This book provides a detailed, updated exposition and defense of five of the historically most important (but in recent years largely neglected) philosophical proofs of God’s the Aristotelian, the Neo-Platonic, the Augustinian, the Thomistic, and the Rationalist.
It also offers a thorough treatment of each of the key divine attributes—unity, simplicity, eternity, omnipotence, omniscience, perfect goodness, and so forth—showing that they must be possessed by the God whose existence is demonstrated by the proofs. Finally, it answers at length all of the objections that have been leveled against these proofs.
This work provides as ambitious and complete a defense of traditional natural theology as is currently in print. Its aim is to vindicate the view of the greatest philosophers of the past— thinkers like Aristotle, Plotinus, Augustine, Aquinas, Leibniz, and many others— that the existence of God can be established with certainty by way of purely rational arguments. It thereby serves as a refutation both of atheism and of the fideism that gives aid and comfort to atheism.
Edward Feser is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Pasadena City College in Pasadena, California. He has been a Visiting Assistant Professor at Loyola Marymount University in Los Angeles and a Visiting Scholar at the Social Philosophy and Policy Center at Bowling Green State University in Bowling Green, Ohio. He holds a Ph.D. in philosophy from the University of California at Santa Barbara, an M.A. in religion from the Claremont Graduate School, and a B.A. in philosophy and religious studies from the California State University at Fullerton.
Called by National Review “one of the best contemporary writers on philosophy,” Feser is the author of On Nozick, Philosophy of Mind, Locke, The Last Superstition: A Refutation of the New Atheism, and Aquinas, and editor of The Cambridge Companion to Hayek and Aristotle on Method and Metaphysics. He is also the author of many academic articles. His primary academic research interests are in the philosophy of mind, moral and political philosophy, and the philosophy of religion.
Feser also writes on politics and culture, from a conservative point of view; and on religion, from a traditional Roman Catholic perspective. In this connection, his work has appeared in such publications as The American, The American Conservative, City Journal, The Claremont Review of Books, Crisis, First Things, Liberty, National Review, New Oxford Review, Public Discourse, Reason, and TCS Daily.
He lives in Los Angeles with his wife and six children.
I just finished this book a few minutes ago and felt compelled to write about it. This is one of the best books of the existence of God I have ever read, and I've been studying this subject for roughly fifteen years. Feser defends five 'proofs' or metaphysical arguments for God's existence: (1) the Aristotelian 'argument from motion/change' to an Unmoved Mover, defended in Aristotle's 'Metaphysics', (2) the Neoplatonic 'argument from composition' to an absolutely simple being, defended in Plotinus' 'Enneads', (3) the Augustinian 'argument from necessary truths' to an eternal, omniscient Intellect, defended in Augustine's 'On Free Choice of the Will', (4) the Thomistic 'existential argument', defended in Aquinas' 'On Being ans Essence'; and (5) the rationalist 'argument from contingency', defended in Leibniz' 'Monadology'. Feser does not, however, focus of an exegesis of these classic texts, but instead on a detailed, contemporary defense of the arguments themselves. Following this he shows how each of these beings (i.e., the Unmoved Mover, absolutely simple being, etc.) are actually the same being and that this being has the traits classically attributed to God, e.g. omnipotence and omniscience. Finally, Feser refutes a large number of popular atheist objections to the existence of God.
This work builds, in part, on Feser's previous writings. The first and fourth of the arguments Feser defends here will be familiar to readers of Feser's 'Aquinas' and 'The Last Superstition', as the first two of Thomas Aquinas' famous 'Five Ways' of demonstrating God's existence. Readers of Feser's article 'The New Atheism and the Cosmological Argument' will be passingly familiar of the second and fifth arguments he defends here, but he defends these arguments is much greater detail here. Those who respect Feser's previous work, as I do, will find this book even better than his other works.
I already knew the common understanding of Aristotle's physics and metaphysics is completely wrong and unfair (due to taking a history of science class that had us read actual source material), but I still had several misconceptions that Feser was able to help clear up in regards to his notions of change and cause.
I found the first (Aristotelian) and last ("rationalist") arguments to be "good" (valid, difficult to refute, plausible premises, etc...), while I had major problems with the other three. Going into it, I did not expect this to be the case.
I was afraid he was going to spend a lot of time going after the "new" atheists, rather then the "old," which would have been boring, but he engages with both crowds, as well as atheistic analytic philosophers that actual know what they're talking about like J. L. Mackie and Graham Oppy.
Before I start this review I should clarify what this book is. In Five Proofs of the Existence of God Edward Feser presents five arguments for God, inspired by Aristotle, Plotinus, Augustine, Aquinas, and Leibniz, rebuts common objections to them, and tries to establish that the "God" that these arguments establish is the same unique, omnipotent, omniscient, etc, god of classical theism. What this book is not is an account of those arguments themselves. You're going to find very little historical context, textual history, influence and influences, etc, for the proofs given. In fact, the author admits in the preface that it is possible that the five originators themselves would disagree with aspects of the proofs presented here. In other words, it's quite pointless to evaluate this book based on how well, say, Feser explains the Aristotelian argument because that is not the purpose of the book (which is a shame, because that would have been a much more interesting book to read). The purpose of the book is to prove the existence of God, and Aristotle's arguments are just a tool to that end, and a tool that Feser has no qualms about changing and adapting to fit his needs. As such the book will be evaluated accordingly.
The first proof begins with the observation that change happens. I accept this premise. I would struggle to make sense of the world without accepting change or causality, though I admit that these are by no means obvious notions and the more you think about them the less they make sense. I have no problems with the fact that the arguments of this book take change and causality as given, and had the answer merely said "We assume change exists" I would have been okay with it. But the author is not. The author wants to "prove" that change is a real phenomenon, and that rejecting it is not a viable way to reject the existence of God. How do you prove something as thorny as that? Well, apparently the UCSB school of philosophy holds that the correct approach is to laugh at your opponents and call them idiots. The argument Feser offers is that change occurs because trying to convince someone that it does not involves presupposing that you can change their minds, and thus you could not consistently hold that change does not exist and argue against change existing.
How incredibly trite. There are so many questionable assumptions tied up in that -- people only do what is rational, people do anything at all, people have free will to choose one way or another, objective reality exists, etc -- that is hard to see how Feser could possibly find that argument convincing. I don’t believe that he does. This, like many points in the book where Feser runs into trouble, is argument by intimidation. Look at me, I have an authoritative tone of voice, and I think this argument is silly! Well I’m sorry, I’m a little too old to think that teaching philosophy at a community college automatically makes you right. You have to present a reasoned argument like everyone else, and dropping something like this on the second page of your first proof is a bad way to start.
I know this sounds incredibly petty, and I wouldn’t have mentioned it had the rest of the book convinced me he is arguing in good faith, but unfortunately it does not.
Having accepted causality, we are lead to consider causal chains. Feser is very careful to point out that he is not supposing that *everything* has a cause, only change. To use his example, coffee cools (undergoes change) because the surrounding air is cold. The surrounding air became cold (underwent change) because the air conditioner is turned on. The air conditioner was turned on (underwent change) because somebody flicked the switch, and so on. Feser refers to this as a linear series. Now such a series could be finite or infinite. In the first case it would need to have an initial first element which is capable of causing change without being changed itself, “The Unmoved Mover”, in the second it would chain back indefinitely (the third possibility, that the series forms a loop, is never considered by Feser. Presumably it’s isomorphic to the infinite chain).
However, Feser is not interested in linear chains precisely because the plurality of possibilities do not prove God. He wants a chain that *definitely* has a first element, so he defines what he calls a hierarchical chain. Now, the difference between the two chains is that in a linear chain an element gets power from its parent in an *inherited* way, while in a hierarchical chain it is done in a *derived* way. It is hard to tell what Feser means by this because he argues by examples. So for example a long line of children is a linear series, with each child inheriting their power from their parents, but a long line of geometry textbooks, copied from one another, is a hierarchical series, that derive power from their ancestors. What exactly is the difference between copying genes and copying letters? The author does not specify.
