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Body Parts: A Theological Anthropology
Christians have traditionally claimed that humans are created in the image of God (imago Dei), but they have consistently defined that image in ways that exclude people from full humanity. The most well-known definition locates the image in the rational soul, which is constructed in such a way that women, children, and many persons with disabilities are found deficient.Body Parts claims the importance of embodiment, difference, and limitation--not only as descriptions of the human condition but also as part of the imago Dei itself. This thesis is inspired by a parallel claim in an Indian tradition that posits the reflection of the divine body in humanity. Its thirty-six parts invite Christians to consider how consciousness, limitations, mental and emotional capacities, organs of sensation and action, and elements are reflections of divinity. Each chapter pursues openings in the Christian theological tradition in order to imagine these sets of "body parts" as the image of God.
232 pages, Paperback
Published December 1, 2017
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September 6, 2018
Michelle Voss Roberts published Body Parts: a Theological Anthropology through Fortress Press in 2017. In sum, the work is an attempt at integrating anthropological insights from non-dual Shaivism, a variant of Hinduism, into the broader Christian anthropological schema (23). That is to say, Roberts wants to incorporate the illuminative aspects of non-dual Shaivism to correct or strengthen the traditional imago dei model in Christian theology. The inherited model for most Christians (via Aquinas, et al) is an association of the imago with that which separates humans from the rest of the animal kingdom--viz., rationality.[1] Human rationality, in other words, is the foundation upon which the imago dei is erected. Roberts disagrees, instead pointing toward a model in which the imago consists in the web of attributes belonging to humanity--but not to humanity in particular. (14)
Dysfunctional views of the imago motivate Roberts's project. She outlines three key models and their limitations: (1) substance anthropology, in which value comes by virtue of a capacity; (2) functional anthropology, in which value comes by virtue of what we do; and (3) relational anthropology, in which value comes by virtue of our interdependence.
I am sympathetic to Roberts's concerns. The disabled are excluded from traditional accounts of the imago, simply because their grasp on the sine qua non of "human" flourishing is so slight. I'm reminded of the problem in ethics, popularized by Peter Singer, of what to do with the perpetually comatose patient. What account of the human protects this sort of person (or persons like her), who lack a working, rational brain or who cannot perform a task or who do not relate to those around her? How do you affirm the inherent worth of individuals irrespective of their usefulness? Roberts's chapter on "The Limited Body" touches on these issues well, though imperfectly. (The reinterpretation of original sin -- the conditions within which we "overreach" our limits or fail to grasp our own finitude -- is interesting, though certainly unorthodox.)
Nevertheless, the fundamental premise of the work concerns the incorporation of non-dual Shaivism into the Christian schema. In that respect, despite my fundamental agreement with Roberts on the inadequacy of the traditional model of the imago, I did not find her imaginative reworking compelling. There seem to be more fruitful avenues of exploration than Abhinavagupta's "body parts"--the philosophical discourse on "dignity," for one. Roberts should be lauded for the attempt. Putting these two widely divergent traditions in conversation was certainly an enticing read, but the result was not as illuminative as I had hoped. However, Roberts's concern to include the disabled and the excluded in her account of the imago should characterize any future models of the doctrine.
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[1] To be sure, grounding a human's value in something can be an arduous task. Remy Debes, my former professor, outlines some of the philosophical problematics of "dignity" (a related, though distinguished, concept to the imago) in his 2009 article "Dignity's Gauntlet," which you can read here. I remember asking Dr. D about this article in his office as I was just beginning my philosophical training. He was (and still is) very generous with his time for his students and former students, and he has had a profound influence on my understanding of the art of teaching. "You are all philosophers," indeed.
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I received a complimentary edition of this work in exchange for an honest review.
Dysfunctional views of the imago motivate Roberts's project. She outlines three key models and their limitations: (1) substance anthropology, in which value comes by virtue of a capacity; (2) functional anthropology, in which value comes by virtue of what we do; and (3) relational anthropology, in which value comes by virtue of our interdependence.
I am sympathetic to Roberts's concerns. The disabled are excluded from traditional accounts of the imago, simply because their grasp on the sine qua non of "human" flourishing is so slight. I'm reminded of the problem in ethics, popularized by Peter Singer, of what to do with the perpetually comatose patient. What account of the human protects this sort of person (or persons like her), who lack a working, rational brain or who cannot perform a task or who do not relate to those around her? How do you affirm the inherent worth of individuals irrespective of their usefulness? Roberts's chapter on "The Limited Body" touches on these issues well, though imperfectly. (The reinterpretation of original sin -- the conditions within which we "overreach" our limits or fail to grasp our own finitude -- is interesting, though certainly unorthodox.)
Nevertheless, the fundamental premise of the work concerns the incorporation of non-dual Shaivism into the Christian schema. In that respect, despite my fundamental agreement with Roberts on the inadequacy of the traditional model of the imago, I did not find her imaginative reworking compelling. There seem to be more fruitful avenues of exploration than Abhinavagupta's "body parts"--the philosophical discourse on "dignity," for one. Roberts should be lauded for the attempt. Putting these two widely divergent traditions in conversation was certainly an enticing read, but the result was not as illuminative as I had hoped. However, Roberts's concern to include the disabled and the excluded in her account of the imago should characterize any future models of the doctrine.
<><><>
[1] To be sure, grounding a human's value in something can be an arduous task. Remy Debes, my former professor, outlines some of the philosophical problematics of "dignity" (a related, though distinguished, concept to the imago) in his 2009 article "Dignity's Gauntlet," which you can read here. I remember asking Dr. D about this article in his office as I was just beginning my philosophical training. He was (and still is) very generous with his time for his students and former students, and he has had a profound influence on my understanding of the art of teaching. "You are all philosophers," indeed.
<><><>
I received a complimentary edition of this work in exchange for an honest review.
February 13, 2021
GIVE ME INCLUSIVE CHRISTIANITY OR GIVE ME DEATH
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