The Marshall Plan: Dawn of the Cold War

by Benn Steil

Winner of the 2019 New-York Historical Society Barbara and David Zalaznick Book Prize in American History Winner of the 2018 American Academy of Diplomacy Douglas Dillon Award Shortlisted for the 2018 Duff Cooper Prize in Literary Nonfiction Honorable Mention (runner-up) for the 2019 ASEEES Marshall D. Shulman Prize “[A] brilliant book…by far the best study yet” (Paul Kennedy, The Wall Street Journal) of the gripping history behind the Marshall Plan and its long-lasting influence on our world.In the wake of World War II, with Britain’s empire collapsing and Stalin’s on the rise, US officials under new Secretary of State George C. Marshall set out to reconstruct western Europe as a bulwark against communist authoritarianism. Their massive, costly, and ambitious undertaking would confront Europeans and Americans alike with a vision at odds with their history and self-conceptions. In the process, they would drive the creation of NATO, the European Union, and a Western identity that continue to shape world events. Benn Steil’s “thoroughly researched and well-written account” (USA TODAY) tells the story behind the birth of the Cold War, told with verve, insight, and resonance for today. Focusing on the critical years 1947 to 1949, Benn Steil’s gripping narrative takes us through the seminal episodes marking the collapse of postwar US-Soviet relations—the Prague coup, the Berlin blockade, and the division of Germany. In each case, Stalin’s determination to crush the Marshall Plan and undermine American power in Europe is vividly portrayed. Bringing to bear fascinating new material from American, Russian, German, and other European archives, Steil’s account will forever change how we see the Marshall Plan. “Trenchant and timely…an ambitious, deeply researched narrative that…provides a fresh perspective on the coming Cold War” (The New York Times Book Review), The Marshall Plan is a polished and masterly work of historical narrative. An instant classic of Cold War literature, it “is a gripping, complex, and critically important story that is told with clarity and precision” (The Christian Science Monitor).

Genres: History, Nonfiction, Politics, Economics, American History, European History, International Relations

621 pages, Kindle Edition

First published February 13, 2018

About the author

Benn Steil is an American economist and writer.[1] He was educated at Nuffield College, Oxford and at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania. Steil is the senior fellow and director of international economics at the Council on Foreign Relations. He is the founder and editor of the journal International Finance. He has been awarded the Hayek Prize and the Spear's Book Award.

Reviews

[Stefania Dzhanamova · Rating 5 out of 5]

In his book Benn Steil, director of international economics at the Council of Foreign Relations, covers the Marshall Plan, the costly and ambitious initiative to revive Western Europe. 

In 1947, Europe lay in ashes in ruins, its people starving and its economies ruined. The plan's 13 billion in aid allowed Great Britain, France, West Germany, and other European countries to recover economically and neutralize the appeal of Communism. However, is that the Marshal Plan also intensified Cold War tensions because its revival of Germany spread fears of renewed German power across the continent. 

Stalin considered the Marshall Plan a serious threat to his new, hard-won "buffer zone" in Central and Eastern Europe. Interestingly, while they knew it would be the first decisive step toward bitter ideological warfare with the Soviet Union, Truman, Secretary of State George Marshall, the head of the Policy Planning Staff George Frost Kennan, famous for his X Article that outlined the whole American policy of containment towards the Soviet Union, went along with it because, as a CIA report asserted, "the greatest danger to the security of the United States is the possibility of economic collapse in Western Europe and the consequent accession to power of the Communist elements." (One of the founders of the Central Intelligence Agency was Allen Dulles, the younger brother of the stern future Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, a radical anti-communist. Despite their completely different personalities, the two brothers were in remarkable concert when it came to political outlook. The view on which their whole political outlook was built was the perception of Communism as the arch-nemesis not only of America, but of the whole democratic Western Civilization.) 

The support for the Communist parties of Italy and France was strong and Germany, without whose coal, steel and machinery the rest of Europe would have a hard time recovering, was divided in four occupational zones, so American policy-makers feared that international Communism might conquer Europe over all of Europe "without firing a single bullet." The Moscow meetings George Marshall attended in March and April had a deep impact on him. His interactions with Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov and Stalin convinced the new Secretary of State that the split between the Soviet Union and America was deepening and America had to protect itself and its allies from the consequences. He observed that the Marshall Plan was "an outgrowth of [my] disillusionment over the Moscow Conference" and the need "to prevent the complete breakdown of Western Europe." 

In his Harvard speech in June 1947 George Marshall merely planted the idea, reflecting his military experience, though. The responsibility for the plan's execution would be shouldered by an impressive array of American policy-makers, Dean Acheson, George F. Kennan, Lucius Clay, W. Averell Harriman, and Undersecretary for Economic Affairs William Clayton among them. George Marshall and his colleagues understood that the western zones of Germany were vital to the overall revival of Europe and doggedly pursued Germany's reconstruction. George Kennan's first priority was to increase coal production in the Ruhr Valley. A few weeks after Marshall's Harvard Speech, the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued a new directive mandating that the occupational zones in Germany became self-supporting, which meant, among everything else, suspending the obligation to pay reparations to the Soviet Union, which violated the Potsdam agreement. 

