the 800,000 tons per month Dönitz estimated needed to be sunk to achieve decisive results." As during the first happy-time, Milner notes that the U-Boats ability to inflict a decisive defeat on Allied shipping was hampered both by the limited numbers of U-Boats available, and by the poor quality of their torpedoes.
By the summer of 1942 the momentum again started to shift away from Dönitz and his Wolf Packs, this time permanently: "What worried Dönitz by the summer of 1942 was that his U- boats' success since 1939 was largely the result of exploiting weaknesses in the enemy's defence...Only bold new tactics and a reliance on surface manoeuvrability for all phases of the campaign, coupled with successful efforts to extend the operational range of U- boats, accounted for the remarkable success to date...while Germany built a huge fleet of U- boats which relied on unimpeded surface manoeuvrability to accomplish their goals, the Allies built a sound defensive system that progressively denied them that mobility." This continued until May 1943, which was "a catastrophic month for the U-boat fleet. No fewer than forty- one submarines were sunk, the single highest loss rate of any month in the war. One of them carried Dönitz's only son to a watery grave. They were swarmed by aircraft and hounded by well- equipped warships at every turn, especially when the British drove convoy after convoy through their waiting packs in order to bring them to battle...On 24 May, Dönitz admitted tactical defeat and recalled the Wolf Packs from the mid- Atlantic."
Milner notes that "historians of the Second World War usually abandon the story of the Atlantic at this stage. However, the struggle between the U-boat and anti-submarine forces was just beginning to enter its most interesting phase...Apart from the overwhelming superiority of Allied weaponry and sensors the key to this second and final victory, the one which drove the U- boats down and made them fugitives for much of the rest of the war, was superb intelligence...Victory over the U- boats was so complete by autumn 1943 that in late October the British Admiralty announced the cancellation of virtually all their escort- building programmes.
While this marks the end of the German attempt to achieve a strategic result against Allied shipping, the U-boat fleet continued to be a formidable tactical force through to the end of the war - and one which Milner argues was never completely and decisively defeated. In part, he argues that that is a result of shifting Naval priorities on the part of the Allies, who were increasingly looking to the Pacific and the anticipated battle for the Japanese home islands. It is also noteworthy that the attempt to disrupt the Normandy campaign was a complete failure, as was the hope of shifting the strategic balance with the introduction of the type XXI boat. On the positive side, from the German perspective, improved technology meant that U-boats had much more effective torpedoes and were able to operate submerged for the majority of the time - innovations that we should again be grateful did not emerge two or three years earlier.
In the end, the losses sustained by the U-boat fleet are eye watering: "Of the 830 U-boats that participated in operations during the war (a total of 1,162 were built), no fewer than 696 were destroyed by the Allies, an operational loss rate of 83.9 per cent. Personnel losses were equally staggering. Of the 40,900 men who served in U-boats between 1939 and 1945, 25,870 died with their submarines, giving the U-boat service a fatal casualty rate of sixty-three per cent - the highest of any service during the war. When the 5,000 prisoners of war are added to this tally, the total casualty rate for the U- boat service jumps to seventy-six per cent. Despite all this, the U- boat service remained bowed but not broken when the war ended in early May 1945."
With hindsight, Milner concludes that the Battle of the Atlantic was never the crisis it was perceived to be at the time: "The German attack on shipping was dramatic and dangerous, and it had a profound impact on Britain's long-term economic viability. But it was also ultimately futile...It seems, in the end, the Atlantic war was not within Germany's power to win - unless the Allies committed such colossal errors as to defeat themselves. But they did not. The British got the basic defensive system right in the early stages of the war, and had the time they needed to build up resources. The Allies even survived the carnage of early 1942, thanks in large measure to the power of American industry: something the Germans vastly underestimated."
This is an exceptional introduction to the Battle of the Atlantic, covering the main features and considerations of the campaign, and the links to the wider war. As with so much in the history of the Second World War, it underlines the fundamental inability of Germany to win a protracted conflict with the Allies however much things seemed, at the time, to hang in the balance. That only underlines the tragedy of the war, and the appreciation we should have for those who fought to win it.
December 12, 2014
A detailed account of the strategic battle of the Atlantic. Much that I didn't know, even though well read. Thank goodness the author included a glossary at the back of the book! Considering the amount of detail I thought the book was very readable.
There was so much bravery and courage on both sides. But ultimately the outcome was not in doubt, and a battle that the German Navy could not win. Had the Germans been able to bring their incredible inventions to bear earlier then the outcome may have been different. But perhaps the biggest advantage that the Allies had was being able to read the German signals, courtesy of Bletchley Park.
Very enjoyable book.
