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On Thermonuclear War
On Thermonuclear War was controversial when originally published and remains so today. It is iconoclastic, crosses disciplinary boundaries, and finally it is calm and compellingly reasonable. The book was widely read on both sides of the Iron Curtain and the result was serious revision in both Western and Soviet strategy and doctrine. As a result, both sides were better able to avoid disaster during the Cold War.
The strategic concepts still defense, local animosities, and the usual balance-of-power issues are still very much with us. Kahn's stated purpose in writing this book was "avoiding disaster and buying time, without specifying the use of this time." By the late 1950s, with both sides H-bomb-armed, reason and time were in short supply.
Kahn, a military analyst at Rand since 1948, understood that a defense based only on thermonuclear arnaments was inconceivable, morally questionable, and not credible.The book was the first to make sense of nuclear weapons. Originally created from a series of lectures, it provides insight into how policymakers consider such issues. One may agree with Kahn or disagree with him on specific issues, but he clearly defined the terrain of the argument. He also looks at other weapons of mass destruction such as biological and chemical, and the history of their use.
The Cold War is over, but the nuclear genie is out of the bottle, and the lessons and principles developed in On Thermonuclear War apply as much to today's China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea as they did to the Soviets.
The strategic concepts still defense, local animosities, and the usual balance-of-power issues are still very much with us. Kahn's stated purpose in writing this book was "avoiding disaster and buying time, without specifying the use of this time." By the late 1950s, with both sides H-bomb-armed, reason and time were in short supply.
Kahn, a military analyst at Rand since 1948, understood that a defense based only on thermonuclear arnaments was inconceivable, morally questionable, and not credible.The book was the first to make sense of nuclear weapons. Originally created from a series of lectures, it provides insight into how policymakers consider such issues. One may agree with Kahn or disagree with him on specific issues, but he clearly defined the terrain of the argument. He also looks at other weapons of mass destruction such as biological and chemical, and the history of their use.
The Cold War is over, but the nuclear genie is out of the bottle, and the lessons and principles developed in On Thermonuclear War apply as much to today's China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea as they did to the Soviets.
692 pages, Kindle Edition
First published January 1, 1960
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Displaying 1 - 25 of 26 reviews
October 13, 2009
THE bible on thermonuclear war-fighting. Published in 1960 based on the work of The Rand Corporation it is as relevant today as then. Covers everything from doomsday weapons to accidental nuclear conflict. Also addresses small countries eventually getting The Bomb. Much of the movie Dr Strangelove comes straight out of this tome.
It is obvious to the educated that we have been fighting this war every day since the early 50s, this book describes the strategies that all countries involved have been following. After all, as WOPR learns in War Games, "the only way to win is not to play the game". Not really true, but by far the optimum way to win.
I hope SOMEBODY in the current White House is intimately familiar with this book, since it will not be possible to spend months consulting if decisions need to be made in this realm.
Not for everybody.
It is obvious to the educated that we have been fighting this war every day since the early 50s, this book describes the strategies that all countries involved have been following. After all, as WOPR learns in War Games, "the only way to win is not to play the game". Not really true, but by far the optimum way to win.
I hope SOMEBODY in the current White House is intimately familiar with this book, since it will not be possible to spend months consulting if decisions need to be made in this realm.
Not for everybody.
July 10, 2019
The year is 1960. It has been 11 years since the Soviet Union tested their first atomic bomb, and 5 years since they detonated their first full-scale thermonuclear weapon. It has been 3 years since they launched the first ever man-made satellite into space - Sputnik 1 - aboard a missile that could very conceivably deliver those thermonuclear weapons onto American soil. It has been 2 years since Khrushchev's ultimatum on West Berlin prompted war planners from the US, UK and France to sit down and plan a response to what he might do. Even though the crisis never led to disaster, what he might've done was clear to all who witnessed his ruthless crushing of the Hungarian uprising two years earlier.
You are a American military strategist at the RAND Corporation, with the nuclear policy of the world's strongest power in your hands. These international developments clearly necessitate a robust, effective and multi-faceted action plan for the United States' strategic forces, a plan that contemplates all possibilities and puts aside all necessary resources to deal with them. Despite the enormity of the threat, however, you find that your fellow strategists haven't thought about it in a clear-headed fashion.
