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The Battle for Syria: International Rivalry in the New Middle East
An unprecedented analysis of the crucial but underexplored roles the United States and other nations have played in shaping Syria’s ongoing civil war
Most accounts of Syria’s brutal, long-lasting civil war focus on a domestic contest that began in 2011 and only later drew foreign nations into the escalating violence. Christopher Phillips argues instead that the international dimension was never secondary but that Syria’s war was, from the very start, profoundly influenced by regional factors, particularly the vacuum created by a perceived decline of U.S. power in the Middle East. This precipitated a new regional order in which six external protagonists—the United States, Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Qatar—have violently competed for influence, with Syria a key battleground.
Drawing on a plethora of original interviews, Phillips constructs a new narrative of Syria’s war. Without absolving the brutal Bashar al-Assad regime, the author untangles the key external factors which explain the acceleration and endurance of the conflict, including the West’s strategy against ISIS. He concludes with some insights on Syria and the region's future.
Most accounts of Syria’s brutal, long-lasting civil war focus on a domestic contest that began in 2011 and only later drew foreign nations into the escalating violence. Christopher Phillips argues instead that the international dimension was never secondary but that Syria’s war was, from the very start, profoundly influenced by regional factors, particularly the vacuum created by a perceived decline of U.S. power in the Middle East. This precipitated a new regional order in which six external protagonists—the United States, Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Qatar—have violently competed for influence, with Syria a key battleground.
Drawing on a plethora of original interviews, Phillips constructs a new narrative of Syria’s war. Without absolving the brutal Bashar al-Assad regime, the author untangles the key external factors which explain the acceleration and endurance of the conflict, including the West’s strategy against ISIS. He concludes with some insights on Syria and the region's future.
352 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 2016
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 36 reviews
September 24, 2018
This is a second book on recent conflicts in the Middle East and a second rather academic book that I've read in the past couple of months. Previously, I read reading the book on Arab Uprisings, and found it to be exhausting - more focused on the author and his adventures than on the conflict, and with too many "on the street" interviews that are painful simplistic and hard to read. The other book that I mentioned happens to be Algeria: France's Undeclared War, and it was a lot better if somewhat slow.
This book is the blend of these two works in that it touches on the recent developments in the Middle East, the Syrian civil war to be more specific, and it's also written with a rather academic approach that takes a while to chew. Not bad but not really relatable in any way, and too thin on the fine detail that makes the stories compelling.
That said, it's not bad. You get a relatively balanced overview of the internal and external factors that contributed to the Syrian civil war, including the different tribal and ethnical factions within Syria, life under Assad, the meddling and influence of the US, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey, Qatar, and Russia. Israel is also on the list, but it's just a marketing ploy - it's barely mentioned in the book.
The book also goes into some detail in the fragmentation among the Syria's opposition groups, the rise of extremist factions, and how it all ties in together, starting with the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. There are some important lessons in there.
The author talks about how the conflict started and evolved, with these other countries pumping in cash and weapons in order to spur their political goals. Bottom line, Assad turned out to be stronger than expected, Russia won big time, and the US eroded its almighty image by not having a clear and coherent policy. In between, seven years of fighting, half a million dead and 10 million refugees are the cost of the battle for Syria's dominion.
A worthy read, but do sip some wine or something, cause it's a bit dry. Not the wine. The book. I think it could have been shorter, or alternatively, feature more details on the fighting and the consequences. Not bad, but I'm still waiting for the pageturner work on the recent conflicts. Just as their hectic nature seems to elude the psyche of most Westerners so does the narrative, it seems.
Igor
This book is the blend of these two works in that it touches on the recent developments in the Middle East, the Syrian civil war to be more specific, and it's also written with a rather academic approach that takes a while to chew. Not bad but not really relatable in any way, and too thin on the fine detail that makes the stories compelling.
That said, it's not bad. You get a relatively balanced overview of the internal and external factors that contributed to the Syrian civil war, including the different tribal and ethnical factions within Syria, life under Assad, the meddling and influence of the US, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey, Qatar, and Russia. Israel is also on the list, but it's just a marketing ploy - it's barely mentioned in the book.
The book also goes into some detail in the fragmentation among the Syria's opposition groups, the rise of extremist factions, and how it all ties in together, starting with the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. There are some important lessons in there.
The author talks about how the conflict started and evolved, with these other countries pumping in cash and weapons in order to spur their political goals. Bottom line, Assad turned out to be stronger than expected, Russia won big time, and the US eroded its almighty image by not having a clear and coherent policy. In between, seven years of fighting, half a million dead and 10 million refugees are the cost of the battle for Syria's dominion.
A worthy read, but do sip some wine or something, cause it's a bit dry. Not the wine. The book. I think it could have been shorter, or alternatively, feature more details on the fighting and the consequences. Not bad, but I'm still waiting for the pageturner work on the recent conflicts. Just as their hectic nature seems to elude the psyche of most Westerners so does the narrative, it seems.
Igor
October 14, 2016
The ongoing civil war in Syria is easily one of the most volatile foreign policy challenges facing the next president. Christopher Phillips' new book, "The Battle for Syria", is a timely look at the conflict.
"The Battle for Syria" is primarily about the international dimensions of the Syrian civil war. Although Phillips does provide some historical background on Syria, particularly the Assad regime, this is primarily a book about how regional actors have influenced and responded to events in the country. He focuses on the US, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Qatar, and Turkey, with occasional references to Israel, Lebanon, France and Great Britain.
Phillips does an excellent job explaining the complexities of the conflict. There's a lot of information and the book is at times quite dense, but it's always exceedingly clear. Phillips provides just enough information for readers who aren't Middle East experts to follow along (although I follow the news, I'd hardly consider myself an expert).
That said, this is definitely an academic work about states and statecraft. Phillips doesn't spend much time discussing the personalities of the individual leaders involved except where absolutely necessary. Instead, his primary focus is on what regional actors did and what effect that had on the Syrian civil war.
Christopher Phillips is not an American (he's British), which I think allows him to bring a fresh perspective to the subject. Most of the discussion about Syria in the US has focused on America's role, or lack thereof. Fortunately, "The Battle for Syria" doesn't get bogged down in those questions and instead attempts to place America's role in the proper context. Phillips tries to provide a balanced, non-partisan perspective on the Obama administration's Middle East policy, but ultimately concludes that America's greatest failure was simply not communicating its intentions clearly enough. Phillips spends far more time on other countries, especially Qatar and Saudi Arabia, far more consequential actors in the conflict.
Phillips is also less romantic about Syria than most American commentators. He recognizes that the war isn't and never was a struggle between good and evil. He acknowledges that the regime in Damascus in Damascus did have a genuine base of popular support, or at least a large enough group of Syrians who preferred Assad to the alternative. Phillips doesn't downplay the humanitarian crisis, but it's simply not his focus.
One question that arises with books about ongoing current events is their shelf-life. After all, in September 2016, weeks before this book was set to be released, Russia bombed a UN aid convoy, which increased the tensions in the US-Russia relationship to levels not seen since the Cold War. So, to some extent, this book is already obsolete. With that in mind, I think it is still worth reading "The Battle for Syria" because it does such a good job providing context for the conflict.
That said, I was a bit disappointed that Phillips never discusses the Syrian civil war in the context of other major civil wars. He occasionally references the political science literature, which generally finds that foreign intervention on both sides of a civil war prolongs the conflict. But I think it still would have been useful to have gotten a sense of how usual - or unusual - Syria really is. In how many civil wars do you have six or more foreign powers aiding different factions? I was surprised that there was no reference to the Spanish Civil War, which seems like an obvious point of comparison.
