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Advice and Dissent: Why America Suffers When Economics and Politics Collide
A bestselling economist tells us what both politicians and economists must learn to fix America's failing economic policies
American economic policy ranks as something between bad and disgraceful. As leading economist Alan S. Blinder argues, a crucial cultural divide separates economic and political civilizations. Economists and politicians often talk -- and act -- at cross politicians typically seek economists' "advice" only to support preconceived notions, not to learn what economists actually know or believe. Politicians naturally worry about keeping constituents happy and winning elections. Some are devoted to an ideology. Economists sometimes overlook the real human costs of what may seem to be the obviously best policy -- to a calculating machine. In Advice and Dissent , Blinder shows how both sides can shrink the yawning gap between good politics and good economics and encourage the hardheaded but softhearted policies our country so desperately needs.
American economic policy ranks as something between bad and disgraceful. As leading economist Alan S. Blinder argues, a crucial cultural divide separates economic and political civilizations. Economists and politicians often talk -- and act -- at cross politicians typically seek economists' "advice" only to support preconceived notions, not to learn what economists actually know or believe. Politicians naturally worry about keeping constituents happy and winning elections. Some are devoted to an ideology. Economists sometimes overlook the real human costs of what may seem to be the obviously best policy -- to a calculating machine. In Advice and Dissent , Blinder shows how both sides can shrink the yawning gap between good politics and good economics and encourage the hardheaded but softhearted policies our country so desperately needs.
368 pages, Hardcover
First published March 27, 2018
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300 people want to read
About the author
Alan S. Blinder
76 books80 followersAlan Stuart Blinder is an American economist at Princeton University serving as the Gordon S. Rentschler Memorial Professor of Economics and Public Affairs in the Economics Department, and vice chairman of The Observatory Group. He founded Princeton’s Griswold Center for Economic Policy Studies in 1990. Since 1978 he has been a Research Associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research. He is also a co-founder and a vice chairman of the Promontory Interfinancial Network, LLC. He is among the most influential economists in the world according to IDEAS/RePEc, and is "considered one of the great economic minds of his generation."
Blinder served on President Bill Clinton's Council of Economic Advisors (January 1993 - June 1994), and as the Vice Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System from June 1994 to January 1996.
Blinder served on President Bill Clinton's Council of Economic Advisors (January 1993 - June 1994), and as the Vice Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System from June 1994 to January 1996.
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Displaying 1 - 18 of 18 reviews
February 4, 2019
Leading economist who has been part of the last two democratic presidencies insists that neoliberal policies are the only way forward and anyone who insists otherwise just doesn't understand economics. I wish Blinder and others in his cohort would have a little bit of humility about their worldview. There is a whole movement within economists right now that is challenging all of these conventional views and Blinder just wants to insist on tax policy fixes. It's too late. People have moved on. And in part, it's because of people like Blinder who couldn't see that their solutions to radical inequality were too little too late.
But if you're a republican, do read this book. It is written for you to help push against some of the libertarian dogmas that Blinder must have been fighting against in the Clinton and Obama admins.
For progressives, we have to move on from this type of thinking
But if you're a republican, do read this book. It is written for you to help push against some of the libertarian dogmas that Blinder must have been fighting against in the Clinton and Obama admins.
For progressives, we have to move on from this type of thinking
September 18, 2018
Skimmed for an author event. Not as hard to digest as some review suggested. Wasn’t inspired by an ground-breaking ideas, nevertheless some frameworks the author provided are useful to organize thoughts.
February 26, 2018
The Politics of Economics
When Alan Blinder was advising the Clinton Administration from his economics perch, he would often find himself thinking “There is no election next Tuesday.” The thinking of the political class is so far removed from anything else, we find economic advice ignored, public opinion ignored, and the good of the nation ignored. What’s important is the next sound bite, tweet and poll that will aid in re-election. For an economist, it feels like automatic rejection every time.
Advice and Dissent is based on the hundred year-old Lamppost Theory, which says that drunks depend on lampposts for support, not illumination. So with politicians, apparently. They use economists to support their own positions, not for insights or solutions.
The main problem is the Madison Curse, Blinder says. James Madison bequeathed a system so hoary , cumbersome and slow that little or nothing could be accomplished in it. That was the actual idea, and we see the results daily.
