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מלכוד 67: הרעיונות מאחורי המחלוקת שקורעת את ישראל
המחלוקת על עתיד שטחי יהודה ושומרון מטלטלת את ישראל. המחלוקת נובעת מזרמים רעיוניים תת־קרקעיים שפרצו לשיח הציבורי לאחר מלחמת ששת הימים, התנגשו בעוצמה זה בזה וקרעו לגזרים את החברה הישראלית. במרוצת חמישים השנים שחלפו מאז המלחמה הפכה המחלוקת מוויכוח על רעיונות לקרב בין זהויות. השיחה הישראלית התמוטטה.
מלכוד 67 הוא מסע לחקר הרעיונות והזהויות הללו. מלכוד 67 צולל אל הפילוסופיה שביסוד הפוליטיקה, על מנת לנסות לשקם את השיחה הישראלית הפצועה.
״מיכה גודמן מצליח לעשות את הכמעט בלתי אפשרי: לכתוב על נושא טעון ומורכב בצורה סוחפת ולשלוף מנושא מכאיב ונדוש תובנות מפתיעות ומעוררות מחשבה. העומק ההגותי של מלכוד 67 עשוי להפוך את הספר לפלטפורמה להתחדשות השיחה הפוליטית הישראלית.״
גבי אשכנזי, רב־אלוף (במיל.), הרמטכ"ל לשעבר
״מלכוד 67 הוא ספר שאפתני וחשוב. באמצעות ניתוח מרתק של תולדות הרעיונות הישראליים, מדגים גודמן כיצד ניתן להחליף את השיח המתלהם בהקשבה מלאת סקרנות לצדדים השונים של מלחמת הדעות. מומלץ מאד.״
רות גביזון, פרופ' למשפטים, כלת פרס ישראל
״מלכוד 67 מציג בדרך מופלאה כמאה שנים של מחלוקות פילוסופיות ועקרוניות סבוכות. יש כאן תרומה של ממש, במישור האינטלקטואלי, להבנת העמדות השונות ומשמעותן, בעבר ובהווה.״
יעקב עמידרור, אלוף (במיל.), ראש המועצה לביטחון לאומי לשעבר
"החשיבה שלנו תהיה פרודוקטיבית יותר אם נפסיק להגדיר את המצב במילה ״בעיה״ ונתחיל להגדיר אותו במילה ״מלכוד״. למה? כי בעיות יש לפתור - ולבעיה המדוברת אין פתרון. מלכוד, לעומת זאת, לא זקוק לפתרון. ממלכוד יש להיחלץ — וייתכן מאד שמהמלכוד המדובר, מלכוד 67, ניתן להיחלץ."
בשלשת ספריו עד כה חקר מיכה גודמן
את הרעיונות הבסיסיים של האמונה היהודית. בספר החדש מעמיק גודמן ברעיונות הבסיסיים המזינים את אחת הבעיות הכואבות ביותר של החברה הישראלית.
מלכוד 67 הוא מסע לחקר הרעיונות והזהויות הללו. מלכוד 67 צולל אל הפילוסופיה שביסוד הפוליטיקה, על מנת לנסות לשקם את השיחה הישראלית הפצועה.
״מיכה גודמן מצליח לעשות את הכמעט בלתי אפשרי: לכתוב על נושא טעון ומורכב בצורה סוחפת ולשלוף מנושא מכאיב ונדוש תובנות מפתיעות ומעוררות מחשבה. העומק ההגותי של מלכוד 67 עשוי להפוך את הספר לפלטפורמה להתחדשות השיחה הפוליטית הישראלית.״
גבי אשכנזי, רב־אלוף (במיל.), הרמטכ"ל לשעבר
״מלכוד 67 הוא ספר שאפתני וחשוב. באמצעות ניתוח מרתק של תולדות הרעיונות הישראליים, מדגים גודמן כיצד ניתן להחליף את השיח המתלהם בהקשבה מלאת סקרנות לצדדים השונים של מלחמת הדעות. מומלץ מאד.״
רות גביזון, פרופ' למשפטים, כלת פרס ישראל
״מלכוד 67 מציג בדרך מופלאה כמאה שנים של מחלוקות פילוסופיות ועקרוניות סבוכות. יש כאן תרומה של ממש, במישור האינטלקטואלי, להבנת העמדות השונות ומשמעותן, בעבר ובהווה.״
יעקב עמידרור, אלוף (במיל.), ראש המועצה לביטחון לאומי לשעבר
"החשיבה שלנו תהיה פרודוקטיבית יותר אם נפסיק להגדיר את המצב במילה ״בעיה״ ונתחיל להגדיר אותו במילה ״מלכוד״. למה? כי בעיות יש לפתור - ולבעיה המדוברת אין פתרון. מלכוד, לעומת זאת, לא זקוק לפתרון. ממלכוד יש להיחלץ — וייתכן מאד שמהמלכוד המדובר, מלכוד 67, ניתן להיחלץ."
בשלשת ספריו עד כה חקר מיכה גודמן
את הרעיונות הבסיסיים של האמונה היהודית. בספר החדש מעמיק גודמן ברעיונות הבסיסיים המזינים את אחת הבעיות הכואבות ביותר של החברה הישראלית.
222 pages, Paperback
First published March 1, 2017
187 people are currently reading
1695 people want to read
About the author
Micah Goodman
12 books52 followersMicah Goodman is the author of four best-selling books in Israel including Maimonides and the Book That Changed Judaism. He is president of Beit Midrash Yisraeli–Ein Prat, and a senior fellow at the Shalom Hartman Institute in Jerusalem.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 121 reviews
November 19, 2020
Last week I was hanging out with a group of Palestinians (if you think I made jokes about Israelis always being outnumbered by Arabs, you are absolutely correct). One of them asked me why Israeli politics don't talk about the conflict.
I was baffled by this question because surely, all we do in our politics is talk about it. I mean, no one cares about economics, no one has opinions about education or welfare. It's always the conflict. Our left and right parties are defined plainly by this. The big event last year was that religion started to play a role and man, that was a shock.
Before I could answer, a Palestinian said, "isn't it obvious? Israelis benefit from this so why would they change anything? The question we should be asking is what can we do to get Israelis to want to change things."
This was equally surprising to hear because no one is happy with how things are. Both the left and the right think the situation needs to be improved. If there's one thing everyone agrees on, it's that things aren't ideal. I understand that Palestinians have an image of Israelis gleefully planning to take over more land but that feels so far from the reality.
As I was answering, I realized that we talk about the conflict all the time but we don't really say anything. Before I knew that I was doing it, I was echoing what Goodman says. Israeli politics are defined by fear. We no longer talk about what we want to do- we talk about potential catastrophes. Israelis simply do not know how to solve this problem and it is this indecision that has kept us stagnant for so long. No one is happy with how things are but no one knows how to change them.
I don't often read books about the conflict that I agree with. It felt indulgent to read a book that says things I say, that represents a lot of what I feel. I've heard of Micah Goodman for a while but after reading Eight Steps to Shrink the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
, I felt like I had to read his book. I'm so glad I did. This makes me want to go to his midrasha even more.
This is a book by an Israeli for Israelis. In that sense, it doesn't represent the history of the conflict, argue for/against Zionism or attempt to explain ourselves to people abroad. I wouldn't recommend it to someone who knows nothing about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict but I definitely think it's worth a read for people who have some knowledge, especially if they haven't read Israeli thinkers yet (Ilan Pappe doesn't count). If you're looking at our government and wondering how the heck has Netanyahu stayed in power for so long, this book provides some sense of an answer.
Goodman takes a long hard look at the Israeli left, right and religious right. He analyses their claims and finds the middle ground. From this, he begins thinking of ideas to minimize the conflict. Signing a peace agreement isn't feasible now but there are steps that we can do to make things better, that will work for every side.
It's marvelously refreshing. I think every high school student in Israel should read this book. Goodman smashes echo chambers on his journey to get us out of the "catch 67", the results of the 1967 war. The fact that both political sides think he represents the other side implies how balanced this is.
I talk about the importance of pragmatism in the conflict often but I usually focus on pragmatism in dialogues. I mean, Israelis and Palestinians can spend hours debating who's the bigger victim of the 1948 war but it's useless. It doesn't matter. We should focus our conversations on sharing perspectives, not discrediting the other's view. However, this book was the first time I had considered political pragmatism in the conflict. The idea of minimizing the conflict, rather than solving it. Making changes that push us towards a better future, even without making decisions on the big things.
It's brilliant because I've heard so many people talk about small steps like, "let's fix East Jerusalem's trash problem" or "we need to improve the West Bank's water systems" but I haven't heard someone talk about changes that directly impact the conflict. For example, building roads that connect between the Palestinian parts of the West Bank so that they won't have to encounter checkpoints in between their cities. That's so simple and would drastically reduce both terrorism and Palestinian humiliation. Why aren't we talking about this?
Goodman has an answer, one that's common in the political world. Israeli politics aren't about thinking about this rationally. At this point, people vote for their "tribe", it's an emotional statement, rather than a practical one. For this to work, we need to shake ourselves out of this mindset.
This is what Goodman tries to do. He brings up arguments from the left and the right and talks about them. Now, it's not perfect. If I was sitting at the Shabbat dinner table with him, responding to some of the claims wouldn't be too challenging. Nonetheless, the true power isn't his actual arguments as much as it is this methodology, this ability to look at arguments for what they are, to disengage from the emotions. To debate both left and right arguments with credibility and honesty.
Usually, I agree that Palestinian voices are important but here, I mostly disagree. At the end of the day, Palestinians want the end of the occupation. They don't care how we do it, they just want it to happen. So it's on us, the Israelis, to figure out the way to do it. Just as Israelis don't belong in a Palestinian conversation about the governance of Palestine, Palestinians don't belong in our conversation about finding political solutions to ending our stagnant situation. As an Israeli, I want a Palestinian autonomy that won't be violent or corrupt- I don't care how they do it, that's their journey. The same goes for finding political support for engaging better with the conflict, especially when diplomacy has been such a failure.
Certainly some of the plans he lists at the end need Palestinian agreement but truly, we need to gather ourselves together first and understand how to unite the Israeli parties towards minimizing the conflict. And hey, as Palestinians love to point out, Israel has the upper hand currently so really, it is more our responsibility to bring practical ideas to the table (especially since Ehud Barak, I don't think anyone's up for offering big plans that give the Palestinians everything).