Feser then goes on to claim that a hierarchical series *must* have a first element. The example he uses is that if you put a desk on top of a desk on top of a desk, eventually the stack of desks must rest on the ground. An infinite series of desks wouldn’t be supported.
Uh. Wouldn’t it? I don’t know. It might? Supported against what, anyway? The desks won’t fall down on their own accord, there needs to be a force of gravity acting on them. And if we assume that there is such a force of gravity, then we’re begging the question -- we’re trying to prove that the series terminates on the ground, we can’t assume that the ground is already there. And if we don’t assume the ground, we don’t need an infinite series to show that the ground is not necessary. Two desks will support each other against each other. A single desk will float in space and never collapse anywhere. Now I suppose that Feser would argue that it’s not the ground that matters, it’s the force of gravity, which is present inside the desks, and on which the dependence is a derived one and a hierarchical series still exists, but at that point I’m writing his book for him. The point is that this is by far the most important argument of the book. Four out of five proofs rely on it. If you don’t find it convincing, there is no reason to keep reading. And the best way Feser can demonstrate it is with an example that is either wrong or meaningless.
Having (failed to have) established that hierarchical series have a first element, Feser seems to argue that existence is the actualisation of the potential to exist, and thus it also needs a cause. Treating existence as a potential seems extremely suspect to me, as if a thing fails to exist surely that means all of its potentials disappear with it? I’m not claiming that this is definitely the case, but it could certainly use some clarification. You obviously won’t find them in this book. Putting that aside, I can probably accept that if something exists now, something must have caused it to exist at some earlier point in time, ie we have a linear series. But Feser is not happy with a linear series, because it doesn’t give him the conclusion he needs. He claims that we have a hierarchical series, because something that exists, needs to have that potential actualised RIGHT NOW else it would fall into non-existence. The first element in this series, that keeps everything in existence, is God.
What the hell? Let’s go back to our initial premises. If something is changed, then it is changed by something. By the law of contrapositives, if something is not changed by something, then it is not changed. In other words, we have inertia. Not from my own scientistic-or-whatever-the-hell-Feser-wants-to-call-it background, but from the very same premises he provided. A table going from existence to non-existence constitutes a change. If a table already exists, IT WILL NOT STOP EXISTING UNLESS SOME FORCE ACTS UPON IT.
So what we have here is some kind of weird Manichean theology where there is a dark and terrible void that exerts constant pressure on objects to pull them into non-existence. And if we do assume such a void, and the fact that the derived/inherited distinction is meaningful, and that a hierarchical series has a first element, then sure. We can prove the existence of an Unmoved Mover, whom Feser will later argue satisfies all the standard properties of divinity. I didn’t bother reading those arguments in detail because they rest on a whole lot of ifs.
What is this terrible void? The only theologically consistent answer is God. Everything exists or does not exist only because God wills it to. That would be consistent. But it would also involve begging the question -- we are assuming God exists as the Destroyer to prove that God exists as the Maintainer. We set out to prove A and instead prove A implies A. A and a whole bunch of highly suspect premises imply A. This is weaker than the law of identity. Not exactly convincing stuff.
It boggles the mind that Feser cannot see this flaw in his argument. It’s not like he’s unaware of inertia. He brings it up twice, once in the rebuttals section of the first proof, and once in the rebuttals at the end of the book. But there he seems completely incapable to understand what the issue is. He cannot understand where inertia comes from, and seems to think that inertia is this weird, unjustified property of objects that the scientistic atheist posits a propos nothing, and haughtily dismisses it with "Existential inertia is not to answer those arguments but simply to ignore the arguments". Really? How hard is it to understand that inertia is not some kind of existential raincoat that you put on to not get wet -- it is the principle that if it is not raining, YOU WILL NOT GET WET. I am not positing a raincoat. Feser is positing the rain. The principle that without rain I remain dry is also posited by Feser. You can’t escape inertia if you accept causality. They go hand in hand.
The only possible way I see to reconcile this is to argue that non-existence is not a potential, and hence an object ceasing to exist does not constitute a change. This seems extremely suspect, and would need a lot of justification. Feser offers none.
So much for the first proof. Unfortunately, proofs 2, 4, and 5 are exactly the same. They do introduce some additional oddities, however.
In the second proof Feser claims that some entities are composite, and in order to remain composite they need to be held in existence by some other entity in a hierarchical series. The first element of this series must be entirely non-composite, the One, which is God. In this proof Feser claims that the mind is immaterial without bothering to justify the fact. It’s not crucial to his argument, but it doesn’t exactly help -- lumping on questionable assertions is the difference between stating “The US government serves the interests of multinational corporations” and “The US government serves the interests of multinational corporations who are controlled by an international conspiracy of Jews who conspire with the Reptilians to hide the fact that the Earth is flat and surrounded by a giant wall of ice”. Sometimes less is more. It’s also interesting to note that Feser mentions that in the original formulation Plotinus did not attribute intellect to the One, rather the intellect was at a stage below the one. Well, that sounds vaguely interesting. It’d be kinda neat to hear what Plotinus had to say on the matter, without having his proof perverted to fit Feser’s personal theological beliefs. Well, this is the wrong book.
The fourth proof consists of claiming that objects consist of an “essence”, roughly speaking “what” the object is/ought to be, and an “existence”, the fact that they exist. So the essence of a lion is a big, furry cat or whatever, and its existence can be found at the local zoo. The essence of a unicorn is a horse with a horn on its head, but it has no existence. The argument is that essences can exist just because, while existences need to be actively maintained, so the first element in this series must be something whose existence is derived from its essence, also known as God. The trouble here is just what exactly is an essence, anyway? How do you define a lion, in a precise way? A lion is a collection of genes, and different lions have different genetic compositions. When those genetic compositions are pretty close we call them both lions, when they’re a bit farther apart we call one a tiger. Any attempt to make the distinction exact runs into the sorites paradox, which I have never seen a satisfactory resolution to. The concept of “species” does not correspond to some unambiguous biological fact. It is an abstraction that helps us make sense of the data. This is not a problem for biology because biology does not depend upon species in an essential way -- you could still do biology without species, it would just be a lot messier and with higher dropout rates in university. This is a problem for Feser’s proof because unless we establish that essences are a real thing, the proof doesn’t go anywhere.
To be fair, Feser does address this in the rebuttals section (and given that Feser doesn’t bother with definitions, you almost have to start with the rebuttals and work your way backwards if you want to make sense of his argument). He brings up the example of chemical substances, and quote some guy as saying “these differences were not invented by us, or chosen pragmatically to impose order on an otherwise amorphous mass of data. There is no continuous spectrum of chemical variety that we had somehow to categorize.”. Well, sure. I can probably agree that Helium has a clear essence, namely an atom with the atomic number 2. But that’s curious, isn’t it? Every object I have had concrete, direct experience with -- be it lions, tables, mountains, what have you -- IS an amorphous mass of data that I DO pragmatically impose divisions on to make sense of the world. To find actual, discrete essences I have to delve into the world of atoms and molecules, things I have never interacted with directly but only understand through the formalism of high school/undergraduate models. So what’s actually going on here? Is it the helium that has a clear, discrete essence, or just my mental model of helium? Because if it’s the latter, then the proof merely shows that every abstract object has a first cause. But that’s not a proof of God, that is a proof of the Form of the Good.
The variation in the fifth proof is that the Principle of Sufficient Reason states that everything must have a reason, this series must have a first element that is its own reason, and that element is God. It’s interesting that Feser sketches an argument of Leibniz for this which does not appear to rely on hierarchical series. This would have been great to develop because Leibniz is a smart guy, and whatever he said is worth listening to. Unfortunately Feser is so convinced that his argument is irrefutable that he doesn’t bother developing Leibniz’s argument, and just hits the reader with the hierarchical series again. Even if we accept PSR and reject the existence of brute facts, which is by no means as straightforward as Feser makes it out to be, we reach the same problem that his argument from thereon just doesn’t hold water.