Perhaps because of the risks inherent in predicting the future, Phillips also doesn't spend much time in the book discussing policy recommendations to bring the war to a close. Indeed, one of his major conclusions is that the intractability of the conflict defies an easy fix. Most of the major regional actors have a major stake in the outcome in Syria, and to them the war is a zero-sum game. It's a somewhat depressing but realistic view.
Overall, I definitely recommend this book to readers interested in understanding the international dimensions of the Syrian civil war. I suspect it will prove particularly useful for American readers to step outside the confines of our partisan debates about America's role in Syria.
[Note: I received a copy of this book from the publisher in exchange for an honest review.]
"The Battle for Syria" is primarily about the international dimensions of the Syrian civil war. Although Phillips does provide some historical background on Syria, particularly the Assad regime, this is primarily a book about how regional actors have influenced and responded to events in the country. He focuses on the US, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Qatar, and Turkey, with occasional references to Israel, Lebanon, France and Great Britain.
Phillips does an excellent job explaining the complexities of the conflict. There's a lot of information and the book is at times quite dense, but it's always exceedingly clear. Phillips provides just enough information for readers who aren't Middle East experts to follow along (although I follow the news, I'd hardly consider myself an expert).
That said, this is definitely an academic work about states and statecraft. Phillips doesn't spend much time discussing the personalities of the individual leaders involved except where absolutely necessary. Instead, his primary focus is on what regional actors did and what effect that had on the Syrian civil war.
Christopher Phillips is not an American (he's British), which I think allows him to bring a fresh perspective to the subject. Most of the discussion about Syria in the US has focused on America's role, or lack thereof. Fortunately, "The Battle for Syria" doesn't get bogged down in those questions and instead attempts to place America's role in the proper context. Phillips tries to provide a balanced, non-partisan perspective on the Obama administration's Middle East policy, but ultimately concludes that America's greatest failure was simply not communicating its intentions clearly enough. Phillips spends far more time on other countries, especially Qatar and Saudi Arabia, far more consequential actors in the conflict.
Phillips is also less romantic about Syria than most American commentators. He recognizes that the war isn't and never was a struggle between good and evil. He acknowledges that the regime in Damascus in Damascus did have a genuine base of popular support, or at least a large enough group of Syrians who preferred Assad to the alternative. Phillips doesn't downplay the humanitarian crisis, but it's simply not his focus.
One question that arises with books about ongoing current events is their shelf-life. After all, in September 2016, weeks before this book was set to be released, Russia bombed a UN aid convoy, which increased the tensions in the US-Russia relationship to levels not seen since the Cold War. So, to some extent, this book is already obsolete. With that in mind, I think it is still worth reading "The Battle for Syria" because it does such a good job providing context for the conflict.
That said, I was a bit disappointed that Phillips never discusses the Syrian civil war in the context of other major civil wars. He occasionally references the political science literature, which generally finds that foreign intervention on both sides of a civil war prolongs the conflict. But I think it still would have been useful to have gotten a sense of how usual - or unusual - Syria really is. In how many civil wars do you have six or more foreign powers aiding different factions? I was surprised that there was no reference to the Spanish Civil War, which seems like an obvious point of comparison.
Perhaps because of the risks inherent in predicting the future, Phillips also doesn't spend much time in the book discussing policy recommendations to bring the war to a close. Indeed, one of his major conclusions is that the intractability of the conflict defies an easy fix. Most of the major regional actors have a major stake in the outcome in Syria, and to them the war is a zero-sum game. It's a somewhat depressing but realistic view.
Overall, I definitely recommend this book to readers interested in understanding the international dimensions of the Syrian civil war. I suspect it will prove particularly useful for American readers to step outside the confines of our partisan debates about America's role in Syria.
[Note: I received a copy of this book from the publisher in exchange for an honest review.]
September 28, 2017
It is a very good look into the Syrian conflict, but what really got me about this book was the fact that the author repeated himself over and over and over and over again. That being said this was really good when it came time for me to write a paper in my International Relations class.
December 26, 2016
Concise, non-partisan, and straightforward. Must read for beginners on Syrian Civil War. A sound geo-political analysis of the region's current turmoil.
November 7, 2016
The Syrian civil war is now in its fifth year, and despite the Russian intervention i 2015 it is a stalemate. A central reason for this is related to factors external to Syria, both early on in the conflict and throughout those five+ years since the beginning. Christopher Phillips contends that the conflict cannot be fully understood without the international dimension and gives these factors a more central role than internal factors, which usually are used to explain why civil wars begin. This is a conscious choice for his analysis, that does not deny the agency of the regime or the opposition. Rather he argues that from the start, external factors were essential in enabling and facilitating both regime and opposition actions (p.3). This international dimension shaped the conflict in three ways: 1) the international and regional environment in which the uprising began was key to its transformation from protests to revolt, and into war. From shifting regional balance of power through the proliferation of weapons and ideology. 2) Decisions made by leading states (Iran, Saudi Arabia, United States, Turkey, Qatar) in the first year of the conflict that rapidly escalated the conflict. 3) Policies pursued by international and regional actors that shaped the character of the conflict and ensured its continuation.
Phillips begins with an analysis of the international and regional situation on the eve of the civil war. The 2003-2009/11 Iraq war shifted the regional balance with President Obama scaling down U.S. military and political commitment, Iran emerging as a dominant regional actor with Saudi Arabia and Turkey responding, and Qatar with a more active regional foreign policy. The war was a turning point that released three interrelated trends: the breakdown of the post-1991 order; the emergence of regional competition; the regional proliferation of sectarianism, Jihadism, and Kurdish nationalism. He continues with how the most important actors viewed these developments: the United States, Russia, Turkey, Iran, Qatar. Chapter two covers how the regime responded to the Arab Spring and the first protests in Syria in 2011, and chapter three looks at the ambivalent response of the international community. This response is seen in light of other developments in the region, with particular attention to the intervention in Libya, and the "non-intervention" in Bahrain, and developments in Egypt. An important factor is Saudi Arabia acting to contain the Arab Spring to ensure itself, while prevention perceived Iranian expansion. Another factor that Phillips emphasizes is the shift in Turkish foreign policy away from Assad in August 2011, and hosting the leadership of the armed opposition and supporting it. Chapter four to eight describes how the international responses (sanctions, Arab League observers, Kofi Annan/UN observers) failed to coerce any parties to compromise. With continued military and diplomatic support from Russia and Iran the regime felt confident. The opposition was unable to unite politically and militarily. As such there was no credible alternative in Syria for the international community to support. A core point was also the regime use of chemical weapons in August 2013 which did not produce a firm U.S. response but a deal to evacuate Syria's chemical weapons in the deal proposed by Russia. The deal highlighted the limited will of the Western powers to intervene in the conflict, giving the regime and its allies almost free hands to use all available means to defeat the opposition. From then on the conflict descended into chaos and reached a low point with the rise of ISIS/ISIL from Iraq in 2014 and its expansion throughout eastern Syria. Russia's intervention in 2015 is analysed in chapter ten, with military operations focusing primarily on the armed opposition and securing a weakened Assad-regime. Fighting ISIL was/is of secondary importance. The main Russian geo-strategic goal was to prevent another U.S. supported regime change and to end Russian diplomatic isolation after the annexation of Crimea in early 2014. These goals were achieved though the conflict remains unresolved and Russia is stil involved, paying a relatively low cost in securing its goals. In the final chapter Phillips draws some concluding remarks about the consequences of the civil war in Syria. Having already analyzed and concluded in the previous chapters the book doesn't need a long chapter to draw everything together. The chapters works quite well as stand alone. An interesting trend that is definitely worth a closer look is the regional failure of states in the Middle east that gives more space to non-state actors, notably al-Qaeda, Hizbullah, ISIL/ISIS, PKK and its allies, and various shi'ite militias under Iranian guidance. A trend very relevant for Syria. This is a lesson the regional actors does not seem to have learned, and do not have control over how will develop in the long term. What will happen to the Free Syrian Army groups supported by Turkey and fighting ISIL in northern Syria (Euprates Shield)? How will the various Syrian militias shape the country in the long term and the possibilities for rebuilding a Syrian state? A concluding chapter could have addressed these questions in detail but then this excellent book would have been much longer. A subject for another book I suppose. This is by far the best analysis of the external factors that have shaped, and shapes, the Syrian civil war. Read this together with Charles Lister's "The Syrian Jihad - al-Qaeda, the Islamic State, and the Evolution of an Insurgency" and you will have a firm grasp of this gigantic human tragedy which is set to continue.
