What do you think?
Rate this book
Situation Ethics: True or False?: A Dialogue between Joseph Fletcher and John Warwick Montgomery
Situation True or False? is a dialogue between Joseph Fletcher and John Warwick Montgomery on the question of whether or not it’s sometimes right to do wrong.
Joseph Fletcher says that whether we ought to follow a moral principle or not would always depend upon the
He follows this No action is good or right of itself. It depends on whether it hurts or helps people. There are no normative moral principles whatsoever which are intrinsically valid or universally obliging. We may not absolutize the norms of human conduct. Love is the highest good and the first-order value, the primary consideration to which in every act. We should be prepared to sidetrack or subordinate other value considerations of right and wrong.
Joseph Fletcher says that whether we ought to follow a moral principle or not would always depend upon the
He follows this No action is good or right of itself. It depends on whether it hurts or helps people. There are no normative moral principles whatsoever which are intrinsically valid or universally obliging. We may not absolutize the norms of human conduct. Love is the highest good and the first-order value, the primary consideration to which in every act. We should be prepared to sidetrack or subordinate other value considerations of right and wrong.
70 pages, Kindle Edition
Published March 10, 2017
5 people are currently reading
14 people want to read
About the author
John Warwick Montgomery
172 books51 followersJohn Warwick Montgomery was an American-born lawyer, academic, Lutheran theologian, and author. He was born in Warsaw, New York, United States. Montgomery maintained multiple citizenship in the United States, United Kingdom, and France. From 2014 to 2017, he was Distinguished Research Professor of Philosophy at Concordia University, Wisconsin. He was Professor-At-Large, 1517: The Legacy Project. He was named Avocat honoraire, Barreau de Paris (2023), after 20 years in French legal practice. He continued to work as a barrister specializing in religious freedom cases in international Human Rights law until his death.
Montgomery was chiefly noted for his major contributions as a writer, lecturer, and public debater in the field of Christian apologetics.
From 1995 to 2007 he was a Professor in Law and Humanities at the University of Bedfordshire, England; and from 2007 to 2014, the Distinguished Research Professor of Philosophy and Christian Thought at Patrick Henry College in Virginia, United States. He later became Emeritus Professor at the University of Bedfordshire. He was also the director of the International Academy of Apologetics, Evangelism & Human Rights in Strasbourg, France, and was the editor of the theological online journal Global Journal of Classical Theology.
Montgomery was chiefly noted for his major contributions as a writer, lecturer, and public debater in the field of Christian apologetics.
From 1995 to 2007 he was a Professor in Law and Humanities at the University of Bedfordshire, England; and from 2007 to 2014, the Distinguished Research Professor of Philosophy and Christian Thought at Patrick Henry College in Virginia, United States. He later became Emeritus Professor at the University of Bedfordshire. He was also the director of the International Academy of Apologetics, Evangelism & Human Rights in Strasbourg, France, and was the editor of the theological online journal Global Journal of Classical Theology.
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 of 1 review
July 2, 2024
A FASCINATING DIALOGUE BETWEEN FLETCHER AND A MAJOR CHRISTIAN APOLOGIST
John Warwick Montgomery (b. 1931) is one of the major philosophical apologists of the 20th century. He is also a trained lawyer, which influenced his "historical/legal" approach to Christian apologetics. He is perhaps best known as a writer for his book History and Christianity, as well as for his debates with the infamous atheist Madalyn Murray O'Hair (1967), with the "Death of God" theologian Thomas Altizer (reprinted in 'The Suicide of Christian Theology').