Having chaired Clinton’s Council of Economic Advisors and vice-chaired the Federal Reserve board, Blinder had a front row seat to the disconnect between politicians and economists. He says economists are all about data and equity, while politicians are all about the popular vote and re-election. These two galaxies rarely cross paths. That is why tax reform is so difficult, why boondoggles continue to exist and why common sense is not a factor. It’s to the point, he says, where even a bipartisan panel of economists would not necessarily agree with a bipartisan panel of lawmakers.
Blinder goes into exquisite detail of how things get derailed in the process. How the budget needs to be passed by scores of committees. How local politics can destroy national programs. How linkages and logrolling top proven practices and corrective initiatives. The government is there for the needs of the politicians and the process. Economists don’t figure in that, unless they support the politicians’ stands.
There is a separate room in economics hell for supply-side theories. Blinder quotes newly-minted Nobel laureate George Stigler, invited to comment on Reagan’s new cure-all: “It’s a gimmick, or if you wish, a slogan.” There are essentially no economists who support the supply side, trickle-down theory of cutting taxes to increase government revenues. Which is why you never see them backing the president. Blinder stabs the supply-siders numerous times throughout the book. The whole concept is an embarrassment to the discipline. But that doesn’t stop politicians from trying it again and again, claiming it is a proven solution.
Economists have the numbers, and the politicians ignore them. Blinder shows that while politicians bemoan the disappearance of American manufacturing, output has been stable for 60 years (Jobs have disappeared, but production continues). And while politicians claim government has ballooned, the civil service is the same size it was in the Eisenhower Administration. This stops absolutely no one from winning elections based on government-bashing.
The government is twisted so far out of shape that Blinder’s suggestions for nudging it back to the mean would have seemed crazy not long ago. He thinks we need more backroom negotiations where deals can be done out of the sunshine. He thinks we should bring back earmarks to exchange for votes on bills. And he thinks we can safely implement otherwise impossible tax hikes if we pass them now but put them off for years. The intellectual dishonesty is breathtaking.
On the other hand, Blinder argues for a Tax Board, made up of economists and other technocrats, to structure a fairer and simpler tax system, without input from special interests. Taking this away from the politicians is not unprecedented. He points to the Federal Reserve, which Congress created because it was out of its depth trying to reign in panics and recessions. Similarly, fast track approvals allow specialists to devise an entire package, and Congress gets to vote yea or nay on the whole thing. We have the resources to make government work, but politicians have other priorities.
Another great old idea is the parliamentary system of civil service. The US president must appoint 9000 people to Administration positions. The vacancies can last for two years or more, what with finding candidates, having the FBI investigate them, and the senate confirm them. The UK and Canadian governments carry on with a full and neutral civil service, without missing a beat. Only the ministers (cabinet secretaries) change.
The one great weakness of Advice and Dissent is Blinder’s clear and omnipresent status as a Democrat. He wears it proudly, and demonstrates it often. This is not merely beneath the lofty pedestal he puts economists on, but ironically, points right back James Madison, whom Blinder cites repeatedly. Madison was totally against political parties for gumming up the works. Which is saying something, considering Madison’s design. If we had politicians devoted to issues instead of ideologies, even the government might work better.
After reading Advice and Dissent, your appreciation of how government works changes; you realize it is a miracle if anything productive comes of it, ever.
David Wineberg
When Alan Blinder was advising the Clinton Administration from his economics perch, he would often find himself thinking “There is no election next Tuesday.” The thinking of the political class is so far removed from anything else, we find economic advice ignored, public opinion ignored, and the good of the nation ignored. What’s important is the next sound bite, tweet and poll that will aid in re-election. For an economist, it feels like automatic rejection every time.
Advice and Dissent is based on the hundred year-old Lamppost Theory, which says that drunks depend on lampposts for support, not illumination. So with politicians, apparently. They use economists to support their own positions, not for insights or solutions.
The main problem is the Madison Curse, Blinder says. James Madison bequeathed a system so hoary , cumbersome and slow that little or nothing could be accomplished in it. That was the actual idea, and we see the results daily.