This brings us to the third proof, the only one that doesn’t fall flat immediately because it relies on the same argument as the others. Here Feser starts with the premise that abstract objects exist, if only in the mind of beings, which is fine, and if they exist they must exist somewhere (why?). He then offers three (or five, quickly dismissing two) possible explanations. The Platonic, that holds that they exist in the World of Ideas, the Aristotelian, that they exist, in part, in real objects, and as an abstraction in the minds of men, and the Scholastic, that they exist in the mind of God. He then argues that the Scholastic view makes more sense than the others.
Well, that’s not really a proof, is it? Even if we accept all of Feser’s arguments, all we have is “The best explanation of abstract objects we have involves God”. That’s a theory of God, contingent on further developments that might disprove it. Is it at least a good theory? Well, I tried hard to understand Feser’s arguments but it’s hard to read this proof as nothing more than bare assertions. For example in the Aristotelian view objects have a certain property that makes them red, namely that they reflect/radiate light in the 620-750 nm range, and a human being observing these objects has a concept of “redness” in their mind that ties these objects together. Feser claims that if all the humans were to suddenly disappear we would still have these red objects, so obviously we would still have redness which must exist somewhere outside of men’s minds.
Would we? We would still have objects that reflect/radiate light in the 620-750 nm range, sure, but that is not redness. In the Aristotelian view redness is a human concept, so without humans it wouldn’t exist. I fail to see how this is somehow inconsistent or not sensible. More generally, the notion of existence here used is extremely hazy. According to Feser, facts like “2+2=4” exist. What does that actually mean? Is it actualising a potential to exist? But surely that must mean it is possible for it to not exist?
A Formalist might say that 2+2=4 is a consequence of a formal system like Peano arithmetic that was invented out of convenience to model the world. But 2+2=4 even in a world with no humans, Feser retorts. Uh, does it? Sure, if we accept the Platonic interpretation of number, which I do, it would. But a Formalist does not. A Formalist probably wouldn’t even interpret such a statement as wrong, just meaningless, because to assert that 2+2=4 you would need to draw up a formal system and demonstrate that 2+2=4 is a consequence of it. But then you have just invented a formal system, and so you did not establish any metaphysical reality of your claim. And Formalism is hardly a fringe current of mathematical thought. It’s a respectable and sensible tradition, and merely asserting that they’re wrong is not an argument.
The last section of the book reiterates on the fact that all these arguments apparently prove the same God, and He is the God of classical theism (yes, down to the masculine pronoun). I’m running into the character limit so I can’t say all I wanted to say here, which is a shame because I had a long rant on why using language “analogously” is a cheap cop out in a field that claims to be an analytical discipline. Instead I’ll just say that it is remarkable how confident Feser is that his arguments are 100% bulletproof, and no one in good faith could find an issue with them. He has a section where he rebuts the criticism some atheists have that God’s existence should be obvious, by pointing to his book as an example. He even ends the book with a QED. It’s funny how it never strikes him as strange that no one seems to claim that an inconvenient mathematical proof is wrong. They may take issue with the premises or the applicability, but if the argument is valid then it is valid. Surely the fact that so many people find the proofs presented in the book suspect suggests that either: They are suspect. Feser does a terrible job of explaining them. No, as far as Feser is concerned the only possible reason you are not convinced by his drivel is that if you are not reading the book in good faith, and are approaching the arguments with a view to justify your preordained conclusions.
“Natural theology is a confident discipline” Feser writes, and this book is a good example of why I have a very low opinion of confidence. If you’re right, you come across like an asshole. If you’re wrong, you come across like an idiot.
My only complaint is that it had to end*. Some initial thoughts:
The counter arguments are horrible, far worse than I'd thought: What caused G-d? Quantum particles pop out of nothing so why can't the universe? Even if there's some non-contingent layer of Reality there's no reason to say it's Divine. All of these objections are refuted. Completely. The first one is exposed as missing the whole point of the arguments. Feser's treatment of the last objection is nothing short of a tour de force.
You can learn more about the arguments for theism from this book than a philosophy degree. I speak from bitter experience. "Plotinus' argument for the One? Is that some eastern thing?" (It has occurred to me that 18-25 is not the optimal period in life to do philosophy.)
Aquinas is a tough nut to crack. It's not simply the exotic terminology; it's an alien conceptual framework. The scales have fallen from at least one of my eyes on the existence/essence dichotomy.
In a debate with William Craig, Hitchens reached for this petrified tit: "None of these arguments establish the god of any particular religion." If you've heard this objection once, you've heard it a google times. Feser writes:
[T]he arguments of natural theology do have a great deal to tell us about how to evaluate the claims of the various religions. If a religion says things about the nature of G-d or His relationship to the world which are incompatible with the results of natural theology, then we have positive reason to think that religion is false. (p. 246)
Testify!
It's very difficult (for me) not to think in terms of G-d knocking over the first domino a long, long, long time ago. This book demonstrates how He keeps everything in existence from nanosecond to nanosecond and how this does not entail occasionalism.
This book is only 300+ pages! Is it possible to be more concise when covering this much ground? I was bending page corners of particularly lucid passages until I noticed it was ruining the book. I'm looking forward to rereading it.
This book is a decisive refutation of atheism, skepticism, and fideism. The skeptic is making positive assertions about metaphysics (whether he knows it or not). These assertions are destroyed.
***
Regarding Hitchens' query, the Kuzari argument is the next step. The eyewitness testimony of a nation makes the Torah the only self-authenticating Revelation in human history. All subsequent revelations use this foundation and claim to add the latest chapter. The practical upshot isn't religion.
***
*One quibble. On p. 245 Feser asserts that a prophet who can perform miracles must have a Divine "seal of approval." This notion is ubiquitous, treated like some axiom of deductive logic. It's only true if a prior Revelation doesn't put the kibosh on it. Deut. 13 plainly states that some miracles are tests.
If you are semi-acquainted with God-proofs like me, meaning you have encountered them and read about them and even understood them, their force and some of their weaknesses, then this book is a great way to establish and understand their strengths and grasp them even further.
This is not a book about the 5 proofs of Aquinas, but rather an inspired take on five different kinds of proofs including one of Aquinas. This is a great read because it gives you a breadth and a qualified discussion on the proofs, you get a very good introduction to them that becomes quite complex and then the objections to the proofs. These proofs hints, or points at, the qualities of God - and these are then discussed further in the sixth chapter, and then a seventh and last chapter is then added to discuss more objections but more primarily the modern new atheist strawman arguments.
The book does have a fair share of repetition, as many of the arguments have some of the same elements(like infinite regress) and encounter the same kinds of objections(who caused the cause?) - but in a way, they are alluded to and ignored(rather than repeating them in detail), but expanded on if necessary. There is a weakness in that the "formal" argument made has so many points that the chain of reasoning is doomed to be found weak in some of the parts - at least if one takes them in themselves without the previous discussion in mind.
I will definitely come back to this book to both reiterate the arguments, but also to check the proof if some arguments against them are made. That being said, it is a very good and in-depth book that is well written, but it is also written in a style that is accessible to more than people within academics. Feser could, as I know him, have been much more thorough and detailed even though the disposition feels just good enough.
While a challenging read and very philosophical, this book gives impressive arguments from philosophy supporting the existence of one God. It was surprising to me that both Plato and Aristotle reasoned to many of the attributes of the Judeo-Christian god through natural reasoning.
The qualities are: one, immutable, eternal, immaterial, incorporeal, perfect, fully good, omnipotent, intellent, and omniscient.
Feser also gives an excellent critique of the "new atheists" and scientism. More than other authors I've read I think he really devastates scientism.
Zipped through this to fill in a gap of my dissertation. Very good. Feser is part of a rare breed: a readable philosopher. He’s a brilliant educator (and very witty). I’ve stumbled across a new favorite author, I think.