Many of them find the notion of thermonuclear war so terrible that they hesitate to even imagine a postwar world, instead focusing merely on how to avoid getting there. You disagree; you fully accept the possibility of nuclear war, just as one who lives on a plate boundary accepts the possibility of an earthquake. Therefore, you urge your fellow planners to institute civil defence measures, stock up on geiger counters, and adopt the mindset that thermonuclear war is not the 'end of the world'. You don't mean this in the moral sense, but in the objective sense - you may lose 50 million people, but at least that's not 100 million. It may take you 10 years to recover, but at least that's not 20 years.
They also misunderstand the nature of deterrence. There are those who impute their own abhorrence of nuclear war on their enemies, claiming that as long as both sides possess these weapons, their use in war is impossible. They are wrong. There are also those who ignore the full spectrum of possibilities that much strain our deterrence to its limits. If the Soviets launch an invasion of Western Europe, will we retaliate, even though that will bring destruction to ourselves? If the only alternatives are suicide or surrender, how can our allies ever entrust to us their defence?
They may also neglect to learn from the past or anticipate the fast-paced changes of the future. How did failures of deterrence and communication plunge Europe into World Wars I and II? What lessons can we apply from history to the study of our thermonuclear present? On the flip-side, you understand that programs and strategies made today will only reach fruition in 5-10 years' time, by which time the technological landscape will have completely changed. What technological revolutions can we expect in the coming years? How will they impact the nature of warfare? You exhort your fellow planners to think through these issues.
How do you achieve this? Well, you write a dense, occasionally dry, 600-page book, of course. 'On Thermonuclear War' is largely a work of analysis and prescription, from the standpoint of a nuclear war planner who desperately wants his government and public to change the way they view the topic. As such, it barely covers the history, philosophy or physics of thermonuclear weapons, or the way they have impacted society or international relations. I must admit, I initially did not expect the book to be so narrowly-focused, but now that I see what it was meant for, it's clear Kahn has achieved his aims in exemplary fashion.
Given the level of detail, the tone, and the academic approach, it can quite tough-going - and as such it certainly is not for everyone. However, if you're interested in how to approach thermonuclear war from the perspective of a military planner, it would serve you well to read this book.
You are a American military strategist at the RAND Corporation, with the nuclear policy of the world's strongest power in your hands. These international developments clearly necessitate a robust, effective and multi-faceted action plan for the United States' strategic forces, a plan that contemplates all possibilities and puts aside all necessary resources to deal with them. Despite the enormity of the threat, however, you find that your fellow strategists haven't thought about it in a clear-headed fashion.
Many of them find the notion of thermonuclear war so terrible that they hesitate to even imagine a postwar world, instead focusing merely on how to avoid getting there. You disagree; you fully accept the possibility of nuclear war, just as one who lives on a plate boundary accepts the possibility of an earthquake. Therefore, you urge your fellow planners to institute civil defence measures, stock up on geiger counters, and adopt the mindset that thermonuclear war is not the 'end of the world'. You don't mean this in the moral sense, but in the objective sense - you may lose 50 million people, but at least that's not 100 million. It may take you 10 years to recover, but at least that's not 20 years.
They also misunderstand the nature of deterrence. There are those who impute their own abhorrence of nuclear war on their enemies, claiming that as long as both sides possess these weapons, their use in war is impossible. They are wrong. There are also those who ignore the full spectrum of possibilities that much strain our deterrence to its limits. If the Soviets launch an invasion of Western Europe, will we retaliate, even though that will bring destruction to ourselves? If the only alternatives are suicide or surrender, how can our allies ever entrust to us their defence?
They may also neglect to learn from the past or anticipate the fast-paced changes of the future. How did failures of deterrence and communication plunge Europe into World Wars I and II? What lessons can we apply from history to the study of our thermonuclear present? On the flip-side, you understand that programs and strategies made today will only reach fruition in 5-10 years' time, by which time the technological landscape will have completely changed. What technological revolutions can we expect in the coming years? How will they impact the nature of warfare? You exhort your fellow planners to think through these issues.
How do you achieve this? Well, you write a dense, occasionally dry, 600-page book, of course. 'On Thermonuclear War' is largely a work of analysis and prescription, from the standpoint of a nuclear war planner who desperately wants his government and public to change the way they view the topic. As such, it barely covers the history, philosophy or physics of thermonuclear weapons, or the way they have impacted society or international relations. I must admit, I initially did not expect the book to be so narrowly-focused, but now that I see what it was meant for, it's clear Kahn has achieved his aims in exemplary fashion.
Given the level of detail, the tone, and the academic approach, it can quite tough-going - and as such it certainly is not for everyone. However, if you're interested in how to approach thermonuclear war from the perspective of a military planner, it would serve you well to read this book.