To conclude, what I loved about this book is that it's grounded but optimistic. Unlike Westerners (*coughs* every single "pro Israel"/"pro Palestine" activist), it includes plans that factor both Israeli and Palestinian needs. It doesn't waste time with lengthy pseudo academic arguments (can you all believe I had to spend like 20 minutes explaining why a Jewish state isn't a racist concept? I literally had to detail why the chosen people thing isn't in any way a white supremacist idea. Like dear god, this is why education in religion matters). If you want to understand a little bit more about what goes on in Israeli politics, this short book is amazing.
So what are some of my favorite Goodman arguments?
- The right is correct in saying that the land of Palestine isn't occupied, as there was never a Palestinian state, it used to be part of Jordan and Israelis tried to give it back several times. So the West Bank is a disputed territory- not an occupied one. However, the left is right in saying that there's an occupied people. There are people living under military occupation and this is not a good thing. Being an occupying force is bad, not just for us as Israelis but because taking away someone's autonomy is bad. It's so true that when denying the occupation, the right talks about land while when talking about the occupation, the left always talks about people. That's a gap that exists.
- The right is scared of leaving the West Bank because of security concerns. The left is scared of staying because of humanitarian concerns. There are ways for Israel to hang on to the security edge while still ending the military presence. It's not an either/or situation.
- Ze'ev Jabotinsky wasn't worried about demographics when he was planning a dual Arab-Jewish state because he was looking at pre-Holocaust Europe. It's such a different perspective, we don't think about those 6 million Jews as potential Israelis that could tilt the demographics. I imagine Israel's Mizrahi-Ashkenazi relations would be even more messed up if there was an Ashkenazi majority (also, how would we ever succeed in Eurovision without the Middle Eastern Mizrahi vibes?).
- As Zionists, we're faced with a choice: give up on part of our historical homeland for a truly Jewish country, risk becoming a Jewish minority in our own country, or erect an apartheid where Jews have more voting rights. When we frame it like this, the choice becomes clear. Separating from the Palestinians makes sense, even if the classic two state solution is dead.
- Religious concerns are not an excuse for staying in the West Bank- if it saves lives, Judaism allows it. So the religious argument is derived from the security concerns. However, I believe there's something about the land, a halacha that says you can't give up on Eretz Israel, so yeah, I'm not sure why Goodman doesn't talk about it.
- When we ask Palestinians to give up the right of return, we're essentially asking them to give up on part of their identity.
- In the past, the right was scared of an overly powerful Palestinian state that would attack us. Nowadays, the fear is a weak Palestinian state that would fall apart and be taken over by extremists, as we see in much of the Middle East. It's fascinating to think about because if there was a malfunctioning independent Palestinian state, what would this look like? What would Israel do? Would we feel more obligated to be involved than we did when Syria collapsed?
- This is a broad statement but as a whole, Israelis are scared of Palestinians while Palestinians feel humiliated by Israelis. Obviously, not everyone but in my experience, Palestinians aren't scared of Israelis. They're angry and frustrated. Palestinians are sometimes scared of the army, though while Israelis aren't scared of Palestinian institutions usually. We tend to be scared of Palestinians as people, rather than angry at them (although there's definitely some anger as well, especially for people who experience the conflict's influence more in their daily life). Although, idk, I think at this point, I'm mostly frustrated.
----------------
Of the substantial amount of books I've read about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, this is the first one that I (mostly) agree with and also feel brings something useful to the conversation. This is exciting. Review to come!
I was baffled by this question because surely, all we do in our politics is talk about it. I mean, no one cares about economics, no one has opinions about education or welfare. It's always the conflict. Our left and right parties are defined plainly by this. The big event last year was that religion started to play a role and man, that was a shock.
Before I could answer, a Palestinian said, "isn't it obvious? Israelis benefit from this so why would they change anything? The question we should be asking is what can we do to get Israelis to want to change things."
This was equally surprising to hear because no one is happy with how things are. Both the left and the right think the situation needs to be improved. If there's one thing everyone agrees on, it's that things aren't ideal. I understand that Palestinians have an image of Israelis gleefully planning to take over more land but that feels so far from the reality.
As I was answering, I realized that we talk about the conflict all the time but we don't really say anything. Before I knew that I was doing it, I was echoing what Goodman says. Israeli politics are defined by fear. We no longer talk about what we want to do- we talk about potential catastrophes. Israelis simply do not know how to solve this problem and it is this indecision that has kept us stagnant for so long. No one is happy with how things are but no one knows how to change them.
I don't often read books about the conflict that I agree with. It felt indulgent to read a book that says things I say, that represents a lot of what I feel. I've heard of Micah Goodman for a while but after reading Eight Steps to Shrink the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
, I felt like I had to read his book. I'm so glad I did. This makes me want to go to his midrasha even more.
This is a book by an Israeli for Israelis. In that sense, it doesn't represent the history of the conflict, argue for/against Zionism or attempt to explain ourselves to people abroad. I wouldn't recommend it to someone who knows nothing about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict but I definitely think it's worth a read for people who have some knowledge, especially if they haven't read Israeli thinkers yet (Ilan Pappe doesn't count). If you're looking at our government and wondering how the heck has Netanyahu stayed in power for so long, this book provides some sense of an answer.
Goodman takes a long hard look at the Israeli left, right and religious right. He analyses their claims and finds the middle ground. From this, he begins thinking of ideas to minimize the conflict. Signing a peace agreement isn't feasible now but there are steps that we can do to make things better, that will work for every side.
It's marvelously refreshing. I think every high school student in Israel should read this book. Goodman smashes echo chambers on his journey to get us out of the "catch 67", the results of the 1967 war. The fact that both political sides think he represents the other side implies how balanced this is.
I talk about the importance of pragmatism in the conflict often but I usually focus on pragmatism in dialogues. I mean, Israelis and Palestinians can spend hours debating who's the bigger victim of the 1948 war but it's useless. It doesn't matter. We should focus our conversations on sharing perspectives, not discrediting the other's view. However, this book was the first time I had considered political pragmatism in the conflict. The idea of minimizing the conflict, rather than solving it. Making changes that push us towards a better future, even without making decisions on the big things.
It's brilliant because I've heard so many people talk about small steps like, "let's fix East Jerusalem's trash problem" or "we need to improve the West Bank's water systems" but I haven't heard someone talk about changes that directly impact the conflict. For example, building roads that connect between the Palestinian parts of the West Bank so that they won't have to encounter checkpoints in between their cities. That's so simple and would drastically reduce both terrorism and Palestinian humiliation. Why aren't we talking about this?
Goodman has an answer, one that's common in the political world. Israeli politics aren't about thinking about this rationally. At this point, people vote for their "tribe", it's an emotional statement, rather than a practical one. For this to work, we need to shake ourselves out of this mindset.
This is what Goodman tries to do. He brings up arguments from the left and the right and talks about them. Now, it's not perfect. If I was sitting at the Shabbat dinner table with him, responding to some of the claims wouldn't be too challenging. Nonetheless, the true power isn't his actual arguments as much as it is this methodology, this ability to look at arguments for what they are, to disengage from the emotions. To debate both left and right arguments with credibility and honesty.
Usually, I agree that Palestinian voices are important but here, I mostly disagree. At the end of the day, Palestinians want the end of the occupation. They don't care how we do it, they just want it to happen. So it's on us, the Israelis, to figure out the way to do it. Just as Israelis don't belong in a Palestinian conversation about the governance of Palestine, Palestinians don't belong in our conversation about finding political solutions to ending our stagnant situation. As an Israeli, I want a Palestinian autonomy that won't be violent or corrupt- I don't care how they do it, that's their journey. The same goes for finding political support for engaging better with the conflict, especially when diplomacy has been such a failure.
Certainly some of the plans he lists at the end need Palestinian agreement but truly, we need to gather ourselves together first and understand how to unite the Israeli parties towards minimizing the conflict. And hey, as Palestinians love to point out, Israel has the upper hand currently so really, it is more our responsibility to bring practical ideas to the table (especially since Ehud Barak, I don't think anyone's up for offering big plans that give the Palestinians everything).
To conclude, what I loved about this book is that it's grounded but optimistic. Unlike Westerners (*coughs* every single "pro Israel"/"pro Palestine" activist), it includes plans that factor both Israeli and Palestinian needs. It doesn't waste time with lengthy pseudo academic arguments (can you all believe I had to spend like 20 minutes explaining why a Jewish state isn't a racist concept? I literally had to detail why the chosen people thing isn't in any way a white supremacist idea. Like dear god, this is why education in religion matters). If you want to understand a little bit more about what goes on in Israeli politics, this short book is amazing.
So what are some of my favorite Goodman arguments?
- The right is correct in saying that the land of Palestine isn't occupied, as there was never a Palestinian state, it used to be part of Jordan and Israelis tried to give it back several times. So the West Bank is a disputed territory- not an occupied one. However, the left is right in saying that there's an occupied people. There are people living under military occupation and this is not a good thing. Being an occupying force is bad, not just for us as Israelis but because taking away someone's autonomy is bad. It's so true that when denying the occupation, the right talks about land while when talking about the occupation, the left always talks about people. That's a gap that exists.
- The right is scared of leaving the West Bank because of security concerns. The left is scared of staying because of humanitarian concerns. There are ways for Israel to hang on to the security edge while still ending the military presence. It's not an either/or situation.
- Ze'ev Jabotinsky wasn't worried about demographics when he was planning a dual Arab-Jewish state because he was looking at pre-Holocaust Europe. It's such a different perspective, we don't think about those 6 million Jews as potential Israelis that could tilt the demographics. I imagine Israel's Mizrahi-Ashkenazi relations would be even more messed up if there was an Ashkenazi majority (also, how would we ever succeed in Eurovision without the Middle Eastern Mizrahi vibes?).
- As Zionists, we're faced with a choice: give up on part of our historical homeland for a truly Jewish country, risk becoming a Jewish minority in our own country, or erect an apartheid where Jews have more voting rights. When we frame it like this, the choice becomes clear. Separating from the Palestinians makes sense, even if the classic two state solution is dead.
- Religious concerns are not an excuse for staying in the West Bank- if it saves lives, Judaism allows it. So the religious argument is derived from the security concerns. However, I believe there's something about the land, a halacha that says you can't give up on Eretz Israel, so yeah, I'm not sure why Goodman doesn't talk about it.
- When we ask Palestinians to give up the right of return, we're essentially asking them to give up on part of their identity.
