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通敵：二戰中國的日本特務與地方菁英
卜正民在《維梅爾的帽子》中，展現了藝術修養以及對史料的嫻熟，剪裁出一幅十七世紀全球貿易的迷人圖像；在《通敵》中，則是處理卜正民另一個專精領域──二十世紀日本侵華史。
兩岸政權為了「抗戰是誰打的」，爭奪話語權、詮釋權不休；政治立場不同者，動輒饗以「民族大義」、「漢奸」的大帽子，把道德／政治標準驟然拉到無可轉圜的高度，無視於抗日的神話，有許多是事後製造出來的，也不顧錯貼亂貼的漢奸的標籤不在少數。
卜正民的《通敵》並非為某些特定的「漢奸」平反，而是集中在嘉定、鎮江、南京、上海、崇明這五個地方的史料與數據，試圖從人性與生活的層面、實際發生的事情，讓讀者了解，「通敵合作」比我們所想像的更為模稜、廣泛而普遍。
當外敵入侵，烽煙四起，戰火燎原。無辜生靈，危在旦夕，無一能倖免於暴力威脅。你若是地方上的頭臉人物，或是有志做出一番事業，或有心服務鄉里，值此危難，選擇挑起領導的責任。武裝抵抗，只聞其聲，游擊隊伏於鄉間，且與盜匪強梁無異。日寇的文職人員出現在你家門前，請你提供合作。那麼，你會怎麼辦？
兩岸政權為了「抗戰是誰打的」，爭奪話語權、詮釋權不休；政治立場不同者，動輒饗以「民族大義」、「漢奸」的大帽子，把道德／政治標準驟然拉到無可轉圜的高度，無視於抗日的神話，有許多是事後製造出來的，也不顧錯貼亂貼的漢奸的標籤不在少數。
卜正民的《通敵》並非為某些特定的「漢奸」平反，而是集中在嘉定、鎮江、南京、上海、崇明這五個地方的史料與數據，試圖從人性與生活的層面、實際發生的事情，讓讀者了解，「通敵合作」比我們所想像的更為模稜、廣泛而普遍。
當外敵入侵，烽煙四起，戰火燎原。無辜生靈，危在旦夕，無一能倖免於暴力威脅。你若是地方上的頭臉人物，或是有志做出一番事業，或有心服務鄉里，值此危難，選擇挑起領導的責任。武裝抵抗，只聞其聲，游擊隊伏於鄉間，且與盜匪強梁無異。日寇的文職人員出現在你家門前，請你提供合作。那麼，你會怎麼辦？
320 pages, Paperback
First published December 22, 2004
4 people are currently reading
109 people want to read
About the author
Timothy Brook
32 books105 followersTimothy James Brook is a Canadian historian, sinologist, and writer specializing in the study of China (sinology). He holds the Republic of China Chair, Department of History, University of British Columbia.
His research interests include the social and cultural history of the Ming Dynasty in China; law and punishment in Imperial China; collaboration during Japan's wartime occupation of China, 1937–45 and war crimes trials in Asia; global history; and historiography.
His research interests include the social and cultural history of the Ming Dynasty in China; law and punishment in Imperial China; collaboration during Japan's wartime occupation of China, 1937–45 and war crimes trials in Asia; global history; and historiography.
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Displaying 1 - 12 of 12 reviews
August 12, 2021
The reader of this book should always ask himself this question: "What would I have done?"
We tend to view collaboration of the conquered with the conqueror from the dichotomous narrative of patriots versus traitors: whoever works with the enemy is a traitor to his own country, those who resist are patriots. The author of this work however, wanted to present a different perspective, one that exists between these two extremes, in different shades, perpetuated by people for different reasons with different motivations.