Edward Feser has delivered exactly what his title advertised: five distinct-yet-mutually-reinforcing arguments for the existence of God. Each proof hails from a different philosophical stream (Aristotelian, Neo-Platonic, Augustinian, Thomistic, and Rationalist), but they all coincide and cohere in ways that make the whole work greater than the sum of its parts. Indeed, this is a formidable and forceful book. It ranks next to David Bentley Hart’s “The Experience of God” as one of the more compelling articulations of classical theism in the last decade (see also Hart’s glowing review of this book: https://churchlifejournal.nd.edu/arti... ). Where Hart’s book is more lyrical and poignant, Feser’s is more systematic and precise. Together (or apart) they are strong medicine for modern unbelief. If the New Atheist movement were to seriously and honestly grapple with both of these books it would be forced to either innovate or fizzle out. (I suspect even some atheists would welcome the latter.) Hats off to Feser for this supremely persuasive achievement—a modern classic of natural theology.
A very good overview of the arguments for the God of classical theism, it was clear and easy to read, although a bit repetitive at times. I enjoyed the Aristotelian, Augustinian and Rationalist arguments the most, the Thomist and Neo-Platonic arguments just felt like variations of the Aristotelian one.
The discussion of divine simplicity and how that fits with the divine attributes was interesting. I'm still kind of confused as to how God's act of creation can be a cambridge property though. The final chapter which addresses various dumb objections to natural theology should be a useful reference for twitter debates and stuff, but I mostly skimmed it since he goes over this stuff in his other books.
The book isn't supposed to be an exegesis of the works of the various philosophers from whom he takes the arguments, he alters them to make them as strong as he can.
I'd highly recommend the book, definitely one of Feser's best from what I've read.
A la fois une présentation, une vulgarisation et une défense précise de cinq preuves de l'existence de Dieu par Feser, un philosophe thomiste (lié à l'école de Thomas d'Aquin) à la fois compétent et pédagogue. Après avoir prouvé l'existence de Dieu, Feser explique les différents attributs de Dieu tels que la majorité des chrétiens jusqu'à aujourd'hui l'ont toujours compris (le théisme classique) et montre qu'ils ne sont pas illogiques ni contradictoires (l'unité, la simplicité, l'immatérialité, l'éternité, l'immuabilité etc). Enfin il traite brillamment les objections courantes contre les monothéismes : le problème du mal, les miracles, Dieu se cache, Dieu et le paradoxe du roche, si Dieu contrôle tout il n'y a plus de libre-arbitre etc. C'est un de mes livres préférés d'apologétique, j'aurais vraiment aimé l'avoir lu plus tôt.
Ces preuves qu'il aborde sont les plus importantes dans l'histoire de la philosophie (hormis l'argument cosmologique du kalam) : 1) L'argument aristotélicien (Aristote, très similaire à la première voie de Thomas d'Aquin) qui part du changement : les choses de l'univers changent, des choses causent leurs changements, on doit remonter à une cause ultime pour réussir à expliquer tous ces changements. 2) L'argument néo-platonicien (Plotin, un néo-platoniste) : les choses composées ont besoin d'être harmonisées par quelque chose de simple (qui n'est pas composé de parties) 3) L'argument augustinien (Augustin) : les idées abstraites (les lois mathématiques, les universaux, les propositions logiques, les nombres, les mondes possibles cf. la philosophie analytique et la logique modale) pour pouvoir être objectives doivent exister dans un intellect qui existe de manière nécessaire. 4) L'argument thomiste (Thomas d'Aquin) : la distinction entre essence et existence montre que les essences (ce que sont les choses abstraction faite de leur existence) ont besoin d'une cause dont l'essence est l'existence, qui existe nécessairement pour leur communiquer l'existence. 5) L'argument rationaliste (Leibniz) : le principe de raison suffisante sous une formulation thomiste ("Tout ce qui existe a une raison qui explique son existence") appliqué aux êtres contingents (qui peuvent exister ou ne pas exister) dit ce que ces êtres là ont besoin d'être expliqué ultimement par un être nécessaire (qui existe forcément).
Paradoxalement, elles sont soit les moins connues, les plus négligées ou les moins bien comprises aujourd'hui à notre époque contemporaine au détriment de d'autres arguments à la mode tels que le kalam, l'argument téléologique de Paley, l'argument du fine-tuning, l'argument moral, l'argument ontologique de Plantinga etc... Mais elles sont très puissantes car elles ne reposent pas du tout sur les données de la science qui est sans cesse mise à jour. Les conclusions qu'elles offrent sont certaines et rigoureuses. Elles ont à la fois l'avantage d'être valides même si le monde est éternel (sans commencement) contrairement au kalam et de prouver quasiment tous les attributs de Dieu en même temps. Cela inclut même le fait qu'il est constamment en train de soutenir le monde et non pas juste l'horloger de Voltaire qui une fois son horloge créée, la laisse fonctionner toute seule.
Le gros chapitre sur les attributs de Dieu est semblable au développement que Thomas d'Aquin fait sur les attributs de Dieu Dieu après avoir prouvé son existence par ses cinq voies. Mais en beaucoup plus accessible et synthétisé. Ce chapitre permet à tout lecteur curieux de faire connaissance avec le Dieu de la Bible (dont certains attributs sont repris par les philosophes et les théologiens musulmans) et de trouver des réponses à des questions épineuses. De même, le croyant pourra approfondir sa compréhension de Dieu, qui est si superficielle dans les Eglises de notre époque (cela est souvent dû à une ignorance de la tradition chrétienne et une crise identitaire des chrétiens du 21ème siècle). L'analyse philosophique ("qu'est ce que ça veut dire précisément" et pas juste une liste de versets) des attributs de Dieu est beaucoup plus poussée que celle qu'on trouve généralement dans les théologies systématiques les plus populaires d'aujourd'hui (MacArthur, Grudem par ex), c'est donc une bonne manière d'approfondir ce sujet.
En lisant ce livre, le lecteur s'initiera au notions fondamentales de la philosophie scholastique (du Moyen-Âge) : le quatre causes, le principe de causalité, le principe de raison suffisante, le principe de causalité proportionnelle, le principe de l'analogie (d'attribution et de proportionnalité), agere sequitur esse, les couples acte et puissance, matière et forme, essence et existence, simple et composé etc
Enfin sur le plan de la rhétorique, le livre est intéressant car Feser prend le temps de répondre à la fois aux objections des athées assez mauvais (Dawkins, Hitchens, Harris, Dennett) mais aussi à celles de athées compétents (Graham Hoppy, Michael Martin, J. L. Mackie). J'étais aussi agréablement surpris par son honnêteté intellectuelle : il est bien conscient que des Protestants partagent aussi ces arguments, la philosophie de Thomas d'Aquin et cette vision de Dieu (le théisme classique), il en cite et recommande même de les lire (James Dolezal, Greg Welty) !
I had originally left this book with four stars, but I decided to give it five stars for clarity, persuasiveness, and quality. I stumbled a few times, but the times I stumbled was no fault of the author. This is an excellent book, one that will go down in history as the same quality as C.S. Lewis’ books on apologetics.
Most of these arguments rely on the belief of a “hierarchical series.” Dr. Feser defends this series of causality quite well in the first argument presented.
Edward Feser is an exceptional philosopher who has written many good books, including this one. He presents five interestingly formulated arguments for the existence of God. Each of which is carefully reasoned in a step-by-step manner. He considers many objections to the arguments. He also makes the case for the Thomistic version of God and considers various objections to the general project of natural theology. I especially enjoyed the chapter on the Rationalist Proof, to which I will continue to refer in the future.