This book is a transcript of the February 11, 1971 dialogue between Montgomery and Joseph Fletcher (who wrote Situation Ethics: The New Morality). Here are a few examples of their exchanges:
FLETCHER: "I think there are no normative moral principles whatsoever which are intrinsically valid or universally obliging.... If we are, as I would want to reason, obliged in conscience sometimes to tell white lies, as we often call them, then in conscience we might be obliged sometimes to engage in white thefts and white fornications and white killings and white breakings of promises and the like." (pg. 15)
FLETCHER: “I want to suggest that methodologically there are basically only three alternatives strategies… the three options open to conscience at work are to be simply labeled as legalism, antinomianism, and situationism… In between these [first] two extremes lies situationism… and a mediating position in the spectrum. The situationist enters into troubling moral situations armed… [with] some reflective generalizations about what is ordinarily and typically the right thing to do. But unlike the legalist he refuses to absolutize … any normative principle… he is prepared to depart from a usually applicable generalization if in the particular case the consequence of following the rule is to minimize rather than to optimize … the first-order value to which he’s committed.” (Pg. 19, 23-24)
MONTGOMERY: “The insurmountable difficulty is simply this: there is no way… of knowing when the situationist is actually endeavoring to set forth genuine facts and true opinions, and when he is lying… Why? Because deception is allowed on principle … .as long as the ultimate aim is love. Consider: if Professor Fletcher acts consistently with his premises… he can to this end introduce any degree of factual misinformation, rhetorical pettifogging, or direct prevarication into the discussion… Our restatement goes: ‘If a situation ethicist … tells you that he is not lying, can you believe him?’… [This leaves] the audience entirely incapable of ever being sure that Professor Fletcher means what he says.” (Pg. 31-32)
MONTGOMERY: “This is precisely the claim of the historical Christian faith: that biblical revelation constitutes a transcendent word from God establishing ethical values once for all… Absolute moral principles are explicitly set forth; these inform love and guide its exercise.” (Pg. 44)
FLETCHER: “Are you saying, sir, that we must in conscience always tell the truth? And if there are exceptions, when might we prevaricate and why?... are you saying that tyrannicide is never justifiable? If it might be, when and why?... were you or weren’t you saying that interruptions of pregnancy are always wrong? But if there are times when it might be done, why would it be?... Christian ethics … have never allowed that human rights are anything but… relative and contingent.” (Pg. 49)
MONTGOMERY: “the greatest difficulty in situation ethics is revealed exactly at this point. The situation ethicist properly recognizes the ambiguity of situations and the extreme difficulty, often, in knowing what ought to be done; but he endeavors, in these situations, to JUSTIFY HIMSELF. In terms of the ethical approach that I outlined, one CANNOT so justify oneself. If, concretely, I were put in the position that you described of either informing a killer as to where a child was hidden or lying about it, it's conceivable that I would have to lie. But if I did so, I would be unable to justify this ethically; in short, I would be unable to get off the hook. In Christian terminology, I would have committed a sin which should drive me to the cross for forgiveness. This is what I find almost totally lacking in your writings: no one is driven to the Cross.” (Pg. 51)
FLETCHER: “you have said in reply to my question ‘Is it always wrong to have an abortion?’---‘Yes, it always is.’ It seems to me absolutely unbelievable that anybody could say that… Since the tragic complexities of life sometimes call us to do what we might call the ‘lesser evil,’ you WOULD be an instrument because the alternative to the abortion would be greater evil than the evil of the abortion.” (Pg. 52-53)
FLETCHER: “It is ethically foolish to say we ‘ought’ to do what is wrong! What I want to argue philosophically… is that the rightness or the wrongness of anything we do is extrinsic, relative, and dependent upon the circumstances, so that to have an abortion out of loving concern for everybody’s best interests involve, is not an excusably evil thing to do, but a good thing to do.” (Pg. 53-54)
FLETCHER: “And I have to say in all candor that when I examine the Gospel account of Jesus’ teaching in light of our question… he said nothing directly or even implicitly about it one way or another. Jesus was a simple Jewish peasant. He had no more philosophical sophistication than a guinea pig, and I don’t turn to Jesus for philosophical sophistication.” (Pg. 55)
MONTGOMERY: “Well, sir, I think that’s your trouble.” [Laughter and applause from the audience.] (Pg. 55)
MONTGOMERY: “these ambiguous ethical situations are the product of a society what we ourselves create as fallen human beings… For example, one might have to shoot a sniper before he kills more people… To kill a human being… is a sin. It’s morally wrong… In situations like this it may be necessary to judge the number of people who will be killed if the sniper remains alive and, under those circumstances, shoot the sniper. But such a situation doesn’t morally vindicate the man who makes it.” (Pg. 64) “there are ambiguous situations where I might have to live. But… when I do this… It is wrong… and it will cause me to get down on my knees and ask forgiveness for it. But in the case of Professor Fletcher, if he does this, it would be in ACCORD with his ethic.” (Pg. 68-69)
FLETCHER: “Aren’t you in effect telling us that in your ethics we are sometimes morally obliged to do what is wrong, and does that make any sense in terms of ethical analysis?” [Applause from the audience.]