Because of the dearth of research into the subject of collaboration, particularly on Chinese collaboration with the Japanese, it is hard to piece a coherent or complete picture of what forms collaboration took and how extensive it was. But credits to the author for painstakingly going through whatever sources he could find, whether Japanese or Chinese, official or autobiographical, to present the story of Chinese-Japanese collaboration through the events in five places in China. He was able to show the forms that collaboration took, the people behind them, and most interestingly, their motivations in agreeing to work with the Japanese in what was a very risky enterprise.
Central to the five stories is the Japanese's attempt at administering the places they have occupied. The whole idea of invading China in the first place was to claim the resources that Japan lacked. If the conquered territories were not pacified, there would not be function economies that could exploit the resources. The army was not made up of civil administrators. Their job was to occupy territories by force if not by terror. The job of rebuilding a city or town, of reviving the administration, and restarting the economy was thus left to the "special service agents" from Japan. But in the longer run, the only practicable solution was for the Chinese to self-administer. So the Japanese started to recruit Chinese to set up local administrations.
While the sub-title of the book uses the term "local elites", many of the collaborators were anything but elite; some were misfits who were disappointed at their lack of advancement under the KMT, others were opportunists who smelled get-rich opportunities. Ironically, the only ones that were really motivated by wanting to help the Chinese were the non-Chinese that formed the International Committee for the Nanking Safety Zone. Yet, I did not actually see any Chinese who actively collaborated to advance the agenda of the Japanese. If they they were not motivated to advance thus, why then did they agree to work with the Japanese especially if they could end up becoming the target of assassination?
This is where the author made one of the most important contributions to our knowledge - he provided insights into the psyche of the conquered. There were few Chinese who believed in the longevity of the Japanese occupation let alone buying into the concept of the Greater East-Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Most Chinese just thought they would wait out the years and in the meantime, life goes on. The peasants at the lowest rung of the society were especially nonchalant. To them, it was just the displacement of one lousy administration by another, albeit a more cruel one. It was almost like how the Malayans felt when the Japanese displaced the British in the Second World War.
The catch was for how long would the Japanese be around? In the meantime what do they do? They would have to find some ways to accommodate the Japanese. That brings us face to face with the people who collaborated. Some would go quite far to do the job to which they were appointed, even to the extent of organising a parade to mark the swearing-in of the new administration. Then there were those who would be happy to just string the Japanese along. That is the gist of what the author wanted to explore - to what extent do you call them traitors (汉奸)?
Popular narrative, especially Chinese, is decidedly dichotomous; if you are not with us you are against us. But the truth is those capable of armed resistance, KMT or CCP, left the populace behind as they retreated. None of them were able to protect the civilians in the Rape of Nanking remember? What are they to do? Few Chinese welcomed the Japanese occupiers, but in 1937/38, the Imperial Japanese Army was on a roll, the KMT was in retreat and the CCP was not an organised force. Left alone, the civilians and local elites tried to go on and find accommodation with the Japanese, some more willing than others, some more cunningly than others. In some cases collaboration resulted in the enrichment of the collaborators. In others, intentional or not, they reduced the indiscriminate cruelties on the part of the Japanese, probably saving lives. How then should we judge them?
In the end the author did not label any of these collaborators patriots or traitors, that was not his intent. Instead, by exploring these people's deeds, he tries to demonstrate a certain pragmatism inherent in all of us. First and foremost, we try to self-preserve, we try to move on with our life, and while we are at that, we try not to compromise too much, just in case.
I read the Chinese edition of this book because I didn't know that it was originally in English. As such, some of the terms I used here are probably not as they were in the original form. One other thing that I became aware of is the names of the Chinese in the book. The author must have seen them in their original Chinese characters. Having Romanised them, they had to be back-translated into Chinese based on some guesswork. It would have helped greatly if the author had included the Chinese characters in the English edition.
This small complaint would not mar what I think is a careful and nuanced treatment of this subject. In this day when Chinese are increasingly nationalistic, there is no room for a textured exploration of what is essentially human nature. In fact nowadays it is not even dichotomous - Chinese are patriots, full stop. This is a thought-provoking book and before we judge the characters, we would do well to ask ourselves: "What would I have done?"