- In the past, the right was scared of an overly powerful Palestinian state that would attack us. Nowadays, the fear is a weak Palestinian state that would fall apart and be taken over by extremists, as we see in much of the Middle East. It's fascinating to think about because if there was a malfunctioning independent Palestinian state, what would this look like? What would Israel do? Would we feel more obligated to be involved than we did when Syria collapsed?
- This is a broad statement but as a whole, Israelis are scared of Palestinians while Palestinians feel humiliated by Israelis. Obviously, not everyone but in my experience, Palestinians aren't scared of Israelis. They're angry and frustrated. Palestinians are sometimes scared of the army, though while Israelis aren't scared of Palestinian institutions usually. We tend to be scared of Palestinians as people, rather than angry at them (although there's definitely some anger as well, especially for people who experience the conflict's influence more in their daily life). Although, idk, I think at this point, I'm mostly frustrated.
----------------
Of the substantial amount of books I've read about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, this is the first one that I (mostly) agree with and also feel brings something useful to the conversation. This is exciting. Review to come!
December 25, 2018
This is getting strong reviews, but I didn't find it terribly compelling. I'd like to state at the outset that I think the book's weaknesses are not so much a result of political partisanship: people who claim it's either right or left wing are really missing the point (the answer is probably just that Dr. Goodman is to their left or right).
The issue is twofold: One, the book is very short. Two, Dr. Goodman's background is in Jewish thought and philosophy, not in politics or history, and this leads him to make generalizations that he fails to support.
He divides Israelis into two broad camps: the right and the left. Unfortunately, this means that different segments of each camp are either conflated, or one stream is focused on. The anti-Zionist left, which has been strengthening in recent years, is ignored (he dismisses the non-Zionists or post-Zionists explicitly). The left, as represented in the book, is the Zionist left. This means that some arguments--for example, that the demographic problem is a fundamentally racist question--are simply not raised. However, his portrayal of Israelis is more incomplete than inaccurate.
His characterization of the Palestinians, however, I found to be a problem. This is not to say there's no elements of truth to it, but he tends to characterize Palestinians as a single group that doesn't have diverse viewpoints and he makes widespread generalizations without evidence, such as saying that Palestinians are motivated by humiliation and that they simply don't accept Jewish rule. If you're going to make these kinds of sweeping statements, you need to build your argument better. I know this book was initially written for an Israeli audience that has greater familiarity with the history and the conflict than English speakers, but if you're not even distinguishing between secular nationalism and Islamism, I don't think that's the whole issue.
He also argues that the West Bank and Gaza is not occupied territory because it doesn't belong to anyone (although he says the Palestinians themselves are occupied). Many scholars would disagree with that.
The book isn't all bad: it tries to promote a pragmatic view to dealing with the conflict. However, he doesn't deal sufficiently with all present problems. It may not be possible to have an overarching peace agreement that deals with what happened in 1948. However, the rights of Palestinians today are another question, and how political equality can be achieved--either through independence/self government or through Israeli citizenship--isn't fleshed out. More self government might be a pragmatic choice for Israelis, but will it be accepted by the other side? His arguments only apply to what Israelis might find palatable, and not anything else.
The issue is twofold: One, the book is very short. Two, Dr. Goodman's background is in Jewish thought and philosophy, not in politics or history, and this leads him to make generalizations that he fails to support.
He divides Israelis into two broad camps: the right and the left. Unfortunately, this means that different segments of each camp are either conflated, or one stream is focused on. The anti-Zionist left, which has been strengthening in recent years, is ignored (he dismisses the non-Zionists or post-Zionists explicitly). The left, as represented in the book, is the Zionist left. This means that some arguments--for example, that the demographic problem is a fundamentally racist question--are simply not raised. However, his portrayal of Israelis is more incomplete than inaccurate.
His characterization of the Palestinians, however, I found to be a problem. This is not to say there's no elements of truth to it, but he tends to characterize Palestinians as a single group that doesn't have diverse viewpoints and he makes widespread generalizations without evidence, such as saying that Palestinians are motivated by humiliation and that they simply don't accept Jewish rule. If you're going to make these kinds of sweeping statements, you need to build your argument better. I know this book was initially written for an Israeli audience that has greater familiarity with the history and the conflict than English speakers, but if you're not even distinguishing between secular nationalism and Islamism, I don't think that's the whole issue.
He also argues that the West Bank and Gaza is not occupied territory because it doesn't belong to anyone (although he says the Palestinians themselves are occupied). Many scholars would disagree with that.
The book isn't all bad: it tries to promote a pragmatic view to dealing with the conflict. However, he doesn't deal sufficiently with all present problems. It may not be possible to have an overarching peace agreement that deals with what happened in 1948. However, the rights of Palestinians today are another question, and how political equality can be achieved--either through independence/self government or through Israeli citizenship--isn't fleshed out. More self government might be a pragmatic choice for Israelis, but will it be accepted by the other side? His arguments only apply to what Israelis might find palatable, and not anything else.
October 3, 2018
This book, the author says at the beginning, is not about the Arab-Israeli conflict. Originally published in Hebrew, it is about how Israelis think (and argue) about the nation's most salient policy issue. Israel (like the US) has become polarized, with people on either side of the political spectrum demonizing those who do not share their views.
Goodman first establishes how ideas differ from ideology: ideology becomes part of a person's identity; therefore attacks on ideology become personal. He traces the evolution of both right and left in Israel in an admirably nonpartisan manner: how both sides developed their own idées fixes, with the left focusing on occupation while denying Israel's real security threat, and the right focusing on security while showing indifference to the Palestinians.
The problem is, Goodman says, both sides are right (and both are wrong). The existing situation is paradoxical in that unilaterally ending the occupation is a security risk, but focusing solely on security to the exclusion of demographic, democratic, and moral issues creates a different kind of risk. The refusal to listen to the other side, recognize their concerns, and the refusal to compromise in ideology keeps the two sides in their separate corners, unable to make any progress. (Palestinians are not absolved, they have their own paradoxes.)
Goodman does not have "the answer," but he discusses possible options as "food for thought," ways to break out of the box. Israelis must stop thinking in Manichaean, messianic/ utopian ideals and work pragmatically. This will not lead to peace (there are other factors involved), but it might make the environment less toxic: not just among Israelis, but between Israelis and Palestinians.
Goodman (over)simplifies many issues, but he provides a pragmatic, clarifying perspective, and his insights might surprise even jaded observers of the conflict. He maintains a Jewish perspective, because if there is a solution to Israeli polarization, it will have to come from an internal source.
Although the book is not about the Arab-Israeli conflict, it does a remarkable job of distilling the essential issues (mostly, but not entirely, from the Israeli perspective) and demonstrates why the bromide "We all know what the solution looks like" is a fraud.
This book is recommended for anyone seeking insight into why this conflict defies simple resolution. It is concise and very readable. It is recommended for pragmatists who wonder at the lack of pragmatism, but also on the right and left who are sure of their answers. Perhaps those are the people who need to read it most, and to listen.
Goodman first establishes how ideas differ from ideology: ideology becomes part of a person's identity; therefore attacks on ideology become personal. He traces the evolution of both right and left in Israel in an admirably nonpartisan manner: how both sides developed their own idées fixes, with the left focusing on occupation while denying Israel's real security threat, and the right focusing on security while showing indifference to the Palestinians.
The problem is, Goodman says, both sides are right (and both are wrong). The existing situation is paradoxical in that unilaterally ending the occupation is a security risk, but focusing solely on security to the exclusion of demographic, democratic, and moral issues creates a different kind of risk. The refusal to listen to the other side, recognize their concerns, and the refusal to compromise in ideology keeps the two sides in their separate corners, unable to make any progress. (Palestinians are not absolved, they have their own paradoxes.)
Goodman does not have "the answer," but he discusses possible options as "food for thought," ways to break out of the box. Israelis must stop thinking in Manichaean, messianic/ utopian ideals and work pragmatically. This will not lead to peace (there are other factors involved), but it might make the environment less toxic: not just among Israelis, but between Israelis and Palestinians.
Goodman (over)simplifies many issues, but he provides a pragmatic, clarifying perspective, and his insights might surprise even jaded observers of the conflict. He maintains a Jewish perspective, because if there is a solution to Israeli polarization, it will have to come from an internal source.
Although the book is not about the Arab-Israeli conflict, it does a remarkable job of distilling the essential issues (mostly, but not entirely, from the Israeli perspective) and demonstrates why the bromide "We all know what the solution looks like" is a fraud.
This book is recommended for anyone seeking insight into why this conflict defies simple resolution. It is concise and very readable. It is recommended for pragmatists who wonder at the lack of pragmatism, but also on the right and left who are sure of their answers. Perhaps those are the people who need to read it most, and to listen.
September 17, 2023
Audible Plus 5 hours 44 min. Narrated by Paul Boehmer (A)
I am listening to the last two chapters of this book for the third time. I am just giving up hope of understanding this book even after listening to this book twice. Between the old right and the new right; the old left and the new left; both are correct; both are wrong; the existential, the pragmatic; the political. the moral, the partial peace plan, the divergent plan, and on and repetitiously on. The main thing I take away is that the Israelis live under fear, and the Palestinians live in humiliation. The pioneers in Israel rendered the impossible possible, whether it be the use of Hebrew as a national language, turning the desert into a garden, or creating a strong, cohesive country out of millions of refugees from around the world. The current citizens of Israel are so set in two camps that an answer may not be resolved because neither camp is willing to compromise even temporarily. Rival beliefs are not only wrong but dangerous.
I am listening to the last two chapters of this book for the third time. I am just giving up hope of understanding this book even after listening to this book twice. Between the old right and the new right; the old left and the new left; both are correct; both are wrong; the existential, the pragmatic; the political. the moral, the partial peace plan, the divergent plan, and on and repetitiously on. The main thing I take away is that the Israelis live under fear, and the Palestinians live in humiliation. The pioneers in Israel rendered the impossible possible, whether it be the use of Hebrew as a national language, turning the desert into a garden, or creating a strong, cohesive country out of millions of refugees from around the world. The current citizens of Israel are so set in two camps that an answer may not be resolved because neither camp is willing to compromise even temporarily. Rival beliefs are not only wrong but dangerous.
December 4, 2018
Somewhat informative, but the ideas about the Palestinian perspective certainly don't echo what any Palestinian would say. The bold and false assertion that Palestinians don't fear Israelis and only feel humiliated by them, for example.