Phillips begins with an analysis of the international and regional situation on the eve of the civil war. The 2003-2009/11 Iraq war shifted the regional balance with President Obama scaling down U.S. military and political commitment, Iran emerging as a dominant regional actor with Saudi Arabia and Turkey responding, and Qatar with a more active regional foreign policy. The war was a turning point that released three interrelated trends: the breakdown of the post-1991 order; the emergence of regional competition; the regional proliferation of sectarianism, Jihadism, and Kurdish nationalism. He continues with how the most important actors viewed these developments: the United States, Russia, Turkey, Iran, Qatar. Chapter two covers how the regime responded to the Arab Spring and the first protests in Syria in 2011, and chapter three looks at the ambivalent response of the international community. This response is seen in light of other developments in the region, with particular attention to the intervention in Libya, and the "non-intervention" in Bahrain, and developments in Egypt. An important factor is Saudi Arabia acting to contain the Arab Spring to ensure itself, while prevention perceived Iranian expansion. Another factor that Phillips emphasizes is the shift in Turkish foreign policy away from Assad in August 2011, and hosting the leadership of the armed opposition and supporting it. Chapter four to eight describes how the international responses (sanctions, Arab League observers, Kofi Annan/UN observers) failed to coerce any parties to compromise. With continued military and diplomatic support from Russia and Iran the regime felt confident. The opposition was unable to unite politically and militarily. As such there was no credible alternative in Syria for the international community to support. A core point was also the regime use of chemical weapons in August 2013 which did not produce a firm U.S. response but a deal to evacuate Syria's chemical weapons in the deal proposed by Russia. The deal highlighted the limited will of the Western powers to intervene in the conflict, giving the regime and its allies almost free hands to use all available means to defeat the opposition. From then on the conflict descended into chaos and reached a low point with the rise of ISIS/ISIL from Iraq in 2014 and its expansion throughout eastern Syria. Russia's intervention in 2015 is analysed in chapter ten, with military operations focusing primarily on the armed opposition and securing a weakened Assad-regime. Fighting ISIL was/is of secondary importance. The main Russian geo-strategic goal was to prevent another U.S. supported regime change and to end Russian diplomatic isolation after the annexation of Crimea in early 2014. These goals were achieved though the conflict remains unresolved and Russia is stil involved, paying a relatively low cost in securing its goals. In the final chapter Phillips draws some concluding remarks about the consequences of the civil war in Syria. Having already analyzed and concluded in the previous chapters the book doesn't need a long chapter to draw everything together. The chapters works quite well as stand alone. An interesting trend that is definitely worth a closer look is the regional failure of states in the Middle east that gives more space to non-state actors, notably al-Qaeda, Hizbullah, ISIL/ISIS, PKK and its allies, and various shi'ite militias under Iranian guidance. A trend very relevant for Syria. This is a lesson the regional actors does not seem to have learned, and do not have control over how will develop in the long term. What will happen to the Free Syrian Army groups supported by Turkey and fighting ISIL in northern Syria (Euprates Shield)? How will the various Syrian militias shape the country in the long term and the possibilities for rebuilding a Syrian state? A concluding chapter could have addressed these questions in detail but then this excellent book would have been much longer. A subject for another book I suppose. This is by far the best analysis of the external factors that have shaped, and shapes, the Syrian civil war. Read this together with Charles Lister's "The Syrian Jihad - al-Qaeda, the Islamic State, and the Evolution of an Insurgency" and you will have a firm grasp of this gigantic human tragedy which is set to continue.
December 21, 2024
Syria is one of the most complex conflicts of the 21st century, which all came to a very definite stop recently. Many people ask me often to explain it to them in layman’s terms, which I jokingly retort will take at least fifteen minutes. This book is around 400 pages and yet I still do not believe it accurately gives an account of all the forces at work in Syria, even within the first five years.
December 10, 2024
Everyone had their own agenda and the interests of Syrian people came second, third or not at all
March 21, 2022
comprehensive analysis, covers the domestic and international factors which have defined this conflict in Syria with considerable detail
June 4, 2021
In-depth book on the international relations aspects of the Syrian conflict. Not an easy read, but worth it if you want to learn the specifics. Definitely recommend.
December 20, 2021
This book provides a thorough explanation of the different aspects of the Syrian civil war, beginning with the outbreak of peaceful protests until the emergence of ISIS and the international war on terrorism. The book focuses more on the international calculations and rivalries in Syria and analyses the aspirations, achievements, and and approaches of all the intervening external parties. Though he generally presents a neutral and credible examination of the conflict, the author seems particularly concerned in shifting the blame for the outcome of the Syria war away from Obama's administration, placing it solely instead on the US allies' overestimation of the extent of American support for their battle. Five years after the publication of this book, many political developments have surfaced, some policies have changed, others have been consolidated. Even so, this book is definitely worth reading.
May 23, 2023
It is convincing enough to assume that there exists post-American Middle East which creates a kind of power (geo-political) vacuum to entice Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey into competing with the dwindling influence of the United States (US) in the Middle East; the battle for Syria is one such example where external forces are contending for dictating their terms. This is the central idea of the book.
In the post-Cold war era, Syria has been enjoying an interesting combination of dynasty and socialism, led by President Bashar al-Assad, who belongs to Shia Alawi minority tribe (12% of the population) ruling over the Sunni Arab majority (65%). After December 17, 2010, when Mohamed Bouazizi immolated himself in Tunisia and sparked the Arab Spring of awakening, Deraa was the first Syrian city where anti-Assad slogans were heard from teenagers in early March 2011. The latent period of two and a half months was enough to let the Syrian regime brace the challenge.