We tend to view collaboration of the conquered with the conqueror from the dichotomous narrative of patriots versus traitors: whoever works with the enemy is a traitor to his own country, those who resist are patriots. The author of this work however, wanted to present a different perspective, one that exists between these two extremes, in different shades, perpetuated by people for different reasons with different motivations.
Because of the dearth of research into the subject of collaboration, particularly on Chinese collaboration with the Japanese, it is hard to piece a coherent or complete picture of what forms collaboration took and how extensive it was. But credits to the author for painstakingly going through whatever sources he could find, whether Japanese or Chinese, official or autobiographical, to present the story of Chinese-Japanese collaboration through the events in five places in China. He was able to show the forms that collaboration took, the people behind them, and most interestingly, their motivations in agreeing to work with the Japanese in what was a very risky enterprise.
Central to the five stories is the Japanese's attempt at administering the places they have occupied. The whole idea of invading China in the first place was to claim the resources that Japan lacked. If the conquered territories were not pacified, there would not be function economies that could exploit the resources. The army was not made up of civil administrators. Their job was to occupy territories by force if not by terror. The job of rebuilding a city or town, of reviving the administration, and restarting the economy was thus left to the "special service agents" from Japan. But in the longer run, the only practicable solution was for the Chinese to self-administer. So the Japanese started to recruit Chinese to set up local administrations.
While the sub-title of the book uses the term "local elites", many of the collaborators were anything but elite; some were misfits who were disappointed at their lack of advancement under the KMT, others were opportunists who smelled get-rich opportunities. Ironically, the only ones that were really motivated by wanting to help the Chinese were the non-Chinese that formed the International Committee for the Nanking Safety Zone. Yet, I did not actually see any Chinese who actively collaborated to advance the agenda of the Japanese. If they they were not motivated to advance thus, why then did they agree to work with the Japanese especially if they could end up becoming the target of assassination?
This is where the author made one of the most important contributions to our knowledge - he provided insights into the psyche of the conquered. There were few Chinese who believed in the longevity of the Japanese occupation let alone buying into the concept of the Greater East-Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Most Chinese just thought they would wait out the years and in the meantime, life goes on. The peasants at the lowest rung of the society were especially nonchalant. To them, it was just the displacement of one lousy administration by another, albeit a more cruel one. It was almost like how the Malayans felt when the Japanese displaced the British in the Second World War.
The catch was for how long would the Japanese be around? In the meantime what do they do? They would have to find some ways to accommodate the Japanese. That brings us face to face with the people who collaborated. Some would go quite far to do the job to which they were appointed, even to the extent of organising a parade to mark the swearing-in of the new administration. Then there were those who would be happy to just string the Japanese along. That is the gist of what the author wanted to explore - to what extent do you call them traitors (汉奸)?
Popular narrative, especially Chinese, is decidedly dichotomous; if you are not with us you are against us. But the truth is those capable of armed resistance, KMT or CCP, left the populace behind as they retreated. None of them were able to protect the civilians in the Rape of Nanking remember? What are they to do? Few Chinese welcomed the Japanese occupiers, but in 1937/38, the Imperial Japanese Army was on a roll, the KMT was in retreat and the CCP was not an organised force. Left alone, the civilians and local elites tried to go on and find accommodation with the Japanese, some more willing than others, some more cunningly than others. In some cases collaboration resulted in the enrichment of the collaborators. In others, intentional or not, they reduced the indiscriminate cruelties on the part of the Japanese, probably saving lives. How then should we judge them?
In the end the author did not label any of these collaborators patriots or traitors, that was not his intent. Instead, by exploring these people's deeds, he tries to demonstrate a certain pragmatism inherent in all of us. First and foremost, we try to self-preserve, we try to move on with our life, and while we are at that, we try not to compromise too much, just in case.