MONTGOMERY: “No, obviously it does not make any sense in terms of YOUR ethical analysis, but that’s what we are trying to determine---whether that ethical analysis is right… What I’m saying is that it may be necessary to choose a lesser of evils. But such a choice still remains an evil.” (Pg. 69-70)
MONTGOMERY: “In my ethic a lesser evil does not turn out to be a good by the fact that it’s less evil than something else.”
FLETCHER: “Now we are getting circular.”
MONTGOMERY: “That is NOT circular; it’s the POINT!” (Pg. 83)
MONTGOMERY: “this doesn’t mean that the Christian may not find himself in a position where he cannot help but fight. But heaven help him if he thereby feels that he is engaged in a justifiable activity. He is in fact participating in the kind of activity that we sinful and fallen human beings have brought about on this planet…” (Pg. 89)
Though nearly fifty years old, this vigorous dialogue remains of keen interest for those interested in Christian apologetics, Situation Ethics, Humanistic Ethics, and contemporary philosophy.
John Warwick Montgomery (b. 1931) is one of the major philosophical apologists of the 20th century. He is also a trained lawyer, which influenced his "historical/legal" approach to Christian apologetics. He is perhaps best known as a writer for his book History and Christianity, as well as for his debates with the infamous atheist Madalyn Murray O'Hair (1967), with the "Death of God" theologian Thomas Altizer (reprinted in 'The Suicide of Christian Theology').
This book is a transcript of the February 11, 1971 dialogue between Montgomery and Joseph Fletcher (who wrote Situation Ethics: The New Morality). Here are a few examples of their exchanges:
FLETCHER: "I think there are no normative moral principles whatsoever which are intrinsically valid or universally obliging.... If we are, as I would want to reason, obliged in conscience sometimes to tell white lies, as we often call them, then in conscience we might be obliged sometimes to engage in white thefts and white fornications and white killings and white breakings of promises and the like." (pg. 15)
FLETCHER: “I want to suggest that methodologically there are basically only three alternatives strategies… the three options open to conscience at work are to be simply labeled as legalism, antinomianism, and situationism… In between these [first] two extremes lies situationism… and a mediating position in the spectrum. The situationist enters into troubling moral situations armed… [with] some reflective generalizations about what is ordinarily and typically the right thing to do. But unlike the legalist he refuses to absolutize … any normative principle… he is prepared to depart from a usually applicable generalization if in the particular case the consequence of following the rule is to minimize rather than to optimize … the first-order value to which he’s committed.” (Pg. 19, 23-24)
MONTGOMERY: “The insurmountable difficulty is simply this: there is no way… of knowing when the situationist is actually endeavoring to set forth genuine facts and true opinions, and when he is lying… Why? Because deception is allowed on principle … .as long as the ultimate aim is love. Consider: if Professor Fletcher acts consistently with his premises… he can to this end introduce any degree of factual misinformation, rhetorical pettifogging, or direct prevarication into the discussion… Our restatement goes: ‘If a situation ethicist … tells you that he is not lying, can you believe him?’… [This leaves] the audience entirely incapable of ever being sure that Professor Fletcher means what he says.” (Pg. 31-32)
MONTGOMERY: “This is precisely the claim of the historical Christian faith: that biblical revelation constitutes a transcendent word from God establishing ethical values once for all… Absolute moral principles are explicitly set forth; these inform love and guide its exercise.” (Pg. 44)
FLETCHER: “Are you saying, sir, that we must in conscience always tell the truth? And if there are exceptions, when might we prevaricate and why?... are you saying that tyrannicide is never justifiable? If it might be, when and why?... were you or weren’t you saying that interruptions of pregnancy are always wrong? But if there are times when it might be done, why would it be?... Christian ethics … have never allowed that human rights are anything but… relative and contingent.” (Pg. 49)