Lucius Clay, the military governor of the American zone of occupied Germany, was a dictator, albeit a benign one. He was determined to see Germany committed to capitalism and integrated into the Western Europe economic sphere. If this meant dividing the country in two, so be it. If it meant losing Poland and Czechoslovakia to the Soviet bloc, so be it. According to Steil, American policymakers were making sacrifices to pursue their priorities, and by doing so, they were preparing themselves for a long, and bitter, Cold War.

George Kennan and George Marshall also designed a clever plan. To not alienate some of the countries on which the success of the Marshall Plan depended, they presented it not as an anti-Soviet measure, but as aimed at defeating "hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos" in general, not at any particular country or doctrine, and invited the Soviet Union to participate. However, Stalin could not meet the conditions for participation because they included the revival of Germany and the opening of Eastern Europe to trade. 

The Marshall Plan created serious problems. It shattered all hopes of co-operation between the Soviet Union and the West, as it took Stalin by surprise. He suddenly found himself faced with potential German revival and Western intrusion into his hard-won sphere of influence. Just as George Kennan had predicted earlier, he reacted by seizing power in Czechoslovakia and blockading Berlin. Also, because of the European countries mistrust toward each other, the plan almost provoked war in the short term and might have left Western Europe vulnerable to Communist overtake in the long term. 

The French, for instance, made it clear that they wouldn't accept British or American undertakings in Germany without security guaranties, so, despite being aimed at aiding American military disengagement from Europe, the Marshall Plan ended up, through NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), deepening American commitment to the American commitment to the Old World. George Kennan, who liked the Marshall Plan because it was an economical, not a military, strategy, criticized that unexpected "militarization," but Dean Acheson, who succeeded George Marshall as Secretary of State in 1949, was determined "to challenge Moscow on every front – political, economic, and military . . ." 

One of the surprising parts of the author's analysis is that while "Marshall aid did stimulate investment and that such investments boosted growth", it is not clear to what extent Europe's later economic recovery was the result of the plan. According to him, the Marshall Plan was primarily a political triumph. It was designed as a response to the threat of Communist electoral success, or forceful takeover, in Western Europe, and it succeeds in keeping Communists out of the governments of Italy, France, and other countries.

Steil's work also studies what it takes for an administration to redeem its foreign policy after a disastrous start. Truman's first months in the White House were disappointing – the inexperienced president was ill-prepared to lead the country after the death of his illustrious predecessor, Franklin Delano Roosevelt. However, George Marshall, with the help of Dean Acheson, George Kennan and others, quickly understood that the true danger to American interests in Europe was political chaos and economic decline, not the Soviet military forces. Their impressive achievements led many to remark that Truman represented all that is bad about American foreign policy and George Marshall represented all that is good. 

THE MARSHALL PLAN is a compelling, insightful study that argues that the major virtue of the Marshall Plan was its success in uplifting the spirit of Western Europe and its major drawback was its deepening of the Cold War.

[Micah Cummins · Rating 5 out of 5]

"The Marshall Plan is remembered as one of the great achievements of American foreign policy not merely because it was visionary but because it worked. It worked because the United States aligned its actions with its interests and capacities in Europe, accepting the reality of a Russian sphere of influence into which it could not penetrate without sacrificing credibility and public support. Great acts of statesmanship are grounded in realism no less than idealism. It is a lesson we need to relearn." (Page 404)

"The Marshall Plan" by Benn Steil is an incredibly detailed look into one of the most important diplomatic programs of the twentieth century, one that not only reshaped Europe after the ravaging of the Second World War, but one that also ushered in a whole new type of warfare, one that would keep the world on the edge of its seat well into the 1990's.

After the Second World War, Europe was in chaos with millions of citizens homeless, millions more dead. The infrastructures of most every country were on the verge of collapse, due to damages sustained during the Second World War. The United States was very much concerned that the current state of Europe could lead to a Soviet take over of Eastern, and most of Western, Europe. As well, many of the agreements made at Yalta and Potsdam no longer seemed to be carrying the same weight. With players on both sides, the United States, and the USSR, were making decisions that conflicted with those previously agreed upon.

One of the most hotbed countries during the Marshall Plan was Germany. As John J. McCloy wired to President Harry S Truman, "Germany is on the verge of complete collapse unparalleled in history unless one goes back to the fall of the Roman Empire." Germany was a key country because of its ability to be the gate way for the Soviet Union to enter the rest of Western Europe. The United States was very focused on infusing the German economy, and building it back as an industrial as well as agricultural stronghold for the West. The United States thought that if they could build up Germany with a capitalist end in mind, they would be able to cut off the Soviet Union's influence outside of Eastern Europe.

There were several European countries that did not receive any Marshall Aid, and these not surprisingly were those under Soviet control. The USSR didn't trust the United States about their true goals of the Marshall Plan, and thus, Stalin refused any type of United States aid to the USSR, which also cut any aid from going to Poland, or Czechoslovakia. Stalin remained against the Marshall Plan for the rest of its run. Even after witnessing the positive outcome in many of the countries where aid was delivered, Stalin continued to give the United States the stiff arm, and not allow any aid to enter into the Soviet Union, while also giving the United States a tough time on matters such as troop withdrawals and military placement.

Over all, from the birth of the Marshall Plan in 1948, to its conclusion in 1951, the United States poured well over thirteen billion dollars into rebuilding Europe after the Second World War. With the memories of what happened the last time a European nation was left ravished, the United States wanted to do the best it could to ensure that there would never be another world conflict. However, even with the mainly positive outcome of United States aid, the Marshall Plan also issued in a new era, the Cold War, a period of international hostility, mostly between the United States and the Soviet Union, until the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989.

