China’s ‘unprovoked’ attack on India in 1962 is an event deeply embedded into the psyche of the modern Indian nation. Not so much because it was a betrayal of Pt Nehru’s Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai philosophy, but more so because of the absolute and utter humiliation suffered by the country in the battlefield. After decades of maintaining Pakistan as a convenient threat #1, the last few years have once again brought to the fore the significantly larger threat faced by India from China.
In this context, Bertil Lintner’s book attempts to shed light on Chinese perspective on the Indo-China relationship. As someone who has covered South Asia, specifically Burma, India and China, Bertil comes with some credibility to write on this complex topic.
As is wont, the early part of the book is entirely focused on the Indo-China war of 1962. The book doesn’t spend too much time on the sequence of events (there are others books for that). Rather, it starts by debunking Neville Maxwell’s theory that while China was the aggressor, the raison-d’etre behind the war were India’s provocative actions, including the Forward Policy.
Lintner references together a series of publications and commentaries from within China to highlight that ‘showing India its proper place’ was a long-standing action item for the CCP leadership. Multiple uncharitable references to Pt Nehru in Chinese state-controlled media apart, there are multiple statements by Chinese leaders well before 1962 that suggests teaching India a lesson was on the agenda for the Maoist regime. Even Deng Xiaoping, the architect of modern China, is said to have remarked in 1959 (in reference to India having given shelter to the Dalai Lama), ‘When the time comes, we certainly will settle accounts with them [the Indians].’
While the author proposes several possible reasons behind China’s assault in 1962, the most likely seems to be triggered by India’s safe haven to the Dalai Lama. That China chose its times of attacking, also reflects the long term mindset of the nation and its leaders, and hence should be a warning to any subsequent Indian leadership of reading too much into short-term thaws and expressions of friendship.
The author spends a bit of real estate talking about the aftermath of the war within India. Here he makes a few bloopers when he sympathises with VK Menon and his qualifications to be a member of the government, quoting the ‘famous’ Lieutenant General BM Kaul - “He (Menon) was a vegetarian, did not drink alcohol or smoke tobacco, and, as a minister, he lived in a small room in a modest bungalow full of books.”
Similarly, in the context of Kaul, Lintner is dewy eyed, referring to Kaul’s distinguished military career when there are replete references across literature to Kaul’s unearned rise through the ranks and his famous exit from the frontlines in 1962 apparently as he got hit by altitude sickness!
The book then traverses into a discussion on various other flashpoints in the Indo-China relationship - Sikkim, Bhutan, Nepal and the North East. It contextualises the evolution of each of these states including their evolving complex relationships with India and the role played by China to try and provoke a break or create a place for itself or ensure its actions leave a thorn in India’s backside through support to militants, separatists and such others
Barring the story of Sikkim, in most cases the Indian response comes across as rather weak and myopic, with very little long term impact. The most obvious example of the same is the case of Nepal where over the years India’s big-brother attitude has allowed China to make inroads into the political establishment of our Himalayan neighbour.
A well-researched and rounded book wherein, unfortunately, India comes across as the rather weak and ineffective power when it comes to dealing with China and its shenanigans!