I read the Chinese edition of this book because I didn't know that it was originally in English. As such, some of the terms I used here are probably not as they were in the original form. One other thing that I became aware of is the names of the Chinese in the book. The author must have seen them in their original Chinese characters. Having Romanised them, they had to be back-translated into Chinese based on some guesswork. It would have helped greatly if the author had included the Chinese characters in the English edition.
This small complaint would not mar what I think is a careful and nuanced treatment of this subject. In this day when Chinese are increasingly nationalistic, there is no room for a textured exploration of what is essentially human nature. In fact nowadays it is not even dichotomous - Chinese are patriots, full stop. This is a thought-provoking book and before we judge the characters, we would do well to ask ourselves: "What would I have done?"
June 17, 2024
Everything a historical narrative should be. Questioning narratives that have so long been in place and rebuking them is no simple task, but Brook handles it with such grace. Completely lit a fire under my ass to continuously questions everything especially historical narratives.
“Living under war regimes and tremendous ambiguities… we confuse how individuals acted with what we think they could have done…”
“Living under war regimes and tremendous ambiguities… we confuse how individuals acted with what we think they could have done…”
November 25, 2012
I've enjoyed this at several different level so I will review this book from different perspective: Chinese history, historiography, lessons for the US current military involvement overseas and spiritually as a Christian.
In terms of Chinese history, this book is on a time period and events that few Americans know about let alone understand. Way before America was attacked on Pearl Harbor on December 7th, 1941, Japan has already been waging war and spreading its imperialism for decades. This book is about events of Japan’s invasion of China during the 1930s from the Shanghai area to Nanking, and it explores what mainstream history have not focus much on: the subject of the book being Chinese collaborators with the Japanese. If the saying is true that “history is written by those who win,” then the implication from this must also be true: mainstream’s popular historical narrative will often leave out details it would rather forget. It’s easy to see in pop cultural memory that the population of China “resisted” the Japanese before and during the Japanese invasion of China before and during World War Two, but that’s not always the case as this book accurately portray. In order to survive in an occupied China one has to acknowledge the political realities of Japanese control. Currently the history of the Japanese invasion of China is overshadowed by the great work, “The Rape of Nanking,” which documents extensively the incredible atrocity of the Japanese Army against Chinese civilians, and it’s easy to have the framework of the victimization of China overshadow the reality on the ground of what happened on the ground during occupation when some was trying to survive by cooperating with the Japanese (that is not to deny the realities of victims and the heinous crimes that occurred). No doubt the book does not deny that reality of the Japanese atrocities and even provide more further details paralleling Iris Chang’s famous work. However, here in this work the author of “Collobration” advance the thesis that there were some elites in China that did cooperated with the Japanese during occupation and that they can’t be demonized into a one dimensional cardboard wicked “traitors.” It can get more complicated than that.
What I thoroughly enjoyed about this book is the consciousness of the author’s historiography. As I began reading the book, I wondered how the author was going about to write as objectively as possible a historical work concerning a subject that would not enjoy a lot of surviving data: Collaborators would have been seen as traitors after the Japanese left, and no doubt it would not help for the accurate preservation of any written record of their experiences not to mention the collaborators’ survival! This work was truly amazing in terms of the author’s fortune of working with primary sources of Japanese Imperial army’s record, the memoirs of Japanese pacification agents and Western observers in Shanghai. The author Timothy Brook does a good job of handling the primary sources with care while also bringing the readers into the conversation of how he weighed the evidences, acknowledging the biases of each source as he weaved the data to produce his narrative. Brook admit the data is far from complete and there are limitations to historical research of collaborators yet it’s amazing how much he can carefully extrapolate. I’ve enjoyed Brook’s discussion of collaboration in the greater context of collaboration studies of the European front in World War Two, noting how historiography of collaboration is so different from that of say occupied France with that of China under Japan, and also situational differences between the European front with that of China.