March 20, 2016
Kahn's seminal 1960 work on nuclear strategy. This is a dense and weighty book that examines its subject in great detail. Kahn is remembered for his assertions that a nuclear war would mean neither the end of civilization nor of humanity, that even a modest civil defense program could make a substantial difference in the time that a first-world nation needed to recover from such a war, and that a nuclear war was therefore "winnable," at least as of the 1960's, and in the sense of one combatant emerging less damaged than the other. He has sometimes been reviled as a warmonger for his unsentimental appraisal of the prospect of the deaths of millions - but what I took from his arguments early in this book is that he simply felt that when formulating policy regarding a war on such a scale, it would be irresponsible to be less than completely honest and completely objective. Thus, he argued for quantitative rather than emotional assessments, and had little use for analyses that were driven by a need to justify pre-conceived notions.
Beyond these ideas, he also develops a kind of taxonomy of the different kinds of deterrence, and elaborates the implications of each at great length. One can recognize the approaches to deterrence by the various different modern nuclear states quite easily in Kahn's treatment of the subject.
Kahn did recognize that, with more powerful thermonuclear devices, more sophisticated delivery systems, and more nuclear-capable nations being likely, the world would become a much more dangerous place in the decades after the 1960's. It would be fascinating to see what he would make of the current nuclear landscape. He does not, for example, address the concept of nuclear winter, which did not become a major subject of inquiry until the early 1980's. Given that even today one can find papers asserting that the dangers of nuclear winter are overstated and other papers predicting that even a relatively modest nuclear war would ultimately lead to the deaths of 90 percent of the human race, a Kahn-style examination of the risks would be highly instructive.
Beyond these ideas, he also develops a kind of taxonomy of the different kinds of deterrence, and elaborates the implications of each at great length. One can recognize the approaches to deterrence by the various different modern nuclear states quite easily in Kahn's treatment of the subject.
Kahn did recognize that, with more powerful thermonuclear devices, more sophisticated delivery systems, and more nuclear-capable nations being likely, the world would become a much more dangerous place in the decades after the 1960's. It would be fascinating to see what he would make of the current nuclear landscape. He does not, for example, address the concept of nuclear winter, which did not become a major subject of inquiry until the early 1980's. Given that even today one can find papers asserting that the dangers of nuclear winter are overstated and other papers predicting that even a relatively modest nuclear war would ultimately lead to the deaths of 90 percent of the human race, a Kahn-style examination of the risks would be highly instructive.
January 2, 2019
A cursory reading of On Thermonuclear War may lead a reader to believe that Herman Kahn is suggesting that thermonuclear war is not quite the significant event that other theorists and planners have portrayed it. Uninformed critics could claim that Herman Kahn uses On Thermonuclear War to assert that a thermonuclear war would be conducted much like a conventional war, but perhaps with a higher number of casualties and a few long-term annoyances such as birth defects and lingering radiation. This leads to the idea that Herman Kahn has removed the taboo nature of nuclear war and made it easier for a nation that possesses nuclear weapons to use them. Herman Kahn’s actual intentions in On Thermonuclear War could not be further from that thought. Far from removing the stigma or taboo of conducting a nuclear war Herman Kahn stresses that a thermonuclear war would be a catastrophe on an unprecedented scale, but that it would not, as Deterrence adherents believe, be the ultimate end of the world as we know it.
It really is a fantastic work on understanding nuclear theory and shows that America's current policy of Optimistic Nuclear Deterrence has flaws that would not be too difficult to remedy.
It really is a fantastic work on understanding nuclear theory and shows that America's current policy of Optimistic Nuclear Deterrence has flaws that would not be too difficult to remedy.
March 20, 2010
rereading this last night, it's striking how much Kubrick ripped off from here for "Dr. Strangelove" -- not to mention DFW for the Eschaton passage in Infinite Jest!
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Amazon 2009-07-22. A classic, of course; I look forward to 668 pages of fun!
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Amazon 2009-07-22. A classic, of course; I look forward to 668 pages of fun!