In conclusion, Benn Steil's "The Marshall Plan: Dawn of the Cold War" is in my opinion is an incredibly well-rounded and thoroughly understandable book on the topic. It is highly recommendable to anyone who wants to have a better understanding of Europe after the Second World War, as well as the cause and effects that led the world into the Cold War.

[Jean · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is more of an academic book that tells about the massive and complicated United States effort to aid Europe after World War Two. In 2017 I read “Harry and Arthur” by Lawrence J Haas. Having read that book help me have a better understanding when reading “The Marshall Plan”. Steil did not go into depth about any of the people involved, he just told what they did. Harry Truman (1884-1972) and Arthur Vandenberg (1884-1951) play key roles in this book. The other book that helped with obtaining more depth of understanding was “The Kennon Diaries” by George F. Kennan (1904-2005). Kennan wrote the first part of the Marshall Plan and plays a key role in this book.

The book is well written and meticulously researched. Steil extensively researched the United States archival material as well as that of Britain, France, Germany, Czech, Serbia and Russia. Steil also discussed the founding of NATO.

Secretary of State, General George C. Marshall (1880-1959), guided the planning and implementation of the plan to help Europe recover from the devastation of the War. The United States was concerned about the spread of communism. If I read the book correctly, I think, Steil adopted the argument made by historians, Scott Parnish and Mikhail Narinsky in 1994, that the Soviets viewed the Marshall Plan as an aggressive move by the United States. Steil ended with the fall of the Soviet Union and the unification of Germany. I found this book helped me understand what is happening today in the world and the great risk that is taking place with a return to the far-right totalitarianism around the world.

Steil tells the story in fascinating detail and I felt he created interesting portraits of the major policy makers of the United States and Western Europe. I found Steil’s writing style easy to read. I have read a number of books about the Marshall Plan and I think this one is excellent in explaining the big picture.

I read this as an audiobook downloaded from Audible. The book is fairly long at sixteen hours and thirty-eight minutes or about 600 pages in the printed format. Arthur Morey does an excellent job narrating the book. Morey is an actor and well-known audiobook narrator. I have always enjoyed listening to him. He has won many Earphone Awards as well as voted Best Voice in Non-Fiction and also in History by the Audiofile Magazine.

[Mikey B. · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is a stirring account of the after-war years during which the Marshall Plan (also known as the European Recovery Plan) was implemented. It is very impressive, outlining the efforts and dedication of the different personalities and countries who were motivated to put this economic and social reconstruction in place. It is logically outlined in this well written book which gives us the step by step approach beginning in 1947.

Europe after the war was an underdeveloped area whose infrastructure had collapsed. Piece-meal aid had done little to ameliorate the conditions. By 1947 some Americans were coming to believe that the key to rejuvenating Europe was Germany – more specifically the areas occupied by the U.S., England, and France. George C. Marshall was Secretary of State and he became the main overseer of this vast project. By putting Germany “in business” would help lift up the rest of the European nations. To get this going they needed to convince the occupying countries – namely England, France, and “possibly” the Soviet Union. The book documents how Stalin never wanted to participate with the Marshall Plan; there was a constant obfuscation from the Soviets of any ideas from the Western powers. So essentially, the Marshall Plan accelerated the escalation of the Cold War. France also needed convincing to be brought onside and was obviously concerned about a rejuvenated Germany on her border .

With the Marshall Plan came NATO. The Western European countries and the U.S. came to realize that with the high dollar value of the Marshall Plan a security guarantee was needed for Europe – to protect it from a re-developing Germany and an increasingly belligerent Stalinist-Soviet Union that had already swallowed up much of Eastern Europe, and in 1948 ended any hint of democracy in Czechoslovakia. Also this led to the creation of West Germany as a nation in 1949. Of course this was opposed by Stalin and was a major post-war failure for Stalinist expansion. West Germany joined NATO in 1955.

Initially the U.S. was averse to helping Europe and was retreating back to isolationism. The author explains how both the government and the American people were brought to believe in the benefits of the Marshall Plan. And one of the prime motivators was the fear of communism spreading to Western Europe. One must emphasize that this was the era of Stalin. The democratic world was doing an about-face from its World War II alliance, as it increasingly realized the totalitarian nature of the communist dictatorship.

We are given solid portrayals of the many individuals involved who cooperated or disagreed with the many facets of the Marshall Plan – like Senator Arthur Vandenberg, George Kennan (an American diplomat who had spent many years in the U.S.S.R.), Ernest Bevin (British Foreign Secretary), Georges Bidault (French Foreign Minister), General Lucius Clay (U.S. military Governor in the U.S. zone in Germany), Vyacheslav Molotov (Soviet Foreign Minister and a constant thorn at any meeting) – and of course the two essential prime movers - President Harry Truman and Secretary of State George Marshall.

The final chapter has an interesting discussion on the current state of Russia and its increasing aggressiveness. The author makes a strong point that liberal democracy was an essential starting point for countries involved in the Marshall Plan, but the military alliance of NATO (rather than democracy) is now more important to the new Eastern bloc countries that want to participate in the European Community.