The consciousness upon the author to use the European occupation and collobration under Nazi control in World War 2 as a foil for the situation in occupied China lead me to think about collaboration and military occupation beyond just France and China. I can’t help it but to think about what lessons this book brings to the greater geo-political affairs of today, specifically with Iraq and Afghanistan. As I read this book I can’t help but to recall memories walking a patrol with a Civil Affairs Marine officer in Iraq in 2003 and hearing this young officer’s heavy burden as he explained that afternoon of the difficulties of geo-political realities, local politics, war craft and “nation-building.” As much as I do not like the term “occupation” to describe our military involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, and though I think the Japanese control over China is qualitatively and morally different than the US efforts in the Middle East, nevertheless I think there are some lessons one can learn here from collaboration concerning contemporary doctrine of counter-insurgency and the “hearts and minds” component of military occupation today. I think this book is worth being put under the Marine Corps Commandant’s reading list. Timothy Brooks notes the difficult realities of how difficult it was for the Japanese to find quality collaborators (which he encouraged the readers not to load that term with negative moral connotation right away in the book, but reserving it to the end of the work). When the nationalists government in Nanking retreated as the Japanese army advance, the elites with the technical and beaucratic know-how of operating governments and infrastructures fled with the Nationalists army as well. There was no incentive for them to be the puppet of a Japanese regime. The Japanese attempt to establish “peace committees” were frustrating, with the difficulties of sorting out people the right people with legitimate political and community capital from those who were just opportunists. As always, distrust on the part of the Japanese military and not empowering the local Chinese government ended up hindering the Japanese instead. There’s a lesson here with the fact that any occupation if it’s going to successfully transfer to new indigenous civilian management won’t be easy and the occupying Army can easily make numerous mistakes with such a fragile mission. It is a worthy study and reflection with lessons applicable to the difficulty in Afghanistan.
The dimension of the book that I most appreciate however is the chapter that focuses on Westerners who were in Nanking that got involved to protect the Chinese as much as possible from the cruelty of the Japanese. These were heroic men and women who had the liberty to leave and not get involved and yet they remained on the scene to make a difference for the lives of the Chinese. As I read this chapter I can’t help but to wonder what it was that drove them to do what they do knowing the risks involved. Many of them were Christian missionaries. As a Christian myself, I appreciated the book’s documentation from missionary’s diaries, letters and records. Though I know it’s not the intention or direction of the book, I can’t help to see the connection that true Christian spirituality means that there is the Lordship of Christ in every sphere of life including the political. These men and women saw the travesty of what the Japanese can do to their fellow man and women, and they responded. From orphanage, women shelter, rice distribution center, writing to the Embassy and the military to see aide is provided and even the audacity and affront to the Japanese of establishing a safe zone that was to be free of Japanese soldiers, these men and women can be forgotten for what they have done. However, if there is a God and the theology of these men and women are true, then it follows that their action are not totally forgotten—they lived and did what they did knowing that there is a God who remember and will call men into account one day. The implication of that is not just the preaching of the Gospel (that Jesus died for sinners and raised on the Third Day as proof) but also doing what they can to help fellow man who is made in the image of God.
In terms of Chinese history, this book is on a time period and events that few Americans know about let alone understand. Way before America was attacked on Pearl Harbor on December 7th, 1941, Japan has already been waging war and spreading its imperialism for decades. This book is about events of Japan’s invasion of China during the 1930s from the Shanghai area to Nanking, and it explores what mainstream history have not focus much on: the subject of the book being Chinese collaborators with the Japanese. If the saying is true that “history is written by those who win,” then the implication from this must also be true: mainstream’s popular historical narrative will often leave out details it would rather forget. It’s easy to see in pop cultural memory that the population of China “resisted” the Japanese before and during the Japanese invasion of China before and during World War Two, but that’s not always the case as this book accurately portray. In order to survive in an occupied China one has to acknowledge the political realities of Japanese control. Currently the history of the Japanese invasion of China is overshadowed by the great work, “The Rape of Nanking,” which documents extensively the incredible atrocity of the Japanese Army against Chinese civilians, and it’s easy to have the framework of the victimization of China overshadow the reality on the ground of what happened on the ground during occupation when some was trying to survive by cooperating with the Japanese (that is not to deny the realities of victims and the heinous crimes that occurred). No doubt the book does not deny that reality of the Japanese atrocities and even provide more further details paralleling Iris Chang’s famous work. However, here in this work the author of “Collobration” advance the thesis that there were some elites in China that did cooperated with the Japanese during occupation and that they can’t be demonized into a one dimensional cardboard wicked “traitors.” It can get more complicated than that.