June 2, 2021
This book is good, like academic good. I have been hearing about this huge gem from "pro-Israel" people, and I knew what I was I was stepping into, but I had to give it a chance. Surprinsingly, it didn't have that one-sided biased outlook, I mean, one can still catch some of those "hasbara" zionist talking points, but it was balanced and fair.
The book itself claims to be for Israelis, and to understand the discussion between multiple political factions inside of Israel. It tries to speak on behalf of Palestinians at some points, and most times the book is erroneous on that basis. (For example, Palestinians do feel scared of Israel and Israelis as much as they feel humiliated. Another point: there is not just Palestinian Islamism, there's also secular nationalism, Palestinians of Christian heritage, and many other factions to highlight that Palestinians are also not a monolith.)
The book is well-written, the analytical passages make sense, from an Israeli perspective. Despite all that, I think the book failed to explore some anti-Zionism, even among Israelis who denouce the idea of a Jewish state, and think of it as a disqualifier for any peace talk. I, myself, do not believe in a Jewish state, nor any ethnostate to be established in a vastly multiethnic region. It's basically an accident waiting to happen, and until Israelis stop clinging to the idea of an ethnostate, the Palestinians are always going to want to return to their homeland and villages, and fight for freedom and equal rights.
For me, if I may give my opinion, the ethnic identity of Israel is what keeps fueling this conflict, and the reason neither Palestinians nor Israelis can catch a break from this endless mess. Whenever I try to dwell on these ideas, I think of the movie "The kids are all right", where the biological father of two kids in a lesbian family shows up and has an affair with one of the moms and tries to convince her to run away with him, and therefore disrupt the happy, peaceful family. That doesn't happen eventually, and the other mom tell him in one dramatic, significant scene: "if you want so much a family of your own, go outside and make one." That is exactly how I feel about this conflict. Jewish people can and should be welcome to live on the holy land next to the millions of Palestinians who already live there, but if you want so much a Jewish state, go somewhere to an uninhabited land and do whatever you want, at least you won't have to deal with the moral dilemma of demographic control, ethnic cleansing or/and apatheid.
Anyway, as a staunch anti-Zionist, I recommand this book to everybody who wants to know about the political discourse inside of Israel.
The book itself claims to be for Israelis, and to understand the discussion between multiple political factions inside of Israel. It tries to speak on behalf of Palestinians at some points, and most times the book is erroneous on that basis. (For example, Palestinians do feel scared of Israel and Israelis as much as they feel humiliated. Another point: there is not just Palestinian Islamism, there's also secular nationalism, Palestinians of Christian heritage, and many other factions to highlight that Palestinians are also not a monolith.)
The book is well-written, the analytical passages make sense, from an Israeli perspective. Despite all that, I think the book failed to explore some anti-Zionism, even among Israelis who denouce the idea of a Jewish state, and think of it as a disqualifier for any peace talk. I, myself, do not believe in a Jewish state, nor any ethnostate to be established in a vastly multiethnic region. It's basically an accident waiting to happen, and until Israelis stop clinging to the idea of an ethnostate, the Palestinians are always going to want to return to their homeland and villages, and fight for freedom and equal rights.
For me, if I may give my opinion, the ethnic identity of Israel is what keeps fueling this conflict, and the reason neither Palestinians nor Israelis can catch a break from this endless mess. Whenever I try to dwell on these ideas, I think of the movie "The kids are all right", where the biological father of two kids in a lesbian family shows up and has an affair with one of the moms and tries to convince her to run away with him, and therefore disrupt the happy, peaceful family. That doesn't happen eventually, and the other mom tell him in one dramatic, significant scene: "if you want so much a family of your own, go outside and make one." That is exactly how I feel about this conflict. Jewish people can and should be welcome to live on the holy land next to the millions of Palestinians who already live there, but if you want so much a Jewish state, go somewhere to an uninhabited land and do whatever you want, at least you won't have to deal with the moral dilemma of demographic control, ethnic cleansing or/and apatheid.
Anyway, as a staunch anti-Zionist, I recommand this book to everybody who wants to know about the political discourse inside of Israel.
January 15, 2020
This is an important contribution to Americans' understanding of the Israel/Palestine mess, a subtle discussion that becomes more and more important as one faction increasingly overwhelms the rest of Israeli society. I can't judge whether Israelis would learn useful insights from the book, but I assure Americans (Jewish and non-Jewish) that they will.
Rare is the book that comes out declaring itself a failure. This one does, in the preface to the English edition. Whether or not the author's proposals can move the peace process forward, they have clearly been rejected by Israelis on all sides, who continue to entrench themselves in familiar positions. But the history in the book is fascinating and enlightening. I personally will go back and read the historical works of Zionism, such as Jabotinsky, after reading this eye-opening book.
Rare is the book that comes out declaring itself a failure. This one does, in the preface to the English edition. Whether or not the author's proposals can move the peace process forward, they have clearly been rejected by Israelis on all sides, who continue to entrench themselves in familiar positions. But the history in the book is fascinating and enlightening. I personally will go back and read the historical works of Zionism, such as Jabotinsky, after reading this eye-opening book.
August 14, 2019
Micah Goodman thinks that Israel is stuck. Ideologically stuck, as he explains in the first part. The Zionist Right has left its original liberalism and has become a messianic movement, the Left gave up the fight for social justice and deluded herself that peace was behind the corner (it was not, as we know); the Disengagement from Gaza has shattered the certainties of the Religious Zionist camp, bringing its leaders to realise that they are, culturally, a minority.
In the second part of the book, Micah Goodman explains that Israel is, also, politically stuck. Here the dilemma is demography vs security. If Judaea and Samaria, the Occupied Territories, continue to remain under Israeli control, the Arab population may grow to the 40%, or even more, threatening Jewish sovereignty as a whole. On the other hand keeping a military presence in these same territories is indispensable for Israel's security, they are not strictly speaking occupied, they never belonged to another State and there are sound reason in Jewish Law to keep them. But, there, another people live under occupation, and this is morally untenable, regardless the effective benefits in term of quality of life.
As Micah Goodman proves beyond any doubt throughout the book, the main reason for this mess is Palestinian rejectionism, that is the unwillingness of the non elected and not accountable Palestinian leaders to accept any Jewish presence, let alone right, in what they consider immutably Muslim land.
But, anyway, nu, mah la'asot? Regardless the responsibilities, is there a solution to the catch? In the last part of the book, Goodman suggests some pragmatic, possible, solutions, none of them destined to end the conflict, but at least to soften its most acute thorns in the flesh of the two people destined to live next to each other in the foreseeable future and beyond.
The good points of this book. It is for many parts a refreshing reading. I wonder how the chapter about the liberalism of Jabotinsky will be read by Left wing Zionists of my generation, fed since youth with lies about the "Fascist tendencies" of the founder of Revisionist Zionism. Goodman honestly assesses the need for security of the Israelis and how the Palestinians, and the international community, both fail to address them. The book has a balanced structure, it takes into consideration the Left and the Right viewpoints and presents both of them. Goodman has done its Talmud and it shows.
Unfortunately, the brutal honesty with which Micah Goodman assesses the failures of the Oslo Accords, and the myopia of the Israeli (and Jewish) Left concerned only with the Palestinians rights, will infuriate many of the readers that could be the ideal audience of this book. So probably this is the right book for the wrong kind of readers, at least in the UK. But is the book published at a right time? Goodman believes that international legitimacy and trust in liberal democracy are crucial for Israel's survival (it may surprise a reader but in this respect he is a follower of Jabotinsky).
The book has been published in Israel in 2017. Over the last two years, in the Western world, democracy has lost great part of its appeal, e.g. in the UK after the Brexit referendum. Israel, on the other hand, is doing well and the threats are under control, despite the not excellent ideological quality of its leadership. Perhaps Micah Goodman is too pessimistic. But anyway, this is definitively a book to read.
In the second part of the book, Micah Goodman explains that Israel is, also, politically stuck. Here the dilemma is demography vs security. If Judaea and Samaria, the Occupied Territories, continue to remain under Israeli control, the Arab population may grow to the 40%, or even more, threatening Jewish sovereignty as a whole. On the other hand keeping a military presence in these same territories is indispensable for Israel's security, they are not strictly speaking occupied, they never belonged to another State and there are sound reason in Jewish Law to keep them. But, there, another people live under occupation, and this is morally untenable, regardless the effective benefits in term of quality of life.
As Micah Goodman proves beyond any doubt throughout the book, the main reason for this mess is Palestinian rejectionism, that is the unwillingness of the non elected and not accountable Palestinian leaders to accept any Jewish presence, let alone right, in what they consider immutably Muslim land.
But, anyway, nu, mah la'asot? Regardless the responsibilities, is there a solution to the catch? In the last part of the book, Goodman suggests some pragmatic, possible, solutions, none of them destined to end the conflict, but at least to soften its most acute thorns in the flesh of the two people destined to live next to each other in the foreseeable future and beyond.
The good points of this book. It is for many parts a refreshing reading. I wonder how the chapter about the liberalism of Jabotinsky will be read by Left wing Zionists of my generation, fed since youth with lies about the "Fascist tendencies" of the founder of Revisionist Zionism. Goodman honestly assesses the need for security of the Israelis and how the Palestinians, and the international community, both fail to address them. The book has a balanced structure, it takes into consideration the Left and the Right viewpoints and presents both of them. Goodman has done its Talmud and it shows.
Unfortunately, the brutal honesty with which Micah Goodman assesses the failures of the Oslo Accords, and the myopia of the Israeli (and Jewish) Left concerned only with the Palestinians rights, will infuriate many of the readers that could be the ideal audience of this book. So probably this is the right book for the wrong kind of readers, at least in the UK. But is the book published at a right time? Goodman believes that international legitimacy and trust in liberal democracy are crucial for Israel's survival (it may surprise a reader but in this respect he is a follower of Jabotinsky).
The book has been published in Israel in 2017. Over the last two years, in the Western world, democracy has lost great part of its appeal, e.g. in the UK after the Brexit referendum. Israel, on the other hand, is doing well and the threats are under control, despite the not excellent ideological quality of its leadership. Perhaps Micah Goodman is too pessimistic. But anyway, this is definitively a book to read.