This is an essential book for understanding the postwar years in Europe (there is a minimum of economic jargon) and also gives insight to the current dilemmas within the fracturing European Community.

[Steven Z. · Rating 4 out of 5]

At a time when the President of the United States disparages the European Union and NATO, it is important to remember the role the Atlantic Alliance has played since the end of World War II. President Trump can tweet and criticize these institutions all he wants, but you skirt their importance particularly in light of the policies pursued by Vladimir Putin and his nationalistic “Russia first” policies. Perhaps the most important policy of the United States in the post-war world, which formed the bedrock of its foreign policy toward Europe, was the Marshall Plan. The plan was conceived by the State Department under then Secretary of State, George C. Marshall as a vehicle to promote European recovery from World War II and foster unity against the Soviet Union, as by 1946 the wartime alliance was severed. To understand how the Marshall Plan came about and its impact, an important lesson for all to learn, one should consult Benn Steil’s new book, THE MARSHALL PLAN: DAWN OF THE COLD WAR.

The book itself does more than present the ideological give and take within the American foreign policy establishment faced with the destruction in Europe after the war as it details negotiations with European counterparts, and presents Soviet opposition to the Marshall Plan in general, especially for Eastern European countries like Poland and Czechoslovakia. Steil’s account is the most detailed and lengthy to date as it dives deep into the postwar “German problem,” Soviet actions in Eastern Europe, and finally the Berlin Blockade, culminating with the creation of NATO. Steil presents the benefits of “soft power” as a foreign policy tool, something the current occupant of the White House should consider.

As Harry S. Truman assumed the presidency a new dynamic was at work in American foreign policy. Franklin Roosevelt mostly acted as his own Secretary of State, but Truman’s approach would be different as the State Department regained influence with the presence of George C. Marshall, George F. Kennan, Dean Acheson, William Clayton, and others. As the war came to a close Stalin had tremendous expectations for the Soviet Union. He witnessed a United Kingdom in decline as it would stop providing aid to Greece and Turkey by 1947. It would also see its position erode within the Commonwealth especially in India and Palestine. As the US quickly demobilized and Germany defeated, Stalin felt there would be little opposition in spreading the “Soviet blanket” over Eastern Europe and create the “buffer zone” he had spoken about so often during the war.

By 1946 it became clear that the wartime alliance was over with disagreements at the Council of Foreign Ministers meetings in dealing with Germany, reparations and other issues. This produced George Kennan’s famous “Long Telegram,” which stressed Russia’s expansionist nature, and within a few weeks Winston Churchill made his famous “Iron Curtain speech in Fulton, Missouri. Steil stresses that Stalin was bent on pushing the United States to see how much he could get away with. The Soviets would push and prod over issues and territories whereby US policymakers came to see western unity and recovery as the only viable alternative to a major military commitment in Europe.

Steil offers a dramatic description of Europe’s plight in the winter of 1947. The destruction of homes and infrastructure, compounded by freezing temperatures led to starvation, frostbite, and death. This situation provided the major impetus for American aid to Europe as communist parties in Italy and France seemed to be a threat, in addition to the civil war in Greece and troubles in Turkey. Exacerbating the situation was the massive movement of ethnic minorities across borders, particularly as it related to Germany and Poland. What became clear by 1947 that some sort of economic stabilization of Europe was the key to peace.

Steil correctly points to the evolution of Dean Acheson’s thinking toward Russia as a key to developing the Marshall Plan as his wartime sympathy toward Moscow changed when confronted by Soviet demands in the Mediterranean. Acheson would become Marshall’s Chief of Staff and an Undersecretary of State, and along with George Kennan would outline his “containment” policy in his famous “X Article” in Foreign Affairs, and the announcement of the Truman Doctrine and aid to Greece and Turkey - the American approach to Soviet machinations had changed.

The key for European recovery was that the German economy had to be strong. The old concept of “Mitteleuropa” remained a reality and US policymakers did their best to keep reparations manageable and allow German industry to rebuild, much to Stalin’s chagrin. Steil zeroes in on the Moscow Conference of 1946 as the beginning of the Cold War as Marshall left the meetings believing that Stalin’s goal was to leave Europe in shambles, allowing him to pick up the pieces. Marshall would later say that the impetus for the European Recovery Program, a.k.a. Marshall Plan was a direct result of Stalin’s attitude.

Steil’s analysis mirrors some of the arguments put forth by Michael Hogan in his book, THE MARSHALL PLAN in that the recovery program was not totally one of American largess and altruism, with no agenda of its own. If Europe did not recover, then it could not buy American products leading to a downturn in the US economy. Further, the resulting political, social, and economic dislocation would foster a piecemeal US aid approach which would drain US resources. Hogan, more so than Steil concluded the US would allow France to recover some of its empire i.e., Southeast Asia as a means of gaining support for the Marshall Plan as well the integration of all three German zones. European colonies were important to their recovery so the US receded from its anti-imperialist tone fostered by Roosevelt during the war.

