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Two Dogmas of Empiricism
Modern empiricism has been conditioned in large part by two dogmas. One is a belief in some fundamental cleavage between truths which are analytic, or grounded in meanings independently of matters of fact, and truth which are synthetic, or grounded in fact. The other dogma is reductionism: the belief that each meaningful statement is equivalent to some logical construct upon terms which refer to immediate experience. Both dogmas, I shall argue, are ill founded. One effect of abandoning them is, as we shall see, a blurring of the supposed boundary between speculative metaphysics and natural science. Another effect is a shift toward pragmatism.
25 pages, Unknown Binding
Published January 1, 1951
About the author
Willard Van Orman Quine
76 books241 followers"Willard Van Orman Quine (June 25, 1908 Akron, Ohio – December 25, 2000) (known to intimates as "Van"), was an American analytic philosopher and logician. From 1930 until his death 70 years later, Quine was affiliated in some way with Harvard University, first as a student, then as a professor of philosophy and a teacher of mathematics, and finally as an emeritus elder statesman who published or revised seven books in retirement. He filled the Edgar Pierce Chair of Philosophy at Harvard, 1956-78. Quine falls squarely into the analytic philosophy tradition while also being the main proponent of the view that philosophy is not conceptual analysis. His major writings include "Two Dogmas of Empiricism", which attacked the distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions and advocated a form of semantic holism, and Word and Object which further developed these positions and introduced the notorious indeterminacy of translation thesis." - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Willard_...
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Displaying 1 - 27 of 27 reviews
February 23, 2019
Quine dunking on Carnap and the logical positivists is so fun and section VI of this paper is sick af
August 1, 2019
This is a famous and extremely important essay (thus the 4 stars, despite the annoying parts) by Quine arguing against the distinction between analytic and synthetic statements, and the belief that we can determine whether an individual statement is true. Even though it's readable, it's also part of an unbearable philosophical tradition and I would advice skimming through or even skipping the first four sections (and the next two paragraphs).
In the first part, Quine tries to find out what is an analytic statement and if it can really be justifiably called a priori true. Some call them true by virtue of meaning but he traces meaning at Aristotle, claiming that meaning is what essences become when they refer not to the object but to the linguistic form. He thinks that they are dubious entities and that a theory of meaning would talk of synonymy and not meaning. And he thinks synonymy should be explained for another reason. He has no problem calling the statement “No unmarried men is unmarried” true because no matter how the words are interpreted it is true but not the “No bachelor is unmarried” because it relies in synonymy.
Some people try to appeal to definitions to reduce statements of the second class to those of the first, but definitions and a relevant activity, explication relie on pre-existing synonyms too. Another attempt to talk of synonymy is interchangeability, the idea that changing a word in a statement doesn't change it's truth condition. (Cognitive) synonymy can explain analyticity only if there are already words like “necessarily” that already have meaning and the concept of analyticity inside them. In a purely extensional language it can preserve truth but extensional agreement is not enough for analyticity. Finally, analyticity can't be explained by semantical rules either and I won't even pretend to follow his arguments because it seemed like a direct reply to Carnap and I have no intention of reading him. These were the first four sections that dealed with the first dogma.
The refutation of the second dogma is much more interesting. Traditionally, every linguistic term is supposed to be verifiable by an observation. As this is too restricting we started thinking that meaningful statements and not simple terms should be verified by an observation. This idea is reinforced by the distinction between synthetic and analytic statements since it assumes that individual synthetic statements are verified by experience. Contrary to that, Quine, inspired by how difficult it is to verify even one simple statement he suggests that “our statements should face the tribunal of sense experience as a whole, instead of individual statements”. He still thinks that knowledge consists of two components, experience and language, but the relevant level of analysis is not individual statements but the whole system.
He visualizes this idea with an image of our knowledge, from history to physics to everything as a construct that touches experience only on its edges and even that touch is only in the sense that they are less likely (but not impossible) to be readjusted and only because we vie for stability and there are less important statements that can be readjusted first. We say that experience underdetermines any theory, which means that experience is usually incompatible with some statements but is never compatible with only one statement. This means that there can be many different constructs as long as the web of statements inside it can make them compatible. Close to the center of the construct there are ontological or highly theoretical statements of logic that are usually the first to go.