Having chaired Clinton’s Council of Economic Advisors and vice-chaired the Federal Reserve board, Blinder had a front row seat to the disconnect between politicians and economists. He says economists are all about data and equity, while politicians are all about the popular vote and re-election. These two galaxies rarely cross paths. That is why tax reform is so difficult, why boondoggles continue to exist and why common sense is not a factor. It’s to the point, he says, where even a bipartisan panel of economists would not necessarily agree with a bipartisan panel of lawmakers.
Blinder goes into exquisite detail of how things get derailed in the process. How the budget needs to be passed by scores of committees. How local politics can destroy national programs. How linkages and logrolling top proven practices and corrective initiatives. The government is there for the needs of the politicians and the process. Economists don’t figure in that, unless they support the politicians’ stands.
There is a separate room in economics hell for supply-side theories. Blinder quotes newly-minted Nobel laureate George Stigler, invited to comment on Reagan’s new cure-all: “It’s a gimmick, or if you wish, a slogan.” There are essentially no economists who support the supply side, trickle-down theory of cutting taxes to increase government revenues. Which is why you never see them backing the president. Blinder stabs the supply-siders numerous times throughout the book. The whole concept is an embarrassment to the discipline. But that doesn’t stop politicians from trying it again and again, claiming it is a proven solution.
Economists have the numbers, and the politicians ignore them. Blinder shows that while politicians bemoan the disappearance of American manufacturing, output has been stable for 60 years (Jobs have disappeared, but production continues). And while politicians claim government has ballooned, the civil service is the same size it was in the Eisenhower Administration. This stops absolutely no one from winning elections based on government-bashing.
The government is twisted so far out of shape that Blinder’s suggestions for nudging it back to the mean would have seemed crazy not long ago. He thinks we need more backroom negotiations where deals can be done out of the sunshine. He thinks we should bring back earmarks to exchange for votes on bills. And he thinks we can safely implement otherwise impossible tax hikes if we pass them now but put them off for years. The intellectual dishonesty is breathtaking.
On the other hand, Blinder argues for a Tax Board, made up of economists and other technocrats, to structure a fairer and simpler tax system, without input from special interests. Taking this away from the politicians is not unprecedented. He points to the Federal Reserve, which Congress created because it was out of its depth trying to reign in panics and recessions. Similarly, fast track approvals allow specialists to devise an entire package, and Congress gets to vote yea or nay on the whole thing. We have the resources to make government work, but politicians have other priorities.
Another great old idea is the parliamentary system of civil service. The US president must appoint 9000 people to Administration positions. The vacancies can last for two years or more, what with finding candidates, having the FBI investigate them, and the senate confirm them. The UK and Canadian governments carry on with a full and neutral civil service, without missing a beat. Only the ministers (cabinet secretaries) change.
The one great weakness of Advice and Dissent is Blinder’s clear and omnipresent status as a Democrat. He wears it proudly, and demonstrates it often. This is not merely beneath the lofty pedestal he puts economists on, but ironically, points right back James Madison, whom Blinder cites repeatedly. Madison was totally against political parties for gumming up the works. Which is saying something, considering Madison’s design. If we had politicians devoted to issues instead of ideologies, even the government might work better.
After reading Advice and Dissent, your appreciation of how government works changes; you realize it is a miracle if anything productive comes of it, ever.
David Wineberg
May 1, 2018
I really enjoyed this book.
It's focused on the American system, and talks about how the layout of the constitution promotes the status quo. (As the author puts it, the American system has strong safeguards against errors of commission - but almost no safeguards against errors of omission.) There is also a description of the British parliamentary system as "a sequence of dictatorships punctuated by periodic elections. A British prime minister with a majority in the House of Commons can pass pretty much anything without consulting the opposition. If the votes grow unhappy with what the governing party is doing, they can throw the rascals out at the next election."
However, some descriptions of politics are generally applicable.
For example, the nature of the political system means that politicians inevitably deal with short time horizons (until the next election - the author estimates that the president has 12 - 18 months to work before political rhythms of the next election take over), and the need to appease votes (which you can consider accountability or populism). They also have to deal with what he considers that three Is: ignorance, ideology, and interest groups.