There was so much bravery and courage on both sides. But ultimately the outcome was not in doubt, and a battle that the German Navy could not win. Had the Germans been able to bring their incredible inventions to bear earlier then the outcome may have been different. But perhaps the biggest advantage that the Allies had was being able to read the German signals, courtesy of Bletchley Park.
Very enjoyable book.
April 28, 2024
A superlatively well-researched and well-written discussion of the Battle of the Atlantic. It is hard to imagine a better concise history of the Battle of the Atlantic being written. The author has clearly done extensive research and is well-informed across the spectrum of fields necessary to understand the Battle of the Atlantic.
One of its many strengths is taking a very holistic approach to describing and analysing the Battle of the Atlantic. The usual escort forces and technology are covered (and very well), but the author also discusses administrative and command arrangements and oceanography –factors often neglected in accounts.
Another of its strengths is in being very well-written. The writing remains engaging and interesting, and guides the reader through a multitude of events and developments, all the while maintaining a cohesive argument that is easy to follow.
There are two sections of well-chosen photographs with informative captions that materially add to the story, and numerous diagrams and track charts peppered throughout the book. There are not academic notes, and the bibliography is more a list of recommended reading (the book was very clearly written based on far more than the bibliography presented) but there is a list of illustrations and a separate list of maps and diagrams, as well as an index, which greatly aid the use of the books as a reference.
It’s not perfect – minor blemishes include the occasional use of unexplained acronyms that don’t turn up in the list of abbreviations. The standard of editing is above-average but there were still a few errors (incorrect months, for example, or grammatical slips). Also, while the smallest of things, it was a little bit of a shame given the author’s effort to be inclusive of American and Canadian efforts, that the sinking of U-127, mentioned in the book, does not mention it was by an Australian destroyer (Nestor) – although there is good mention of the RAAF.
All up, if one was to only read five books on the Second World War at sea, then I’d strongly recommend this one being included. Its depth and insight, on the other hand, make it worthwhile reading even if one had already read hundreds.
One of its many strengths is taking a very holistic approach to describing and analysing the Battle of the Atlantic. The usual escort forces and technology are covered (and very well), but the author also discusses administrative and command arrangements and oceanography –factors often neglected in accounts.
Another of its strengths is in being very well-written. The writing remains engaging and interesting, and guides the reader through a multitude of events and developments, all the while maintaining a cohesive argument that is easy to follow.
There are two sections of well-chosen photographs with informative captions that materially add to the story, and numerous diagrams and track charts peppered throughout the book. There are not academic notes, and the bibliography is more a list of recommended reading (the book was very clearly written based on far more than the bibliography presented) but there is a list of illustrations and a separate list of maps and diagrams, as well as an index, which greatly aid the use of the books as a reference.
It’s not perfect – minor blemishes include the occasional use of unexplained acronyms that don’t turn up in the list of abbreviations. The standard of editing is above-average but there were still a few errors (incorrect months, for example, or grammatical slips). Also, while the smallest of things, it was a little bit of a shame given the author’s effort to be inclusive of American and Canadian efforts, that the sinking of U-127, mentioned in the book, does not mention it was by an Australian destroyer (Nestor) – although there is good mention of the RAAF.
All up, if one was to only read five books on the Second World War at sea, then I’d strongly recommend this one being included. Its depth and insight, on the other hand, make it worthwhile reading even if one had already read hundreds.
February 27, 2022
Very well written and readable book, which combines plenty of detailed accounts of individual convoys and operations with the strategic picture. That high level picture is clearer and better laid out than in any other comparable length book. A couple of examples.
The use of schnorkel had obvious tactical impacts, that are often described. I hadn't appreciated (or seen so clearly laid out) the operational impacts (reduced range, slower transit times) that made schnorkel submarines so much less effective (until the Type XXI came along).
While the British were desperately short of escorts early in the war, that is argued (plausibly) as a deliberate plan; the belief was (correctly) that Britain could build escorts at the last minute, and only had to start doing so when the U-Boat fleet started to expand.
Finally, Torch crippled the Atlantic war (drawing off escorts and forcing convoy routes to close), but then helped it (because the Mediterranean was open, and shortening routes provided more shipping).
This ability to explain the big picture without getting lost in the detail makes this the best single volume history of the battle I've read.
The use of schnorkel had obvious tactical impacts, that are often described. I hadn't appreciated (or seen so clearly laid out) the operational impacts (reduced range, slower transit times) that made schnorkel submarines so much less effective (until the Type XXI came along).
While the British were desperately short of escorts early in the war, that is argued (plausibly) as a deliberate plan; the belief was (correctly) that Britain could build escorts at the last minute, and only had to start doing so when the U-Boat fleet started to expand.
Finally, Torch crippled the Atlantic war (drawing off escorts and forcing convoy routes to close), but then helped it (because the Mediterranean was open, and shortening routes provided more shipping).