Objects are just posits, hypotheses, epistemologically not very different from the Homeric gods. They are tools that make our experience more manageable. He makes an analogy with irrational numbers. Even if we only care about rational numbers, since some square numbers lack value for them, we can modify our ontology and create irrational numbers to help us, but we could have created multiple other sets of numbers. The difference with objects, he postulates, is that they are much more simplified, and are archaic posits that might be necessary for language. We also posit forces, subatomic particles and ultimately scientific theories. In the end: “Each man is given a scientific heritage plus a continuing barrage of sensory stimulation; and the considerations which guide him in warping his scientific heritage to fit his continuing sensory promptings are, where rational, pragmatic.”
In the first part, Quine tries to find out what is an analytic statement and if it can really be justifiably called a priori true. Some call them true by virtue of meaning but he traces meaning at Aristotle, claiming that meaning is what essences become when they refer not to the object but to the linguistic form. He thinks that they are dubious entities and that a theory of meaning would talk of synonymy and not meaning. And he thinks synonymy should be explained for another reason. He has no problem calling the statement “No unmarried men is unmarried” true because no matter how the words are interpreted it is true but not the “No bachelor is unmarried” because it relies in synonymy.
Some people try to appeal to definitions to reduce statements of the second class to those of the first, but definitions and a relevant activity, explication relie on pre-existing synonyms too. Another attempt to talk of synonymy is interchangeability, the idea that changing a word in a statement doesn't change it's truth condition. (Cognitive) synonymy can explain analyticity only if there are already words like “necessarily” that already have meaning and the concept of analyticity inside them. In a purely extensional language it can preserve truth but extensional agreement is not enough for analyticity. Finally, analyticity can't be explained by semantical rules either and I won't even pretend to follow his arguments because it seemed like a direct reply to Carnap and I have no intention of reading him. These were the first four sections that dealed with the first dogma.
The refutation of the second dogma is much more interesting. Traditionally, every linguistic term is supposed to be verifiable by an observation. As this is too restricting we started thinking that meaningful statements and not simple terms should be verified by an observation. This idea is reinforced by the distinction between synthetic and analytic statements since it assumes that individual synthetic statements are verified by experience. Contrary to that, Quine, inspired by how difficult it is to verify even one simple statement he suggests that “our statements should face the tribunal of sense experience as a whole, instead of individual statements”. He still thinks that knowledge consists of two components, experience and language, but the relevant level of analysis is not individual statements but the whole system.
He visualizes this idea with an image of our knowledge, from history to physics to everything as a construct that touches experience only on its edges and even that touch is only in the sense that they are less likely (but not impossible) to be readjusted and only because we vie for stability and there are less important statements that can be readjusted first. We say that experience underdetermines any theory, which means that experience is usually incompatible with some statements but is never compatible with only one statement. This means that there can be many different constructs as long as the web of statements inside it can make them compatible. Close to the center of the construct there are ontological or highly theoretical statements of logic that are usually the first to go.
Objects are just posits, hypotheses, epistemologically not very different from the Homeric gods. They are tools that make our experience more manageable. He makes an analogy with irrational numbers. Even if we only care about rational numbers, since some square numbers lack value for them, we can modify our ontology and create irrational numbers to help us, but we could have created multiple other sets of numbers. The difference with objects, he postulates, is that they are much more simplified, and are archaic posits that might be necessary for language. We also posit forces, subatomic particles and ultimately scientific theories. In the end: “Each man is given a scientific heritage plus a continuing barrage of sensory stimulation; and the considerations which guide him in warping his scientific heritage to fit his continuing sensory promptings are, where rational, pragmatic.”
December 22, 2020
Two Dogmas of Empiricism is a modern classic in Philosophy. Sadly, rather than discuss the real world, it discusses two old philosophical problems This may be very important to philosophers, but to me it is irrelevant. It is a very short work, but as always with philosophy it is long sentences and words you rarely see used other places. That makes it a very slow 25 pages to read. Afterwards I am left with the impression that the standing of the famous philosopher Kant is in decline. At least thats something.