April 22, 2023
"Mr. President, I'm not saying we wouldn't get our hair mussed, but I do say no more than 20-30 million killed, depending on the breaks." General "Buck" Turgidson, in DR STRANGELOVE
What is the humane alternative to Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) during a global thermonuclear war? Why, a preemptive strike on the enemy, of course, assuming you're side is willing to accept megadeaths to win. Such was the fearful symmetry and logic of the late Herman Kahn, who published this book while working at the RAND Corporation, or Kubrick's BLAND Corporation, in the mid-Sixties. (I had a late frenemy who worked at RAND, on Latin American politics, and can assure you he was as crazy as the rest of the lot. He once tried to have me thrown out of UCLA yet I still became a Doctor.) Kahn is proof that the difference between crank, madman and advisor to the Pentagon is a matter of carte blanche. He developed his theory of "winnable nuclear war" in opposition to the MAD theory of John von Newman, the father of Game Theory. Von Newman presumed there could be no winners in a nuclear exchange, just like no one wins if prisoners rat out each other. Not so fast, said Herman. If we aim for their (they being the Russians, of course) cities and incapacitate their nuclear response we will climb up from the rubble victorious. Kahn, in all seriousness, calls this "the morally superior" position to MAD. Kahn's views became so popular with the U.S. foreign policy establishment that a Kahn-like professor advocate of doomsday, played by Walter Matthau, is featured in both the novel and the brilliant film FAIL-SAFE. Around the same time Henry Kissinger advocated a similar positive stance towards nuclear war in the book that made him a star in Washington, D.C., NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND FOREIGN POLICY. Did anyone listen? Yes! President Richard Nixon, relying on Kissinger and inspired by Kahn, threatened a nuclear strike on North Viet Nam during his phase of the Viet Nam War, wagering with the lives of millions that the Soviets would not call his bluff. Nixon also boasted he had warned India, a minor nuclear power, of destruction from the sky during the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971. The full implementation of Kahn's horror show scenario had to await the presidency of Jimmy Cater, who reassigned U.S. nuclear ICBMs away from Soviet strategic sites and towards major cities, in a move the neo-conservative magazine THE NEW REPUBLIC called "the most terrifying presidential order since World War II". Fortunately, Kahn had passed to that great nuclear testing ground in the sky by then. Unfortunately, preventive thermonuclear war is still an option, "moral and honorable", for far too many nations.
What is the humane alternative to Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) during a global thermonuclear war? Why, a preemptive strike on the enemy, of course, assuming you're side is willing to accept megadeaths to win. Such was the fearful symmetry and logic of the late Herman Kahn, who published this book while working at the RAND Corporation, or Kubrick's BLAND Corporation, in the mid-Sixties. (I had a late frenemy who worked at RAND, on Latin American politics, and can assure you he was as crazy as the rest of the lot. He once tried to have me thrown out of UCLA yet I still became a Doctor.) Kahn is proof that the difference between crank, madman and advisor to the Pentagon is a matter of carte blanche. He developed his theory of "winnable nuclear war" in opposition to the MAD theory of John von Newman, the father of Game Theory. Von Newman presumed there could be no winners in a nuclear exchange, just like no one wins if prisoners rat out each other. Not so fast, said Herman. If we aim for their (they being the Russians, of course) cities and incapacitate their nuclear response we will climb up from the rubble victorious. Kahn, in all seriousness, calls this "the morally superior" position to MAD. Kahn's views became so popular with the U.S. foreign policy establishment that a Kahn-like professor advocate of doomsday, played by Walter Matthau, is featured in both the novel and the brilliant film FAIL-SAFE. Around the same time Henry Kissinger advocated a similar positive stance towards nuclear war in the book that made him a star in Washington, D.C., NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND FOREIGN POLICY. Did anyone listen? Yes! President Richard Nixon, relying on Kissinger and inspired by Kahn, threatened a nuclear strike on North Viet Nam during his phase of the Viet Nam War, wagering with the lives of millions that the Soviets would not call his bluff. Nixon also boasted he had warned India, a minor nuclear power, of destruction from the sky during the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971. The full implementation of Kahn's horror show scenario had to await the presidency of Jimmy Cater, who reassigned U.S. nuclear ICBMs away from Soviet strategic sites and towards major cities, in a move the neo-conservative magazine THE NEW REPUBLIC called "the most terrifying presidential order since World War II". Fortunately, Kahn had passed to that great nuclear testing ground in the sky by then. Unfortunately, preventive thermonuclear war is still an option, "moral and honorable", for far too many nations.