On page 48, Phillips writes: “[I]t is quite possible that Syrians would have remained largely passive were it not for the trigger of the Arab Spring, which served as both an inspiration and a guide…Technology helped facilitate protest…It took days and weeks for Syrians and the world to learn about the Hama massacre in [February] 1982 [to quell the revolt of the Muslim Brotherhood], but in 2011 technology [e.g. internet, satellite television, Smartphone, social media and al-Jazeera] allowed instant information.” Here, whereas Phillips says that the presence or absence of technology to spread information makes a difference between the reaction of people to incidents in 1982 and 2011, he does not mention the significance of the authenticity of information to be spread through technology. Ironically, Phillips does not value the role of Wikileaks for giving people access to the raw truth – and not disinformation – spread through the prevailing technology in Tunisia leading to the Arab Spring in 2011. In the bibliography section, only one reference about Wikileaks – and that is related to “Ankara’s new foreign policy” – is found on page 288. Perhaps, Phillips does not appreciate that, more than technology, the difference lies in the legitimacy of information being bandied about, and that the revelation of information through Wikileaks became the immediate reason for the making of the Arab Spring.
Phillips differentiates between uprising and civil war in Syria but considers 2011 an important year in both cases. From page 50 to 57, Phillips comments on uprising. He explicates two main pre-emptive modes of appeasement adopted by the Assad regime to keep Syrians in general away from toppling it through any uprising be it in the name of the Arab Spring, unlike Iraq, Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. The first mode is contingent on five buy-ins such as offering economic benefits to the Sunni merchant and middle class, extending patronage to important tribes, launching propaganda to depict Bashar al-Assad a reformer, avowing secularism of the regime to offer solace to secular Sunnis against Islamism and Jihadism and keeping Sunni-Alawi (Shia) tensions lower, and resorting to the appeal of stability be valued by the masses. The second mode is resorting to two coup-proofing strategies such as avoiding army’s defection by buying its loyalty and resorting to spying (or “Mukhabarat” which were 15 agencies by 2011) on the regime, general population and each other. Moreover, the Assad regime has protected itself not only by resorting to selective – and not wide-spread – violence against protestors through the security forces and Alawi pro-Assad non-state actors such as Shabiha but also by following a reconciliatory policy towards Kurds.
The Assad regime has come into the grip of two major limitations. First, the UNSC Resolution 1973 which, on March 17, 2011, gave mandate to NATO to “intervene to protect anti-regime demonstrators that Gaddafi had threatened to crush” deters Assad from using brute force against protestors – to avoid any international intervention, as mentioned on page 56. Secondly, the caution given to Syria by US President Barack Obama on August 20, 2012, not to cross the red line of using chemical weapons against rebels closes the option of suppressing rebels, as mentioned on page 175. Hence, whereas the measures taken by the Assad regime has enabled it to survive the uprising, the limitations imposed from outside have made it surrender Syria to a civil war.
On page 196, Phillips writes: “Seeing advantage when the Syrian uprising turned into a civil war [by December 2011] … It eventually acquired sufficient supporters and territory inside Syria to rename itself the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) in April 2013”. This paragraph shows that December 2011 was the time when Syria was descending into a civil war while the US forces were withdrawing from Iraq as per the 2008 electoral pledge made by US President Barack Obama. This is the point in time which Phillips considers to have given an impression of perceived decline of US power in the Middle East and which consequently shapes a new geopolitical order in the region. Here, Phillips forgets to mention the significance of the Status of Forces Agreement between Iraq and the US signed in 2008 and expired on December 31, 2011, and which the government of Iraq’s Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki refused to extend owing to domestic political opposition. The extension could have afforded the US some leeway to station a residual (combat) force in Iraq to counter any immediate threat, as the US and NATO signed similar agreements with Afghanistan in December 2014 for another ten years.
If the Eisenhower doctrine (January 05, 1957) and the Carter doctrine (January 23, 1980) were any guide, the assumption of post-American Middle East would be a fallacy. Similarly, if the Clinton doctrine (February 26, 1999) were any guide, US planes would soon be hitting targets in the troubled spots in Syria. Neither is there any dwindling of US influence in the Middle East nor is there any new Middle East in the making. Nevertheless, the Afghanistan model can still be created in Syria by persuading the Assad regime to introduce reforms to make the government as representative as possible to let pro-democratic Syrians back the democratic process. The Syrian rebels of all hues can be treated as the Taliban and al-Qaeda are dealt with in Afghanistan.
In the post-Cold war era, Syria has been enjoying an interesting combination of dynasty and socialism, led by President Bashar al-Assad, who belongs to Shia Alawi minority tribe (12% of the population) ruling over the Sunni Arab majority (65%). After December 17, 2010, when Mohamed Bouazizi immolated himself in Tunisia and sparked the Arab Spring of awakening, Deraa was the first Syrian city where anti-Assad slogans were heard from teenagers in early March 2011. The latent period of two and a half months was enough to let the Syrian regime brace the challenge.
On page 48, Phillips writes: “[I]t is quite possible that Syrians would have remained largely passive were it not for the trigger of the Arab Spring, which served as both an inspiration and a guide…Technology helped facilitate protest…It took days and weeks for Syrians and the world to learn about the Hama massacre in [February] 1982 [to quell the revolt of the Muslim Brotherhood], but in 2011 technology [e.g. internet, satellite television, Smartphone, social media and al-Jazeera] allowed instant information.” Here, whereas Phillips says that the presence or absence of technology to spread information makes a difference between the reaction of people to incidents in 1982 and 2011, he does not mention the significance of the authenticity of information to be spread through technology. Ironically, Phillips does not value the role of Wikileaks for giving people access to the raw truth – and not disinformation – spread through the prevailing technology in Tunisia leading to the Arab Spring in 2011. In the bibliography section, only one reference about Wikileaks – and that is related to “Ankara’s new foreign policy” – is found on page 288. Perhaps, Phillips does not appreciate that, more than technology, the difference lies in the legitimacy of information being bandied about, and that the revelation of information through Wikileaks became the immediate reason for the making of the Arab Spring.
Phillips differentiates between uprising and civil war in Syria but considers 2011 an important year in both cases. From page 50 to 57, Phillips comments on uprising. He explicates two main pre-emptive modes of appeasement adopted by the Assad regime to keep Syrians in general away from toppling it through any uprising be it in the name of the Arab Spring, unlike Iraq, Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. The first mode is contingent on five buy-ins such as offering economic benefits to the Sunni merchant and middle class, extending patronage to important tribes, launching propaganda to depict Bashar al-Assad a reformer, avowing secularism of the regime to offer solace to secular Sunnis against Islamism and Jihadism and keeping Sunni-Alawi (Shia) tensions lower, and resorting to the appeal of stability be valued by the masses. The second mode is resorting to two coup-proofing strategies such as avoiding army’s defection by buying its loyalty and resorting to spying (or “Mukhabarat” which were 15 agencies by 2011) on the regime, general population and each other. Moreover, the Assad regime has protected itself not only by resorting to selective – and not wide-spread – violence against protestors through the security forces and Alawi pro-Assad non-state actors such as Shabiha but also by following a reconciliatory policy towards Kurds.
The Assad regime has come into the grip of two major limitations. First, the UNSC Resolution 1973 which, on March 17, 2011, gave mandate to NATO to “intervene to protect anti-regime demonstrators that Gaddafi had threatened to crush” deters Assad from using brute force against protestors – to avoid any international intervention, as mentioned on page 56. Secondly, the caution given to Syria by US President Barack Obama on August 20, 2012, not to cross the red line of using chemical weapons against rebels closes the option of suppressing rebels, as mentioned on page 175. Hence, whereas the measures taken by the Assad regime has enabled it to survive the uprising, the limitations imposed from outside have made it surrender Syria to a civil war.