My issue with this book is that Feser's arguments seem to commit one to accept the Thomistic version of divine simplicity. To me this doctrine carries a lot of problematic metaphysical baggage which leaves me sceptical of the view. I do think some of the arguments can be adapted in such a way that it doesn't commit one to such a strong form of divine simplicity*. But I am a little unsure of the Augustinian and Thomistic proofs. Also, I didn't find Feser's attempts at reconciling Thomistic divine simplicity with the various attributes of God to be overly convincing. The only other issue I found was that, although these arguments rely on commonsense reasoning, they are not the simplest and most straightforward arguments for God's existence. This is no reflection on the book, it's just a note that this is by no means a simple read with arguments you can readily share with others.
You may ask, if I had so many criticisms of the book, why did I give it four stars? It challenged me and got me to really think about these arguments and the nature of God. There were some fantastic and novel responses to the various objections as well. I was very impressed with the book.
* For example, instead of running the Thomistic argument whereby you are left you with a being whose “essence is identical to existence”, you run it in such a way where you are left with a being whose ‘essence entails existence’. This would still show a contrast between God and creation, as no contingent thing has an essence which entails its own existence (by definition) and thus you are left with a stopping point in God. This allows one to preserve the distinction between essence and existence while bypassing Thomisitic divine simplicity. Although it seems to end up as a sort of contingency argument for God.
Same with the Aristotelian proof where the conclusion is a being who is “pure actuality”. You can run it where you are left with a being whose ‘potentialities cannot be made actual by anything external to it.’ This would likewise provide a distinction between God and contingent reality, since contingent reality requires something outside itself to actualise its own potentialities. Since God does change (but not in perfection) but is not changed by anything external to it, we seem to have a potentially successful argument for God that preserves the distinction between potentiality and actuality but which doesn’t accept strong Thomistic divine simplicity or immutability. Or perhaps we could maintain the concept of “pure actuality,” but define the idea it in terms of not being actualised by anything external to it… or we could say God transcends the actuality/potentiality distinction.
Apparently you have to mark a book "read" to get it off "currently reading", but I have added this to my get back to later shelf after reading about a third of it. My gut feeling is that it is only the possibility of the existence of God that can be irrefutably proved, not His actual existence. But it is worthwhile to understand the classical reasoning. This book does a good job of fulfilling its aim to lay out these proofs systematically and precisely in terms the layman can understand. I will definitely use it for reference.
I largely read each of the 5 proofs for my Philosophy class. I found each one to be very convincing and used logical reasoning to prove the existence of God. I would recommend to anyone who is going through a journey to understand God. I still have so many lingering questions that arose after reading this book. Nevertheless, Fesser made sense texts understandable and related abstract concepts to everyday life. Don’t need to be a philosophy major to understand.
There is any number of ways in which people prove the existence of God to themselves, some do it by looking at nature, some do it through an experience they had at one point in their life, and some simply believe that God exists because it makes sense to them. What those personal affirmations do not always do, however, is convince others that some divine being exists and is largely responsible for everything they see and experience. Personal testimony can be a very powerful motivator for belief but it rarely convinces vast swathes of people, so what exists that possibly can? This is the essential question behind Five Proofs and I think that Professor Feser did an excellent job in answering that question.
What I want to be sure to say at the start is that this book doesn’t have a theological bend towards one system of belief or the other, from what I understand Professor Feser is a Catholic but his book doesn’t present a case for Catholicism. All the book does is explain historical proofs for the existence of God from philosophers and thinkers in history. Two of those thinkers, Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, were religious men but their proofs for God do not rely on the Bible or Christian theology in order to prove their point. This fact, that the book represents viewpoints detached from a certain system of belief, make it an incredibly important volume for a time in which almost no-one who preaches an existence of God does so from a position outside of a religious order.
Arguments in the realm of theology are no longer about God existing or not but are effectively Atheist vs Christian or Atheist vs Muslim or some other iteration of a religious system. This doesn’t help the discussion at hand because anyone representing the side that believes in God has two arguments to make whereas the Atheist only has one. You have to both prove God’s existence as well as the truth of the faith you represent in the debate when a healthy debate between the two modes of thought should revolve solely around whether a divine being does exist. Five Proofs represents the best possible volume of information for the religious man or woman to define natural ways in which to explain God’s existence as a definitive fact.
For the same reason, the book removes a particular religious order from its text, I’ll do the same with my review. Each of the proofs offers a good explanation for God from a naturalistic standpoint, and they’re written in a way that makes the book accessible to a very wide audience. First, Professor Feser breaks the explanation of each proofs into a non-formal explanation, then he goes to a formal explanation in list format, then he refutes common objections to the historical proofs. This is a really intelligent way to lay out the information so that not only is there repetition for the reader but a very thorough explanation of how the proof works.
Now, I will say that it is not always in as plain of language as possible, Professor Feser comes from the world of academia so there is plenty of academic language used, but I firmly believe that anyone can understand this book if they take their time with it. Additionally, he uses a lot of analogy to illustrate his points, which can go a long way for some readers to understand the text and the argumentation of each of the proofs used in the book. Overall, the writing here is completely understandable and one of the most accessible academic works of philosophy that I’ve ever read.
After the explanation of all five proofs, there are two extra sections. In the first, Professor Feser extrapolates out the attributes of God based upon the proofs he’s explained, and it’s in this section that some definition is given for who God could be. The historical arguments used here would point to a monotheistic western understanding of the deity as opposed to a more eastern understanding, but he makes no judgment on what religion that God would belong to, which keeps the impartial nature of the book securely intact. Then, in the last section of the book, he offers up more refutations to common objections to theism based upon natural theology, and all of his refutations are just as impeccably written and cited as the ones present in the first five chapters of the book.
We live in a world where there is less and less focus placed upon religion than ever before, more and more people are defining themselves as Agnostic or Atheist and while I respect anyone’s decision to identify themselves as such, I believe that there is enough logical argumentation to the opposite viewpoint the make Atheism and Agnosticism untenable. I believe that much of the problem in our modern time is that the existence of God has been traditionally defined within the confines of the church, which not only brings up the issue of double proving an argument, as I explained above, but also connects the existence of God with any atrocities or crimes committed by the religious institution that the positive side of a debate represents.
In this way, Five Proofs represents a landmark work in getting back to the early argumentations of the enlightenment in which first and foremost the question was whether God exists. Whether you’re Atheist, Agnostic, or religious I highly recommend this book because it will either challenge the viewpoints you currently hold or it will give you more tools in your belt to help debate a negative viewpoint on whether God exists. Once there is an agreed-upon answer that God does exist, the two sides, now having common ground, can shift to which religion has the correct concept of God and the correct way to both worship and find oneself in the camp of the saved. There should be more literature like this, and it needs to be eminently approachable if we have any hope of changing the predominant viewpoint on God in the 21st Century. Five Proofs represents an excellent first step towards that goal, and now it’s in the hands of people to read it to continue pressing on.
Like Feser, I'm a Christian theist, so I agree with many of his ultimate conclusions. Feser is a respected philosopher, and he has some decent endorsements. I wanted to like this book. But it was a massive hair-pulling struggle for me to get through it. Perhaps I don't get scholastic metaphysics because Feser is a respected representative of the philosophy, and seems skilled in the art. Being as charitable as I can, I'd rate The Five Proofs of the Existence of God - 3.5 stars.
Half of the book is spent getting the reader to accept an Arche - the foundation on which the existence of all things rests. Near the end of each argument, there is a brief attempt to link the Arche with God's attributes, with promises of more detail to follow in the second half of the book. But getting to an Arche is trivial. No Arche implies metaphysical nothingness. With a little thought, it is axiomatic. Van Inwagen, in his _Metaphysics_ assumes it outright and takes the reader immediately to the real question: Is the Arche a Logos or is it a Chaos? Is the purely-actual actualizer mind or non-mind; the First-cause God or the multiverse? Is the universe the Arche's work ex nihilo, or a mindless byproduct ex materia? I found myself saying: "Alright already, it's obvious there is an Arche, but let's look at why the Arche is God!"