Ignorance means that people are economically illiterate and unable to assess economic policies. Ideology refers to rigid ideological positions (e.g. reducing tax rates will accelerate growth) - which may not be borne out by fact. Interest groups refer to the situation where some economic policies may be better for society as a whole, but the minority affected (sometimes rich lobbyists) can cause the policy to stonewall. (Although the author later acknowledges that there may be a need to mitigate these transaction costs.) As he says:
I loved the way he sets out the importance of messaging in democracy. As he puts it:
I liked how he also quotes James Bennet about how "Information is both currency and weaponry in Washington, a means to create and pay debts, to reward friends and destroy enemies." - if the craft of politics is about messaging, information leaks are a form of counter-messenging.
At the same time, he talks about how "unauthorised leaking impairs the ability to conduct a healthy internal debate, to think out loud and explore options that probably won't be adopted, to probe your policy's weaknesses the way a debater would. And when the policy development process is impaired, the main victims are the citizens, not the office holders."
This description reminds me a lot about the concept of safe spaces - although the definition "safe space" is also under a lot of contention. In short, though - the idea is that there is a place free to discuss ideas (however inchoate they might be). There is also the idea of privacy to discuss - which he sets out in detail in Chapter 11 (on Remedies).
Similarly, he talks about the role of journalists:
He then goes on to talk about how this can fail as well - through false equivalences, for example. Or the danger of the fourth estate's own self-interest (i.e. the need to make money). This corporate agenda does not necessarily coincide with the public interest.
I adored Blinder's last two chapters, which were devoted to remedies. One of the things he talked about was the need for a return to some backdoor politicking and less transparency. He goes into detail (for example on nominating procedures - which, because few moderates want to participate, has become susceptible to hyper-partisan minorities), but I loved the observation that "Yes, sunshine is the best disinfectant. But it's an indiscriminate disinfectant." TV shows and cameras are for posturing; the difficulty is in compromising.
I also enjoyed the description of the civil service. There is a tension between how much gets delegated to the civil service and how high the hierarchy gets before the bureaucracy gets replaced by incoming politicians; as Blinder observes, the British replace at the ministerial level (possibly too high a level to effect changes) and the Americans have to replace too much (resulting in higher bureaucratic costs).
Blinder spends some time musing over when to outsource political functions and when not to. His key example for this is the Federal Reserve - which is independent from Congress, and which he observes that Congress rarely seeks to reclaim power from. As he puts it: "They [Congress] know that their comparative advantage lies in criticising the Fed, not running it."
This book sets out basic economic principles well. I loved how short and clear his writing is. Perhaps this is not the most original book with fresh ideas, but I enjoyed it as a primer to deeper economic ideas (although it is also very clear that he has a few pet policies, e.g. tax). A lot of his suggestions at allocating bureaucrats take heed from the Federal Reserve and how their technocrats are selected; I wondered how this would jive with, for example, how judges are selected in America. I felt that - while perhaps outside the scope of his argument - would have added some depth/context.
It's focused on the American system, and talks about how the layout of the constitution promotes the status quo. (As the author puts it, the American system has strong safeguards against errors of commission - but almost no safeguards against errors of omission.) There is also a description of the British parliamentary system as "a sequence of dictatorships punctuated by periodic elections. A British prime minister with a majority in the House of Commons can pass pretty much anything without consulting the opposition. If the votes grow unhappy with what the governing party is doing, they can throw the rascals out at the next election."
However, some descriptions of politics are generally applicable.
For example, the nature of the political system means that politicians inevitably deal with short time horizons (until the next election - the author estimates that the president has 12 - 18 months to work before political rhythms of the next election take over), and the need to appease votes (which you can consider accountability or populism). They also have to deal with what he considers that three Is: ignorance, ideology, and interest groups.
Ignorance means that people are economically illiterate and unable to assess economic policies. Ideology refers to rigid ideological positions (e.g. reducing tax rates will accelerate growth) - which may not be borne out by fact. Interest groups refer to the situation where some economic policies may be better for society as a whole, but the minority affected (sometimes rich lobbyists) can cause the policy to stonewall. (Although the author later acknowledges that there may be a need to mitigate these transaction costs.) As he says:
When our political system is asked to weigh concentrated and readily identified losses for a vocal minority against diffuse and hidden benefits for the silent majority, it doesn't hesitate long before siding with the minority.
I loved the way he sets out the importance of messaging in democracy. As he puts it:
People in public life must care as much about what is heard as about what is said. They must craft their words so that listeners receive the right message. Among other things, they must keep their messages short, clear, and punchy because political discourse has limited room for complexity.