January 19, 2022
Quine dunks on logical positivism, which is inherently and totally satisfying if you’ve read more than a page of the stuff.
Read
February 13, 2023An analytic philosopher destroying analytic philosophy... analytically
August 1, 2018
"[T]he abstract entities which are the substance of mathematics -ultimately classes and classes of classes and so on up- are another posit in the same spirit. Epistemologically these are myths on the same footing with physical objects and gods, neither better nor worse except for differences in the degree to which they expedite our dealings with sense experience"
Ever since I read Hume and Kant with their definition of analytic, I was convinced that the only methods of knowledge were obtained analytically and synthetically. It just seemed to intuitive; there's no way "All bachelors are unmarried" and that "all squares have four sides" are known in any way other than analytically. You could just imagine my shock as Quine slowly destroys my -previously intuitive!- notion of analytic. What is it?? Synonyms? Nope. Definitions? Nope. Semantic laws? Nope.
Slowly my world toppled over me as he reaches his completely justified conclusion, "There is no analytic knowledge," while I look back and try to find errors in his argument. It's sound. How is it sound?!
This is not the meat of the paper; oh no, I wouldn't give it away like that. His final conclusion is how through this lack of analytical knowledge, metaphysics is blended in with science. They are one in the same field. Absolutely blew me away.
Recommended read for anyone getting into science or anyone interested in the theory of knowledge in general. Linguists will enjoy as well.
Ever since I read Hume and Kant with their definition of analytic, I was convinced that the only methods of knowledge were obtained analytically and synthetically. It just seemed to intuitive; there's no way "All bachelors are unmarried" and that "all squares have four sides" are known in any way other than analytically. You could just imagine my shock as Quine slowly destroys my -previously intuitive!- notion of analytic. What is it?? Synonyms? Nope. Definitions? Nope. Semantic laws? Nope.
Slowly my world toppled over me as he reaches his completely justified conclusion, "There is no analytic knowledge," while I look back and try to find errors in his argument. It's sound. How is it sound?!
This is not the meat of the paper; oh no, I wouldn't give it away like that. His final conclusion is how through this lack of analytical knowledge, metaphysics is blended in with science. They are one in the same field. Absolutely blew me away.
Recommended read for anyone getting into science or anyone interested in the theory of knowledge in general. Linguists will enjoy as well.
November 4, 2021
I don't entirely agree, which is to say I don't necessarily disagree, but it is tough to come to terms with the confusing terms or jargon this paper is full of. I'm excited to come back to this paper after clearing up some of my confusion because what I can comprehend in this is interesting.
"Analytic-Synthetic Distinction: Quine questions the traditional distinction between analytic and synthetic statements. Analytic statements are considered true by virtue of their meaning (e.g., "All bachelors are unmarried"), while synthetic statements are true or false based on empirical evidence (e.g., "The cat is on the mat"). Quine argues that this distinction is not clear-cut because it relies on the idea of synonymy, which is itself problematic.
Confirmation Holism: Quine introduces the concept of confirmation holism, which challenges the idea that individual statements or sentences are confirmed or disconfirmed by empirical evidence in isolation. Instead, he argues that our entire web of beliefs forms a holistic system, and when we receive conflicting evidence, we make adjustments within the system, rather than rejecting isolated statements.
The Indeterminacy of Translation: Quine discusses the indeterminacy of translation, which means that there are multiple ways to translate one language into another without a unique, correct translation. This challenges the idea of a fixed, objective meaning for words and sentences"
This helped
"Analytic-Synthetic Distinction: Quine questions the traditional distinction between analytic and synthetic statements. Analytic statements are considered true by virtue of their meaning (e.g., "All bachelors are unmarried"), while synthetic statements are true or false based on empirical evidence (e.g., "The cat is on the mat"). Quine argues that this distinction is not clear-cut because it relies on the idea of synonymy, which is itself problematic.
Confirmation Holism: Quine introduces the concept of confirmation holism, which challenges the idea that individual statements or sentences are confirmed or disconfirmed by empirical evidence in isolation. Instead, he argues that our entire web of beliefs forms a holistic system, and when we receive conflicting evidence, we make adjustments within the system, rather than rejecting isolated statements.