On page 196, Phillips writes: “Seeing advantage when the Syrian uprising turned into a civil war [by December 2011] … It eventually acquired sufficient supporters and territory inside Syria to rename itself the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) in April 2013”. This paragraph shows that December 2011 was the time when Syria was descending into a civil war while the US forces were withdrawing from Iraq as per the 2008 electoral pledge made by US President Barack Obama. This is the point in time which Phillips considers to have given an impression of perceived decline of US power in the Middle East and which consequently shapes a new geopolitical order in the region. Here, Phillips forgets to mention the significance of the Status of Forces Agreement between Iraq and the US signed in 2008 and expired on December 31, 2011, and which the government of Iraq’s Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki refused to extend owing to domestic political opposition. The extension could have afforded the US some leeway to station a residual (combat) force in Iraq to counter any immediate threat, as the US and NATO signed similar agreements with Afghanistan in December 2014 for another ten years.
If the Eisenhower doctrine (January 05, 1957) and the Carter doctrine (January 23, 1980) were any guide, the assumption of post-American Middle East would be a fallacy. Similarly, if the Clinton doctrine (February 26, 1999) were any guide, US planes would soon be hitting targets in the troubled spots in Syria. Neither is there any dwindling of US influence in the Middle East nor is there any new Middle East in the making. Nevertheless, the Afghanistan model can still be created in Syria by persuading the Assad regime to introduce reforms to make the government as representative as possible to let pro-democratic Syrians back the democratic process. The Syrian rebels of all hues can be treated as the Taliban and al-Qaeda are dealt with in Afghanistan.
February 12, 2017
The book provides a valuable insight into the dynamics of a the Syrian civil war. Although Phillips described it as being the "greatest humanitarian catastrophe of the twenty-first century", he does not dwell deeply into the bloodshed and the horrors of the war. Rather, he tries to unravel the larger scope , internal policies and international play that have come to shape the war as we know it today.
AThe book more or less represents an objective political description of the conflict in Syria rather than a political analysis, and although it is a little repetitive at times, I would highly recommended it to anyone wishing to get introduced to the Syrian civil war.
AThe book more or less represents an objective political description of the conflict in Syria rather than a political analysis, and although it is a little repetitive at times, I would highly recommended it to anyone wishing to get introduced to the Syrian civil war.
January 6, 2018
Overall, the book explains the roots of the conflict and the impact that each of the major actor had. The author is successful in explaining major milestones, breaking points, and other outcomes that would otherwise be confusing for the reader to understand. However, he could have done more to assess possible future outcomes of the conflict and how it will evolve for both Syria and its neighbors. If you want to understand the Syria question, I'd recommend the book.
June 24, 2017
Concise and analytical book even for the layman
Originally I chose this book because Dr Phillips was my tutor at university and I must say this book does not disappoint it is superbly written, balanced and well documented exploring multiple avenues and dimensions for the conflict other authors and commentators have glosses over. Highly recommend this book!
Originally I chose this book because Dr Phillips was my tutor at university and I must say this book does not disappoint it is superbly written, balanced and well documented exploring multiple avenues and dimensions for the conflict other authors and commentators have glosses over. Highly recommend this book!
January 1, 2017
A great introductory book to the Syrian conflict.
January 23, 2017
Informative & well written
April 3, 2021
So dry / i am too stupid to read books like this
Read
September 28, 2022عرض كتاب "معركة سوريا.. منافسة دولية في الشرق الأوسط الجديد"
الكتاب: معركة سوريا.. منافسة دولية في الشرق الأوسط الجديد
المؤلف: كريستوفر فيليبس
الناشر: مطبعة جامعة ييل
تاريخ الإصدار: 25 أكتوبر 2016
عدد الصفحات: 320 صفحة.
اللغة: الإنجليزية
(1)
في 320 صفحة باللغة الإنجليزية، أصدرت مطبعة جامعة ييل، بتاريخ 25 أكتوبر 2016، كتابًا بعنوان "معركة سوريا.. التنافس الدولي في الشرق الأوسط الجديد"، لمؤلفه كريستوفر فيليبس.
يستهل الكتاب باستعراض المشهد السوري، والشرق أوسطي بشكل عام، في مستهل الحرب التي يروق للغربيين دائمًا وصفها بـ"الأهلية"، ولم تضع أوزارها حتى الآن.
الفصل الثاني مكرًّسٌ لرصد انتقال الربيع العربي إلى سوريا. أما الثالث فيتناول الموقف الغربي الذي يصفه المؤلف بـ "المتردد" حيال رحيل "الأسد".
ويتطرق الفصل الرابع إلى دور المؤسسات الدولية في مواجهة انزلاق البلد إلى أتون الحرب.
الفصل الخامس يتحدث عن فكرة "الممثل الشرعي"، وما يتعلق بها من دعم المعارضة السياسية السورية وتخريبها، على حد وصف الكتاب.
في المحطة السادسة يتناول المؤلف "تسليح المتمردين" ودعم المعارضة المسلحة. ثم يتحدث عن الدعم الذي قدمه حلفاء الأسد في الفصل السابع.
عنون المؤلف الفصل الثامن بـ "لا خطوط حمراء"، وتحدث فيه عن مسألة التدخل العسكري الغربي.
وفي الفصل التاسع، تتبَّع الكتاب انزلاق البلد إلى مستنقع الفوضى، ووصول المشهد إلى طريق مسدود، وصعود تنظيم الدولة.
الفصل العاشر والأخير، سبر غور التدخل الروسي، مركزًا على رهانات بوتين على الساحة السورية.
تُوِّجت الفصول العشر بخاتمةٍ تُلخِّص وجهة نظر الكاتب، ومفادها: أن المأساة السورية هي "حرب خسرها الجميع".
(2)
يقدم الكتاب تحليلًا للدور الحاسم الذي قامت به الولايات المتحدة ودول أخرى في صياغة الحرب الدائرة في سوريا، ورغم ذلك لم يحظَ بقدرٍ كافٍ من الاستكشاف.
بينما معظم التحليلات التي تتناول الحرب الوحشية التي طال أمدها في سوريا تركز على النزاع الداخلي الذي انطلقت شرارته الأولى في عام 2011، وجذب الدول الأجنبية لاحقًا للانخراط في العنف المتصاعد.
بيد أن كريستوفر فيليبس يركز في هذا الكتاب على جانب آخر من القصة، هو: البعد الدولي، الذي لم يكن ثانويًا أبدًا.
ويجادِل المؤلف بأن الحرب السورية كانت متأثرة، منذ البداية، بالعوامل الإقليمية، لا سيما الفراغ الناتج عن التراجع الواضح لنفوذ الولايات المتحدة في الشرق الأوسط.
عجَّل ذلك بتشكيل نظام إقليمي جديد، شهد تنافسًا عنيفًا بين ستة أطراف: الولايات المتحدة وروسيا وإيران والسعودية وتركيا وقطر.
كانت سوريا هي ساحة المعركة الرئيسية، أما الهدف، فهو: امتلاك النفوذ.
بالاعتماد على عدد من المقابلات المباشرة، رسم "فيليبس" لوحة يقول الناشر إنها جديدة للحرب في سوريا. لكنها ليست بهذا القدر من الإنصاف الذي يحاول العرض الترويجيّ للكتاب أن يُظهرها به.
مثلا، في حين يؤكد المؤلف على أنه لا يبرئ نظام بشار الأسد الوحشيّ، وبالفعل يفكك العوامل الخارجية الرئيسية التي تفسر تسارع النزاع واستمراريته، بما في ذلك استراتيجية الغرب ضد تنظيم الدولة.