March 21, 2019
This book discusses the Israeli Palestinian conflict in a refreshingly pragmatic manner. It has two major parts:
1. A historical description of the conflict, with insights on both narratives: the Jewish-Israeli, and the Muslim-Palestinian. In this part the author leads the reader through the complexity of the conflict, and eventually to its derived "Catch 67", a borrowed term from Catch-22 by Joseph Heller. According to the author, the catch is simply unsolvable, but then maybe, this unsolvable conflict could be greatly reduced rather then solved altogether. This is the main message of the book.
2. In the second part, the author describes two optional approaches to minimize the conflict. Neither of the approaches is exclusively "right" or "left", but they are a superposition (or a mix) of the two dogmas, combined in a way that is meant to minimize threat to Israel, and maximize freedom to the Palestinians, without officially solving the conflict.
Overall, I think this book encourages open discussion, and shows the advantages of replacing tribal dogmas (left and right) with simple pragmatism. A good (and surprisingly short) read.
1. A historical description of the conflict, with insights on both narratives: the Jewish-Israeli, and the Muslim-Palestinian. In this part the author leads the reader through the complexity of the conflict, and eventually to its derived "Catch 67", a borrowed term from Catch-22 by Joseph Heller. According to the author, the catch is simply unsolvable, but then maybe, this unsolvable conflict could be greatly reduced rather then solved altogether. This is the main message of the book.
2. In the second part, the author describes two optional approaches to minimize the conflict. Neither of the approaches is exclusively "right" or "left", but they are a superposition (or a mix) of the two dogmas, combined in a way that is meant to minimize threat to Israel, and maximize freedom to the Palestinians, without officially solving the conflict.
Overall, I think this book encourages open discussion, and shows the advantages of replacing tribal dogmas (left and right) with simple pragmatism. A good (and surprisingly short) read.
July 18, 2021
During operation “Guardian of the Walls” I stumbled upon a flood of comments pointing Israel as an oppressor of the Gaza Strip and the occupied territories from the six day war that happened in 1967. I decided to have a conversation with random commenters to understand their level of familiarity on this subject and found all of them had little knowledge about the happening in this area. The sad part I understand them same about myself. I decided to to deepens my knowledge. For several days I was looking for that can shade some light on situation between Israel and Palestine, with little as possible personal flavors. Most of the recommendations included this book. Not only it enlightened my knowledge on this subject, but also I understood better the political philosophy and psychology of Israel and it’s neighbors, how far this go back in the past, and interesting approaches for solution. I recommend this book to anyone who is willing to have a better understanding about this phenomenon called Israel.
January 18, 2023
עצם העובדה שספר שעוסק בהבראת השיח בין שמאל לימין הפך לרב מכר בישראל כנראה מלמד כמה אנשים משתוקקים לשיח כנה, לוגי, קונסטרוקטיבי ומעשי על הסכסוך. כמה מעייף השיח הנפוץ: זה המקטב, המסית, הדרמטי, הדמגוגי והשקרי שמתודלק על ידי המדיה המסורתית והחברתית כאחד.
הספר במידה רבה הוא כתב התקפה על אידיאולוגיות מוחלטות, וקריאה למעבר לפרגמטיזם. הדרך למסקנותיו נסללת ביד אמן על ידי הצגת טיעוני הצדדים המנוגדים בצורה האמינה והמשכנעת ביותר (סטילמאן), ומיזוגם אלה באלה. באופן בלתי נמנע, מתקבלת המסקנה האבסורדית ש"כולם צודקים". תזה, אנטיתזה, סינתזה. אולי אם לא נתנגד לתנועה הכל כך טבעית הזאת קדימה, וננסה להבין את החששות של האדם שלא חושב כמונו במקום לסמן אותו כאויב שלנו, אולי אז נצליח להגיע לרמה חדשה של הבנה, שתביא איתה צורות חדשות של פתרון.
הספר במידה רבה הוא כתב התקפה על אידיאולוגיות מוחלטות, וקריאה למעבר לפרגמטיזם. הדרך למסקנותיו נסללת ביד אמן על ידי הצגת טיעוני הצדדים המנוגדים בצורה האמינה והמשכנעת ביותר (סטילמאן), ומיזוגם אלה באלה. באופן בלתי נמנע, מתקבלת המסקנה האבסורדית ש"כולם צודקים". תזה, אנטיתזה, סינתזה. אולי אם לא נתנגד לתנועה הכל כך טבעית הזאת קדימה, וננסה להבין את החששות של האדם שלא חושב כמונו במקום לסמן אותו כאויב שלנו, אולי אז נצליח להגיע לרמה חדשה של הבנה, שתביא איתה צורות חדשות של פתרון.
September 29, 2018
ספר מאוד מעניין. לדעתי מציג בצורה מצוינת איך הגענו עד למצב של היום. ואיך השתנו עמדות של ימין ושמאל עם הזמן.
ההצעות שלו על מה שצריך לעשות בהמשך יותר מדי מעורפלות ולא מוגדרות.
אז לסיכום הוא תיאר יפה למה גם אנחנו וגם פלשתינאים נמצאים במלכוד שאין כל כך איך לצאת ממנו, אבל לא הצליח גם לנסח פתרון הגיוני.
ההצעות שלו על מה שצריך לעשות בהמשך יותר מדי מעורפלות ולא מוגדרות.
אז לסיכום הוא תיאר יפה למה גם אנחנו וגם פלשתינאים נמצאים במלכוד שאין כל כך איך לצאת ממנו, אבל לא הצליח גם לנסח פתרון הגיוני.
May 15, 2017
ספר מעניין מאוד. קל לקריאה ומעורר מחשבה.
February 8, 2023
Superb, simply written and though the conflict is a quagmire - the book does boil down the topic to its core, thus making at least some of the deeper existential issues appear fairly cut and dry.
January 6, 2024
Really enjoyed, will reread. Below are all quotes:
Idealists struggle to differentiate themselves from their ideals. Their world views not only consist of collections of ideas but form an integral part of their identity. Idealists identify with their ideas just as materialists identify with their possessions. People who assimilate their opinions into their identity become closed to criticism of those opinions. As they see it, any objection to their views is an assault on their being.
The rift between Israelis & Palestinians is perpetuated by a destructive psychological dynamic.
The clash between these two nations is also a clash of emotions. The dominant emotion among Israelis is fear. Israelis fear the Palestinians. This fear is ancient, deep, & common to Israelis of all political stripes. The sound of someone speaking Arabic sets off alarm bells for left-wing & right-wing Israelis alike. The dominant emotion among Palestinians is not fear but humiliation. Palestinians are not afraid of Israelis, but they feel humiliated by them… These emotions nurture & aggravate each other. The Israelis fear of Palestinians pushes them to take defensive steps such as placing restrictions on Palestinians’ movement, delaying their passage through checkpoints, & questioning them at the entrances to public spaces. The Palestinians’ sense of humiliation grows deeper as a result of these actions. But the destructive dynamic does not end here. This humiliation inflames the existing feelings of hatred & anger & creates a climate that breeds violence. Violence that in turns heightens the Israelis’ sense of fear. Tragically the Israelis’ sense of fear provokes actions that deepen the Palestinians’ sense of humiliation. & the Palestinians sense of humiliation provokes reactions that heighten the Israelis sense of fear. & so on & so forth. When fear & humiliation collide each becomes stronger. This dynamic not only characterizes the personal relationships between the two nations but the political one too. one of the most important goals for the Palestinians is to craft & accord with Israel that does not humiliate them. In contrast the most important demand for Israelis is to craft & accord with the Palestinians that does not endanger them. & therein lies the problem. The satisfaction of Israel's security needs is bound to hinder the Palestinians’… national pride.
The success of Zionism is a painful & living reminder to Muslims of their ongoing humiliation at the h&s of Western civilization. In sum, just as Palestinian terrorism is not the cause of the Israelis’ fear but rather amplifies an older Jewish fear, Israel's actions today are not the cause of the Palestinians sense of humiliation, but amplify a broader humiliation shared by the Muslim world at large.
Rabbi's ordered their congregations to observe mere customs as if they were explicit biblical commandments. They conflated the trivial with the supreme, eliminated all nuance in Jewish religious law, & painted an entire rich & diverse heritage in a single shade. Not only did religious law become dichotomous, so did political thought. Just as ultra orthodox law eliminated the spectrum of comm&s & offenses & made everything equally grave, Jewish politics eliminated the spectrum of issues & solutions & made everything equally grave as well. Both left & right translated religious language, the distinctions between pure & impure, sacred & profane into political language distinguishing between darkness & enlightenment, patriotism & treason. Israeli political thought has become binary over the past 50 years. Israel is either an occupying power or a moral society. It is either in conflict or at peace. It is either settling the land of betraying its identity & values.
Instead of asking how to bring peace, therefore, Israelis must ask what they can do to increase it.
Over 70% of Israelis have no desire to rule over the Palestinians but a similar proportion have no faith in the possibility of reaching a peace agreement with them.
Just as the right matured & moved on from talking about redemption, the left matured & moved on from talking about peace. The left replaced its hopes for peace with concerns about the crimes of occupation… The new right & the new left are mirror images. The new left no longer argues that withdrawing from the territories will bring peace. Rather leftists maintain that sustaining a military presence there will bring disaster. The new right no longer argues that settling the territories will bring redemption. Right-wingers claim that withdrawing from them will bring disaster. Both have replaced their greatest hopes with their darkest fears. I have illustrated in brief the history of two compelling ideas, the story of how both the left & right metamorphosed twice. Those on the right began life as liberals, developed into messianists, & now limp along thinking mostly about security. Those on the left arose as socialists then dreamed of peace & now focus mostly on human rights & the evils of occupation. This is the story of how Israel was delivered from the past certainties of its robust ideologies to its present reality of utter confusion.
Arguments, however, do not cultivate identities. They justify courses of action. Arguments do not produce intellectual world views. They justify practical policies. Israel's political arguments have fallen into crisis just as its ideologies have. But this is a different kind of crisis. Israel's ideological crises occurred when those ideologies fail to comport with reality. Israel's political arguments however remain cogent. Reality has not discredited them. It has vindicated them. Over time almost all the political arguments voiced in Israel Today have emerged as correct.
4 arguments: existential, ethical, Jewish, & Zionist
Because of its location & its area Israel is encircled by enemies & is challenged to defend itself against them. These difficult conditions heighten the importance of the mountains of Judea & Samaria to Israel’s security. Owing to Israel's population distribution & geographic features the country simply cannot be defended without this territory.