The Indeterminacy of Translation: Quine discusses the indeterminacy of translation, which means that there are multiple ways to translate one language into another without a unique, correct translation. This challenges the idea of a fixed, objective meaning for words and sentences"
This helped
December 31, 2021
"That there is such a distinction to be drawn at all is an unempirical dogma of empiricists, a metaphysical article of faith."
I feel that there's nothing new to me in this paper, but he was revolutionary in some ways. And maybe because of this, the notion of analyticity circularity became so famous that I came in contact with it before the paper itself. This short paper basically sets up the most famous notion about the so-called two dogmas of empiricism, analyticity and its circularity and reductionism and its premises that rests in immediate experience and a logical truth.
For Quine and for most analytic thinkers after him the supposed analytic statements possibly do not always justifies itself and for this he introduces the notion, early in the paper of cognitive synonyms that points (and in certain way makes) certain words have the same meaning, one of the examples is when in (1) 'No unmarried man is married' and (2) 'No bachelor is married.' the terms "Unmarried man" and "Bachelor" are interchangeable as he points later. This, though, does not deal with all the problems and there are some things that interchangeability cannot deal with, but I'll not talk about all the cases. It's important to understand that, for Quine, this belief that the so-called analytic statements depends on a synonym and the synonym depends on the notion of analyticity itself show to us that the interchangeability isn't, salve veritate, consistent. Thus, it's a circular argument and fails.
The section about 'Semantical Rules' was what most interested to me, as I am particularly interested in linguistics and above all semantics. In this section Quine points (always points, because he actually doesn't really formally prove anything in this paper) to the notion that all analytic statements are in relation with a specified type of language, i.e, statement P is analytic for artificial or ordinary language P. The rules for this are several. This is reminiscent of Wittgenstein, for sure, and for me.
Finally, in the last two sections of the article, Quines points out the dogma of reductionism and shows that (rather, suggests) it rest on the preconceived verification theory of meaning that admits that each statement, taken in isolation from its fellows, can admit of confirmation or infirmation at all. He implies that this dogma lies on another dogma: that there exists a cleavage between the analytic and synthetic statements.
It seems to me that this view Quine gives to the synthetic/analytic distinction is heavy influenced by the way he sees what philosophy is, for example, for Kant it's more or less safe to affirm that he thinks philosophy occupies itself with the presumed synthetic propositions. Wittgenstein, on the other hand, negating the sense of the synthetic propositions, clearly advocates that philosophy deals strictly with analytic statements and just elucidates the others way of thinking. For Quine to reject this distinction is clearly something that is clarified only later on, in other articles or books by him that I have not read at the moment of this review.
January 16, 2023
I know professional philosophers think this work is a Big Deal, but I personally am not impressed with it.
To simply the author’s main point, Quine disagrees with Kant, and more than that, he seems to disagree a bit with the analytic-continental separation, as far as modern schools of philosophy go. (Neither of which is really emphasized or spoken about in the paper itself). People who disliked Kant’s epistemological ideas as expressed in Critique of Pure Reason and perhaps modern professional philosophers annoyed with the “analytic-continental” division will probably like this work (especially those who consider themselves to be in the continental school), since it critiques whether analyticity exists.
That all said, that’s all rather insignificant stuff. The whole analytic-continental school stuff, if one doesn’t find it meaningful, doesn’t have to be adhered to in any way.
With regards to Quine’s points about analytic points being inherently circular, I just don’t think he has a clear conception of language that he thinks he does, in terms of its function. I think Kant’s concepts were interesting and lead to some interesting thoughts and conclusions, but Quine’s ideas are essentially dead on arrival. If language is inherently circular, then there’s really no point in communicating, since all our signs are communicating the same thing thing. In general, Liebnitz point (and others who make it) that mathematical claims are different from natural science/etc. claims is just true. You can say that all math says is that 1 = 1, or something similar, as far as an entire subject field of calculus, algebra, and so on goes, but that itself is flattening the entire field by an absurd amount, to the point that it’s no longer useful nor enlightening in any way.