To be sure the arguments are in part verbose to prepare the reader for a case for divine attributes. But the second-half question, the sixty-four-thousand-dollar question, (Is the Arche a Logos?) was never answered well. Part of the problem linking the five arguments to divine-attributes is Feser's analogical approach under the dubious dependency on divine simplicity. If God's power, goodness, wrath, omniscience, and love are all the same thing under the hood, then the words mean practically nothing (at least to me.) If we view them as univocal concepts, then we are off the simplicity-reservation because now God is composite?
That leads to my second source of continual mental anguish during this read: I can't make heads or tails out of the concepts used in scholastic metaphysics. What in the world does it mean for the essence of a thing to be equivalent to its existence? I thought about this off an on for three days and finally gave up. What does it mean for an immaterial being to be composite or noncomposite? How do we even conceive of a composite immaterial entity? And as for Christianity, whatever the Trinity is, if it's not composite in some way, then I am sure I don't get what Feser is saying.
Is the immaterial, transcendent, timeless Father, no different than the material, in-time Son who returns and reigns from the New Jerusalem? Under divine simplicity and the ambiguity of analogical attributes, somehow the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit do not make up a composite (whatever composite means.) I can't get my head around that. Thankfully my sanity was restored in about two minutes reading two pages from Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview (Craig, Moreland) which in no uncertain terms releases the reader from having to buy into divine simplicity. Don't even get me started on divine timelessness - another dependency for scholastic metaphysics.
I picked this up after seeing Ed Feser on Ben Shapiro's Sunday Special. For those familiar with William Lane Craig's five arguments, this is a logical next step. The arguments are dense and in some cases a little harder to grasp; but each argument is offered in a formal and informal version. One is more casual as if being discussed with a friend in a coffee shop, the other is more academic like something you'd expect in an advanced philosophy class.
Feser's five contain some similarities to Craig's, but they are far more powerful in the sense that they rest entirely on metaphysical principles. It's difficult to refute them with without introducing a double standard, contradiction, or some kind of fallacy.
The last chapter of the book contains refutations to popular atheist arguments. To echo the endorsement on the back jacket, this chapter alone is "worth the price of the book."
I was familiar with some of the arguments for the existence for God before reading, especially the argument from contingency, or what Fesser refers to as the Platonic proof that was used by Father Copeland to stunt Bertrand Russel in their 1948 BBC debate.
The utility of this book is that the arguments are amalgamated in one place, and modern language and analogy's are drawn to promote maximum ease of understanding. Fesser is great at this, this is far from a philosophical slugger that requires many repetitions to grasp. I strongly recommend this book for anyone trying to get a passable grasp on the Arguments for the Existence of God, or anyone who is taking their first step into the subject.
Feser brilliantly presents his arguments along with responses to any potential rebuttal. The book requires some prior knowledge of the topic due to the complexity of the discussion. The reader should ensure he is free of any disturbance in order to sufficiently understand what is being conveyed. Highly recommend the book.
A sad tale of seperation from divinity the author attempts to pigeon hole God as something lesser than all creation and seperate from the self. A heart breaking tale of woe as he runs in circular arguments achieving nothing of any merit. So sad.
it's fairly evident that the whole work is based on faulty premises such as the denial of John 17 (the unity of God), and the majority of Jesus's teachings. I don't think love was mentioned even once, nor forgiveness, nor anything Jesus had to say. So as far as I can tell it's a work of utter uselessness.
He makes many statements that in no way follow, like he keeps saying "God is absolutely good" or something to that effect, when there was nothing leading up to it, he has never even attempted to analyze what "good" means, or what "evil" means, or any of the most basic terminology.
It sounds like a song of suffering, derived from the attempt to diminish God as something less than the creation, as something less than the entirety of all that is. it is a work that attempts to seperate self from God, and is thus a working of the left hand path, attempting to hide and distance self from God, instead of being as Jesus, working to be more divine, filling oneself with God, identifying self as God and thus letting God work through them.
It seems the author doesn't even grasp that European Atheists are simply Christians like Nietzche that have seen the "great divide" caused by the church between self and God, and attempted to diminish it by removing God from the equation, in an attempt to reachieve unity. The seperation is painful, and it's no wonder people wish reduce it.
The book seems to be completely oblivious to the fact that all things are both true and false at the same time, and that one can never be certain of anything in this density. If the author managed to achieve stillness for even a moment, they would come to realize that their writing are wholy empty and without substance, they are based on straws floating on the water, and he is rapidly sinking away from unity with God.
I feel very sorry if this book is somehow reflective of European thought, they must have a very troubled mindstream, to be filled with such division and pain. needless suffering. I feel for you, if this is your heritage, ouch. I don't know if there is anything I can do to help.
Philosophy it seems is a massive misnomer, philo-sophia love of wisdom. Like I said, I did not hear any love in this work, or indeed in most works of so called "philosophy" mostly circular reasoning, and pain of seperation/reductionism. I'd assume that in an ideal world it would be the balance of love and wisdom. But it seems it has become callous wisdom completely devoid of love.
I have to empathize that perhaps the reason European philosophy is so empty of substance is because anyone who may have had anything of substance to say was burned at the stake or drowned by the Church. And so only the most useless expressions, with no application or divinity have survived, as they were not deemed a threat to the dominance hierarchy pulling the wool over peoples eyes to distract them from God's teachings are revealed through Jesus. Indeed dominance hierarchies hate love and unity, because if we are all one as Jesus said, then hierarchy is an illusion.
Well I hope you can heal from this my friend, perhaps pick up the pieces and put them together with love. Or I donno maybe you like being in pieces it's not my call. It looks/sounds like it hurts, but yeah it's your mindstream you know better what works for you.
Ephesians 4:16
from whom the whole body, being fitly joined together and united, through the supply of every joint, according to the working in the measure of each single part, the increase of the body doth make for the building up of itself in love.
Llresearch 1990/0722.txt:2:Pilgrims and colleagues and warriors of peace and love. You and we will always be much misunderstood. Consider that a great compliment but do not let it keep you from the humility demanded of those who would be servants, those who would serve all others in the name of the one infinite Creator. For you are not here to learn how to be loved. You are to here to learn to love. You are not here to learn how to be happy and content and peaceful. You are here to learn and in learning is change and in change is pain. You are here to be uncomfortable a great part of the time but with the divine discomfort of one who is progressing in its evolution as a being of light in the metaphysical sense, that does not perish, that has always been and is now and will be forever. This is who you are. This is what you’ve come to uncover, the part of yourself that was created by love and is pure, whole, healed and perfect love. For that never varies or changes.
Llresearch 1993/0322_02.txt:72:Look at yourself standing there, perched like a deer ready to flee because it expects the voice of judgment which it has heard so often. Speaking your own name to yourself and saying, “When did you last tell yourself, ‘I love you’?” Can you offer that to yourself? Speaking your name and saying, “I love you. Yes, you are not perfect. Yes, you are sometimes reactive, frightened and unskillful. I do not love you because you are perfect. I love you because you are. All of that which I have judged about myself, I invite back into my heart. And I ask that judged part of myself, ‘Can you forgive me the judging as I forgive you your imperfections? Let us be one again. Let us enter wholeness. For whatever ways I have hurt you, can you forgive me for the ways I have judged you? For whatever flaws you have manifest for which I have judged you, as you forgive me for the judging, I forgive you for being human and embrace your humanness.’ It is so painful to feel this separation from myself. May I be whole. May I be healed. For whatever pain I have caused to myself, I offer forgiveness. I forgive you. I love you.”
I started reading the book about a week ago and i just finished the 3rd chapter. Before this book i tried to read some articles and books on the same topic, but i found it either too simplistic or find it too hard. The reason i found it hard because they do not introduce the argument step by step. Unlike Feser, who start with a shallowest part, and then define esoteric words, and move from informal to formal discussion of the topic. In the introduction of the book the author claimed that the arguments are definitive, powerful, and convincing (i think that is why he used the title"5 proof" instead of "5 evidence"). And he also think that the real debate will going to be between theists of different sorts after reading the book. It is because the arguments are robust. So far the arguments are convincing, but i love to reach to the last two chapters where he rebuttals some of the objections. I think it is worth to reread or close read.