إلا أنه في المقابل، لم ينجُ من الاختزال تماما حين تطرق إلى بعض الزوايا الحساسة. وفي حين أراد توسيع رقعة المسؤولية- وهذا مطابق للواقع- انزلق في بعض المواطن إلى فخ تفريق دمائِها، لدرجة إيهام القارئ بأن خطيئة النظام السوري الكبرى كانت في انتمائه لإيران الشيعية.
(3)
بحلول منتصف عام 2012، يقول المؤلف إن المعارضة السورية انقسمت إلى 3250 فرعًا مسلحًا على الأقل، وفشلت كل محاولات توحيدهم.
يرجع ذلك جزئيًا إلى سعي من يصفهم المؤلف بـ "أمراء الحرب" المحليين إلى جمع الغنائم بدلا من إحراز النصر الوطني، ورفض الأطراف الخارجية تنسيق جهودها.
أما الغزاة التقليديون للشرق الأوسط- بريطانيا وفرنسا والولايات المتحدة- فأصبحوا "سجناء خطابهم الخاص"، على حد قول "فيليبس"، الذي اتهم واشنطن أيضًا بأن لديها "فجوة معرفية تاريخية كبيرة في الشأن السوري"، معتبرًا أن صمت أوباما "لا يُغتَفَر".
أما السعودية، من وجهة نظر المؤلف، فبالغت في تقدير قوة المتمردين في حين قللت من قوة الأسد، وإن لم تكن الرياض وحدها هي التي وقعت في هذا الفخ.
بـ " معركة سوريا"؛ ينضم "فيليبس" إلى قائمة قصيرة من الكتاب الذين قدموا إسهامات أصليّة لشرح أسباب الحرب في سوريا، ونتائجها المحتملة.
تضم القائمة: مدير مركز دراسات الشرق الأوسط في جامعة أوكلاهوما، البروفسور جوشوا لانديس، و مراسل صحيفة الإندبندت البريطانية في الشرق الأوسط، باتريك كوكبيرن، وأستاذ سياسة الشرق الأوسط والعلاقات الدولية في كلية لندن للاقتصاد والعلوم السياسية ومدير مركز دراسات الشرق الأوسط في جامعة لندن، فواز جرجس، ومراسل نيويورك تايمز وواشنطن بوست وأسوشيتد برس، الراحل أنتوني شديد.
ما يمنح الكتاب ثِقَلا- من وجهة نظر المراسل السابق لـ إيه بي سي نيوز في الشرق الأوسط، تشارلز جلاس- هو: أنه يوجه "طعنةً حازمة وناجحة، ويوزع المسؤولية على جميع البلدان التي تسببت بتوفير السلاح والمال في إطالة أمد الحرب لفترة أطول بكثير مما كانت الموارد السورية تسمح به".
النتيجة: إزهاق أكثر من 500 ألف روح، وتشريد قرابة نصف سكان سوريا. ولا أبلغَ من ذلك دليلٌ على أن هؤلاء الغرباء لا يهتمون بسوريا أصلا، بل هو يكشف أولوياتهم التي تخدم فقط أهدافهم المتصارعة.
حول المؤلف:
كريستوفر فيليبس، خبير العلاقات الدولية في منطقة الشرق الأوسط، ومحاضر بارز في كلية الملكة ماري في لندن، وزميل مشارك في برنامج الشرق الأوسط وشمال أفريقيا التابع لـ تشاتام هاوس، وهناك أسس مبادرة سوريا وجيرانها. يعيش في لندن.
(نُشِرَ هذا العرض على موقع مركز إدراك للدراسات والاستشارات في عام 2016، ومتاح على الرابط التالي https://idraksy.net/the-battle-for-sy...، كما نُشِرَ على موقع "العالم بالعربية"؛ أول منصة عربية متخصصة في رصد وتحليل اتجاهات الصحف ومراكز الأبحاث والإصدارات العالمية)
الكتاب: معركة سوريا.. منافسة دولية في الشرق الأوسط الجديد
المؤلف: كريستوفر فيليبس
الناشر: مطبعة جامعة ييل
تاريخ الإصدار: 25 أكتوبر 2016
عدد الصفحات: 320 صفحة.
اللغة: الإنجليزية
(1)
في 320 صفحة باللغة الإنجليزية، أصدرت مطبعة جامعة ييل، بتاريخ 25 أكتوبر 2016، كتابًا بعنوان "معركة سوريا.. التنافس الدولي في الشرق الأوسط الجديد"، لمؤلفه كريستوفر فيليبس.
يستهل الكتاب باستعراض المشهد السوري، والشرق أوسطي بشكل عام، في مستهل الحرب التي يروق للغربيين دائمًا وصفها بـ"الأهلية"، ولم تضع أوزارها حتى الآن.
الفصل الثاني مكرًّسٌ لرصد انتقال الربيع العربي إلى سوريا. أما الثالث فيتناول الموقف الغربي الذي يصفه المؤلف بـ "المتردد" حيال رحيل "الأسد".
ويتطرق الفصل الرابع إلى دور المؤسسات الدولية في مواجهة انزلاق البلد إلى أتون الحرب.
الفصل الخامس يتحدث عن فكرة "الممثل الشرعي"، وما يتعلق بها من دعم المعارضة السياسية السورية وتخريبها، على حد وصف الكتاب.
في المحطة السادسة يتناول المؤلف "تسليح المتمردين" ودعم المعارضة المسلحة. ثم يتحدث عن الدعم الذي قدمه حلفاء الأسد في الفصل السابع.
عنون المؤلف الفصل الثامن بـ "لا خطوط حمراء"، وتحدث فيه عن مسألة التدخل العسكري الغربي.
وفي الفصل التاسع، تتبَّع الكتاب انزلاق البلد إلى مستنقع الفوضى، ووصول المشهد إلى طريق مسدود، وصعود تنظيم الدولة.
الفصل العاشر والأخير، سبر غور التدخل الروسي، مركزًا على رهانات بوتين على الساحة السورية.
تُوِّجت الفصول العشر بخاتمةٍ تُلخِّص وجهة نظر الكاتب، ومفادها: أن المأساة السورية هي "حرب خسرها الجميع".
(2)
يقدم الكتاب تحليلًا للدور الحاسم الذي قامت به الولايات المتحدة ودول أخرى في صياغة الحرب الدائرة في سوريا، ورغم ذلك لم يحظَ بقدرٍ كافٍ من الاستكشاف.
بينما معظم التحليلات التي تتناول الحرب الوحشية التي طال أمدها في سوريا تركز على النزاع الداخلي الذي انطلقت شرارته الأولى في عام 2011، وجذب الدول الأجنبية لاحقًا للانخراط في العنف المتصاعد.
بيد أن كريستوفر فيليبس يركز في هذا الكتاب على جانب آخر من القصة، هو: البعد الدولي، الذي لم يكن ثانويًا أبدًا.
ويجادِل المؤلف بأن الحرب السورية كانت متأثرة، منذ البداية، بالعوامل الإقليمية، لا سيما الفراغ الناتج عن التراجع الواضح لنفوذ الولايات المتحدة في الشرق الأوسط.
عجَّل ذلك بتشكيل نظام إقليمي جديد، شهد تنافسًا عنيفًا بين ستة أطراف: الولايات المتحدة وروسيا وإيران والسعودية وتركيا وقطر.