So I consider Quine’s work to be a bit of a pessimistic, skeptical point of view, even if that’s not how it’s often categorized as such, in terms of how useful all scientific knowledge is (outside of perhaps his own brand of criticisms). I just don’t think his views are accurate, nor do they have much utility, so I’m lead to question why philosophers enjoy his work, outside of the fact that his work may decrease the importance of the work of natural scientists and mathematicians, and increase the importance of works by angsty, navel gazing philosopher types.
There are many interesting philosophy works out there, I just don’t see this essay as contributing much.
To simply the author’s main point, Quine disagrees with Kant, and more than that, he seems to disagree a bit with the analytic-continental separation, as far as modern schools of philosophy go. (Neither of which is really emphasized or spoken about in the paper itself). People who disliked Kant’s epistemological ideas as expressed in Critique of Pure Reason and perhaps modern professional philosophers annoyed with the “analytic-continental” division will probably like this work (especially those who consider themselves to be in the continental school), since it critiques whether analyticity exists.
That all said, that’s all rather insignificant stuff. The whole analytic-continental school stuff, if one doesn’t find it meaningful, doesn’t have to be adhered to in any way.
With regards to Quine’s points about analytic points being inherently circular, I just don’t think he has a clear conception of language that he thinks he does, in terms of its function. I think Kant’s concepts were interesting and lead to some interesting thoughts and conclusions, but Quine’s ideas are essentially dead on arrival. If language is inherently circular, then there’s really no point in communicating, since all our signs are communicating the same thing thing. In general, Liebnitz point (and others who make it) that mathematical claims are different from natural science/etc. claims is just true. You can say that all math says is that 1 = 1, or something similar, as far as an entire subject field of calculus, algebra, and so on goes, but that itself is flattening the entire field by an absurd amount, to the point that it’s no longer useful nor enlightening in any way.
So I consider Quine’s work to be a bit of a pessimistic, skeptical point of view, even if that’s not how it’s often categorized as such, in terms of how useful all scientific knowledge is (outside of perhaps his own brand of criticisms). I just don’t think his views are accurate, nor do they have much utility, so I’m lead to question why philosophers enjoy his work, outside of the fact that his work may decrease the importance of the work of natural scientists and mathematicians, and increase the importance of works by angsty, navel gazing philosopher types.
There are many interesting philosophy works out there, I just don’t see this essay as contributing much.
October 6, 2020
Famously one of the most profound and well-wrought texts in analytical philosophy in the second part of the 20th century.
Two types of analytic statements:
(1) No unmarried man is married.
(2) No bachelor is married.
We shifted from (1) to (2) by substituting “unmarried” by its so-called synonym “bachelor”. But how do we know that “bachelor” is defined as “unmarried (man)”? One could think one speaks of synonymy every time two terms are interchangeable salva veritate. But what tells us that the interchangeability is a matter of logic rather than a matter of fact? After all, I can also replace “creature with a heart” by “creature with kidneys” with no extensional difference as both expressions refer to the same set of things. “Any statement can be held true come what may, if we make drastic enough adjustments elsewhere in the system.”
Two types of analytic statements:
(1) No unmarried man is married.
(2) No bachelor is married.
We shifted from (1) to (2) by substituting “unmarried” by its so-called synonym “bachelor”. But how do we know that “bachelor” is defined as “unmarried (man)”? One could think one speaks of synonymy every time two terms are interchangeable salva veritate. But what tells us that the interchangeability is a matter of logic rather than a matter of fact? After all, I can also replace “creature with a heart” by “creature with kidneys” with no extensional difference as both expressions refer to the same set of things. “Any statement can be held true come what may, if we make drastic enough adjustments elsewhere in the system.”
March 1, 2023
One of the most influential essays in the 20th century, undeniably a classic in the field of not just Analytic, but Philosophy Proper has a whole.
Ever since I read Hume and Kant, I have always presupposed the Analytic-Synthetic distinction to be true. After all, how can that not be the case? Quine, however, blows the distinction out of the water and unleashes a wave of destruction in its wake.