Steil explores two other key figures in depth without which the Marshall Plan may not have been developed and passed by Congress. First, the work of Will Clayton who had run the Reconstruction Finance Corporation under the New Deal, and Michigan Senator Arthur Vandenberg. Clayton was responsible for conveying the sense of urgency that the American public needed to hear and worked to foster a US plan to restore an equilibrium to the continent. His greatest contribution was convincing people that the problems that existed in European countries were interrelated, and could only be solved through cooperation and a certain amount of integration. Clayton was able to work through European and British opposition to American plans and in the end, along with his colleagues was successful. Vandenberg stands out as the Republican Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee who evolved from an isolationist to a grudging internationalist as he was greatly affected by wartime events and the condition of Europe after 1945. He was able to gain passage of the European Recovery Act in his committee, bringing along fellow Republicans and gaining overall Senate approval.

Perhaps one of Steil’s best chapters analyzes the Soviet approach to Marshall’s Harvard Speech where he announced the recovery plan and their strategy to confront American aid. Steil presents Stalin’s and Molotov’s thinking regarding whether to oppose Marshall’s offer, particularly as it related to Eastern European “satellites.” Soviet ideology is at the forefront of the author’s approach and he provides a bird’s eye view into Kremlin thought processes. In the end by refusing American aid, Stalin did the United States a favor because there was no way Congress would approve aid to the Soviet Union, and Communist demands would have been such that the US could not have afforded it.

Some have argued that when Molotov rejected American aid and cabled Eastern European allies not to discuss aid with the west on July 7, 1947 it marked the onset of the Cold War. Further, by December, 1947 Soviet disinformation over Berlin and the collapse of the London Council of Foreign Ministers meeting, the CIA warned of the possibility that the Soviet Union might try to forcibly remove American troops from Berlin. With the Russian clamp down on Czechoslovakia in early February, 1948 and the questionable death of its Foreign Minister Thomas Masaryk, Stalin had now seized a country that was not agreed to by the “Big Three” during the war. Lastly, on March 5, 1948 England, France and the United States merged the three allied zones to create West Germany - the Cold War was on, making the success of the Marshall Plan an urgent necessity.

The major strength of Steil’s monograph is his ability to explain the bureaucracy that the Marshall Plan produced as it dispersed more than $13 billion in aid from 1948 to 1952. He writes in an easily understandable style that allows the economics “layperson” the ability to understand complex mechanisms that were used to fuel the recovery of Western Europe. Steil provides an in depth analysis as to whether the Marshall Plan actually was successful or not, and integrates the role the creation NATO had on this argument. Though a military component was not in early American planning, the NATO alliance was finally seen as a security imperative and went hand in glove with the economic recovery of Europe.

Steil goes on to discuss the role of NATO today in light of its expansion eastward after 1991. The Russians were under the assumption that the alliance would not encroach on its western borders. As the alliance accepted former Soviet satellites into membership Russian leadership grew increasingly agitated exemplified by Vladimir Putin’s actions in Georgia, Crimea, and the Ukraine. Many like to compare the current situation to the post World War II world, but there is a major difference; during the Truman administration there seemed to be a coherent strategy based on realism, accepting the Soviet sphere of influence. Today, it appears there is no coherent strategy and a total lack of statesmanship – perhaps we need to relearn the lessons of the early Cold War period.

In summary, Steil has done a remarkable service for historians and those who want to understand Europe’s recovery following World War II. Though at times, the author can become bogged down in statistics, his overall command of history, primary and secondary sources, and his ability to synthesize the ideas of the main individuals and economic theory lend itself to an important contribution to Cold War literature.

[Joseph Sciuto · Rating 5 out of 5]

"The Marshall Plan: Dawn of the Cold War" by Benn Steil is a detailed, historical and economic analysis of the famous Plan that helped restore western Europe after the destruction of World War 2, and keep the Soviet Union from spreading its destructive and authoritarian designs beyond east Berlin. The idea of actually helping rebuild Germany as a way to further European recovery after the destructive and deadly war they started, sounds almost like a plot for a science fiction movie. But in essence that was the sales pitch the Truman administration sold to reluctant countries and allies like Britian, France, Austria, Italy, Greece, etc. In return for the aid the Marshall Plan provided to our desperately starving and bankrupt allies, they agreed to this strategy that would reshape the world, stop the spread of Communism, and ultimately defeat the Soviet Union.

In retrospect the plan was ingenious, a very difficult piece of legislation to get passed through the Congress of the United States, but in the hands of the very capable Senate Majority Leader, Arther Vanenberg (R, MI) it passed.

Germany was the economic key to western European recovery. Its resources and industry, even after the war, was essential if the allied countries had any hope of recovering in a matter of years and not decades. The sister to the Marshall Plan, which was strictly economic aid and a refute of communism, was the creation of NATO... A military organization with the stated purpose that if one of its member nations was attacked, it was an attack on all of them. The Marshall Plan and the creation of NATO were direct renunciations of FDR's vision of a "One World Concept" after the end of the war. It, along with the United Nations, were utopian ideals impossible to implement because of the behavior of the Soviet Union and the murderous Stalin.

President Truman, who I have long considered one of the greatest Presidents, General Clay, Sec. Of State George Marshall, Senator Vanenberg, and under Sec. Of State Dean Acheson were the men who had the foresight to implement a policy that to many Europeans is still viewed upon as their salvation. A tribute at the grave of General Clay, placed there by the citizens of Germany, reads

Wir danken dem Bewahrer unserer Freiheit.
"We thank the Defender of our Freedom."