December 10, 2025
Kahn was born too early to play Hearts of Iron IV, born just in time to write the definitive guide to nuclear warfare. I like that one of his central points is that people have made no preparations for nuclear war largely due to a psychological fear of the outcome, and this very fear will make the thing they're afraid of significantly worse than if they just faced the issue at hand soberly. So much of his book is just really basic, eminently reasonable stuff:
• We should buy civilian geiger counters
• We should stockpile food for 3 years
• We can (and should) build extensive shelters for up to a certain PSI range quite cheaply in major cities to significantly reduce causalities in a war. We can (and should) institute wide-ranging civilian programs to teach them about what to do in case of a nuclear war. Such infrastructure serves a dual purpose, in that it provides another possible stepping stone in case of an escalation in international politics
• Focusing on only a nuclear deterrent makes international diplomacy infinitely more dangerous: if your only response to an enemy provocation is surrender or nuclear attacks against cities, you're making the war worse than it needs to be. Especially since none of these plans come with a corresponding method of recovery after the war. People have collectively chosen the cheapest, most dangerous, and psychologically easy choice.
• It actually makes no sense for the Soviets to strike our cities, or us theirs, if we can contain the situation to a limited war. Rather, even if we're attacked and we think it's an accident, it's better to strike back in a limited fashion against strategic military sites while negotiating some kind of peace agreement. Striking cities virtually guarantees an expansion of the war, unnecessary deaths, and also deprives the side that does it of any bargaining power (enemy civilian hostages) in negotiations
In conclusion, top tier book.
We should probably outlaw Paradox games and anime, the audiences of these things would, in times past, be trying to catalogue every single beetle in Bavaria, or writing detailed, multidisciplinary guides on thermonuclear war. Now they watch K-On and play map painting simulators. Gentlemen, we must prevent an autism gap with the CCP.
• We should buy civilian geiger counters
• We should stockpile food for 3 years
• We can (and should) build extensive shelters for up to a certain PSI range quite cheaply in major cities to significantly reduce causalities in a war. We can (and should) institute wide-ranging civilian programs to teach them about what to do in case of a nuclear war. Such infrastructure serves a dual purpose, in that it provides another possible stepping stone in case of an escalation in international politics
• Focusing on only a nuclear deterrent makes international diplomacy infinitely more dangerous: if your only response to an enemy provocation is surrender or nuclear attacks against cities, you're making the war worse than it needs to be. Especially since none of these plans come with a corresponding method of recovery after the war. People have collectively chosen the cheapest, most dangerous, and psychologically easy choice.
• It actually makes no sense for the Soviets to strike our cities, or us theirs, if we can contain the situation to a limited war. Rather, even if we're attacked and we think it's an accident, it's better to strike back in a limited fashion against strategic military sites while negotiating some kind of peace agreement. Striking cities virtually guarantees an expansion of the war, unnecessary deaths, and also deprives the side that does it of any bargaining power (enemy civilian hostages) in negotiations
In conclusion, top tier book.
We should probably outlaw Paradox games and anime, the audiences of these things would, in times past, be trying to catalogue every single beetle in Bavaria, or writing detailed, multidisciplinary guides on thermonuclear war. Now they watch K-On and play map painting simulators. Gentlemen, we must prevent an autism gap with the CCP.
July 17, 2017
So I have finally read it. While it might sounded innovative in its time (a nuclear war is not an obligatory mutual destruction! there are strategic options of limited response! we can use data and simulation to plan causalities and responses!), now all its premises look obvious (yes, this is a pioneering work which formulated them in the first place, but still).
Also, like most military strategy books, it is incredibly BORING (did anyone managed to finish "On War", actually?) Perhaps I am not a military strategist, but still -- the topic is of much interest to me, and I was surprised to encounter such a boring book. Perhaps my expectations were too high.
Also, like most military strategy books, it is incredibly BORING (did anyone managed to finish "On War", actually?) Perhaps I am not a military strategist, but still -- the topic is of much interest to me, and I was surprised to encounter such a boring book. Perhaps my expectations were too high.
Read
February 23, 2023.
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Just started reading a scan of the fourth printing from 1961.
I met the book in a Dutch translation of The Sum of All Fears that has a quote from it.
In the preface on page vii "In the United States and Western Europe poverty as a general economic problem has in the main been eleminated." That has changed sixty years later.
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Just started reading a scan of the fourth printing from 1961.
I met the book in a Dutch translation of The Sum of All Fears that has a quote from it.
In the preface on page vii "In the United States and Western Europe poverty as a general economic problem has in the main been eleminated." That has changed sixty years later.
url
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January 24, 2019
Its notable how quickly this book became dated. The last quarter is excellent.