If the Analytic-Synthetic distinction is no longer sacred, what about the priori-a posteriori distinction or the necessary-contingent distinction? Since Kant already demonstrated that the semantic can be divorced from the metaphysical and epistemic categories, does the destruction of the semantic distinction call for the collapse of the boundary between the metaphysical and epistemic?
Popper and Kripke are next.
4/5
Ever since I read Hume and Kant, I have always presupposed the Analytic-Synthetic distinction to be true. After all, how can that not be the case? Quine, however, blows the distinction out of the water and unleashes a wave of destruction in its wake.
If the Analytic-Synthetic distinction is no longer sacred, what about the priori-a posteriori distinction or the necessary-contingent distinction? Since Kant already demonstrated that the semantic can be divorced from the metaphysical and epistemic categories, does the destruction of the semantic distinction call for the collapse of the boundary between the metaphysical and epistemic?
Popper and Kripke are next.
4/5
May 11, 2025
Great last section!! Can skip the rest.
An elaboration perhaps on the engineering motto that, “all models are wrong, some models are useful.” I will need to muse on the comparison between experience with rational numbers and physical objects with irrational numbers as ultimately placeholders for a useful end.
P.s. From this it seems like you could make a pragmatic argument for the veracity of religion from beneficial outcomes regardless of the empirical verifiability of foundational claims for the ideas.
It seems like you have a few avenues such as: intention (Kant), pure faith (Kierkegaard) , or outcome.
An elaboration perhaps on the engineering motto that, “all models are wrong, some models are useful.” I will need to muse on the comparison between experience with rational numbers and physical objects with irrational numbers as ultimately placeholders for a useful end.
P.s. From this it seems like you could make a pragmatic argument for the veracity of religion from beneficial outcomes regardless of the empirical verifiability of foundational claims for the ideas.
It seems like you have a few avenues such as: intention (Kant), pure faith (Kierkegaard) , or outcome.
September 7, 2021
Unarguably one of the most important philosophical papers. I’ve read it a couple of times, and I always say that I have not understood it better than the present reading. It is brief but dense, always gives you more in every reading. It has always been my model of clarity and precision (and creativity) in what should be a proper philosophical writing. Every instance of reading it is a gain.
September 14, 2025
Other than completely sh*tting on Carnap, Logical Positivism, and the analytic/synthetic distinction, the writing is filled with a witty-scent and vibrant colouring. Certain sections, I couldn't hold myself from bursting into laughter. To say that I thoroughly enjoyed it is a dangerous understatement.
January 18, 2026
Even if one doesn't agree, this is an article that has to be addressed sooner or later, you can't dismiss it if you take these matters seriously (it's not enough to not be convinced by it). If it's too difficult to understand you can get to it later, but you should get to it eventually, definitely one of the best philosophical works of the 20th century.
November 23, 2019
My falsifiability is dead
May 3, 2021
This book concisely dunks on Logical Positivists (which is always good) by overturning the "intuitive" notion of an analytic synthetic divide and refuting reductionism.
May 1, 2022
wrong definition of synonymy in my opinion
November 27, 2025
Take this, Kant!
Want to Read
March 12, 2026one of the most important papers in 20th century philosophy. attacks two central ideas of logical positivism: analytic vs synthetic truth and reductionism
July 6, 2026
Here Quine bears upstream of just about every discussion of epistemology and realism that one could have.
A lucid and enjoyable read.
A lucid and enjoyable read.
March 4, 2018
This is a great essay but we must not forget that Philosophy is much more than just analytic philosophy.
June 17, 2021
كواين والعلم الطبيعي المُثَقّل بالميتافيزيقا
في هذه المقالة "عقيدتان في المذهب التجريبي"، استنتجَ ويلارد كواين أن هناك غموضٌ في الحد الفاصل بين العلم الطبيعي والتأمل الميتافيزيقي؛ بسبب خطأ عقيدتين في المذهب التجريبي، وهُما: 1- وجود حد فاصل بين القضايا التحليلية (القائمة على معانٍ بمعزل عن الواقع مثل قضايا المنطق والرياضيات) والقضايا التركيبية (القائمة على معانٍ واقعية). 2- مذهب الاختزال؛ وهو "إمكانية اختزال كل العبارات الدالة إلى عبارات بسيطة ترتبط مباشرةً بالتجربة، يطلق عليها اسم العبارات الأساسية أو عبارات البروتوكول، ما يسمح بالتحقق من دلالتِها وبالتالي علميتها أو العكس".
