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The Storm: What Went Wrong and Why During Hurricane Katrina--the Inside Story from One Louisiana Scientist
The ultimate inside story: how bureaucracy, politics, and a disregard of science combined to cripple—perhaps forever—a great American city
As deputy director of the Louisiana State University Hurricane Center, Ivor van Heerden had for years been warning state and local officials about New Orleans’s vulnerability to flooding. But like Cassandra’s, his predictions were ignored—until Hurricane Katrina hit on August 29, 2005. Suddenly, van Heerden found himself at the center of a media maelstrom. Stepping forward to challenge the official version of events, he revealed the truth about the city’s shoddy levee construction.
As deputy director of the Louisiana State University Hurricane Center, Ivor van Heerden had for years been warning state and local officials about New Orleans’s vulnerability to flooding. But like Cassandra’s, his predictions were ignored—until Hurricane Katrina hit on August 29, 2005. Suddenly, van Heerden found himself at the center of a media maelstrom. Stepping forward to challenge the official version of events, he revealed the truth about the city’s shoddy levee construction.
Now, in The Storm, van Heerden shares up-to-the-minute reporting from his investigations and connects the dots among the Army Corps of Engineers, the bureaucrats, the politicians, and the chain of events—both natural and human—that culminated in catastrophe. An epic of cutting- edge science and systemic bureaucratic failure, The Storm is the first book from a major player in the Katrina disaster and a riveting narrative that brings expertise, passion, and a human viewpoint to America’s greatest natural disaster.
- GenresNonfictionHistoryScience
320 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 2006
15 people are currently reading
249 people want to read
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January 21, 2020
The problem with The Storm by Ivor Van Heerden and Mike Bryan may be little more than being too close to their topic. That Van Heerden has the training and viewpoint of science and engineering and a passionate interest in advocating solutions generates a certain amount of conflict. He is not sufficiently careful about shifting between the data and his advocacy.
I prefer science that is presented dispassionately and with the scholarly remove that puts final interpretation on the reader. When the topic is one that reflects on emotional things like loss of life or the potential loss of life, I also accept that the writer may be justified in taking a side. Having taken a side one can be emotional about why that side and why there is no automatic requirement to make the opposition case. The truth is not always s in the middle. The facts, in so far as we can know things like truth and facts by falling where they may, substantiate one view while leaving little of merit in another point of view.
It is on this edge where I have problems with Van Heerden.
Dr. Van Heerden was co-founder of the Louisiana State University Hurricane Center. In the period just before Hurricane Katrina it was part of his job to know the science behind hurricane tracking. His particular expertise included estimating the possible destructive outcomes given what was known about what a storm’s wind speeds rain and tidal flooding can do against the natural and man-made barriers. He is aware of and sensitive toward the people in or near that track. For them these are matters of life and death. He was one of the people government and the press turned to for analysis and clarification.
In his book, He catches himself between his legitimate knowledge of what was known, became known, and what happened that did not need to happen. The result is sometimes not enough science and too much of his frustration. Part of what happened in a swath from Southern Alabama to the edges of the Texas Gulf coast was an act of nature. The loss of life and property was too often the result of decades of naïve, optimistic cost-based decision-making and at best sloppy if not criminal execution of those decisions.
In passing it should be noted that the Mr Go, or Mississippi River Gulf Outlet proved to be one of those ideas that seemed good at the time but was a contributor to the disaster with no prior history of delivering on its promise.
In the way of disclosure, I was a resident of New Orleans at that time. What was our home was just out of camera range of his pictures of canal failures. I am now a resident of Houston, a civilian with the police department. Houstonians, and the HPD have reasons to take pride in their immediate response in favor of evacuees and their feeling of hurt at the instances where their hospitality was abused and when New Orleans failed to repay in kind. Shortly after the storm. my wife and I were living in emergency quarters aboard a ship in New Orleans. We were government employees supporting emergency responders. We were breakfasting with friends when they were informed; they had lost an entire household of near family members in the post Katrina flooding.
Further I am a native of New Orleans, having lived through Hurricanes since before the mega storms Betsy and Camille. By having lived on storm tracks since they were plotted by hand on butcher paper and having a little education in science and engineering, my preference is for analysis and sources. Having lived through the after math of Katrina with its attendant stresses and confusion, I understand his emotions.
As a reader and in the name of those with a less personal stake, I feel that Van Heerden and Bryan could have done a better job of isolating their roles of scientist and participant. Reporting the issues with, for example The Corps of Engineers and picking between the personalities involved in the periods before and after the failures is legitimate. I am suggesting is that the roles of Analyst of fact, Participant in events and Advocate for better decisions, could have been better separated.
The court cases and other analysis of why things that failed, failed as badly as they did largely uphold the claims and analysis included in The Storm. Some of what Van Heerden advocated is now in place and has been tested by later potential flooding events. With this proof, The Storm is a valuable read. It contains several cries from the heart in the name of protecting humans by: repairing and protecting wetlands, and re-thinking the stakes in poor mouthing flood protection engineering.
I prefer science that is presented dispassionately and with the scholarly remove that puts final interpretation on the reader. When the topic is one that reflects on emotional things like loss of life or the potential loss of life, I also accept that the writer may be justified in taking a side. Having taken a side one can be emotional about why that side and why there is no automatic requirement to make the opposition case. The truth is not always s in the middle. The facts, in so far as we can know things like truth and facts by falling where they may, substantiate one view while leaving little of merit in another point of view.
It is on this edge where I have problems with Van Heerden.