MONTGOMERY: “the greatest difficulty in situation ethics is revealed exactly at this point. The situation ethicist properly recognizes the ambiguity of situations and the extreme difficulty, often, in knowing what ought to be done; but he endeavors, in these situations, to JUSTIFY HIMSELF. In terms of the ethical approach that I outlined, one CANNOT so justify oneself. If, concretely, I were put in the position that you described of either informing a killer as to where a child was hidden or lying about it, it's conceivable that I would have to lie. But if I did so, I would be unable to justify this ethically; in short, I would be unable to get off the hook. In Christian terminology, I would have committed a sin which should drive me to the cross for forgiveness. This is what I find almost totally lacking in your writings: no one is driven to the Cross.” (Pg. 51)
FLETCHER: “you have said in reply to my question ‘Is it always wrong to have an abortion?’---‘Yes, it always is.’ It seems to me absolutely unbelievable that anybody could say that… Since the tragic complexities of life sometimes call us to do what we might call the ‘lesser evil,’ you WOULD be an instrument because the alternative to the abortion would be greater evil than the evil of the abortion.” (Pg. 52-53)
FLETCHER: “It is ethically foolish to say we ‘ought’ to do what is wrong! What I want to argue philosophically… is that the rightness or the wrongness of anything we do is extrinsic, relative, and dependent upon the circumstances, so that to have an abortion out of loving concern for everybody’s best interests involve, is not an excusably evil thing to do, but a good thing to do.” (Pg. 53-54)
FLETCHER: “And I have to say in all candor that when I examine the Gospel account of Jesus’ teaching in light of our question… he said nothing directly or even implicitly about it one way or another. Jesus was a simple Jewish peasant. He had no more philosophical sophistication than a guinea pig, and I don’t turn to Jesus for philosophical sophistication.” (Pg. 55)
MONTGOMERY: “Well, sir, I think that’s your trouble.” [Laughter and applause from the audience.] (Pg. 55)
MONTGOMERY: “these ambiguous ethical situations are the product of a society what we ourselves create as fallen human beings… For example, one might have to shoot a sniper before he kills more people… To kill a human being… is a sin. It’s morally wrong… In situations like this it may be necessary to judge the number of people who will be killed if the sniper remains alive and, under those circumstances, shoot the sniper. But such a situation doesn’t morally vindicate the man who makes it.” (Pg. 64) “there are ambiguous situations where I might have to live. But… when I do this… It is wrong… and it will cause me to get down on my knees and ask forgiveness for it. But in the case of Professor Fletcher, if he does this, it would be in ACCORD with his ethic.” (Pg. 68-69)
FLETCHER: “Aren’t you in effect telling us that in your ethics we are sometimes morally obliged to do what is wrong, and does that make any sense in terms of ethical analysis?” [Applause from the audience.]
MONTGOMERY: “No, obviously it does not make any sense in terms of YOUR ethical analysis, but that’s what we are trying to determine---whether that ethical analysis is right… What I’m saying is that it may be necessary to choose a lesser of evils. But such a choice still remains an evil.” (Pg. 69-70)
MONTGOMERY: “In my ethic a lesser evil does not turn out to be a good by the fact that it’s less evil than something else.”
FLETCHER: “Now we are getting circular.”
MONTGOMERY: “That is NOT circular; it’s the POINT!” (Pg. 83)
MONTGOMERY: “this doesn’t mean that the Christian may not find himself in a position where he cannot help but fight. But heaven help him if he thereby feels that he is engaged in a justifiable activity. He is in fact participating in the kind of activity that we sinful and fallen human beings have brought about on this planet…” (Pg. 89)
Though nearly fifty years old, this vigorous dialogue remains of keen interest for those interested in Christian apologetics, Situation Ethics, Humanistic Ethics, and contemporary philosophy.
Displaying 1 of 1 review