In this alarming scenario Zionism will not meet its end because the Jews will return to being minorities in the nation states from which they came, but because they will become a minority in the nation state they inhabit now. But the end of Zionism is not the only possible result of this demographic scenario. There exists another. That Israel's Jewish minority will continue to rule the country despite being a minority & will do so by force of arms. The state of Israel would continue to be Jewish in such a scenario but it would no longer be democratic. This is the beating heart of the demographic problem.
From a security perspective, Israel must not withdraw from the territories. But from a demographic perspective Israel must not remain there. If Israel withdraws, its area shrinks to indefensible proportions. But if it remains the Jewish majority is in danger. The two contrary positions create a confusing paradox.
A treaty that removed the IDF from territories captured in the six-day war but left the Islamic world feeling inferior in the face of western superiority would not address the Palestinians’ basic identity needs. Diplomatic Solutions proposed thus far for ending this conflict are flimsy & paper thin. But the problem remains deep & inflexible. The asymmetry between problem & proposed solutions is in itself a fundamental problem. Israel does not have the power to erase the centuries of Islamic humiliation by the West that nourish the Palestinians’ national struggle against Zionism. Israel does not have the power to erase the trauma of the Nakba without surrendering its own identity & existence.
First, even without neutralizing the Jewish majority an annexation of the territories would shrink that majority & thereby undermine Israel's self-definition as the nation state of the Jewish people. Second, total reliance on the optimistic demographic scenario represents a risk calculation so irrational as to constitute an unreasonable gamble that endangers the continuity & survival of the Zionist project.
The Palestinians coveted freedom from Israeli rule more than they coveted its economic benefits.
Zionism drew some stark lessons from Jewish history. Zionists inferred that neither blind faith in the gentiles nor blind faith in God would guarantee security. Zionism is the belief that the Jews can trust only themselves & can rely only on themselves. Nobody who accepts this lesson of history as the early Zionists did can believe that Israel should either risk relinquishing territory out of trust in international guarantees or risk holding on to that territory out of trust in God. This is the fundamental basis of a great political confusion afflicting Israel today.
[Demand for social justice] Is the reaction of the many Israelis who have no interest in ruling over the Palestinians but equally would not dare endanger themselves by pulling out of the territories.
The conviction of our own beliefs does not depend on the reasonableness of our arguments but on the strength of our identification with a group that professes those beliefs. Even those who are personally aware that they can sometimes be wrong subconsciously deny that their group could also be wrong. In other words, when the sphere of public discourse is no longer a place where ideas meet but an arena where tribes clash, critical thinking is in danger. I can personally attest to the almost obsessive need to bring opinions in line with group identity. Whenever I speak to the public about liberalism & humanism, I am immediately suspected of being a leftist. Whenever I speak about Patriotism & Zionism, I am immediately suspected of being a right winger.
Palestinians face Israelis & see in them European colonialism. Israelis face Palestinians & see in them European antisemitism. Each side sees the other as representing Europe in its ugliest & most threatening guise. Each side sees the other as the product of a broader phenomenon in which it itself is the victim. In the Palestinians narrative they are the victims of Israel. In the Israelis narrative they are the victims of the Palestinians. In this conflict each side is the victim of its own victims... So when each side sees themselves as victims empathy necessarily disappears & understanding moves ever farther away.
Over the past few decades the notion has taken root that Judaism belongs within a common JudeoChristian heritage. [Meir] Buzaglo proposes replacing the JudeoChristian narrative with a JudeoMuslim one. Judaism holds more in common with Islam than with Christianity… The hidden temptation in embracing the JudeoChristian narrative is that it enables Jews to feel at home in Western culture. But this narrative is a heavy price because, while it connects Jews to the west, it also isolates them from the Middle East.
But a casual reader would be surprised to discover that the Talmud does not enumerate the laws that Jews must follow. Rather it records the debates about those laws. The Talmud is unique among tomes about religious law for canonizing not the law itself but disagreements about the law.
Whenever a theory appears to you as the only possible one, take this as a sign that you have understood neither the theory nor the problem which it was intended to solve. -Karl Popper
Had he not yielded ground to the ultra-orthodox the UN committee might not have recommended that a Jewish state be created. Had he not dissolved the institutions of socialism, the institutions of a nation state could not have been built. Had he not compromised over the unity of the land, it would not have been possible to establish a state on even part of the land. Conventional wisdom states that were it not for the great ideas & ideologies of Israel’s founders the state of Israel could not have been born. But in fact the opposite is true. Had Israel’s founding father clung tenaciously to their ideologies, the state would never have been created at all. The state that was destined to fulfill so many dreams owes its very existence to the visionaries who were willing to relinquish those dreams.
The action that lifts one catastrophic peril merely converts it into another peril no less catastrophic. This is Israel's catch-67. Israeli’s way of thinking would be so much more productive if they stopped defining the situation as a problem & started framing it as a catch instead. Why? Because problems are meant to be solved & this problem has no solution. A catch however is not meant to be solved. It is meant to be escaped from & Israel's catch-67 can almost certainly be escaped from, too. Searching for a way out of the catch rather than a solution to a problem creates lower & more realistic expectations than those behind grand diplomatic initiatives.
It is not enough merely to promote a pragmatic way of thinking. It is essential to illustrate that mode as well.
If a Palestinian state were established, hundreds of thousands of these refugees would probably cross the Jordan River, flood Palestine & destabilize a country that would only just have been established… Israel’s military presence in the Jordan Valley therefore would have two purposes: it would prevent the militarization of a Palestinian state but it would also prevent its collapse.
This would not be a deal to forge peace but to terminate a state of war.
For Palestinians to agree to terminate the conflict & renounce their claims would therefore be a betrayal of the refugees & an offense against religious law. To make peace the Palestinians would have to commit an offense against their own faith & against their own people… This is the Palestinians trap. Their only route to a sovereign & independent state runs through a transformation of their religious & national identity. The preservation of their national & religious loyalties will continue to deprive them of independence & statehood… it is hardly surprising that when the Palestinians are pushed into a corner & compelled to choose between their identity & their independence the majority opt for their identity.
The way out, some argue, is for the Israelis to make even grander offers than they have in the past in order to tempt the Palestinians to sign a peace agreement. The political logic of the partial peace plan is the reverse of this thinking. Instead of Israel offering the Palestinians more, it should expect from them less.
As long as Israel holds out hope of solving the conflict, the international recognition of Palestine before the successful conclusion of negotiations would indeed be problematic. But if Israel chose instead to settle for restructuring the conflict then the international recognition of Palestine could be an advantage. That is to say: Israel should stop fighting the Palestinian authorities’ diplomatic offensive & join it instead.
It is tempting to categorize the partial peace plan as moderate left & the divergence plan as moderate right but such a temptation is rooted in the bad habits of long held thinking patterns.
Neither initiative aims to solve the problem, only to extract Israel from the trap of the catch-67. Neither hopes to solve the conflict only to convert it from a fatal situation to a chronic one.
When it comes to traffic accidents & crime people think in degrees. But when it comes to the Israeli Palestinian conflict Israelis have become accustomed to thinking in dichotomies. They never ask how to reduce the incidence of terrorism. They want to know how to eliminate it. They never ask how to reduce the intensity of the conflict, only how to solve it. They never ask how to minimize the occupation, only how to end it.
The right exchanged redemption for security as its primary concern. & the left exchanged peace for the occupation as its primary concern. The old left & old right were destined to collide but the new right & new left are able to talk instead. Because, while peace & redemption come at the expense of one another, security & the end of the occupation can come hand-in-hand. In other words Israel's present crisis of ideas grants it its greatest opportunity for genuine dialogue.
Few people realize that moving on from believing in the possibility of peace is the mirror image of moving on from believing in the possibility of victory in war. For decades wars have not ended in victory. In a world of asymmetric warfare there is no such thing as victory… In every war the people demand victory & emerge embittered when confronted with equivocal & ambiguous results.
In this book I offer an indictment of total ideologies. But the truth is that without these redemptive ideologies the Zionist project would never have been able to surmount its many obstacles & establish itself against all odds In Catch-67 I have sought to expose the ideological fixations created by such unequivocal beliefs & to argue that escaping the catch requires leaving these ideological fixations behind. Revolutionary ideologies were indeed necessary to bring Zionism into existence but their softening & maturation are equally necessary for Zionism to survive & to prosper.
In his final speech to the nation, Moses described the fear of the power of others as a fear of returning to Egypt. But he described the fear of the corrupting nature of one’s own power as a fear of turning into Egypt. The Bible does not ask us to banish these fears. Instead it demands that we learn to live with them both.
Most of my close friends in Israel who are hypersensitive to the dangers of a hostile Middle East tend to be apathetic about the human rights of the Palestinians. Most of my close friends who are hypersensitive about the rights of the Palestinians tend to be apathetic about the great danger that surrounds them from the outside. Each camp has taken exclusive ownership of a single fear. One camp is afraid of returning to Egypt. The other camp is afraid of turning into Egypt.
Ideological politics deals with meaning. Pragmatic politics deals mostly with survival. This is also the weakness of pragmatic politics. What sense of meaning can we possibly retain if we have to give up the great ideas that first filled our lives with the adrenaline of idealism?
The Bible systematically denies the divine nature of Kings & the eternality of the political order.
Those who believe that their solution will bring redemption are bound to believe that their rival’s solution will bring devastation. The rhetoric of ideologies is to maintain that rival beliefs are not just wrong but dangerous. Because of this any intellectual sphere in which perfect solutions are pitted against each other is one in which no one is listening.
Idealists struggle to differentiate themselves from their ideals. Their world views not only consist of collections of ideas but form an integral part of their identity. Idealists identify with their ideas just as materialists identify with their possessions. People who assimilate their opinions into their identity become closed to criticism of those opinions. As they see it, any objection to their views is an assault on their being.
The rift between Israelis & Palestinians is perpetuated by a destructive psychological dynamic.