Dr. Van Heerden was co-founder of the Louisiana State University Hurricane Center. In the period just before Hurricane Katrina it was part of his job to know the science behind hurricane tracking. His particular expertise included estimating the possible destructive outcomes given what was known about what a storm’s wind speeds rain and tidal flooding can do against the natural and man-made barriers. He is aware of and sensitive toward the people in or near that track. For them these are matters of life and death. He was one of the people government and the press turned to for analysis and clarification.
In his book, He catches himself between his legitimate knowledge of what was known, became known, and what happened that did not need to happen. The result is sometimes not enough science and too much of his frustration. Part of what happened in a swath from Southern Alabama to the edges of the Texas Gulf coast was an act of nature. The loss of life and property was too often the result of decades of naïve, optimistic cost-based decision-making and at best sloppy if not criminal execution of those decisions.
In passing it should be noted that the Mr Go, or Mississippi River Gulf Outlet proved to be one of those ideas that seemed good at the time but was a contributor to the disaster with no prior history of delivering on its promise.
In the way of disclosure, I was a resident of New Orleans at that time. What was our home was just out of camera range of his pictures of canal failures. I am now a resident of Houston, a civilian with the police department. Houstonians, and the HPD have reasons to take pride in their immediate response in favor of evacuees and their feeling of hurt at the instances where their hospitality was abused and when New Orleans failed to repay in kind. Shortly after the storm. my wife and I were living in emergency quarters aboard a ship in New Orleans. We were government employees supporting emergency responders. We were breakfasting with friends when they were informed; they had lost an entire household of near family members in the post Katrina flooding.
Further I am a native of New Orleans, having lived through Hurricanes since before the mega storms Betsy and Camille. By having lived on storm tracks since they were plotted by hand on butcher paper and having a little education in science and engineering, my preference is for analysis and sources. Having lived through the after math of Katrina with its attendant stresses and confusion, I understand his emotions.
As a reader and in the name of those with a less personal stake, I feel that Van Heerden and Bryan could have done a better job of isolating their roles of scientist and participant. Reporting the issues with, for example The Corps of Engineers and picking between the personalities involved in the periods before and after the failures is legitimate. I am suggesting is that the roles of Analyst of fact, Participant in events and Advocate for better decisions, could have been better separated.
The court cases and other analysis of why things that failed, failed as badly as they did largely uphold the claims and analysis included in The Storm. Some of what Van Heerden advocated is now in place and has been tested by later potential flooding events. With this proof, The Storm is a valuable read. It contains several cries from the heart in the name of protecting humans by: repairing and protecting wetlands, and re-thinking the stakes in poor mouthing flood protection engineering.
March 24, 2013
One man’s view of what when wrong during Hurricane Katrina.
Since I work in emergency management, I try to read just about anything I can that relates to disasters and disaster response operations. To quote (the oft misquoted) George Santayana, “"Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it,” and it seems we have spent a good deal of time dulling our senses to the causes of disaster events and the lessons learned in responding to them. Hurricane Katrina is perhaps the modern bellwether of that belief – a catastrophe in terms of both the storm’s impact and an unarguably underwhelming government response … at least in New Orleans, Louisiana.
So it was with much interest that I picked up this book, penned by outspoken scientist Ivor Van Heerden of the LSU Hurricane Center, a man who was pretty close to the center of the action as Katrina came ashore in 2005 and whose scientific expertise offered what I hoped would be a rather unique viewpoint of the storm’s impact on the Louisiana coast and the City of New Orleans.
This book got me about half of what I hoped for.
On the plus side, Van Heerden does a pretty smart job of explaining storm surge projections and the impact Katrina had on the levee system of New Orleans (and by extension southern Louisiana). Like a good gumshoe detective, he takes us step-by-step through the tragic flooding of the Big Easy, detailing what levees broke and why – rejecting one proposed hypotheses after another before proposing a final creditable solution – and carefully analyzing the flaws in the levee designs. It’s a bit like the forensics one would follow to try to figure out exactly why the Titanic sank and, while I’ll admit to not having the resources to fact-check Van Heerden’s levee analysis, his assertions are compelling – as are his stories about the influence of politics, money, and special interests in the formation of coastal wetland protection policies.
From there, though, I’m not sure I buy the rest of what Van Heerden is telling. While there’s plenty of (arguably justified) castigation of FEMA and the folks in Washington, the book is far from balanced in its vitriol. New Orleans local and Louisiana state government pretty much get a pass and, while defending the home team is understandable, I have a hard time swallowing that whole mess can all be laid on the front door of the federal government. Argue that FEMA was late and the Army Corps substandard in its levee design plans, but it’s also hard to argue that the City of New Orleans and the State of Louisiana were also critically unprepared for this storm. There are also a couple assertions that FEMA was in charge – when most of us in emergency management know that FEMA is never in charge – but instead supports state and local entities.
Further, I found Van Heerden’s theories that wetlands could function as storm surge protection interesting, but unsupported. In 2008, Robert Young of Western Carolina University presented a white paper on the issue, representing findings from more than two dozen scientists. Young criticized prior storm surge measurement techniques and questioned whether the scale of wetland restoration efforts could ever mitigate an event as catastrophic as a hurricane. A news release for Young's lecture quotes him as saying, “While I think that wetland restoration is a worthy goal, there's almost no scientific evidence that suggests that we will be able to put the wetlands back on the scale and nature needed to reduce storm impacts" (Geological Society of America, 2008).