I liked how he also quotes James Bennet about how "Information is both currency and weaponry in Washington, a means to create and pay debts, to reward friends and destroy enemies." - if the craft of politics is about messaging, information leaks are a form of counter-messenging.
At the same time, he talks about how "unauthorised leaking impairs the ability to conduct a healthy internal debate, to think out loud and explore options that probably won't be adopted, to probe your policy's weaknesses the way a debater would. And when the policy development process is impaired, the main victims are the citizens, not the office holders."
This description reminds me a lot about the concept of safe spaces - although the definition "safe space" is also under a lot of contention. In short, though - the idea is that there is a place free to discuss ideas (however inchoate they might be). There is also the idea of privacy to discuss - which he sets out in detail in Chapter 11 (on Remedies).
Similarly, he talks about the role of journalists:
Reporters do not just transmit information; inevitably, they also interpret it. Once again, this interpretive role of the press is neither nefarious nor inappropriate. After all, most readers and viewers are not specialists; they need someone to put the news, including the economic news, into context for them - to explain it. Furthermore, citizens of a vibrant democracy should not accept the statements of public officials at face value. The interpretive role of the press is not only inevitable but entirely legitimate, probably even essential, and - when done competently and honestly - almost certainly in the public interest.
He then goes on to talk about how this can fail as well - through false equivalences, for example. Or the danger of the fourth estate's own self-interest (i.e. the need to make money). This corporate agenda does not necessarily coincide with the public interest.
I adored Blinder's last two chapters, which were devoted to remedies. One of the things he talked about was the need for a return to some backdoor politicking and less transparency. He goes into detail (for example on nominating procedures - which, because few moderates want to participate, has become susceptible to hyper-partisan minorities), but I loved the observation that "Yes, sunshine is the best disinfectant. But it's an indiscriminate disinfectant." TV shows and cameras are for posturing; the difficulty is in compromising.
I also enjoyed the description of the civil service. There is a tension between how much gets delegated to the civil service and how high the hierarchy gets before the bureaucracy gets replaced by incoming politicians; as Blinder observes, the British replace at the ministerial level (possibly too high a level to effect changes) and the Americans have to replace too much (resulting in higher bureaucratic costs).
Blinder spends some time musing over when to outsource political functions and when not to. His key example for this is the Federal Reserve - which is independent from Congress, and which he observes that Congress rarely seeks to reclaim power from. As he puts it: "They [Congress] know that their comparative advantage lies in criticising the Fed, not running it."
This book sets out basic economic principles well. I loved how short and clear his writing is. Perhaps this is not the most original book with fresh ideas, but I enjoyed it as a primer to deeper economic ideas (although it is also very clear that he has a few pet policies, e.g. tax). A lot of his suggestions at allocating bureaucrats take heed from the Federal Reserve and how their technocrats are selected; I wondered how this would jive with, for example, how judges are selected in America. I felt that - while perhaps outside the scope of his argument - would have added some depth/context.
April 30, 2018
It's sad that not only will the target audience not read this book but also the economically illiterate who need some practical economics lessons won't either.
Professor Blinder is a more liberal economist than most I read but still shoots straight on economics and god knows could use some more straight shooters on the political and economic left as well as on the political and economic right.
I recommend to anyone on the left or right interested a discussion and recommendations on some fiscal policies including free trade and taxation.
Professor Blinder is a more liberal economist than most I read but still shoots straight on economics and god knows could use some more straight shooters on the political and economic left as well as on the political and economic right.
I recommend to anyone on the left or right interested a discussion and recommendations on some fiscal policies including free trade and taxation.
July 23, 2018
The first 7 chapters of this book are meaningless if you have been keeping abreast of current events. I almost abandoned the book. I am really not sure who the audience is for this book. The last 3 chapters are interesting but I was hoping for more from this author.
August 26, 2025
“But I have an iconoclastic theory of the future of political message, one that points precisely in the opposite direction. It is based on the time-tested economic principle that scarcity creates value, which fades away as a commodity becomes too abundant. The surplus commodity I have in mind is political spin, which has proliferated at an alarming rate since about 1980. At first, it worked splendidly. President Reagan's handlers were justly celebrated as masters of the art. (Reagan's television skills didn't hurt, either.) But that was then, and this is now. After more than three decades on a diet of heavy political spin, the American people, I believe, have had their fill. They hunger for the commodity that is currently so scarce: straight talk.