The clash between these two nations is also a clash of emotions. The dominant emotion among Israelis is fear. Israelis fear the Palestinians. This fear is ancient, deep, & common to Israelis of all political stripes. The sound of someone speaking Arabic sets off alarm bells for left-wing & right-wing Israelis alike. The dominant emotion among Palestinians is not fear but humiliation. Palestinians are not afraid of Israelis, but they feel humiliated by them… These emotions nurture & aggravate each other. The Israelis fear of Palestinians pushes them to take defensive steps such as placing restrictions on Palestinians’ movement, delaying their passage through checkpoints, & questioning them at the entrances to public spaces. The Palestinians’ sense of humiliation grows deeper as a result of these actions. But the destructive dynamic does not end here. This humiliation inflames the existing feelings of hatred & anger & creates a climate that breeds violence. Violence that in turns heightens the Israelis’ sense of fear. Tragically the Israelis’ sense of fear provokes actions that deepen the Palestinians’ sense of humiliation. & the Palestinians sense of humiliation provokes reactions that heighten the Israelis sense of fear. & so on & so forth. When fear & humiliation collide each becomes stronger. This dynamic not only characterizes the personal relationships between the two nations but the political one too. one of the most important goals for the Palestinians is to craft & accord with Israel that does not humiliate them. In contrast the most important demand for Israelis is to craft & accord with the Palestinians that does not endanger them. & therein lies the problem. The satisfaction of Israel's security needs is bound to hinder the Palestinians’… national pride.
The success of Zionism is a painful & living reminder to Muslims of their ongoing humiliation at the h&s of Western civilization. In sum, just as Palestinian terrorism is not the cause of the Israelis’ fear but rather amplifies an older Jewish fear, Israel's actions today are not the cause of the Palestinians sense of humiliation, but amplify a broader humiliation shared by the Muslim world at large.
Rabbi's ordered their congregations to observe mere customs as if they were explicit biblical commandments. They conflated the trivial with the supreme, eliminated all nuance in Jewish religious law, & painted an entire rich & diverse heritage in a single shade. Not only did religious law become dichotomous, so did political thought. Just as ultra orthodox law eliminated the spectrum of comm&s & offenses & made everything equally grave, Jewish politics eliminated the spectrum of issues & solutions & made everything equally grave as well. Both left & right translated religious language, the distinctions between pure & impure, sacred & profane into political language distinguishing between darkness & enlightenment, patriotism & treason. Israeli political thought has become binary over the past 50 years. Israel is either an occupying power or a moral society. It is either in conflict or at peace. It is either settling the land of betraying its identity & values.
Instead of asking how to bring peace, therefore, Israelis must ask what they can do to increase it.
Over 70% of Israelis have no desire to rule over the Palestinians but a similar proportion have no faith in the possibility of reaching a peace agreement with them.
Just as the right matured & moved on from talking about redemption, the left matured & moved on from talking about peace. The left replaced its hopes for peace with concerns about the crimes of occupation… The new right & the new left are mirror images. The new left no longer argues that withdrawing from the territories will bring peace. Rather leftists maintain that sustaining a military presence there will bring disaster. The new right no longer argues that settling the territories will bring redemption. Right-wingers claim that withdrawing from them will bring disaster. Both have replaced their greatest hopes with their darkest fears. I have illustrated in brief the history of two compelling ideas, the story of how both the left & right metamorphosed twice. Those on the right began life as liberals, developed into messianists, & now limp along thinking mostly about security. Those on the left arose as socialists then dreamed of peace & now focus mostly on human rights & the evils of occupation. This is the story of how Israel was delivered from the past certainties of its robust ideologies to its present reality of utter confusion.
Arguments, however, do not cultivate identities. They justify courses of action. Arguments do not produce intellectual world views. They justify practical policies. Israel's political arguments have fallen into crisis just as its ideologies have. But this is a different kind of crisis. Israel's ideological crises occurred when those ideologies fail to comport with reality. Israel's political arguments however remain cogent. Reality has not discredited them. It has vindicated them. Over time almost all the political arguments voiced in Israel Today have emerged as correct.
4 arguments: existential, ethical, Jewish, & Zionist
Because of its location & its area Israel is encircled by enemies & is challenged to defend itself against them. These difficult conditions heighten the importance of the mountains of Judea & Samaria to Israel’s security. Owing to Israel's population distribution & geographic features the country simply cannot be defended without this territory.
In this alarming scenario Zionism will not meet its end because the Jews will return to being minorities in the nation states from which they came, but because they will become a minority in the nation state they inhabit now. But the end of Zionism is not the only possible result of this demographic scenario. There exists another. That Israel's Jewish minority will continue to rule the country despite being a minority & will do so by force of arms. The state of Israel would continue to be Jewish in such a scenario but it would no longer be democratic. This is the beating heart of the demographic problem.
From a security perspective, Israel must not withdraw from the territories. But from a demographic perspective Israel must not remain there. If Israel withdraws, its area shrinks to indefensible proportions. But if it remains the Jewish majority is in danger. The two contrary positions create a confusing paradox.
A treaty that removed the IDF from territories captured in the six-day war but left the Islamic world feeling inferior in the face of western superiority would not address the Palestinians’ basic identity needs. Diplomatic Solutions proposed thus far for ending this conflict are flimsy & paper thin. But the problem remains deep & inflexible. The asymmetry between problem & proposed solutions is in itself a fundamental problem. Israel does not have the power to erase the centuries of Islamic humiliation by the West that nourish the Palestinians’ national struggle against Zionism. Israel does not have the power to erase the trauma of the Nakba without surrendering its own identity & existence.
First, even without neutralizing the Jewish majority an annexation of the territories would shrink that majority & thereby undermine Israel's self-definition as the nation state of the Jewish people. Second, total reliance on the optimistic demographic scenario represents a risk calculation so irrational as to constitute an unreasonable gamble that endangers the continuity & survival of the Zionist project.
The Palestinians coveted freedom from Israeli rule more than they coveted its economic benefits.
Zionism drew some stark lessons from Jewish history. Zionists inferred that neither blind faith in the gentiles nor blind faith in God would guarantee security. Zionism is the belief that the Jews can trust only themselves & can rely only on themselves. Nobody who accepts this lesson of history as the early Zionists did can believe that Israel should either risk relinquishing territory out of trust in international guarantees or risk holding on to that territory out of trust in God. This is the fundamental basis of a great political confusion afflicting Israel today.
[Demand for social justice] Is the reaction of the many Israelis who have no interest in ruling over the Palestinians but equally would not dare endanger themselves by pulling out of the territories.
The conviction of our own beliefs does not depend on the reasonableness of our arguments but on the strength of our identification with a group that professes those beliefs. Even those who are personally aware that they can sometimes be wrong subconsciously deny that their group could also be wrong. In other words, when the sphere of public discourse is no longer a place where ideas meet but an arena where tribes clash, critical thinking is in danger. I can personally attest to the almost obsessive need to bring opinions in line with group identity. Whenever I speak to the public about liberalism & humanism, I am immediately suspected of being a leftist. Whenever I speak about Patriotism & Zionism, I am immediately suspected of being a right winger.
Palestinians face Israelis & see in them European colonialism. Israelis face Palestinians & see in them European antisemitism. Each side sees the other as representing Europe in its ugliest & most threatening guise. Each side sees the other as the product of a broader phenomenon in which it itself is the victim. In the Palestinians narrative they are the victims of Israel. In the Israelis narrative they are the victims of the Palestinians. In this conflict each side is the victim of its own victims... So when each side sees themselves as victims empathy necessarily disappears & understanding moves ever farther away.
Over the past few decades the notion has taken root that Judaism belongs within a common JudeoChristian heritage. [Meir] Buzaglo proposes replacing the JudeoChristian narrative with a JudeoMuslim one. Judaism holds more in common with Islam than with Christianity… The hidden temptation in embracing the JudeoChristian narrative is that it enables Jews to feel at home in Western culture. But this narrative is a heavy price because, while it connects Jews to the west, it also isolates them from the Middle East.
But a casual reader would be surprised to discover that the Talmud does not enumerate the laws that Jews must follow. Rather it records the debates about those laws. The Talmud is unique among tomes about religious law for canonizing not the law itself but disagreements about the law.
Whenever a theory appears to you as the only possible one, take this as a sign that you have understood neither the theory nor the problem which it was intended to solve. -Karl Popper
Had he not yielded ground to the ultra-orthodox the UN committee might not have recommended that a Jewish state be created. Had he not dissolved the institutions of socialism, the institutions of a nation state could not have been built. Had he not compromised over the unity of the land, it would not have been possible to establish a state on even part of the land. Conventional wisdom states that were it not for the great ideas & ideologies of Israel’s founders the state of Israel could not have been born. But in fact the opposite is true. Had Israel’s founding father clung tenaciously to their ideologies, the state would never have been created at all. The state that was destined to fulfill so many dreams owes its very existence to the visionaries who were willing to relinquish those dreams.
The action that lifts one catastrophic peril merely converts it into another peril no less catastrophic. This is Israel's catch-67. Israeli’s way of thinking would be so much more productive if they stopped defining the situation as a problem & started framing it as a catch instead. Why? Because problems are meant to be solved & this problem has no solution. A catch however is not meant to be solved. It is meant to be escaped from & Israel's catch-67 can almost certainly be escaped from, too. Searching for a way out of the catch rather than a solution to a problem creates lower & more realistic expectations than those behind grand diplomatic initiatives.
It is not enough merely to promote a pragmatic way of thinking. It is essential to illustrate that mode as well.
If a Palestinian state were established, hundreds of thousands of these refugees would probably cross the Jordan River, flood Palestine & destabilize a country that would only just have been established… Israel’s military presence in the Jordan Valley therefore would have two purposes: it would prevent the militarization of a Palestinian state but it would also prevent its collapse.
This would not be a deal to forge peace but to terminate a state of war.
For Palestinians to agree to terminate the conflict & renounce their claims would therefore be a betrayal of the refugees & an offense against religious law. To make peace the Palestinians would have to commit an offense against their own faith & against their own people… This is the Palestinians trap. Their only route to a sovereign & independent state runs through a transformation of their religious & national identity. The preservation of their national & religious loyalties will continue to deprive them of independence & statehood… it is hardly surprising that when the Palestinians are pushed into a corner & compelled to choose between their identity & their independence the majority opt for their identity.
The way out, some argue, is for the Israelis to make even grander offers than they have in the past in order to tempt the Palestinians to sign a peace agreement. The political logic of the partial peace plan is the reverse of this thinking. Instead of Israel offering the Palestinians more, it should expect from them less.
As long as Israel holds out hope of solving the conflict, the international recognition of Palestine before the successful conclusion of negotiations would indeed be problematic. But if Israel chose instead to settle for restructuring the conflict then the international recognition of Palestine could be an advantage. That is to say: Israel should stop fighting the Palestinian authorities’ diplomatic offensive & join it instead.
It is tempting to categorize the partial peace plan as moderate left & the divergence plan as moderate right but such a temptation is rooted in the bad habits of long held thinking patterns.