Similarly, Dr. Jeff Masters in his blog on Weather Underground recalls a conversation with Dr. Stephen Baig, the now retired head of the National Hurricane Center's storm surge unit. Baig comments:
Marshes are functionally useless as storm surge dissipators--disregarding for the moment their acknowledged utility for ocean breeding stock and other necessary and/or desirable functions. Once a marsh has more than a few feet of water overlying it the frictional effect of the grass is erased. The mythical "2.7 feet of surge reduction per inland mile of marsh" is just that, a myth. Also, it's unfortunate that the sand islands that front the shoreline are called "barrier" islands. They are certainly not barriers to storm surge. They get over-topped or breached with regularity. They are functionally useless as surge protection. (Masters 2013)
None of this changes the fact that Van Heerden certainly has more expertise than I do in this area – after all, I just started writing these silly reviews as a way to help me keep track of the books I’ve read -- and I don’t want to imply that Van Heerden’s message should simply be discounted. In fact, this is a voice that needs to be heard – if nothing more than to challenge the status quo and provoke some radical rethinking about how best to build truly disaster resilient communities. However, this book left me at that thinking stage ... and didn’t quite give me enough to bring me around to the author’s point of view.
Since I work in emergency management, I try to read just about anything I can that relates to disasters and disaster response operations. To quote (the oft misquoted) George Santayana, “"Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it,” and it seems we have spent a good deal of time dulling our senses to the causes of disaster events and the lessons learned in responding to them. Hurricane Katrina is perhaps the modern bellwether of that belief – a catastrophe in terms of both the storm’s impact and an unarguably underwhelming government response … at least in New Orleans, Louisiana.
So it was with much interest that I picked up this book, penned by outspoken scientist Ivor Van Heerden of the LSU Hurricane Center, a man who was pretty close to the center of the action as Katrina came ashore in 2005 and whose scientific expertise offered what I hoped would be a rather unique viewpoint of the storm’s impact on the Louisiana coast and the City of New Orleans.
This book got me about half of what I hoped for.
On the plus side, Van Heerden does a pretty smart job of explaining storm surge projections and the impact Katrina had on the levee system of New Orleans (and by extension southern Louisiana). Like a good gumshoe detective, he takes us step-by-step through the tragic flooding of the Big Easy, detailing what levees broke and why – rejecting one proposed hypotheses after another before proposing a final creditable solution – and carefully analyzing the flaws in the levee designs. It’s a bit like the forensics one would follow to try to figure out exactly why the Titanic sank and, while I’ll admit to not having the resources to fact-check Van Heerden’s levee analysis, his assertions are compelling – as are his stories about the influence of politics, money, and special interests in the formation of coastal wetland protection policies.
From there, though, I’m not sure I buy the rest of what Van Heerden is telling. While there’s plenty of (arguably justified) castigation of FEMA and the folks in Washington, the book is far from balanced in its vitriol. New Orleans local and Louisiana state government pretty much get a pass and, while defending the home team is understandable, I have a hard time swallowing that whole mess can all be laid on the front door of the federal government. Argue that FEMA was late and the Army Corps substandard in its levee design plans, but it’s also hard to argue that the City of New Orleans and the State of Louisiana were also critically unprepared for this storm. There are also a couple assertions that FEMA was in charge – when most of us in emergency management know that FEMA is never in charge – but instead supports state and local entities.
Further, I found Van Heerden’s theories that wetlands could function as storm surge protection interesting, but unsupported. In 2008, Robert Young of Western Carolina University presented a white paper on the issue, representing findings from more than two dozen scientists. Young criticized prior storm surge measurement techniques and questioned whether the scale of wetland restoration efforts could ever mitigate an event as catastrophic as a hurricane. A news release for Young's lecture quotes him as saying, “While I think that wetland restoration is a worthy goal, there's almost no scientific evidence that suggests that we will be able to put the wetlands back on the scale and nature needed to reduce storm impacts" (Geological Society of America, 2008).
Similarly, Dr. Jeff Masters in his blog on Weather Underground recalls a conversation with Dr. Stephen Baig, the now retired head of the National Hurricane Center's storm surge unit. Baig comments:
Marshes are functionally useless as storm surge dissipators--disregarding for the moment their acknowledged utility for ocean breeding stock and other necessary and/or desirable functions. Once a marsh has more than a few feet of water overlying it the frictional effect of the grass is erased. The mythical "2.7 feet of surge reduction per inland mile of marsh" is just that, a myth. Also, it's unfortunate that the sand islands that front the shoreline are called "barrier" islands. They are certainly not barriers to storm surge. They get over-topped or breached with regularity. They are functionally useless as surge protection. (Masters 2013)
None of this changes the fact that Van Heerden certainly has more expertise than I do in this area – after all, I just started writing these silly reviews as a way to help me keep track of the books I’ve read -- and I don’t want to imply that Van Heerden’s message should simply be discounted. In fact, this is a voice that needs to be heard – if nothing more than to challenge the status quo and provoke some radical rethinking about how best to build truly disaster resilient communities. However, this book left me at that thinking stage ... and didn’t quite give me enough to bring me around to the author’s point of view.
December 23, 2007
The Storm is a suspenseful, detailed account of Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath, written by Ivor van Heerden, Deputy Director of the Louisiana State University Hurricane Center, and co-author Mike Bryan. Recommended for its insights into the often contentious interactions of scientists and politicians, and for the abundance of evidence it offers to show that the loss of New Orleans, far from being the outcome of a natural disaster, was the result of human negligence.