بالنسبةِ للعقيدة الأولى، فكواين كان يقول بخطأِها بسبب التشابك الكُلانيّ بين اللغة والعالم، وبالتالي القضايا التحليلية ليست صحيحة في جميع العوالم المُمكنة، وطالما هي متعلقة بالخبرة الحسية أو العالَم فهي قابلة للمراجعة أثناء التجربة، وبالتالي عملية تثبيتها أو عدم التحقق منها أثناء التجربة تتم بشكلٍ اعتباطيّ، لذلك كواين يعتبر هذا التفريق (التحليلي/التركيبي) "أداة ميتافيزيقية للإيمان". رغم أنه يمكن اعتبار طرح كواين هُنا راديكاليّ، وأن هناك قضايا تحليلية قبلية منفصلة عن القضايا التركيبية وغير قابلة للمراجعة. لكن القضايا التحليلية غير كافية للعلم، لأنها لا تعبر عن قضايا تجريبية أصلًا، "الإفتراضات الرياضية والمنطقية، إذ يقول موريتز شليك "لا تتعامل مع أي حقائق، ولكن مع رموز يمكننا بواسطتها أن نعبر عن الحقائق". وهكذا فهي لا تخبرنا شيئًا عن عالم الحقائق التجريبية. عبر فيتجنشتاين عن الفكرة في (التراكتاتوس) قائلا: "كل افتراضات المنطق تقول لنا الشيء نفسه. وهو لا شيء"".
لكن يبقى أن نقد كواين لمذهب الاختزال صحيح، لأن هناك تشابك كُلانيّ بين المُلاحظة والنظرية، يقول دوهيم "كل مُلاحظة مُثَقّلة بالنظرية"، فإدراكنا الحسيّ مُثَقّل دائما ببارادايم (نموذج) معرفي مُسبق يملي علينا ما نراه، وهو غير ممكن البرهنة عليه تجريبيًا بشكلٍ كليّ، وأن هذا البارادايم "لا يمس الخبرة الحسية إلا عند الأطراف" كما يقول كواين، لذلك يَعتبِر كواين العلم الطبيعي ذو نزعة أسطورية؛ فالعلم الطبيعي هو بارادايم بشري ذاتي اجتماعي (بارادايم توماس كون)، أي أن الإنسان فقط يقوم بتأويل الطبيعة طبقًا للنموذج الخاص به أو بالمجتمع العلمي. والبارادايم قابل للتفنيد والمراجعة دائمًا، لكن من المستحيل عمل تفنيد للفروض كلها في تجربة واحدة في نفس الوقت، ومستحيل نختبر فرض بمفرده بمعزل عن تثبيت فروض أخرى، دوهيم وكواين يقولون أننا نثبِّت عدد لانهائي من الفروض أثناء التجربة ونختبر ونفند فرض واحد أو عدد محدود فقط من الفروض، وإن تم دحض فرض معين، لا يمكن معرفة أين الخطأ، وهذه هي إشكالية "استحالة التجربة الحاسمة"، يقول كواين: "وحدة الدلالة التجريبية هي العلم كله، فالعلم كله شبكة مترابطة من الفرضيات والقضايا والمعاني، حين يتم تكذيب إحداها لا يمكن أن نعرف أين حدث الخطأ، حينما نحاول اختبار فرضية واحدة فنحن بذلك نختبر العلم كله، هنا ظهر مبدأ الكلّية"... لذلك سيظل العلم الطبيعي دائمًا مُثَقّل بالميتافيزيقا.