كانت سوريا هي ساحة المعركة الرئيسية، أما الهدف، فهو: امتلاك النفوذ.
بالاعتماد على عدد من المقابلات المباشرة، رسم "فيليبس" لوحة يقول الناشر إنها جديدة للحرب في سوريا. لكنها ليست بهذا القدر من الإنصاف الذي يحاول العرض الترويجيّ للكتاب أن يُظهرها به.
مثلا، في حين يؤكد المؤلف على أنه لا يبرئ نظام بشار الأسد الوحشيّ، وبالفعل يفكك العوامل الخارجية الرئيسية التي تفسر تسارع النزاع واستمراريته، بما في ذلك استراتيجية الغرب ضد تنظيم الدولة.
إلا أنه في المقابل، لم ينجُ من الاختزال تماما حين تطرق إلى بعض الزوايا الحساسة. وفي حين أراد توسيع رقعة المسؤولية- وهذا مطابق للواقع- انزلق في بعض المواطن إلى فخ تفريق دمائِها، لدرجة إيهام القارئ بأن خطيئة النظام السوري الكبرى كانت في انتمائه لإيران الشيعية.
(3)
بحلول منتصف عام 2012، يقول المؤلف إن المعارضة السورية انقسمت إلى 3250 فرعًا مسلحًا على الأقل، وفشلت كل محاولات توحيدهم.
يرجع ذلك جزئيًا إلى سعي من يصفهم المؤلف بـ "أمراء الحرب" المحليين إلى جمع الغنائم بدلا من إحراز النصر الوطني، ورفض الأطراف الخارجية تنسيق جهودها.
أما الغزاة التقليديون للشرق الأوسط- بريطانيا وفرنسا والولايات المتحدة- فأصبحوا "سجناء خطابهم الخاص"، على حد قول "فيليبس"، الذي اتهم واشنطن أيضًا بأن لديها "فجوة معرفية تاريخية كبيرة في الشأن السوري"، معتبرًا أن صمت أوباما "لا يُغتَفَر".
أما السعودية، من وجهة نظر المؤلف، فبالغت في تقدير قوة المتمردين في حين قللت من قوة الأسد، وإن لم تكن الرياض وحدها هي التي وقعت في هذا الفخ.
بـ " معركة سوريا"؛ ينضم "فيليبس" إلى قائمة قصيرة من الكتاب الذين قدموا إسهامات أصليّة لشرح أسباب الحرب في سوريا، ونتائجها المحتملة.
تضم القائمة: مدير مركز دراسات الشرق الأوسط في جامعة أوكلاهوما، البروفسور جوشوا لانديس، و مراسل صحيفة الإندبندت البريطانية في الشرق الأوسط، باتريك كوكبيرن، وأستاذ سياسة الشرق الأوسط والعلاقات الدولية في كلية لندن للاقتصاد والعلوم السياسية ومدير مركز دراسات الشرق الأوسط في جامعة لندن، فواز جرجس، ومراسل نيويورك تايمز وواشنطن بوست وأسوشيتد برس، الراحل أنتوني شديد.
ما يمنح الكتاب ثِقَلا- من وجهة نظر المراسل السابق لـ إيه بي سي نيوز في الشرق الأوسط، تشارلز جلاس- هو: أنه يوجه "طعنةً حازمة وناجحة، ويوزع المسؤولية على جميع البلدان التي تسببت بتوفير السلاح والمال في إطالة أمد الحرب لفترة أطول بكثير مما كانت الموارد السورية تسمح به".
النتيجة: إزهاق أكثر من 500 ألف روح، وتشريد قرابة نصف سكان سوريا. ولا أبلغَ من ذلك دليلٌ على أن هؤلاء الغرباء لا يهتمون بسوريا أصلا، بل هو يكشف أولوياتهم التي تخدم فقط أهدافهم المتصارعة.
حول المؤلف:
كريستوفر فيليبس، خبير العلاقات الدولية في منطقة الشرق الأوسط، ومحاضر بارز في كلية الملكة ماري في لندن، وزميل مشارك في برنامج الشرق الأوسط وشمال أفريقيا التابع لـ تشاتام هاوس، وهناك أسس مبادرة سوريا وجيرانها. يعيش في لندن.
(نُشِرَ هذا العرض على موقع مركز إدراك للدراسات والاستشارات في عام 2016، ومتاح على الرابط التالي https://idraksy.net/the-battle-for-sy...، كما نُشِرَ على موقع "العالم بالعربية"؛ أول منصة عربية متخصصة في رصد وتحليل اتجاهات الصحف ومراكز الأبحاث والإصدارات العالمية)
May 11, 2024
A seeming small event in a small town in Tunisia on 17 December 2010 when Mohamed Bouazizi, a street vendor frustrated with a long line of humiliations, sets himself on fire - leading to massive protests and on 14 January 2011, the toppling of Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali, the country's ruler of twenty four years. And so began Arab Spring as protests and unrest spread from country to country in the Middle East - to Algeria, Jordan, Oman, Egypt, Sudan, (bringing down the long-standing rule of Hosni Mubarak in Egypt), Iraq, Bahrain, Libya, Kuwait, Morocco, and eastern Saudi Arabia.
Syria's leader, Bashar al-Assad, was confident that the unrest would not come to his country because he had been careful to craft an image of a modern and approachable leader. He was proven wrong as the protests began and his administration took stronger and stronger steps to quelch them. So began the descent into the hell that was the Syrian civil war.
Christopher Phillips, professor in International Relations at University of London and associate fellow at the think tank, Chatham House, takes on the story of Syria's civil war from the viewpoint of the adverse effects caused by the external actors who deepened and prolonged the civil war. Turkey, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia were determined to bring Assad down each for their own individual reasons while the US tried to stay out of the action as Obama's administration sought to pivot from the Middle East to Asia, improving relations with Cuba, and climate change. Unfortunately, Obama was not forceful enough in telegraphing this message to Syria's rebels who were convinced that the US would weigh in on their side to bring Assad down.
As the character of Syria's opposition changed, from perceived moderates to more radical groups, and seemed to be winning, Iran and Russia stepped in to tip the scales back to Assad while the US began to change its mind about regime change when radical jihadists seemed to be taking over the opposition.
Because these external actors, each working for their own benefit, prolonged the civil war, the costs never became severe enough for either Assad's regime or the opposition to stop fighting. And according to the author, Syria and the surrounding Middle Eastern countries were only worse off because of these hostilities as terrorism increased.
It's not clear whether the West of the US should ever enter into these wars even as its proponents say that they are fighting for democracy which is always so enticing for the US. The countries and its people are never better off. We just create millions of refugees, more terrorists, and millions of displaced people with nowhere to go. We should face reality and just tell people straight out, the world is just not going to be the way you want it to be and you need to make the best of your situation. Things can always be worse and more frequently than not is after these wars.
Syria's leader, Bashar al-Assad, was confident that the unrest would not come to his country because he had been careful to craft an image of a modern and approachable leader. He was proven wrong as the protests began and his administration took stronger and stronger steps to quelch them. So began the descent into the hell that was the Syrian civil war.
Christopher Phillips, professor in International Relations at University of London and associate fellow at the think tank, Chatham House, takes on the story of Syria's civil war from the viewpoint of the adverse effects caused by the external actors who deepened and prolonged the civil war. Turkey, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia were determined to bring Assad down each for their own individual reasons while the US tried to stay out of the action as Obama's administration sought to pivot from the Middle East to Asia, improving relations with Cuba, and climate change. Unfortunately, Obama was not forceful enough in telegraphing this message to Syria's rebels who were convinced that the US would weigh in on their side to bring Assad down.