What I thoroughly enjoyed about this book is the consciousness of the author’s historiography. As I began reading the book, I wondered how the author was going about to write as objectively as possible a historical work concerning a subject that would not enjoy a lot of surviving data: Collaborators would have been seen as traitors after the Japanese left, and no doubt it would not help for the accurate preservation of any written record of their experiences not to mention the collaborators’ survival! This work was truly amazing in terms of the author’s fortune of working with primary sources of Japanese Imperial army’s record, the memoirs of Japanese pacification agents and Western observers in Shanghai. The author Timothy Brook does a good job of handling the primary sources with care while also bringing the readers into the conversation of how he weighed the evidences, acknowledging the biases of each source as he weaved the data to produce his narrative. Brook admit the data is far from complete and there are limitations to historical research of collaborators yet it’s amazing how much he can carefully extrapolate. I’ve enjoyed Brook’s discussion of collaboration in the greater context of collaboration studies of the European front in World War Two, noting how historiography of collaboration is so different from that of say occupied France with that of China under Japan, and also situational differences between the European front with that of China.
The consciousness upon the author to use the European occupation and collobration under Nazi control in World War 2 as a foil for the situation in occupied China lead me to think about collaboration and military occupation beyond just France and China. I can’t help it but to think about what lessons this book brings to the greater geo-political affairs of today, specifically with Iraq and Afghanistan. As I read this book I can’t help but to recall memories walking a patrol with a Civil Affairs Marine officer in Iraq in 2003 and hearing this young officer’s heavy burden as he explained that afternoon of the difficulties of geo-political realities, local politics, war craft and “nation-building.” As much as I do not like the term “occupation” to describe our military involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, and though I think the Japanese control over China is qualitatively and morally different than the US efforts in the Middle East, nevertheless I think there are some lessons one can learn here from collaboration concerning contemporary doctrine of counter-insurgency and the “hearts and minds” component of military occupation today. I think this book is worth being put under the Marine Corps Commandant’s reading list. Timothy Brooks notes the difficult realities of how difficult it was for the Japanese to find quality collaborators (which he encouraged the readers not to load that term with negative moral connotation right away in the book, but reserving it to the end of the work). When the nationalists government in Nanking retreated as the Japanese army advance, the elites with the technical and beaucratic know-how of operating governments and infrastructures fled with the Nationalists army as well. There was no incentive for them to be the puppet of a Japanese regime. The Japanese attempt to establish “peace committees” were frustrating, with the difficulties of sorting out people the right people with legitimate political and community capital from those who were just opportunists. As always, distrust on the part of the Japanese military and not empowering the local Chinese government ended up hindering the Japanese instead. There’s a lesson here with the fact that any occupation if it’s going to successfully transfer to new indigenous civilian management won’t be easy and the occupying Army can easily make numerous mistakes with such a fragile mission. It is a worthy study and reflection with lessons applicable to the difficulty in Afghanistan.