“According to this admittedly speculative hypothesis, politicos have carried the fine art of spin well past the point of diminishing returns. Voters have grown to be weary of, jaded with, and distrustful of the whole business, which they increasingly view as a con game. They eagerly await unconventional politicians who will speak to them plainly, like the folks they deal with every day, not like spinmeisters reading talking points from teleprompters. Such unconventional politicians would, of course, need to hone their messages carefully, for all the legitimate reasons discussed in this chapter. But they would sharply delimit the realm of spin and would talk to the public the way ordinary people converse across a kitchen table, not the way most politicians talk when the klieg lights go on.
“Can I prove that this hypothesis is right? Certainly not. The vast majority of political experts—there's that oxymoron again—will assure you that I am dead wrong. That alone makes straight talk a risky strategy. But think back to the 2016 presidential primaries, when Senator Bernie Sanders (I-VT) showed astonishing political appeal and property magnate (and TV celebrity) Donald Trump triumphed over sixteen competitors. Sanders, who hailed from a state with three electoral votes, was seventy-four years old, a self-proclaimed socialist, and not even a Democrat. Trump, who was not obviously a Republican either, gained fame as a foul-mouthed billionaire who fired people on TV. Those were winning formulas?”
“According to this admittedly speculative hypothesis, politicos have carried the fine art of spin well past the point of diminishing returns. Voters have grown to be weary of, jaded with, and distrustful of the whole business, which they increasingly view as a con game. They eagerly await unconventional politicians who will speak to them plainly, like the folks they deal with every day, not like spinmeisters reading talking points from teleprompters. Such unconventional politicians would, of course, need to hone their messages carefully, for all the legitimate reasons discussed in this chapter. But they would sharply delimit the realm of spin and would talk to the public the way ordinary people converse across a kitchen table, not the way most politicians talk when the klieg lights go on.
“Can I prove that this hypothesis is right? Certainly not. The vast majority of political experts—there's that oxymoron again—will assure you that I am dead wrong. That alone makes straight talk a risky strategy. But think back to the 2016 presidential primaries, when Senator Bernie Sanders (I-VT) showed astonishing political appeal and property magnate (and TV celebrity) Donald Trump triumphed over sixteen competitors. Sanders, who hailed from a state with three electoral votes, was seventy-four years old, a self-proclaimed socialist, and not even a Democrat. Trump, who was not obviously a Republican either, gained fame as a foul-mouthed billionaire who fired people on TV. Those were winning formulas?”
November 1, 2020
Some good points -- I found the section on the interaction between policymakers and the Fourth Estate most interesting, but a lot of rehashed/tired points. He falls into many of the common logical traps of his profession (some listed below), but overall he's more aware than most:
1. When you hear someone say that a particular policy is a "clumsy" means to an end... all solutions are clumsy. There are always side effects, unintended consequences. That's the name of the game. You pick your poison. "Clumsy" just means that I dislike these particular side effects.
2. For as much as he's enamored with market efficiency, he ignores the reality of how competition can create inefficiencies.
3. It's amusing to hear academic economists advocate labor market "flexibility" and competition from the perch of tenure. Stability and security create the space for long-term vision and innovation. They, of all people, should understand that.
4. The characterization of utility as one-dimensional -- as if more is always better.
5. Minor issue, but figure 8.3 is particularly egregious ... the bivariate comparison is deeply misleading. Fine to use it to illustrate a point -- we all love charts. But don't pretend that it says much without extensive caveats.
6. It's annoying to hear the tired line "almost all economists agree on this point ... why doesn't everyone else." Of course they agree, it's a closed group indoctrinated with the same fundamentals. where group membership is contingent or more or less agreeing with the dogma. It's like being surprised that the members of your church "mostly agree on most of the issues". Duh. Society is more fractious.
1. When you hear someone say that a particular policy is a "clumsy" means to an end... all solutions are clumsy. There are always side effects, unintended consequences. That's the name of the game. You pick your poison. "Clumsy" just means that I dislike these particular side effects.
