Strategy

by Alexander Svechin

A translation of the second edition of Aleksandr Svechin's seminal work, Strategy . Svechin (1878-1938) was an outstanding Russian military theoretician and widely recognized as the Soviet Clausewitz. This book, strongly influenced by the writings and analyses of the contemporary and classic European figures of Svechin's day, represents his concept of the best approach to national security for the Soviet state. In addition to the translation of Svechin's work, Strategy includes a foreword; introductory essays by A.A. Kokoshin, V.V. Larionov, V.N. Lobov, and Jacob W. Kipp; three book reviews of Svechin's original text from the Red Army's Voina i revoliutsiia [War and Revolution]; and a bibliography of Svechin's published works. First published in 1992. Fourth printing 2004.

Genres: Military Fiction, Philosophy, Politics, History, War

374 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1927

Reviews

[Chase Metcalf · Rating 3 out of 5]

Solid work on strategy by Soviet theorist. Clearly grounded in Clausewitz with emphasis on superiority of politics and emphasis on military history as a tool for the aspiring strategist and commander. Found his emphasis on the interconnected nature of politics, economics, and strategy to be well argued. Also appreciated the importance he put on balancing consistency and relentless focus on overall strategic/political objectives with the flexibility and need to plan/act based on reality of the situation rather then how the aspiring strategist would like the situation to be.

Study was readable but at times bogged down in details - especially for a reader who is not familiar with Napoleonic warfare, World War I, or Russian civil war. Heavy use of history is laudable but requires basic historic understanding by the reader. Additionally, the book focuses heavily on mobilization and idea of positional warfare which is understandable based on the context of the times and authors experience in WWI. Despite being from the 1920's there is elements of consistency with Russian thinking about conflict today - especially with regards the belief that international relations is about competition/conflict requiring military preparation and readiness and the importance of integrating all elements of power (military & non-military) to advance the states interests.

[Ian Fleischmann · Rating 4 out of 5]

Alexander Svechin provides a holistic theoretical overview of the role of Operations, Strategy (in the Liddell Hart sense of the arrangement of military means/operations towards a political end), and Grand Strategy (the coordination of political, military, and economic activities towards the accomplishment of a defined goal). His observations are firmly grounded in his experience of the Russo-Japanese War and WWI, in which the Napoleonic long-march failed to results in a decisive battle and war devolved into long tortuous engagements with little productive visible gain. In the same vein as de Bloch, Svechin concludes that wars of decision, which he characterizes in Delbruckian fashion as wars of destruction, and the future of war is one of attrition. In my opinion, he falls prey to reductionism as he defines wars of destruction simply as singular lines of operation aimed at the destruction of an enemy force with no room for intermediate objectives. His definition for wars of attrition, however, is far more broad and nebulous leaving room for multiple lines of operation oriented on destruction of a force, capture of an objective, or mere delay. This imbalance in definition predisposes Svechin and the reader to conclude in favor of attrition over destruction when, in fact, no such decision need, or should, be made.

That being said, Svechin's discussion on the coordination of economic, military, and political strategy are easily in line with Clausewitz's observations on the organizations of national councils as written in On War's Book 8. It makes sense that economic means could be used to further military ends, but that they may also incur political setbacks and vice versa. In theory, coordination of these ends should occur, but the reality is that this coordination was probably much easier for Soviet Russia. His ultimate recommendations though are not merely coordination, but substantial preparation on all fronts, in particular the military industrial complex (critical for a war of attrition).

In terms of initiative, Svechin clearly delineates between "the initiative" (or operational initiative) and "private initiative" (individual initiative). While he emphasizes both, he makes no clear linkage between the concepts. Private initiative is good, but it is a function of society and command. Operational initiative cannot be equated with the offense and is instead a cumulative advantage stemming from control. He uses the example of a force besieging a detachment in a fortress. Tactically the detachment has the initiative within their planned defense, but the force holds the initiative operationally given their ability to control the environment of the fortress. Obviously this example is simplistic and there are circumstances where the conclusions could be reversed, but I think his point is clear.

Side note: Svechin's thoughts on operational art are worth a read. The fact that they look a lot like what you would expect from the Prussians shouldn't surprise you. His mentor in 1905 was Neznamov, who studied Schlichting, a student of Moltke. In the end, his willingness to include non-Russian scholars, global military history (which he sometimes skews for a point, particularly number in the US Civil war), and advocating for attrition warfare lost him political influence and eventually his head.

[Ivan · Rating 4 out of 5]

Непреклонная воля выражается не в сохранении раз взятого направления, а в том, чтобы ни на одну минуту не упускать конечной цели.
Книга написана сто лет назад. Многие сражения и войны, о которых идет речь мне мало известны.
Часто автор пишет будто оправдывается или слишком хочет завуалировать мысль

[Tottoro80 · Rating 5 out of 5]

Russian classic