This ability to explain the big picture without getting lost in the detail makes this the best single volume history of the battle I've read.
August 1, 2017
Dette er ikke en bok man bør lese fra perm til perm sik jeg gjorde, men heller ta for seg noen sider avgangen. Det ligger et fantastisk arbeid med research bak denne boken, men den innheolder så mange detaljer at den nok passer best for spesielt interesserte. For andre kan den nok bli noe langtekkelig. Men bevarses for et oppslagsverk. Det er lettere lesning den siste delen som omhandler den norske handelsflåten, og den norske marinen. Hadde også stor glede av alle bildene av de gamle skipene og opplysninger om disse.
January 24, 2020
Litt for detaljert, ble kjedelig etter halve boka
January 29, 2023
A good, brief strategic overview of the Battle of the Atlantic with a surprisingly thorough level of operational details to support the larger narrative. Well-written and interesting.
October 28, 2025
Marc Milner’s Battle of the Atlantic is a thorough, scholarly account of the longest campaign of the Second World War, but it’s also one of the driest. It’s impressively detailed and obviously well-researched, yet it often reads more like a military report than a narrative history.
The book traces the entire U-boat war from the sinking of Athenia in 1939 to Germany’s surrender in 1945. Milner moves chronologically through each phase: the early “opening skirmishes,” the First and Second “Happy Times,” the crisis years of 1942, and finally the decisive turnaround in 1943 when Allied radar, air power, and coordination broke the back of the wolfpacks. Later chapters cover the inshore fighting of 1944, the last desperate months of 1945, and the unrealized threat of Germany’s new Type XXI “electro-boats.” Every stage of the campaign is documented, convoy battles, new technology, and inter-Allied command squabbles between Britain, Canada, and the United States.
If you’re looking for operational precision and chronology, Milner absolutely delivers. But as a reading experience, it’s heavy going. The prose is dense and often flat, with little sense of tension or personality despite the immense stakes of the Atlantic war. It’s history told as logistics, and though true to the subject matter, it is exhausting. The lack of footnotes (or at least the very sparse referencing) makes it difficult to follow up on sources or verify certain claims, which undercuts confidence in some of Milner’s interpretations.
By the end, I felt more admiration for the author’s expertise than enjoyment in the reading. Battle of the Atlantic succeeds as a factual synthesis of the campaign, but it lacks the narrative spark. If you want a detailed reference on the Atlantic war, it’s valuable. If you’re looking for a compelling read, this one feels more like duty than discovery.
The book traces the entire U-boat war from the sinking of Athenia in 1939 to Germany’s surrender in 1945. Milner moves chronologically through each phase: the early “opening skirmishes,” the First and Second “Happy Times,” the crisis years of 1942, and finally the decisive turnaround in 1943 when Allied radar, air power, and coordination broke the back of the wolfpacks. Later chapters cover the inshore fighting of 1944, the last desperate months of 1945, and the unrealized threat of Germany’s new Type XXI “electro-boats.” Every stage of the campaign is documented, convoy battles, new technology, and inter-Allied command squabbles between Britain, Canada, and the United States.
If you’re looking for operational precision and chronology, Milner absolutely delivers. But as a reading experience, it’s heavy going. The prose is dense and often flat, with little sense of tension or personality despite the immense stakes of the Atlantic war. It’s history told as logistics, and though true to the subject matter, it is exhausting. The lack of footnotes (or at least the very sparse referencing) makes it difficult to follow up on sources or verify certain claims, which undercuts confidence in some of Milner’s interpretations.
By the end, I felt more admiration for the author’s expertise than enjoyment in the reading. Battle of the Atlantic succeeds as a factual synthesis of the campaign, but it lacks the narrative spark. If you want a detailed reference on the Atlantic war, it’s valuable. If you’re looking for a compelling read, this one feels more like duty than discovery.
March 9, 2017
Excellent book that covers the various phases of the Battle of the Atlantic, and focuses on the anti-sub efforts of all three major Allies navies (Royal, Royal Canadian, and United States).
January 30, 2015
The War at Sea has always held my interest as Dad's brother served in the Royal Navy throughout the Second World War and would tell us about his experiences when he came to visit. This book is written from the Canadian perspective and the major part they played in the battle. The evolution of the techniques and equipment slowly began the decline of the U boats although it was a close run thing. The North Atlantic in winter is a forbidding place and a Canadian Corvette was a very uncomfortable vessel to sail in. Had the German Navy produced their Snorkel submarines at the start of the War, the outcome might have been different. Very good read.
July 12, 2014
Good overview of the campaign.
December 22, 2015
Bit too technical and without narrative for me to read as quickly as I'd like, but dabbled with interested facts here and there.
Displaying 1 - 12 of 12 reviews