[Frank Stein · Rating 3 out of 5]

It's a shame that this book doesn't really know what it is. Although nominally about the Marshall Plan, it only spends 35 pages detailing how it was implemented. Most of the book is about the wider struggle over post-World War II Europe, involving everything from the division of Germany to the fight over communism in Greece. The last chapter of the book is an extended argument about how encircling Russia since 1997 with NATO expansion has exacerbated some of Russia's most paranoid fears. Convincing, but hardly relevant to the Marshall Plan.

Benn Steil does make some convincing arguments about the Marshall Plan itself that warrant wider circulation. Most importantly, he shows that almost since its inception, people have in turn proposed "Marshall Plans" for everything from American inner cities to Third World hunger. Almost none of these other proposals take stock of the real purpose and context of the original. In the winter of 1946-47, currency controls and continued punishment of the German economy (under the Joint Chiefs of Staff 1067 circular, from September 1944, which mandated deindustrialization) had made trade between European countries all but grind to a halt. The intricate division of labor that had supported the continent for over a century, and that had been reoriented towards Germany in the war, broke down. In desperation to horde valued American currency, countries threw up further barriers to trade. Farmers and factories shut down for lack of either inputs, funds, or customers.

The Marshall Plan's real purpose was not so much to jump start the European economy with investment, as to provide enough food and fuel to get Europe over its temporary hump, and to use it as political leverage to convince Europeans to re-establish intra-European trade. Dangling $14 billion dollars in aid (today about $140 billion, or $800 billion as a percent of American GDP, or 1.1% over the years from 1947 to 1952, when aid ended), Secretaries of State George Marshall and then Dean Acheson convinced these countries to lower tariffs between them by almost 90%. They also convinced them to establish a European payments Union in 1950 that allowed clearing of intra-national debts. The real roots of the European Union go back to these reforms. The U.S. also convinced Europe, most especially France, to give Germany back its Ruhr and Saarlands, and to agree to revitalize the German economy and military as part of a united Western front against Communism.

Steil emphasizes that the threat of Soviet communism hung over every aspect of the plan. The Marshall Plan was proposed just months after President Harry Truman announced his "Truman doctrine" providing $400 million in support of Greece and Turkey against what he euphemistically called "outside aggression." The US used Marshall Plan funds to convince both the Italians and French to kick Communist parties out of their governing coalitions, where they shockingly had almost 30% of the vote. The architects of the Marshall Plan, especially George Kennan and Dean Acheson, knew that the Soviet Union would refuse to participate, and thus discredit their imperialistic program in the eyes of the world. In fact, the Western Communist Parties ham-handed attempted to sabotage the plan on the orders of Moscow did much to demean them permanently.

So the Marshall Plan was appropriate for one time and place, but mainly as political leverage, short-term relief, and public relations coups. It has much to teach us about diplomacy, but little about economic development. If only Steil focused his book on these topics and provided a little wider lens about the whole program, I think this book could have provided a truly fresh lens on the period.

[Adam · Rating 4 out of 5]

A 600 page exhaustive history of the Marshall plan and the beginning of the cold war. This was a period when the history of Europe was set for a generation: the establishment of NATO, a European common market, the division and re-industrialization of Germany, the descent of the iron curtain, the definitive end of the British Empire, the establishment of the United Nations, the rise of the U.S. as a global military and economic super-power.

Steil, an economist, gives a clear view of domestic and international politics. He argues that the Soviet Union's domination of Eastern and most of Central Europe was not simply a function of the evils of a Marxist-Lenninist system, but a continuation of Russian tendencies going back centuries--a need to protect their long vulnerable western border by building up a buffer of allied (or at least submissive) states. From that perspective, he writes an interesting final chapter about the collapse of the iron curtain and Soviet Union at the end of the 20th Century. He argues that by encouraging states on Russia's border to join NATO even before they joined the EU, the U.S. (ie, Clinton), was ignorantly and unnecessarily provoking the Russian bear, which led to the rise of a dictator like Putin.

Also interesting to me was the primacy of Germany in the history of post-war Europe. Russia (and France) were still afraid of Germany, wanted to turn it into a "pastoral" state, and extract maximum reparations. Russia, especially, believed that after having endured unprecedented death and destruction at German hands, they were entitled to virtually all of Germany's wealth, and nationalize or dismantled factories in the eastern part of Germany. The U.S., ironically, seemed to be the country that had actually learned the lessons of World War I and the Treaty of Versailles, insisted that Germany could not pay reparations until it could at least feed its own people, and took the bold step of substituting payments made by American taxpayers in place of German reparations. They then realized that the best way to create a prosperous Europe and avoid long-term economic dependency was to allow West Germany to build up its industrial capacity (surprisingly intact after the war), and become the economic engine of Europe and the center of a free-trade zone, which it has remained until today.

Also interesting to learn that Spain almost received payments under the Marshall plan, and it wasn't until the very last minute, under objections from European leaders, and attempts by U.S. politicians to control the costs, that Spain was removed from the program. One wonders how that country would have changed if a different decision had been made.

This book was very well and extensively researched, and for me, who avoided history as a student, it is great background about how 20th Century Europe came to take it's current shape, not to mention a look back to a time when we could expect a lot more from our politicians than we are getting today.

[Peter Tillman]

It would be well worth your while to read the NY Times review, even if (like me) you don't plan to read the book: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/13/bo...

The key quote:
In the words of Lord Hastings Ismay, NATO’s first secretary general, the Atlantic alliance existed to keep “the Soviet Union out, the Americans in and the Germans down.”