February 20, 2022
This book (written in early 2006) was written mostly by Dr. Ivor Van Heerden (the other author, Mike Bryan, apparently makes his living helping people write books). I was here in SouthWestCentral Louisiana when Hurricane Katrina hit New Orleans, and remember vividly how things in the City went from bad to worse during the days and weeks after the storm in August 2005.Dr. Heerden, at the time he wrote his book, was associated with LSU. (He was fired in 2009, and filed a suit for wrongful termination in 2010, which was settled out of court.)
Besides a history of the storm and of the failure on the part of local and federal governments to prepare for such a storm, the author notes that he was involved in the Hurricane Pam exercise the previous year in New Orleans. Some 100,000 people in the City have no way to evacuate out of the City, due to no personal transportation. Dr. Heerden suggests that setting up tent cities north of the city across Lake Pontchartain, would work, with the proper amount of food, medical supplies, sanitation modules, and what have you, and having someplace to house the drivers of the buses (and their families) in the same area might be an answer; he was told by someone at FEMA, “American’s don’t live in tents!” (Better that, than the solution of parking refugees on I-10 in New Orleans in August, with no food, water, or shade.)
Another part of the puzzle was that in Hurricane Katrina there were five breaches in the network of canals in the City. (New Orleans is in a bowl; rain water goes into the City, drains into the Canals, and huge pumps take the water into Lake Ponchartrain.) The Army Corps of Engineers initially claimed “act of God” reasons for the breaches (overtopping of the levees, a Category 4 storm) so that the event outran the engineering; however, it appears that the heart of the levees, the sheet metal going down into the ground, was far too short for the expected load, considering the soil the levees were built upon.
Finally, our author has been a voice calling for the rebuilding of Louisiana barrier islands and wetlands; not only do these dampen the water effect of hurricanes, but I would like for my house (twenty miles north of I-10) to not be beach property in a hundred years.
Besides a history of the storm and of the failure on the part of local and federal governments to prepare for such a storm, the author notes that he was involved in the Hurricane Pam exercise the previous year in New Orleans. Some 100,000 people in the City have no way to evacuate out of the City, due to no personal transportation. Dr. Heerden suggests that setting up tent cities north of the city across Lake Pontchartain, would work, with the proper amount of food, medical supplies, sanitation modules, and what have you, and having someplace to house the drivers of the buses (and their families) in the same area might be an answer; he was told by someone at FEMA, “American’s don’t live in tents!” (Better that, than the solution of parking refugees on I-10 in New Orleans in August, with no food, water, or shade.)
Another part of the puzzle was that in Hurricane Katrina there were five breaches in the network of canals in the City. (New Orleans is in a bowl; rain water goes into the City, drains into the Canals, and huge pumps take the water into Lake Ponchartrain.) The Army Corps of Engineers initially claimed “act of God” reasons for the breaches (overtopping of the levees, a Category 4 storm) so that the event outran the engineering; however, it appears that the heart of the levees, the sheet metal going down into the ground, was far too short for the expected load, considering the soil the levees were built upon.
Finally, our author has been a voice calling for the rebuilding of Louisiana barrier islands and wetlands; not only do these dampen the water effect of hurricanes, but I would like for my house (twenty miles north of I-10) to not be beach property in a hundred years.
January 16, 2024
My Amazon review on October 21, 2014: Better science than the rest of the book.
I think he does a good job on the science and for that the book is to be commended. I write as a meteorologist and hydrologist but I learned some things about storm surge modeling and a LOT about the levees. He does an excellent job in laying out the terrain, canals and failed levee system that funneled water into the city. The Army Corps of Engineers (ACE) comes off beneath poorly in Van Heerden's analysis. Really the book probably deserves 4 stars but the reason i dropped another off was his incessant political bashing along with self-promotion. Very early you will learn how absolutely prescient the author was and how evil and incompetent the ACE and all Republicans are. Perhaps that is completely true, though somehow I doubt it. Clearly the response to Katrina was not very competent and the pre-storm engineering utterly inadequate. I sort of doubt FEMA under any administration would suddenly become a model of efficiency and the ACE is hardly a creature of either political party. Hopefully we won't have to find out how FEMA does in another huge event, oh wait we just did with Sandy. It did do better, some. But Sandy also hit the richest part of the U.S., not one of the poorest and nothing failed in Sandy comparable to the New Orleans levees. Anyway, this book was written so soon after the event that many of the proposals for what to do in terms of mitigating the next storm were still in the planning or even pre-planning stages. It would be interesting to see where it all stands today. Two other somewhat negative points: NO photos and the maps for the most part look hand-drawn (with no scale, a cardinal cartographic error) which is sort of neat at times but not very clear in other places. Still, a very good book covering a complex event.
I think he does a good job on the science and for that the book is to be commended. I write as a meteorologist and hydrologist but I learned some things about storm surge modeling and a LOT about the levees. He does an excellent job in laying out the terrain, canals and failed levee system that funneled water into the city. The Army Corps of Engineers (ACE) comes off beneath poorly in Van Heerden's analysis. Really the book probably deserves 4 stars but the reason i dropped another off was his incessant political bashing along with self-promotion. Very early you will learn how absolutely prescient the author was and how evil and incompetent the ACE and all Republicans are. Perhaps that is completely true, though somehow I doubt it. Clearly the response to Katrina was not very competent and the pre-storm engineering utterly inadequate. I sort of doubt FEMA under any administration would suddenly become a model of efficiency and the ACE is hardly a creature of either political party. Hopefully we won't have to find out how FEMA does in another huge event, oh wait we just did with Sandy. It did do better, some. But Sandy also hit the richest part of the U.S., not one of the poorest and nothing failed in Sandy comparable to the New Orleans levees. Anyway, this book was written so soon after the event that many of the proposals for what to do in terms of mitigating the next storm were still in the planning or even pre-planning stages. It would be interesting to see where it all stands today. Two other somewhat negative points: NO photos and the maps for the most part look hand-drawn (with no scale, a cardinal cartographic error) which is sort of neat at times but not very clear in other places. Still, a very good book covering a complex event.