5 Proofs is provocative and exotic. I feel like the shepherd who stumbled on the Dead Sea Scrolls. Working through these arguments feels like gnostic rediscovery. Fun, challenging, and even bizarre. They're less 5 different arguments than a family of similar ones. I'll need to play around with them, field test them, to crystallize my understanding.
Notes:
1) "four kinds of change: qualitative change (the coffee cools down); change with respect to location (the leaf falls from the tree); quantitative change (the puddle increases in size); and substantial change (a living thing gives way to dead matter)."
2) Change is the actualization of a potential (16)
3) "When we say that a hierarchical series of causes has to have a first member, then, we don’t mean “first” in the sense of being the one that comes before the second, third, fourth, fifth, and so on. We mean it is the first cause in the sense that it has inherent or built-in causal power while the others have only derived causal power. It is their having only derivative causal power that makes the other members secondary rather than first or primary." (21)
4) "Something is perfect to the extent that it has actualized its potentials without privations." (25)
5) Actualizer argument summarized (30)
6) "in that case we are back to a vicious regress and haven’t reached a first actualizer after all" (53)
7) "matter all by itself and apart from any form is, for the Aristotelian, nothing but the potential to be something. It is only actually some thing if it has the form of some particular kind of thing. So, though form and matter are different, there is a sense in which form depends on matter and matter depends on form. We would thus have an explanatory vicious circle if there were not something outside them which accounted for their combination." (59)
8) "In the previous chapter, we started with the distinction between actuality and potentiality, and concluded that there must be something that is purely actual. In the present chapter, we started from the idea of things that are composed of parts, and concluded that there must be something which is simple or noncomposite. But it turns out that these are just different ways of thinking about one and the same thing." (62)
9) The neoplatonic argument summarized (64)
10) "substance—something existing in its own right (rather than being a mere image or reflection or otherwise parasitic on something else), and having an intrinsic source of its properties and characteristic activities (as opposed to deriving them entirely from some extrinsic source)" (79)
11) The augustinian prior summarized (86)
12) "The thesis that this is the case is known as the principle of sufficient reason, or PSR for short. This principle is most famously associated with the early modern rationalist philosopher G. W. Leibniz, but has been formulated in many ways by writers of diverse philosophical commitments. Two characteristic Thomistic formulations would be “everything which is, has a sufficient reason for existing” and “everything is intelligible.”1 A third is that “there is a sufficient reason or adequate necessary objective explanation for the being of whatever is and for all attributes of any being.” (115)
13) "Why should we believe PSR? One important argument for it is a variation on the empirical argument for the principle of causality we considered in chapter 1. Considered as an inductive generalization, PSR is as well supported as any other. For one thing (and as noted already) we do in fact tend to find explanations when we look for them, and even when we don’t, we tend to have reason to think there is an explanation but just one to which, for whatever reason (e.g., missing evidence), we don’t have access. For another thing, the world simply doesn’t behave the way we would expect it to if PSR were false.3 Events without any evident explanation would surely be occurring constantly, and the world would simply not have the intelligibility that makes science and everyday common sense as successful as they are. That the world is as orderly and intelligible as it is would be a miracle if PSR were not true." (115)
14) "the universe undergoes change, which entails that it has potentials which are actualized and thus is not purely actual; and it has diverse parts, which entails that it is not simple or noncomposite. Hence, it cannot be a necessary being" (130)
15) Evil being the privation of good argument (173)
16) Feser discussing divine concurrence. Could give a working account for compatiblism (184)
17) Man is a "real" secondary cause. Inert without divine assistance. (184)
18) Blatantly comparing man's free will to the brick from my analogy above. Feser is using chalk. He says the chalk has a real effect on the causal chain. for instance, while the chalk does nothing without the first mover, the effect would be much different between a piece of red chalk as opposed to blue (185)
The book Five Proofs of the Existence of God by Edward Feser embarks on an ambitious project: it sets out to present and, naturally, defend five proofs of God’s existence, just as its title suggests. In it, Feser introduces five putative proofs that justify theism while, in typical Scholastic fashion, he addresses objections in a dedicated section of each chapter and throughout the last chapter.
I set the goal of this book against an idea I first heard from Professor John Lennox, an Oxford mathematician and Christian apologist, who once remarked that, strictly speaking, we can’t claim to prove the truth of any theory in any discipline—except in mathematics. Rationalistic proving belongs to mathematics alone. We may have even overwhelming evidence for something, but not the kind of ironclad, irrefutable logical proofs we find in mathematics. No matter how compelling the evidence for a physical theory, it should not be mistaken for proof. Evidence is not the same as proof.
But note, Feser did not call the title of his book Five Evidences for the Existence of God but Five Proofs of the Existence of God. Is Lennox correct to think that the notion of a proper proof is only exclusively possible in mathematics? Because it is very clearly the case that it is precisely this genre of proof — rigorous, irrefutable lines of reasoning that follow step-wisely and necessarily — if not the exact kind, that the arguments presented in this book are purported to be about: strict logical and metaphysical demonstrations whose inevitable conclusions are just as certain as those of mathematics. And there is no gainsaying that mathematics is a very precise science.
Feser was apparently conscious of his choice of words and the absolute degree of certainty that a proof, strictly defined and correctly understood, connotes. Consider that he says, “none of the objections against arguments of the sort defended in this book succeeds, and indeed that the most common objections are staggeringly feeble and overrated.” He even goes on to add that we should not find the boldness of his assertion strange, because “natural theology was, historically, a very confident discipline.” (Natural theology, by definition, refers to those truths about God that can be known via pure philosophical reasoning—as opposed to revealed theology, which can only possibly be known by divine revelation).
If the book succeeds in its promise of presenting pure proofs—arguments whose conclusions manifestly and necessarily follow from first principles that are true—then it achieves something rare outside formal mathematics. And if Professor Lennox is right that true proofs are the domain of mathematics, then perhaps philosophy, at its most rigorous, borrows something of the mathematician’s craft. We might even say that such disciplined reasoning constitutes a kind of mathematics—one that dabbles not in quantity, but in quality. One not numerical, but structural. Call it qualitative maths, if you will.
Hence, it is not surprising to discover that the arguments presented in this book are of such nature that they must be followed with care (as one normally would while engaged in ordinary computational mathematics or quantitative reasoning). In other words, the arguments that constitute the proofs are intricate — though quite accessible — and it would benefit the reader to know this lest he follow them sloppily at his own epistemic peril.
So, what are the five proofs presented in this book? They are the Aristotelian proof, the Neoplatonic proof, the Augustinian proof, the Thomistic proof, and the Rationalist proof. Let it be noted, however, that the proofs as presented in this book are not mere paraphrases or reproductions of the original arguments laid out by the originators of each tradition. They are expositions of the proofs that include the author’s own interpretive framing. Feser himself acknowledges that there may be minor details in his presentation that the original thinkers might not have endorsed. The Aristotelian proof is the longest of the five, though not because it is inherently more complex. Its relative length is due to the fact that it tackles certain fundamental points that recur throughout the other proofs. Whenever an argument in a later chapter overlaps with material already treated under the Aristotelian proof, Feser avoids repetition and refers the reader back to that earlier, fuller discussion.
What is common to all the proofs—except the Rationalist proof—is that they begin with some basic premise or observation about the world, and proceed by strict logical deduction to show the necessity of a “necessary being,” one that must possess a particular set of defining characteristics. As a consequence of these characteristics, it is then argued that this necessary being must have the attributes traditionally ascribed to God. For instance, the Aristotelian proof starts with the premise that change occurs. Since change involves the actualization of a potential that already existed in the changing thing, the argument concludes that there must be a necessary being who is pure actuality—a purely actual actualizer. The Neoplatonic proof, beginning with the observation that everything in our experience is composite (i.e., made up of parts), argues toward the necessity of a being who is absolutely simple or non-composite. This being—what Plotinus called “the One”—must be partless, indivisible. Similarly, the Augustinian proof (arguably the most meandering of the five) starts with the reality of universals such as redness or triangularity. Rejecting the existence of a Platonic third realm, it argues that universals point to the necessity of an intellect in which all abstract objects are grounded. And so on.