As the character of Syria's opposition changed, from perceived moderates to more radical groups, and seemed to be winning, Iran and Russia stepped in to tip the scales back to Assad while the US began to change its mind about regime change when radical jihadists seemed to be taking over the opposition.
Because these external actors, each working for their own benefit, prolonged the civil war, the costs never became severe enough for either Assad's regime or the opposition to stop fighting. And according to the author, Syria and the surrounding Middle Eastern countries were only worse off because of these hostilities as terrorism increased.
It's not clear whether the West of the US should ever enter into these wars even as its proponents say that they are fighting for democracy which is always so enticing for the US. The countries and its people are never better off. We just create millions of refugees, more terrorists, and millions of displaced people with nowhere to go. We should face reality and just tell people straight out, the world is just not going to be the way you want it to be and you need to make the best of your situation. Things can always be worse and more frequently than not is after these wars.
September 22, 2023
An excellent overview of the Syrian Civil war, from the first moments of unrest through to the current situation today. Particular emphasis on the international aspect/interventions of the war, though that is fitting given the nature of the conflict and how the international community each individually responded and pursued their own agendas, even when seemingly co-operating.
Other readers have noted that the book is particularly balanced in its view of all parties to the war and their points of view, assumptions, goals and actions. I have to agree. The book goes to great pains to understand parties and attempts to break free of internal biases. This is most evident when discussing the Assad regime, ISIS, and Iran. Pains are gone to attempt a fair shake and not to resort to rhetoric or chastising. Inversely this means less about the US role (though still substantial). This shouldn’t be surprising as a central argument of the book is the effect of the end of American Hegemony in the middle-east and the fallout of continued perception of American power. I’ve seen criticism of the author downplaying the US role, but can’t agree with them. The book makes its arguments well, and acknowledges other points of view about the US. Though I found the book frequently warned about overstating US diplomatic actions a bit often than was probably necessary given its premise.
I was particularly impressed when no effort was made to ‘forecast’ what would come next, or spout any proposal on what ‘should’ be done. These statements (and sometimes whole books) never age well, and knowing even the full context of how we got to a place does not mean you will know what to do next. Especially with a conflict as complex as Syria. This may leave some readers with an ‘ending’ that drops off, or seems a bit of a downer. Unfortunately, that is reality, especially with fighting still going on to this day.
Would recommend and will keep an eye out for future books by the author.
Other readers have noted that the book is particularly balanced in its view of all parties to the war and their points of view, assumptions, goals and actions. I have to agree. The book goes to great pains to understand parties and attempts to break free of internal biases. This is most evident when discussing the Assad regime, ISIS, and Iran. Pains are gone to attempt a fair shake and not to resort to rhetoric or chastising. Inversely this means less about the US role (though still substantial). This shouldn’t be surprising as a central argument of the book is the effect of the end of American Hegemony in the middle-east and the fallout of continued perception of American power. I’ve seen criticism of the author downplaying the US role, but can’t agree with them. The book makes its arguments well, and acknowledges other points of view about the US. Though I found the book frequently warned about overstating US diplomatic actions a bit often than was probably necessary given its premise.
I was particularly impressed when no effort was made to ‘forecast’ what would come next, or spout any proposal on what ‘should’ be done. These statements (and sometimes whole books) never age well, and knowing even the full context of how we got to a place does not mean you will know what to do next. Especially with a conflict as complex as Syria. This may leave some readers with an ‘ending’ that drops off, or seems a bit of a downer. Unfortunately, that is reality, especially with fighting still going on to this day.
Would recommend and will keep an eye out for future books by the author.
March 27, 2020
How does one even begin to grasp, let alone, convey the complexities & vagaries of the many large & small wars occurring simultaneously in Syria today? This book does a masterful job in doing so by its lucid description of the many actors, internal & external, allying with or opposing each other opportunistically with the changing tides of time. Students of ancient history may recall another period when prolonged wars - with various actors with disparate motives likewise allied & opposed one another in successive turns - did occur in the Levant: the early phases of the Crusades between the 9th & 10th century. Highly recommended for any layperson keen on discovering as to who is backing - or fighting - who in this conflict that has extended its misery, directly & indirectly, even far beyond the borders of Syria.
May 6, 2021
The Battle for Syria to be a history of the Syrian civil war, but rather a study in international relations, which utilizes broader approaches from that discipline to increase our understanding of the origins, expansion and continuation of Syria’s conflict. This characterization is not entirely accurate: the content of the book is, in general, more descriptive than it is analytical or prescriptive. One unfortunate consequence of this is that we are not offered many insights into how the direction of the war could or should be changed. Phillips does provide some genuinely valuable insight into the dynamics of a tragedy that will undoubtedly remain at the centre of the world’s attention for many years to come. The catastrophe of Syrian state creates more space for Non-state actors like Hezbollah, Al Qaeda and ISIS.
December 24, 2022
A fairly detailed analysis, explores the internal and international elements that have shaped the Syrian crisis in great depth. The book focuses on international calculations and rivalries in Syria, as well as the objectives, accomplishments, and approaches of all intervening foreign actors. Thought, one thing is clear is that the author of this book seems particularly determined to shift responsibility for the outcome of the Syrian war away from Obama's administration, blaming it mostly on the US partners' exaggerated confidence in American support for their operation.
January 2, 2025
A very dense and academic work, more for fellow scholars than lay readers. This is the first book I have read on the subject, and if I could do it over, I would pick something shorter and easier.
The author’s main argument is that foreign involvement in Syria’s civil war both exacerbated and prolonged the conflict. “Rather than act to deter conflict,” he writes, “external actors helped to fan the flames of war.” (p. 82).
Don’t ask me much about the book beyond that. Syria’s civil war was extraordinarily complex, and the author makes the reader work too hard to try to understand it.
The author’s main argument is that foreign involvement in Syria’s civil war both exacerbated and prolonged the conflict. “Rather than act to deter conflict,” he writes, “external actors helped to fan the flames of war.” (p. 82).
Don’t ask me much about the book beyond that. Syria’s civil war was extraordinarily complex, and the author makes the reader work too hard to try to understand it.
March 25, 2022
It feels like Phillips is just carrying water for Obama, calling him “dovish”. give me a break. while the book is informative in some capacities like getting a better understanding of the several different foreign actors in the Syrian Civil War and the environment that created the rise of ISIS, there is soo much white washing of the atrocities that the US military committed that it makes me question some of the other information a bit.
September 22, 2021
A very good description of the foreign policy aspect of the Syrian civil war up to the Trump era. The book basically lays out the argument, that the Middle East has moved into a post-American era and this opened up space for different regional actors to try their hand in influencing the Syrian conflict, often with more ambition than their skills or resources could back up.
September 22, 2020
Syrian civil war has been one of the greatest tragedies of 20th century and this is a very good book to understand about the factors leading to it plus the involvement of various foreign Countries that really made this civil war a multifaceted proxy war in the middle east.
November 10, 2019
Great job on explaining the complexities and inconsistent agendas.
February 6, 2022
Everybody had their agenda and the interests of the Syrian people came second, third or not at all.
May 1, 2022
Excellent analysis of the international relations aspects of the war in Syria. Very detailed.
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