May 11, 2021
A good perspective on what went wrong with the levees before, during, and immediately after Hurricane Katrina. This book was completed less than 7 months after Katrina so there's no longer term lookback or conclusion since New Orleans and Louisiana were still figuring out the recovery and rebuilding when this was published, but this is still extremely useful knowledge for a New Orleanian or south Louisianan
Ivor van Heerden is scientist who warned about what was coming, was in the Emergency Operations Center in Baton Rouge during Katrina, and examined the levee breeches and flooded city immediately after. He called out the Army Corp of Engineers for their attempts to hide the fact the the levees failed because of poor design and not an overwhelming/unimaginable natural disaster.
The first 2/3 of the book are the best where he describes his own experiences of Katrina and the science and engineering needed to understand how and why the levees failed. This is excellent and informative. The rough, hand drawn graphics cold have been improved by clearer, professional graphics. The last 1/3 - 1/4 is a chapter of political infighting and a chapter of look ahead (from Spring 2006) which has become dated because the final outcome was not known at the time of publication, but it wasn't bad - just less engaging than the first parts of the book.
Three years after the book was published Ivor van Heerden was fired from LSU for continuing to call attention to the fact the fault lay with Army Corp of Engineer mistakes and their attempt to cover up their mistakes.
Ivor van Heerden is scientist who warned about what was coming, was in the Emergency Operations Center in Baton Rouge during Katrina, and examined the levee breeches and flooded city immediately after. He called out the Army Corp of Engineers for their attempts to hide the fact the the levees failed because of poor design and not an overwhelming/unimaginable natural disaster.
The first 2/3 of the book are the best where he describes his own experiences of Katrina and the science and engineering needed to understand how and why the levees failed. This is excellent and informative. The rough, hand drawn graphics cold have been improved by clearer, professional graphics. The last 1/3 - 1/4 is a chapter of political infighting and a chapter of look ahead (from Spring 2006) which has become dated because the final outcome was not known at the time of publication, but it wasn't bad - just less engaging than the first parts of the book.
Three years after the book was published Ivor van Heerden was fired from LSU for continuing to call attention to the fact the fault lay with Army Corp of Engineer mistakes and their attempt to cover up their mistakes.
September 12, 2021
thorough
The author presents the breakdown of the levee and protection systems during Katrina. He also presents practical solutions for improving the protective features from nature of this truly geographically unique area. He also points out the usual problems which plague this country due to pork barrel politics and special interest groups and lobbyists. These are the things that keep our country from being the great Republic it once was. Special interests and expediency take favor over practical steps to improve as a country and as a people. Highly scientific book which the author does a tremendous job of bringing all the scientific concepts down to the common readers level of understanding. Great job.
The author presents the breakdown of the levee and protection systems during Katrina. He also presents practical solutions for improving the protective features from nature of this truly geographically unique area. He also points out the usual problems which plague this country due to pork barrel politics and special interest groups and lobbyists. These are the things that keep our country from being the great Republic it once was. Special interests and expediency take favor over practical steps to improve as a country and as a people. Highly scientific book which the author does a tremendous job of bringing all the scientific concepts down to the common readers level of understanding. Great job.
August 7, 2021
How can coastal Louisiana be saved from a major hurricane?
The book details the events that caused the devastation of New Orleans due to the faulty planning of the levees along the drainage canals in the city. The presentation of the environmental science and civil engineering problems regarding the protection of the coast and the New Orleans region is well written for the layman. The author also shares the local, state, and national political challenges of the time period. A reading of the book 15 years after Katrina makes one aware of the limited progress in solving the problems of storm surge and coastal restoration highlighted. Will we learn from history?
The book details the events that caused the devastation of New Orleans due to the faulty planning of the levees along the drainage canals in the city. The presentation of the environmental science and civil engineering problems regarding the protection of the coast and the New Orleans region is well written for the layman. The author also shares the local, state, and national political challenges of the time period. A reading of the book 15 years after Katrina makes one aware of the limited progress in solving the problems of storm surge and coastal restoration highlighted. Will we learn from history?
January 26, 2022
Interesting read 16 years after hurricane Katrina.
After witnessing our government’s ability to deal with the pandemic it is nice to see it still follows absolutely zero planning, and believes if you throw a ton of money at the problem it will go away.
All levels of government were corrupt and incompetent then and they still are.
Government is incapable of having any coherent plan of action much less being able to execute on those plans.
After witnessing our government’s ability to deal with the pandemic it is nice to see it still follows absolutely zero planning, and believes if you throw a ton of money at the problem it will go away.
All levels of government were corrupt and incompetent then and they still are.
Government is incapable of having any coherent plan of action much less being able to execute on those plans.
November 20, 2020
I liked the first half of this one better than the second half. I really more about the weather and the back half was all about the levees and corrupt politics. I do think the author knows what he's talking about and I think he and his team at LSU did the best they could. It was just a rough situation for everybody involved.
December 31, 2020
Ivor van Heerden is a national treasure and LSU should be ashamed of what they did and I am an alum! I can’t stand when people speak the truth and are silenced! Now on to the book. Very good book. About the second half on is very technical and a little tedious, but still important information. I’m glad he spoke out and I would love to hear his perspective now after this 2020 Hurricane season.