December 21, 2024
Pretty grim book, 3 stars for content educational value, -2 stars for vibe
September 19, 2025
Incredibly dated, a bit slow, but fascinating sort of study of nuclear war. I find it very optimistic in an ironic sort of way. The world will be destroyed but we will live on
October 5, 2025
The book is poorly structured, and the sections are poorly introduced and outlined. Often, the introduction of some topic comes 25 pages before the topic is actually addressed. The intervening pages are filled with parenthetical remarks, qualifications, withdrawals, elaborations etc. One gets the feeling that Herman how so much to say he can't help but drift from the topic at hand. In any case, it is the best researched book on the topic.
Protip: read it in the voice of Dr. Strangelove to maximise Cold War vibes.
Protip: read it in the voice of Dr. Strangelove to maximise Cold War vibes.
July 13, 2015
This is a fascinating look back 50 years at the thoughts, fears, and expectations of a brilliant man. He covers the "unthinkable" and urged the US to plan for possible wars, considering the awful possibilities that were (and are) hard to image. The core message for me was "just because you don't want something to happen doesn't mean you should not think about it carefully."
Not for the light read, 650 pages of rather dense material. It's a snapshot of one military experience from 55 years ago. His characterization of World Wars I and II are interesting, along with his description of why we needed to be in Korea. He also discusses hypothetical WW III, IV, ... VIII, considering potential future weapons and science developments. At the time, the nuclear powered airplane and rockets were seriously being investigated.
Next for me: watch "Dr. Strangelove" again.
Not for the light read, 650 pages of rather dense material. It's a snapshot of one military experience from 55 years ago. His characterization of World Wars I and II are interesting, along with his description of why we needed to be in Korea. He also discusses hypothetical WW III, IV, ... VIII, considering potential future weapons and science developments. At the time, the nuclear powered airplane and rockets were seriously being investigated.
Next for me: watch "Dr. Strangelove" again.
February 17, 2014
Although the book is badly outdated technologically, these arguments are still very relevant. Reading the arguments that the author meticulously explores and the way in which he proves his hypotheses, it's clear he's second to none in this field. His predictions are remarkably prescient, too; there is an advantage to reading this book fifty years later and after the Soviet Union has dissolved. Although we may not think of these concepts like we did when they were new and startling, this book is in no way less authoritative now. Though, even with the engaging writing and interesting material, it's no easy task to slog through 600 pages.
February 1, 2017
A classic. A very clear, well thought out description of how deterrence works, separated in 3 levels : credible first strike, credible response to a first strike, and less lethal alternatives. This book was written when thermonuclear war looked quite likely before 1975, and suggests various ways to survive this period, the main one being arms agreements with Soviet Union, which was subsequently done. The technology described is now old, but the principles behind it are sound.
It's a safe bet that this book is well-known in Kremlin circles. It's another safe bet that Donald Trump has not even heard of it.
It's a safe bet that this book is well-known in Kremlin circles. It's another safe bet that Donald Trump has not even heard of it.
July 25, 2015
I read this, for the first time, years ago. It still is one of the best works I have ever seen on nuclear posture, and the conclusions drawn apply as much today as they did during the height of the cold war. The most chilling aspect though is the section titled "Will the Survivors Envy the Dead." Overall this book isn't going to be a page-turner or one you just decide to read for the fun of it one afternoon, but it will always remain as one of the best references on a bookshelf.
Want to read
February 6, 2016This is more "research", although I think I'm just putting off starting writing something new. Having a hard time getting through it, and keep on starting other things and putting it down. The author is definitely a good Dr. Strangelove, which is interesting.
Update: Didn't very far in this book. It is a dense slog that required more motivation than I could summon.
Update: Didn't very far in this book. It is a dense slog that required more motivation than I could summon.
December 18, 2015
Evil. Dr. Strangelove was arguably based on Herman Kahn. Kahn believes that one can survive a nuclear war. I guess if you are interested in the thinking of a highly intelligent person who believes society can survive a nuclear war, you should read this book. I gave it one star because of his ideas.
April 24, 2012
Interesting premise; albeit rather dark. Overall enjoyed the strategy
December 16, 2012
Frightened an 8 year old boy for about three years until I watched & grokked Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb!!
December 12, 2016
Grim, but maybe good reading for actuaries.
November 13, 2019
Thinking the unthinkable...on reading this I felt that there was some actual deep thought in the MAD scenario and so felt a little safer ..
June 27, 2015
Fantastic book. Dated, but it covers information considered taboo.
April 28, 2017
a cold shower
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