Feser maintains that the necessary being arrived at in each of these proofs is, in fact, the same being—reached from different starting points. A being who is pure actuality, absolutely simple, the grounding of universals, and so on, must also be omnipotent, omniscient, immaterial, and possess the other classical attributes of deity. And that being, traditionally, is what we call God. Therefore, God exists.
The final chapter—devoted solely to rebuttals of objections against natural theology—might be seen as a kind of reward for patience. Having worked through the dense, step-by-step reasoning of the earlier chapters, the reader is now treated to arguments that are somewhat easier to follow. But this is only so if the earlier chapters have been carefully understood. For the argumentative theist, the rebuttals offer a storehouse of intellectual ammunition. For a serious non-theist, they offer a challenge to deeper inquiry. And for yet another group—seekers—they offer something more: direction. Especially for those of faith who are unsatisfied with a merely fideistic stance and long for a firmer, rational grounding in their belief, this chapter (and the book as a whole) is an invaluable resource. Seeking such understanding is not a betrayal of faith but a mark of intellectual seriousness. As Feser notes, classical thinkers like Aquinas rejected the notion that faith means believing without evidence.
Among the first objections dealt with—and one that receives thorough attention—is the familiar question: “If everything has a cause, what caused God?” Feser shows just how misguided that question is. Not a single one of the five arguments, or any “first cause” (aka cosmological) arguments for that matter, has as its premise that everything has a cause. The objection is a straw man. Other familiar objections, such as the problem of evil, are also handled with clarity. One notable example is the rejection of the so-called “best possible world” theory. God, Feser explains, is no more obligated to create a best possible world than He is to create a round square—because such a thing is logically incoherent and cannot exist, not even in principle. He illustrates the point simply: if a world with trees is better than one without, then a world with a forest is better than one with a single tree, and so on. But there’s no upper limit to the number of trees that could exist; when we have n number of trees, we can always add one more to have n +1. So the notion of a “best possible world” is an incoherent ideal.
Some readers—perhaps skeptics or seekers—may resonate with an objection captured near the end of the book: “No one can claim to have a proof or demonstration that God exists, because many people still doubt or deny his existence even after hearing the arguments.” But that doesn’t follow. As Feser replies, the demonstrations in this book “give us knowledge that is more secure than what any scientific inference can give us (as ‘science’ is generally understood today).” Furthermore, “the premises cannot be overthrown by further empirical inquiry, because they have to do with what any possible empirical inquiry must presuppose.”
Take the Aristotelian proof again. It begins with the premise that change occurs. That’s not something empirical science could ever disprove—since any scientific activity presupposes change, including the process of gaining new information.
Whether or not one agrees with Feser’s conclusions, the intellectual seriousness of Five Proofs invites deep reflection on reason, existence, and the ultimate ground of reality. To dismiss such questions lightly is, perhaps, the greatest philosophical recklessness of all.
Professor of philosophy Edward Feser provides a detailed and systematic summary of five major theological arguments for the existence of God. Despite being a Thomist, Feser does not simply present Aquinas' Five Ways here. Instead, he focuses on historical proofs which tend to be a little less well known, specifically:
The Aristotelian Proof (there is change in the world; change constitutes the actualisation of potential; no potential can be actualised unless there is something 'purely actual' which can actualise without itself being actualised);
The Neo-Platonic Proof (the things of our existence are composite; the ultimate cause of such things must be something which is absolutely simple or non-composite, termed 'the one');
The Augustinian Proof (abstract objects are in some sense real; the only possible ultimate ground of these objects is a divine intellect - the mind of God);
The Thomistic Proof (the contingent things of our existence have a distinct essence and existence; nothing in which there is distinction could exist for an instant unless caused by something in which there is no such distinction, an uncaused cause of all things whose essence is its existence);
and the Rationalist Proof (everything is intelligible or has an explanation for why it exists; there cannot be an explanation of the existence of any of the continent things of our experience unless there is a necessary being, the existence of which is explained by its own nature).
After explicating each proof, Feser pre-empts the rebuttals that a sceptic is likely to offer, and offers detailed responses to each. Satisfied with having sufficiently proved the existence of God not just once but in five different ways, he then finishes the book by taking the arguments one step further and providing an argument for the existence of the Christian God in particular. Specifically, he provides arguments for the existence of the divine attributes of simplicity, immutability, immateriality, incorporeality, eternity, necessity, omnipotence, omniscience, perfect goodness, will, love, and incomprehensibility.
Though written for a lay audience, this book is unapologetically rigorous and precise, which can make it challenging. As a reader with an interest but no real education in philosophy and theology, some of the arguments were confusing and difficult to follow. Possibly Feser could have done a better job with guiding readers like me through some of the more challenging terminology (although he does attempt to explain things as clearly as possible and use examples to help bring abstract ideas to life), but on the other hand I understand that the major objective of the book is to provide a thorough and irrefutable account of these proofs. Overall, that objective appears to be achieved, and a very compelling case for the existence of God is made. 7/10
I tried so hard (maybe too hard) to understand this book. Maybe I’m just not that smart. I only got to page 61 and didn’t even finish through the first “proof” of god. It took me 10 months to get through 61 pages and I’m left even more confused than before I started. I’m sorry I understood the argument of causation and the “actualized actualizar” to be everything has a cause and therefore god causes all change. I didn’t understand that. I went back over it and I just can’t get to any other conclusion. The author claims that all change has to have a changer and I say “where’s the proof? To me it’s a statement rather than a claim with points.
I literally got a headache reading 2-3 pages at a time trying to understand this so maybe there is someone smarter than me to help me figure this out because all I got was “everything has a change and therefore god is changing everything” (something to that effect) then god has to have an actualizar of his own. Who created god? It’s that simple. You can’t say “this cup of coffee is changing therefore god is making it change” without actual evidence is just making a statement. I could say that the “flying purple dragon is the cause for all heat in the universe” then you say where’s the proof? And all I say is that “heat exists and therefore a purple dragon that exists on a different cosmic reality causes all heat “. You would look at me crazy and not believe me. Well that is how I felt with this book. It’s a statement with no backbone to really back it up.
So sorry to those who disagree I just can’t pick this book up without going through the mind melting chaotic dung pile of trying to make sense of these “proofs of god” didn’t even finish through the first part and not even past page 61. If this book goes through mental gymnastics just to make statements without x providing actual proof is not worth reading.
I will say this: I love philosophy but I am often reminded how much of an ape I am while reading it. The author does a great job of distilling the "proofs" to appease the common man and make him understand, however I get too lost in the minutia that appeases the academic. Still a great read and highly recommend, but just don't get too stuck on trying to wrap your head around ideas that extend beyond a certain level of understanding. Even if you do, you will still find it thoroughly enjoyable. Just every now and then became too much.
A terrific explication of often misunderstood or completely unknown philosophical arguments for God's existence. It's a great read for theists and atheists alike.
Un verdadero monstruo de la apologética cristiana actual. Sin ningún miedo y con la máxima honradez es capaz de refutar las objeciones planteadas a la cuestión de la existencia de Dios.
En un estilo sencillo, didáctico y racionalista da una respuesta satisfactoria a las dudas que surgen en teología natural, más allá sólo queda el misterio. Pues se crea o no en Dios, su argumentación tiene una perfección lógica impresionante.
Sin embargo, sus adversarios en la eterna disputa no se han preocupado nunca de construir una alternativa coherente al teísmo, y vemos a lo largo de las páginas como van rodando sus cabezas. Desde luego si no sirve para convencer al escéptico, al menos si podrá hacerle dudar de las alternativas al teísmo.