2. For as much as he's enamored with market efficiency, he ignores the reality of how competition can create inefficiencies.
3. It's amusing to hear academic economists advocate labor market "flexibility" and competition from the perch of tenure. Stability and security create the space for long-term vision and innovation. They, of all people, should understand that.
4. The characterization of utility as one-dimensional -- as if more is always better.
5. Minor issue, but figure 8.3 is particularly egregious ... the bivariate comparison is deeply misleading. Fine to use it to illustrate a point -- we all love charts. But don't pretend that it says much without extensive caveats.
6. It's annoying to hear the tired line "almost all economists agree on this point ... why doesn't everyone else." Of course they agree, it's a closed group indoctrinated with the same fundamentals. where group membership is contingent or more or less agreeing with the dogma. It's like being surprised that the members of your church "mostly agree on most of the issues". Duh. Society is more fractious.
June 24, 2020
Blinder is an eminent Princeton U professor and former Vice Chair of the Federal Reserve System who outlines the different problems that economists and politicians seek to solve. In brief, politicians are trying to be re-elected and, while interested in resolving pressing problems, seek short term fixes, while economists are advancing complex solutions that elide painful adjustment costs and deliver in a much longer time frame. As a retired economist, I wish I'd read this book 20 years ago. Blinder is a witty writer who wants to share the lessons he wishes he'd known at the beginning of his career. He clearly frames the world view differences between economists and their usual bosses--politicians. He outlines several issues that he thinks are pressing--tax reform and the debt level and global warming to name two--and the salesmanship challenges of advancing a policies that pay off for economists, politicians, and society.
July 4, 2022
If one is looking for a written and repetitive polemic against conservative or libertarian politics by an economist then you should read this book.
The author is a big government advocate and rambles on against the previous administration without shedding any light on the implications of left leaning policies.
The author is a big government advocate and rambles on against the previous administration without shedding any light on the implications of left leaning policies.
October 14, 2018
Practical observations on the disconnect between economics and politics, and how to bridge the two worlds. Blinder argues that we need policies made with hard heads and soft hearts; an equal focus on efficiency as well as equity.
May 30, 2019
I felt like there was good information about economics and politics, but skimmed through rants on current situations.
February 20, 2022
This book is for economists who have the patience to participate in the public policy process (I don't).
April 23, 2023
An unusually funny book about economic policy in the US. Blinder criticizes both economists and policymakers for their inability to understand each other and provide optimal solutions. Recommended.
January 1, 2024
Very good book by a very good economist. Mostly about the difference between economists and politicians, and how both are needed.
February 21, 2024
Very good for what it is — surface level knowledge and insights for people being introduced to the topics. Author is very readable and not overly formal.
July 6, 2018
A breezily written reflection about the relationship between economic policy and economic advisers by someone who has been a leading practitioner for over four decades. Alan Blinder centers his book around the lamppost theory of economics: that politicians use economic advisers for support not illumination, the corollary being Murphy's Law of economic advising--economists are least influential where they are most in agreement with each other.
Blinder puts much of the blame on the political system and its ignorance of basic economics, but puts some on economists too for not speaking understandably, having overly long time horizons, and ignoring fairness.
He offers a number of suggestions for nudging the two sides together but does not claim that they will accomplish too much, including both more understanding of economics by politicians, slightly more decisions shifted to technocratic decision making, and economists more sympathetic to the problems they solve.
Some of the book refreshes his Hard Heads, Soft Hearts: Tough-minded Economics For A Just Society that was one of my first introductions to economic policy more than two decades ago. It is nice to see the same sentiments applied to today's issues.
Blinder puts much of the blame on the political system and its ignorance of basic economics, but puts some on economists too for not speaking understandably, having overly long time horizons, and ignoring fairness.
He offers a number of suggestions for nudging the two sides together but does not claim that they will accomplish too much, including both more understanding of economics by politicians, slightly more decisions shifted to technocratic decision making, and economists more sympathetic to the problems they solve.
Some of the book refreshes his Hard Heads, Soft Hearts: Tough-minded Economics For A Just Society that was one of my first introductions to economic policy more than two decades ago. It is nice to see the same sentiments applied to today's issues.
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August 19, 2018Basically a book about why and how policies economists think are sound, get lost and unheard in the wilderness of Washington.
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