[Conor Ahern · Rating 3 out of 5]

I forget why I reserved this at the library--perhaps our interests become dad-lier with time? The Marshall Plan isn't of intrinsic interest for me, even as a former history major who focused on the post-WWII period in college. I think it was because I was interested in a pre-Nixon America that was more interested in magnanimity than gloating or retribution. Interestingly enough, the Marshall Plan was anything but magnanimous.

I don't mean to imply that generosity is diminished for having elements of self-interest, but this book lays out just how aggressive the Marshall Plan was. The author presents America's two main objectives as: 1) making Europe into a self-sustaining marketplace for American goods, and turning war-ravaged Central Europe into an ideological and physical breakwater for the lumbering Soviet menace to the East. Whether America would have been stirred to its largess in the absence of these interests is left unanswered, but one gets the impression that America would not have given so readily to its Western European allies or the belligerents it helped vanquish without them.

The Soviets knew what America was planning, and they were put in a tough situation: if they called out dollar diplomacy for what it was, they would risk looking unreasonable, cheap, and envious. Despite the objections that they couched in the contemporary vernacular of post-colonialism, the Marshall Plan is in many ways the precursor to the EU and NATO, the import and influence of which are in more doubt now than ever.

Having finished this, my takeaway is not that the Marshall Plan is something we should pan or be ashamed of. But like so many of the complex phenomena that are glossed over in our civics texts, it should be viewed in its proper context.

[Song · Rating 5 out of 5]

用丰富的历史细节和清晰的逻辑讲述说明了现代史的关键时刻。

二战结束，美苏分裂，柏林墙，冷战对峙，北约成立，欧洲复兴启动一体化进程，这些事件至今仍在用巨大的威力影响着每位地球人的日常，而这些事件的共同关键就是—马歇尔计划。

作者运用第一手材料讲述历史的能力很强，把各种关键事件的前因后果都讲清楚了，这本书是史识，史才，史料俱佳的作品，丰富的细节堪称历史爱好者的盛宴，令人满足。

书中比较印象深刻的几个部分：

美国摆脱孤立主义心态，在马歇尔等人的推动下通过法案，美国民主机制的运行过程和具体操作。虽然有各种不同的意见，需要不断申明主张，获取支持，也有声音不停反对，但决策过程比较透明科学。非政府团体在整个过程中自愿逐渐发挥巨大能量，社会动员程度惊人。议员在投票前的 fact-finding 过程很有意思。如何巧妙运用传媒和公开事件，影响公众意见，也是民主政治的娴熟手法。

在马歇尔计划上，苏联的外交战略实际上是出现重大失误了，他们本来可以参与计划，拿美国的金援而让美国无话可说，但斯大林过于自信和骄傲，决定走向对抗。其实积极参与，在参与中搅局是比公开对抗更狡猾的破坏。但苏联的外交心理决定了控制东欧卫星国与美国对抗的结局。

另外苏联在占领德国的目标上过于短视，目的仅仅是想防止德国再次强大，削弱德国，生产仅以满足苏联赔偿为目的。这与美国让德国自立，自给自足，带动欧洲从废墟中复苏的动机就高下立判了。而正是这一点意识形态差异，让美苏最终在柏林、德国启动了冷战。

最后是捷克斯洛伐克共和国的悲剧，美国畏首畏尾，苏联用各种操纵的手法，在1946年破坏了捷克的选举，暗杀民主派领导人，让捷克无奈地倒向了东欧阵营，错失历史机遇。

书中对美苏法英外交人员的风格，斯大林、杜鲁门、坎南、马歇尔、艾奇逊、莫洛托夫、维辛斯基、Bevin等历史人物的描写，栩栩如生。坎南这个学者尤其有意思，他可以说是美国冷战战略的架构师，震惊世界的“莫斯科长电”被永远记入了外交史。但坎南本人却是反对美国在柏林和德国与苏联直接对抗的，也极力警告北约东扩对俄罗斯的刺激。这是学者的软弱，还是对俄罗斯心灵更加深刻的了解？非常值得玩味。

值得提醒的是，作者毕竟是经济学专家，在讨论“马歇尔计划有没有，以及在多大程度对欧洲从战后废墟中复兴提供了帮助”这个问题时，大量篇幅讨论了宏观经济学问题，比如货币政策，外汇管理，进出口赤字等，阅读这部分需要具备经济学的知识，不太容易。经济学观点也穿插在全书的各个部分，来体现当时领导人决策的经济学考量，也是需要注意的。

[Mikael Raihhelgauz · Rating 4 out of 5]

Väga põhjalik ülevaade sõjajärgsest diplomaatiast. Marshalli plaani mehhanismide arutelu jäi kahjuks napiks. Sain aru, et Steili arvates seisnes suurim võit selles, et loodi teatud rahanduslik puhver, mis võimaldas valuutal taastuda ja samas andis USAle piisavalt mõjuvõimu Lääne-Euroopas isemajandava turu loomiseks. Päris hästi siiski ei seletatud, kuidas see kõik toimis. Natuke häiris ka esmaste allikate vähesus, s.t mitme märgilise tsitaadi puhul viitas Steil mõne teise ajaloolase raamatule.
Paar sõna ka sisust... Minu jaoks oli kõige hämmastavam üksmeel, millega vabariiklased ja demokraadid 1940ndate lõpus ja 1950ndate alguses Trumani-Marshalli visiooni elluviimiseks tööd tegid. Ei kujuta ette, et tänapäeval võiks midagi niisugust aset leida. Ühtlasi läks kaduma põhimõte, et sõjaline jõud on vaid meede institutsionaalse progressi kaitseks. Üllatusega sain teada, et tegelikult püüdis Ameerika esialgu NATO loomist vältida, kuid sõjaline liit tekkis suuresti Euroopa riikide soovist Marshalli plaani kaitsta. 1990. aastatest alates pole presidentide administratsioonides nii koherentset välispoliitilist nägemust olnud ja vahest ei tulegi...