Neither initiative aims to solve the problem, only to extract Israel from the trap of the catch-67. Neither hopes to solve the conflict only to convert it from a fatal situation to a chronic one.
When it comes to traffic accidents & crime people think in degrees. But when it comes to the Israeli Palestinian conflict Israelis have become accustomed to thinking in dichotomies. They never ask how to reduce the incidence of terrorism. They want to know how to eliminate it. They never ask how to reduce the intensity of the conflict, only how to solve it. They never ask how to minimize the occupation, only how to end it.
The right exchanged redemption for security as its primary concern. & the left exchanged peace for the occupation as its primary concern. The old left & old right were destined to collide but the new right & new left are able to talk instead. Because, while peace & redemption come at the expense of one another, security & the end of the occupation can come hand-in-hand. In other words Israel's present crisis of ideas grants it its greatest opportunity for genuine dialogue.
Few people realize that moving on from believing in the possibility of peace is the mirror image of moving on from believing in the possibility of victory in war. For decades wars have not ended in victory. In a world of asymmetric warfare there is no such thing as victory… In every war the people demand victory & emerge embittered when confronted with equivocal & ambiguous results.
In this book I offer an indictment of total ideologies. But the truth is that without these redemptive ideologies the Zionist project would never have been able to surmount its many obstacles & establish itself against all odds In Catch-67 I have sought to expose the ideological fixations created by such unequivocal beliefs & to argue that escaping the catch requires leaving these ideological fixations behind. Revolutionary ideologies were indeed necessary to bring Zionism into existence but their softening & maturation are equally necessary for Zionism to survive & to prosper.
In his final speech to the nation, Moses described the fear of the power of others as a fear of returning to Egypt. But he described the fear of the corrupting nature of one’s own power as a fear of turning into Egypt. The Bible does not ask us to banish these fears. Instead it demands that we learn to live with them both.
Most of my close friends in Israel who are hypersensitive to the dangers of a hostile Middle East tend to be apathetic about the human rights of the Palestinians. Most of my close friends who are hypersensitive about the rights of the Palestinians tend to be apathetic about the great danger that surrounds them from the outside. Each camp has taken exclusive ownership of a single fear. One camp is afraid of returning to Egypt. The other camp is afraid of turning into Egypt.
Ideological politics deals with meaning. Pragmatic politics deals mostly with survival. This is also the weakness of pragmatic politics. What sense of meaning can we possibly retain if we have to give up the great ideas that first filled our lives with the adrenaline of idealism?
The Bible systematically denies the divine nature of Kings & the eternality of the political order.
Those who believe that their solution will bring redemption are bound to believe that their rival’s solution will bring devastation. The rhetoric of ideologies is to maintain that rival beliefs are not just wrong but dangerous. Because of this any intellectual sphere in which perfect solutions are pitted against each other is one in which no one is listening.
February 9, 2022
Micah Goodman har stor innsikt i israelernes rasjonale og evner å forklare denne på en spennende og opplysende måte. Han fremstiller gode og overbevisende argumenter angående hva som skal til for å stabilisere situasjonen mellom israelerne og palestinerne. Boken fordrer en del forkunnskaper, gjentar flere argumenter som ofte går igjen i debatten, men gir også en del nye perspektiver som øker forståelsen.
October 26, 2023
I have been listening to the audio book, the narrator has done a great job indeed!!!
Micah Goodman proves to be a keen and sharp analyst of the situation in Israel...
The Left and the Right is in a state of so-called Catch-22, which means that both sides are right without finding the way out of this bloody dilemma between Israelis and Palestinians...
Well-deserved four stars, and my full recommendation to all who wants to know more about the background of the Palestinians drama!!!
Micah Goodman proves to be a keen and sharp analyst of the situation in Israel...
The Left and the Right is in a state of so-called Catch-22, which means that both sides are right without finding the way out of this bloody dilemma between Israelis and Palestinians...
Well-deserved four stars, and my full recommendation to all who wants to know more about the background of the Palestinians drama!!!
March 31, 2023
ספר מעניין על מדוע קשה לפתור את הסכסוך בין ישראל לפלסטינים ועל איך נסיון להפוך אותו לסוג של מחלה כרונית כרגע ובלי פתרון מוחלט יכול לעזור.
אולי נצליח לעשות את זה גם כדי לפתור את המחלוקת על הרפורמה/הפיכה המשפטית.
אולי נצליח לעשות את זה גם כדי לפתור את המחלוקת על הרפורמה/הפיכה המשפטית.
January 14, 2021
Really interesting. General thesis is moving from "thinking in binaries" to "thinking in degrees". Moving from "solving the problem" to "restructuring the problem to escape a catch-22".
March 1, 2020
This was a refreshingly new way of looking at the dilemma of peace for Israelis and how the debate divides their society. It shined light on many aspects ignored or dismissed by different sides on this issue, and sought to simplify the most difficult issues on the matter. Micah Goodman also provided detailed histories on Israel's political camps, how they changed and how they suffered from various events since 1967. However, by rejecting a real two state solution, he ignores key desires of Palestinians (he does acknowledge other aspects that many liberals ignore though) and he holds to old views of geopolitics in military affairs, without acknowledging how times have changed. While I disagree Goodman on some key issues, this is an important addition to the literature on this debate.
January 29, 2020
I won't try to summarize or critique this book. I'll only say that it is a worthwhile read for anyone who has a strong interest in the Arab-Israeli conflict.
I will, however, point out that some of the possible steps that he describes that could work parallel some of the components of the U.S.' peace proposal issued January 28.
I will, however, point out that some of the possible steps that he describes that could work parallel some of the components of the U.S.' peace proposal issued January 28.
January 17, 2020
Goodman provides a different take on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict than some authors, opting for solutions that limit the conflict rather than put an end to it. On the one hand, this is probably more realistic. On the other, it's also frustrating for those of us with hopes for peace. He accurately spells out many of the contradictions inherent in taking steps like disengaging from the West Bank, while understanding the nuances of the conflict and its human elements. I found his examination of paradox quite useful to understand the situation.
I think the only qualm I have is with Goodman's lack of analysis about how the Haredi community's growth will change the playing field moving forward. Unquestionably, in a fractured political system where Haredi parties are often key to governing, there must be more analysis of their role. He does talk about growing Messianism on the right, but largely omits discussion of Shas and UTJ. It's a stellar book, but this oversight means I can't rate it 5 stars.
I think the only qualm I have is with Goodman's lack of analysis about how the Haredi community's growth will change the playing field moving forward. Unquestionably, in a fractured political system where Haredi parties are often key to governing, there must be more analysis of their role. He does talk about growing Messianism on the right, but largely omits discussion of Shas and UTJ. It's a stellar book, but this oversight means I can't rate it 5 stars.
October 26, 2018
Short and sweet. A clearly written statement of the impossible situation Israel and the Palestinians are caught in. Goodman urges us to move away from dichotomous ideological thinking towards pragmatism. I compare this move to the philosophy of "harm reduction" in dealing with drugs and addiction--instead of absolutist thinking (criminialize/ban/shame) we should think less heroically and more small scale (needle exchanges/treatment/support) to make real--but less perfect--change. In the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: give up on the idea of "solving" the conflict and think about how we can reconfigure the conflict to make incremental change. He has lots of specific plans towards the end of the book (e.g. the Allon plan). Goodman doesn't hold up any of these as the magic solution, but his point is that we need to change how we frame our expectations if we want to escape the Catch-22.
December 15, 2018
At last, a text that offers a description and analysis of both sides of the Israeli Palestinian conflict. Goodman offers two practical political options for moving beyond the impasse that as led to so many wars, recriminations, humiliation, and pain. He admits his options are not perfect or definitive, but possible. He gave me hope that there are ways forward. He concludes: "The tradition of the prophets urges Jews to harbor doubts about their politics, and the tradition of the Talmud urges them to harbor doubts about themselves. Jewish tradition favors not those who are always right but those who know that they are sometimes wrong. Jewish tradition is a tradition of arguing, but also one of listening -- the same sort of listening that could renew and elevate Israel's culture of debate." I'd add, that same sort of listening might elevate Palestinian culture of debate.
January 27, 2020
A good look at the struggles that Israel is going to be facing in the next decade.
March 4, 2019
The book presents a series of arguments as for why Israel’s current political and moral predicament regarding the occupation and settlement of Palestinian territories is an intractable trap from which the state needs to escape. The left, he argues, says the current situation jeopardizes the moral legitimacy of the state of Israel entirely, and the right says any alternative would lead to catastrophic security threats. The issue, he says, is both are right. As such, both are also wrong, and more practical, smaller solutions need to be pursued. I found it interesting as a whole, although a bit too philosophical and high-minded; some more exploration of specifics must be useful given the stakes here.
June 30, 2019
Excellent - should be required for anyone studying Israeli politics
This excellent analysis of the gridlock in Israeli politics - how it arose, what it means and how (perhaps) to escape it - should be required reading for anyone interested in Israel or the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Notably, ignorant western politicians and journalists (the overwhelming majority!) would benefit by reading it. But so too would Israels who despair about escaping the aptly named 'Catch-67'.
This excellent analysis of the gridlock in Israeli politics - how it arose, what it means and how (perhaps) to escape it - should be required reading for anyone interested in Israel or the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Notably, ignorant western politicians and journalists (the overwhelming majority!) would benefit by reading it. But so too would Israels who despair about escaping the aptly named 'Catch-67'.
December 21, 2018
It was very exciting to read this author who was able to clearly discuss the viewpoints of both the right and left in Israel but to bring some new thinking to the issues when it seemed no one was able to get beyond their own position. Hopefully, the dialogue will continue.
May 4, 2019
Fascinating effort that attempts to reframe the Israel-Palestine imbroglio. I gave it 4 stars because while it is an excellent read I didn't totally agree with his conclusions. HOWEVER....if you care about Israel and Palestine, this is a must-read!
November 9, 2019
בסגנון נקי ומדוייק גודמן מצליח להאיר ולשבור הנחות יסוד שבאטמוספירה הישראלית קל לשכוח שהן בכלל לא מובנות מאליהן. באמצעות טיעונים פשוטים וקוהרנטיות בלתי מתפשרת הספר בונה פרספקטיבה מפוכחת ופרגמטית, שלא חשוב אם מגיעים אליה מימין או משמאל, קשה להישאר אדישים למולה.
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