في هذه المقالة "عقيدتان في المذهب التجريبي"، استنتجَ ويلارد كواين أن هناك غموضٌ في الحد الفاصل بين العلم الطبيعي والتأمل الميتافيزيقي؛ بسبب خطأ عقيدتين في المذهب التجريبي، وهُما: 1- وجود حد فاصل بين القضايا التحليلية (القائمة على معانٍ بمعزل عن الواقع مثل قضايا المنطق والرياضيات) والقضايا التركيبية (القائمة على معانٍ واقعية). 2- مذهب الاختزال؛ وهو "إمكانية اختزال كل العبارات الدالة إلى عبارات بسيطة ترتبط مباشرةً بالتجربة، يطلق عليها اسم العبارات الأساسية أو عبارات البروتوكول، ما يسمح بالتحقق من دلالتِها وبالتالي علميتها أو العكس".
بالنسبةِ للعقيدة الأولى، فكواين كان يقول بخطأِها بسبب التشابك الكُلانيّ بين اللغة والعالم، وبالتالي القضايا التحليلية ليست صحيحة في جميع العوالم المُمكنة، وطالما هي متعلقة بالخبرة الحسية أو العالَم فهي قابلة للمراجعة أثناء التجربة، وبالتالي عملية تثبيتها أو عدم التحقق منها أثناء التجربة تتم بشكلٍ اعتباطيّ، لذلك كواين يعتبر هذا التفريق (التحليلي/التركيبي) "أداة ميتافيزيقية للإيمان". رغم أنه يمكن اعتبار طرح كواين هُنا راديكاليّ، وأن هناك قضايا تحليلية قبلية منفصلة عن القضايا التركيبية وغير قابلة للمراجعة. لكن القضايا التحليلية غير كافية للعلم، لأنها لا تعبر عن قضايا تجريبية أصلًا، "الإفتراضات الرياضية والمنطقية، إذ يقول موريتز شليك "لا تتعامل مع أي حقائق، ولكن مع رموز يمكننا بواسطتها أن نعبر عن الحقائق". وهكذا فهي لا تخبرنا شيئًا عن عالم الحقائق التجريبية. عبر فيتجنشتاين عن الفكرة في (التراكتاتوس) قائلا: "كل افتراضات المنطق تقول لنا الشيء نفسه. وهو لا شيء"".
لكن يبقى أن نقد كواين لمذهب الاختزال صحيح، لأن هناك تشابك كُلانيّ بين المُلاحظة والنظرية، يقول دوهيم "كل مُلاحظة مُثَقّلة بالنظرية"، فإدراكنا الحسيّ مُثَقّل دائما ببارادايم (نموذج) معرفي مُسبق يملي علينا ما نراه، وهو غير ممكن البرهنة عليه تجريبيًا بشكلٍ كليّ، وأن هذا البارادايم "لا يمس الخبرة الحسية إلا عند الأطراف" كما يقول كواين، لذلك يَعتبِر كواين العلم الطبيعي ذو نزعة أسطورية؛ فالعلم الطبيعي هو بارادايم بشري ذاتي اجتماعي (بارادايم توماس كون)، أي أن الإنسان فقط يقوم بتأويل الطبيعة طبقًا للنموذج الخاص به أو بالمجتمع العلمي. والبارادايم قابل للتفنيد والمراجعة دائمًا، لكن من المستحيل عمل تفنيد للفروض كلها في تجربة واحدة في نفس الوقت، ومستحيل نختبر فرض بمفرده بمعزل عن تثبيت فروض أخرى، دوهيم وكواين يقولون أننا نثبِّت عدد لانهائي من الفروض أثناء التجربة ونختبر ونفند فرض واحد أو عدد محدود فقط من الفروض، وإن تم دحض فرض معين، لا يمكن معرفة أين الخطأ، وهذه هي إشكالية "استحالة التجربة الحاسمة"، يقول كواين: "وحدة الدلالة التجريبية هي العلم كله، فالعلم كله شبكة مترابطة من الفرضيات والقضايا والمعاني، حين يتم تكذيب إحداها لا يمكن أن نعرف أين حدث الخطأ، حينما نحاول اختبار فرضية واحدة فنحن بذلك نختبر العلم كله، هنا ظهر مبدأ الكلّية"... لذلك سيظل العلم الطبيعي دائمًا مُثَقّل بالميتافيزيقا.
February 18, 2025
There is nothing more gratifying than seeing my ideas expressed far more eloquently than I could ever manage.
September 9, 2017
have to read
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