From the first large-scale Viet Minh offensive against the French in 1950, to the fall of Saigon in 1975, the United States tried desperately to understand the nature of the fierce Communist-led struggle to create a unified, independent Vietnam. American intelligence played a key role in gathering information on the political and military situation in Vietnam and on the strengths and weaknesses of both sides. But as George Allen shows in this eye-popping memoir, intelligence appraisals were consistently ignored or rejected by policymakers in every administration from Eisenhower through Nixon―because these assessments undermined the mistaken assumptions of the White House, the State Department, and the Pentagon. From his vantage point as a chief official with the CIA and army intelligence, Mr. Allen reveals specifically how American leaders, unwilling to face up to “bad news” from intelligence sources, largely excluded intelligence from important policy deliberations until it was too late. None So Blind is a remarkable contribution to the history of the Vietnam War.
Excellent, indispensable, one of the most important books ever published in the English language on the wars in Indochina. Like most arrogant people, I have a pronounced tendency to judge others' intelligence based on how closely they agree with me. By that criterion, George W. Allen is a genius! One of the most fascinating (not to mention exasperating & at times enraging) aspects of the study of the Indochina Wars is the continually poor decision making of various U.S. officials, and this book sheds a great deal of light on the grotesque and sad narrative thereof. This book stands as an extremely useful and enlightening addition to previous books by, among others, William Colby, Peer de Silva, Frank Snepp, Stuart Herrington, John L. Cook, and David Hackworth.
Must read for folks interested in intelligence analysis and military analysis within the US intelligence community during the Vietnam war. Allen does the normal thing of hating on Westmoreland, but this is more about his personality and unwillingness to accept bad news than him pursuing a flawed approach to the war.
I should not be surprised how what we want often over shadows good sense. A friend and fellow Vietnam vet said after reading this that he feels like the whole war was a sham and feels tricked.