November 29, 2017
After a while it’s difficult to tell if this was supposed to be a book of him Van Heerdan venting or if he forgot to warn readers they’d be fishing through his flood of opinions for facts.
May 20, 2018
Great analysis & plan, but I don't see it happening without unacceptable level of graft.
November 4, 2024
3.5 stars. A little dry, but still interesting.
March 9, 2017
The prose is a little on the dry side, but van Heerden provides highly informative analysis on the political climate of the time (local, state and federal) and scientific knowledge. The sections discussing the science of levees and the history of FEMA/federal structures for disaster management were particularly good.
Overall, not the best book written on Katrina by far, but not bad. If you're a reader who has a particular aversion to biased authors I wouldn't recommend this book.
Overall, not the best book written on Katrina by far, but not bad. If you're a reader who has a particular aversion to biased authors I wouldn't recommend this book.
October 11, 2010
Review THE STORM
This was the first book I read that was specifically about Hurricane Katrina and its impact on New Orleans. I have done extensive research in the area as I have a bachelor's degree in Public Safety Administration-Emergency Management, just about completed emergency management certificate and Advanced Professional Certificate from FEMA. My job falls in the category of first responder.
The Good
This was an excellent accounting of how things were going on behind the scenes by first hand accounting when it came to the levees, the breaches and the subsequent investigations and hearings. van Heerden wrote a book that was not overwhelming with technical speak and jargon but yet kept it interesting enough to keep on reading. The concern with books like this one is that they become college thesis papers in their writing format and thus a cure for insomnia but not so with this one.
van Heerden was also not afraid to name names of both those working diligently behind the scenes and those who had a hand in subsequent cover-ups, misinformation campaigns and other shenanigans that went on afterwards.
He did an outstanding job of laying out the history of how New Orleans and the state of Louisiana got to the point it did concerning the levees and wetlands. He then rounds out the book excellent suggestions for how to repair the damage done to Louisiana's wetlands and levees in order to prevent another repeat of Katrina.
The Bad
Throughout the book, van Heerden touts the mapping capabilities that the hurricane center at Louisiana State University had but in the book there is only one real map, all the rest of them along with diagrams were pencil drawings that look like they were done by a high school student.
At times he becomes insulting when he refers to then FEMA Administrator Michael Brown as "Brownie" page after page. While I will agree that the man was in over his head, I would hope that a person of van Heerden's caliber would not have to resort to name calling to make a point. (Yes, I know that is what President Bush called him but that doesn't make it right)
He wants the Federal government to fully compensate the residents of New Orleans for their loses when these same people didn't feel the need to carry flood insurance because their respective areas had never previously flooded. When you live in a bowl below sea level........
van Heerden lays all the guilt and mistakes made on the Federal government with FEMA and US Army Corps of Engineers taking the brunt of it. Other than a couple of bad public relations stunts he gives all local and state officials and organizations a complete pass of any responsibility. He goes as far as to say that once a presidential declaration of disaster was made that FEMA was in charge of everything which is incorrect. FEMA cannot order evacuations and it does not run shelters for just two examples. While FEMA and USAC did make their fair share of mistakes and screwups, so did Louisiana and New Orleans. When Nagin waited until less than 24 hours before landfall to order a mandatory evacuation it was too late plus not to mention the infamous flood buses.
While overall a good book for those interested in disasters and their aftermaths, at times I found it difficult to complete because of his one sidedness on issues. van Heerden raises some good issues and in certain areas hard hitting honesty while other times the book comes across as a little preachy, kind of like, if they all had just listened to him all the problems would have gone away and this would have never happened.
This was the first book I read that was specifically about Hurricane Katrina and its impact on New Orleans. I have done extensive research in the area as I have a bachelor's degree in Public Safety Administration-Emergency Management, just about completed emergency management certificate and Advanced Professional Certificate from FEMA. My job falls in the category of first responder.
The Good
This was an excellent accounting of how things were going on behind the scenes by first hand accounting when it came to the levees, the breaches and the subsequent investigations and hearings. van Heerden wrote a book that was not overwhelming with technical speak and jargon but yet kept it interesting enough to keep on reading. The concern with books like this one is that they become college thesis papers in their writing format and thus a cure for insomnia but not so with this one.
van Heerden was also not afraid to name names of both those working diligently behind the scenes and those who had a hand in subsequent cover-ups, misinformation campaigns and other shenanigans that went on afterwards.
He did an outstanding job of laying out the history of how New Orleans and the state of Louisiana got to the point it did concerning the levees and wetlands. He then rounds out the book excellent suggestions for how to repair the damage done to Louisiana's wetlands and levees in order to prevent another repeat of Katrina.
The Bad
Throughout the book, van Heerden touts the mapping capabilities that the hurricane center at Louisiana State University had but in the book there is only one real map, all the rest of them along with diagrams were pencil drawings that look like they were done by a high school student.
At times he becomes insulting when he refers to then FEMA Administrator Michael Brown as "Brownie" page after page. While I will agree that the man was in over his head, I would hope that a person of van Heerden's caliber would not have to resort to name calling to make a point. (Yes, I know that is what President Bush called him but that doesn't make it right)
He wants the Federal government to fully compensate the residents of New Orleans for their loses when these same people didn't feel the need to carry flood insurance because their respective areas had never previously flooded. When you live in a bowl below sea level........
van Heerden lays all the guilt and mistakes made on the Federal government with FEMA and US Army Corps of Engineers taking the brunt of it. Other than a couple of bad public relations stunts he gives all local and state officials and organizations a complete pass of any responsibility. He goes as far as to say that once a presidential declaration of disaster was made that FEMA was in charge of everything which is incorrect. FEMA cannot order evacuations and it does not run shelters for just two examples. While FEMA and USAC did make their fair share of mistakes and screwups, so did Louisiana and New Orleans. When Nagin waited until less than 24 hours before landfall to order a mandatory evacuation it was too late plus not to mention the infamous flood buses.