The dimension of the book that I most appreciate however is the chapter that focuses on Westerners who were in Nanking that got involved to protect the Chinese as much as possible from the cruelty of the Japanese. These were heroic men and women who had the liberty to leave and not get involved and yet they remained on the scene to make a difference for the lives of the Chinese. As I read this chapter I can’t help but to wonder what it was that drove them to do what they do knowing the risks involved. Many of them were Christian missionaries. As a Christian myself, I appreciated the book’s documentation from missionary’s diaries, letters and records. Though I know it’s not the intention or direction of the book, I can’t help to see the connection that true Christian spirituality means that there is the Lordship of Christ in every sphere of life including the political. These men and women saw the travesty of what the Japanese can do to their fellow man and women, and they responded. From orphanage, women shelter, rice distribution center, writing to the Embassy and the military to see aide is provided and even the audacity and affront to the Japanese of establishing a safe zone that was to be free of Japanese soldiers, these men and women can be forgotten for what they have done. However, if there is a God and the theology of these men and women are true, then it follows that their action are not totally forgotten—they lived and did what they did knowing that there is a God who remember and will call men into account one day. The implication of that is not just the preaching of the Gospel (that Jesus died for sinners and raised on the Third Day as proof) but also doing what they can to help fellow man who is made in the image of God.
Read
April 24, 2025Not sure if I can count this as "read" since I only read two chapters (where relevant) and the conclusion. But the conclusion was so compelling??!! For context, I’m reading up a bit about the second Sino-Japanese War for my essay.
Although I didn‘t read this in full, I want to make note in case I revisit it in the future (albeit unlikely) because that concluding chapter was so thought-provoking.
Although I didn‘t read this in full, I want to make note in case I revisit it in the future (albeit unlikely) because that concluding chapter was so thought-provoking.
February 8, 2019
I enjoyed this. A reminder to regard military occupation as a relationship, not just as an event.
February 24, 2020
Japan didn't do so well with admin
September 24, 2021
Gave me quite a bit to ponder.
November 21, 2025
Read for an essay course in hope to source this as the final essay, rather painful reading experience. Not really interested in this topic.
March 28, 2018
It takes time for people to form a more comprehensive and less prejudiced understanding for happenings in the past, even more so when those happenings are complicated and would evoke bitter emotional struggling. The same goes for reading books on such kind of topics.
On the other hand, while it is relatively clearly defined when there is an alien occupier and a domestic population, it becomes more vague in a situation of internal strife, a division among one people.
On the other hand, while it is relatively clearly defined when there is an alien occupier and a domestic population, it becomes more vague in a situation of internal strife, a division among one people.
August 26, 2015
This book is a good break from traditional scholarship of the China Incident. The common practice in dealing with the war between Japan and China has been to talk of the conflict in terms of heroic resistance against the 'evil Japanese and their few traitorous, cowardly collaborators.' What Timothy Brook has managed to do is penetrate this veil and try to piece together what actually happened in occupied China. He has managed to portray collaborators not as evil traitors to China, although he does note there were a few of those, but as people who were in a complex situation and tried to do the best they could for themselves and their families. In some cases, the collaborators actually cooperated with the Japanese in an effort to help the Chinese people, whether that was obtaining food, or alleviating their suffering. He uses case-studies to achieve his ends. This methodology is a little concerning due to the dearth of sources, although in his introduction he does explain his awareness of this and explain the possibly reasons for this.
The main focus of the book is not to say there was no resistance, but to show that what resistance there was was largely ineffectual. If anything, the resistance movement made the Chinese lot more difficult.
I think this is an excellent beginning to understanding this period in Eastern history. This time period in the Far East is woefully behind similar studies of Europe and this is a marvelous attempt at playing catch up.
The main focus of the book is not to say there was no resistance, but to show that what resistance there was was largely ineffectual. If anything, the resistance movement made the Chinese lot more difficult.
I think this is an excellent beginning to understanding this period in Eastern history. This time period in the Far East is woefully behind similar studies of Europe and this is a marvelous attempt at playing catch up.
July 19, 2025
3.5 - Many brilliant insights into the ambiguities of "collaboration" and the moral judgements that historians and societies have attached to it. These insights are nicely organized into the introductory chapter, the beginnings of the middle chapters, and the final two chapters. However in between those parts is, in my opinion, pretty dry
October 15, 2015
Brilliance slightly tarnished by failure to conceptualise or theorise the activities it so exhaustively describes.
Displaying 1 - 12 of 12 reviews