While overall a good book for those interested in disasters and their aftermaths, at times I found it difficult to complete because of his one sidedness on issues. van Heerden raises some good issues and in certain areas hard hitting honesty while other times the book comes across as a little preachy, kind of like, if they all had just listened to him all the problems would have gone away and this would have never happened.
June 3, 2015
Review title: If it don't stop raining, the levee going to break
This old blues line pretty much sums up van Heerden's scientific conclusion about the primary source of the flood's damage. He writes with the passion of an angry man still in the midst of the circumstances that have raised his ire. He also write from his expertise in coastal geology and disaster preparation and management.
The disaster, he argues vociferously, was not natural (Katrina was a Cat 3 storm by the time it hit the city, not the "big one" everyone feared) but man-made by failure to build and maintain the proper flood management approaches. He proposes a three step restoration approach to ready New Orleans for the next Katrina: improved levees in and south of the city, restoration of wetlands in the Mississippi Delta, and rebuilding of barrier islands off the coast.
Douglas Brinkley's classic Katrina account The Great Deluge would later provide the comprehensive and authoritative history of the full political, social, medical, and human story of Katrina. But Van Heerden applies his scientific background to his account, which gives his story credence. He also wears his sometimes prickly personality on his sleeve, which leaves the reader wondering how much his view of the event is skewed. The writer never claims objectivity but does claim and demonstrate competence.
He also wrote less than a year after Katrina, so his account necessarily ends before the investigations, lawsuits, and restoration efforts were complete. A followup new edition from van Heerden would be interesting. However, such an update will not likely be forthcoming, in 2010 van Heerden was fired by Louisiana State University and enjoined from access to hurricane models and data and prohibited from making public appearances or working with government agencies.
It is his passion that makes this account so interesting to read, but also suggests the need for tempering his passion with competing viewpoints and keeps this book from being a top-rated classic.
This old blues line pretty much sums up van Heerden's scientific conclusion about the primary source of the flood's damage. He writes with the passion of an angry man still in the midst of the circumstances that have raised his ire. He also write from his expertise in coastal geology and disaster preparation and management.
The disaster, he argues vociferously, was not natural (Katrina was a Cat 3 storm by the time it hit the city, not the "big one" everyone feared) but man-made by failure to build and maintain the proper flood management approaches. He proposes a three step restoration approach to ready New Orleans for the next Katrina: improved levees in and south of the city, restoration of wetlands in the Mississippi Delta, and rebuilding of barrier islands off the coast.
Douglas Brinkley's classic Katrina account The Great Deluge would later provide the comprehensive and authoritative history of the full political, social, medical, and human story of Katrina. But Van Heerden applies his scientific background to his account, which gives his story credence. He also wears his sometimes prickly personality on his sleeve, which leaves the reader wondering how much his view of the event is skewed. The writer never claims objectivity but does claim and demonstrate competence.
He also wrote less than a year after Katrina, so his account necessarily ends before the investigations, lawsuits, and restoration efforts were complete. A followup new edition from van Heerden would be interesting. However, such an update will not likely be forthcoming, in 2010 van Heerden was fired by Louisiana State University and enjoined from access to hurricane models and data and prohibited from making public appearances or working with government agencies.
It is his passion that makes this account so interesting to read, but also suggests the need for tempering his passion with competing viewpoints and keeps this book from being a top-rated classic.
February 20, 2014
An excellent book and very informative but I have taken away a star because the author displayed a tendency toward being self-aggrandizing and subjective at times. Considering that the author is a professional hurricane scientist, perhaps he should have brought his political cards closer to his vest and taken his heart a little bit off his sleeve.
The exhibition of these instincts are understandable, though, given the subject material; it's just that scientists are expected to be more objective with their presentation of their facts and certainly less opinionated. I personally am left with the impression, though, that van Heerden would have been open to even more criticism had he not chosen to write in this style on this subject matter since the book is as much a populist advocacy for weather-proofing for the future of his native Louisiana going forward in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina as it was a factual play-by-play of what happened.
Overall, though, a very educational and enlightening piece of non-fiction about hurricanes, Louisiana political culture, New Orleans and its levee system and wetlands, and an entirely interesting read--particularly from an anthropological point-of-view--for anybody that is interested in what happened before, during, and after Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana.
The exhibition of these instincts are understandable, though, given the subject material; it's just that scientists are expected to be more objective with their presentation of their facts and certainly less opinionated. I personally am left with the impression, though, that van Heerden would have been open to even more criticism had he not chosen to write in this style on this subject matter since the book is as much a populist advocacy for weather-proofing for the future of his native Louisiana going forward in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina as it was a factual play-by-play of what happened.
Overall, though, a very educational and enlightening piece of non-fiction about hurricanes, Louisiana political culture, New Orleans and its levee system and wetlands, and an entirely interesting read--particularly from an anthropological point-of-view--for anybody that is interested in what happened before, during, and after Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana.
July 5, 2007
From a scientist's point of view, the story of Hurricane Katrina is told. Lays out the science of a storm and hurricane and helps the reader to understand how levees work and fail. Very heavily against the work of the Corps of Engineers and politics-as-usual in Louisiana, and gives some brief modern history of both. The writing is no so conventional in that Heernden is not a writer, per se, but a scientist who is writing as he likely talks. As such he goes off on tangents and leads the reader away from the point at times only to return pages later. Also, Heernden seems to imply that since science is exact, his recommendations and findings are unfailingly correct 99% of the time and, as such, he tends to get caught up in an I-told-you-so/gotcha game with those he opposes and those who oppose him. Overall, though, it is a very informative book that shows the non-technical reader what happened and what needs to be done to make sure it doesn't happen again. It also illustrates the fact that things will never change and New Orleans is in for a great deal more of the danger it received from Katrina, unless things change on the political landscape.
March 28, 2009
There have been a lot of books written about Katrina..the natural disaster. This shows why the devastation did not have to happen, and does not have to happen again.Katrina was forseable .If we only implemented sound scientific , engineering, and enviornmental advice, there still would have been a hurricane, but not the loss of a major American city. The inadeqate levees were not built to standard in the first place, ageing, and sinking, and people were ringing alarm bells before Katrina. It is possible to protect cities surrounded by, or , "under water",and Van Heerden talks about materials and systems that make such protection possible.
The authors personal history and profile is fascinating as well. If he were given control over building levees to protect us from the next storm, I believe New Orleans would be as safe as is possible. If you live in a city protected by levees, read this book. America, when we rebuild our infrastructure,we should rebuild it using the best minds available.
January 11, 2008
This book starts out great and deteriorates quickly into a rant that is one part legitimate scientific outrage and one part hype-sensitive outraged ego. The early parts recounting both Van Heerden’s early life and the parallel description of the Katrina advent, arrival, and aftermath are outstanding reading. Then it gets petty, repetitive, bitter but self-serving. The descriptions, supported by informative hand-drawn diagrams, about why the flooding happened, why the levees failed, and what the possible solutions are, are worth the eventual tedium of getting through the whole book. Like Michael Moore, a measured voice, less ego, and Joe Friday like accounting that allows the facts to speak for themselves would have been far more effective in presenting his case (and, ironically, representing the author—these strained efforts to call attention to one’s brilliance, rightness, caring are nearly always doubly undermining.)
August 29, 2008
This book is the epitome of the science behind why Hurricane Katrina was so devastating to New Orleans and the parishes of St.Bernard and Plaquemines. By far this is the best book that I have ever read. Ivor van Heedan is a great scientist at the LSU Hurricane Center. He and other scientist like Hassan Mashriqui (storm surge wizard) helped solve the important question of why the levees broke in Orleans, St.Bernard, and Plaquemines parish. He goes in great depth of how the Army Corps of Engineers is responsible for the disaster of Hurricane Katrina. I also love this book because it also explains what we need to do as a society in order to fix these problems. We need to protect are wetlands!!!
April 19, 2007
This was a fantastic book by a scientist at LSU who has been studying the diminishing Louisiana coast for decades. He explains what happened during Katrina, and why, from an insider's perspective with scientific research to back it up. It's very clear and easy to read, not a bunch of scientific mumbo jumbo. He had been telling everyone who would listen what would happen if a Cat. 5 storm came to Louisiana, and everything he predicted was correct. It makes such common sense, you wonder how Louisiana politicians have ignored the signs for decades. And why they don't take a more aggressive approach to saving our state.
January 27, 2014
Interesting that this book didn't cause more of a stir. This LSU scientist accuses the federal government of causing the deaths of 1300+ people in New Orleans, by improperly designing the levees and not protecting the barrier islands. It showed the ineptness of FEMA in their attempts ( if they can be called that ) at rescuing the residents and The Army Corp of Engineers of improperly building the levees. Tough book because you know it won't change based on the politics of trying to have our representatives protect someone other than the people who line their pockets. Nice comparison near the end with the Dutch who also live below sea level.
January 27, 2008
A very telling account by an LSU scientist whose job for several years before Katrina was to assess Louisiana's state of readiness for just such an emergency. He tells us what was known--and ignored--by politicians and the Army Corps of Engineers, that could have saved thousands of lives and livelihoods. He also outlines what needs to be done now to avert similar disasters in the future.
Read
October 30, 2009The scariest part of this book is that the main lessons STILL aren't being heard. When was the last time you heard anybody say that the barrier islands need to be restored, in order to protect the wetlands? And what's the odds that the same neglect is happening in your neck of the woods, if (as is likely), you live near a seashore?
March 27, 2011
More like 2.5 stars.
Passionately, if not hurriedly, written...possibly to beat the publication of the official findings of other entities...but otherwise gets its point across.
Poor graphics (hand sketches by the author) & very few citations (the author's spiel on this can be summarized by the phrase, "just f*ckin' google it") somewhat weaken things.
Passionately, if not hurriedly, written...possibly to beat the publication of the official findings of other entities...but otherwise gets its point across.
Poor graphics (hand sketches by the author) & very few citations (the author's spiel on this can be summarized by the phrase, "just f*ckin' google it") somewhat weaken things.
June 28, 2012
It was refreshing to hear about Katrina from a scientist's perspective. Not only did he explain the wetlands and levee situations which he was qualified to speak about he used his scientific thinking to analyze the political mess that caused the tragedy in the first place. I work for the federal government and can concur with most of his analysis.
December 16, 2008
Good information, if told a bit breathlessly and with a few too many exclamation points. Sort of a rough diamond in a rough setting.
March 29, 2009
I was there, I am still there....and everything this man wrote about is true. If you have not read this you can't understand why Katrina was a man made event, and not just a natural disaster.
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