[Steven Meyers · Rating 5 out of 5]

War ends but the social and environmental detritus left behind on the battlefields continue. Nations do not suddenly shed all their war wounds and happily skip along into a future of peaceful coexistence. Widespread hunger, malnutrition, death, lawless, violence, and savagery were the daily diet for post-World War II Europe. Typically, countries went by the mantra “To the victor belong the spoils.” The problem was that inflicting retribution through economic means caused political, economic, and social instability upon the losers and made the destitute countries ripe for totalitarian wannabes. With the world in shambles after World War II and the Soviet Union ginned up about expanding its communist empire, the reluctant United States was the only country that was capable of stepping up to thwart coldblooded Stalin’s aspirations. Another big problem was Americans were tired of the war, wanted our troops back home, and had little desire to be the world’s Santa Claus. Isolationism had long been the United States’ inclination since George Washington became president. Given our history it was an understandable viewpoint but extremely shortsighted and not in tune on how technology had made the world a much smaller place. ‘The Marshall Plan’ explains how the Truman Administration went about helping the various European countries and convincing Congress as well as U.S. citizens for the need to invest heavily in bucking up nations on the brink of total collapse.

‘The Marshall Plan’ is a well-written but wonk presentation. It avoids up-close personal stories of the war-torn citizens’ daily lives. The list of political characters is twenty-six friggin’ pages long and its appendices, references, index, and map sections could be a book all their own. It is not meant as a criticism about ‘The Marshall Plan’ but to underscore the thoroughness of Mr. Steil’s efforts in writing this illuminating work. If you ignore the above mentioned sections, the book is a wee bit over four-hundred pages long. It does a very good job of explaining the key players’ objectives and how difficult it was getting Western Europe all on the same page. Each country was dealing with unique political challenges and demands as well as the constant efforts of the Soviet Union to undermine reconstruction for the sake of expanding communism. A big sticking point was the form Germany should take going forward. Germany’s industrial capacity was the linchpin for Europe being able to get back on its feet. Considering the immense damage Germany inflicted upon the world during two bloody wars, it was asking a lot of the victimized nations to bring it back into the fold instead of constantly leeching from German industry like Stalin wanted to do. ‘The Marshall Plan’ is important reading because as it states, “What made economic and financial aid such a radical alternative to a military buildup was that the former had never been tried on such an enormous scale, and in such a critical diplomatic confrontation.” Not only was the Marshall Plan a historical geopolitical game changer, it saved West European nations from tyranny. Mr. Steil’s book also explains the Berlin Blockade and Airlift, and the necessary creation of NATO. The author also makes a clear-eyed assessment of its economic, political, and social ramifications from their inceptions and up to present-day. All parties involved had their fair share of blunders and duplicities along the way. I can’t even imagine having the kind of temperament necessary to be a diplomat. With my short fuse when it comes to tolerating bureaucratic gobbeldygook, I’d be spewing out a litany of profanity that would be neither diplomatically constructive nor helpful in getting me through the Pearly Gates. The book was published in 2018.

‘The Marshall Plan’ is important history. The Soviet Union’s constant efforts to stall and disrupt democracy during the Cold War is still very much part of Putin’s playbook today. Mr. Stein explains the Russian mindset, how it’s more than remnants of a communist ideology, and involves a justifiable insecurity due to their long history of being attacked by outside forces. While we in the west view NATO expansion and the European Union as positive developments, Russia has a much less rosy outlook and it can be seen in their more authoritarian and adversarial approach to governance. The Marshall Plan was one of the great twentieth-century achievements but has frequently been place upon a nearly utopian level of excellence that is not warranted. It was a unique moment in history where, despite many internal government battles, learned men worked out a solution that saved Western Europe, and drew a line in the sand against the expansion of communism. I found the book highly engrossing but you might think reading ‘The Marshall Plan’ was as exciting as reading a textbook about how to watch paint dry.

[Nilesh Jasani · Rating 4 out of 5]

Benn Steil's Marshall Plan is a balanced book on the oft-ignored but tremendously important phase of global geopolitics in the shadow of the second world war. For most casual readers, the recount may prove excessively detailed, though.

Mr. Steil does well removing many myths around the Plan, even though the messages might be lost on its ardent fans. The account clearly shows that the isolationist United States had little interest in the betterment of almost any European nation immediately after the war. The US's global geopolitical involvement was an offshoot of the rivalry with the USSR that it wanted to dominate.

The revisionists have endlessly claimed how the winners' post-WW2 reconstruction policies were designed after learning from the previous war's disastrous, damage-seeking post-war impositions. Nothing can be farther from the truth as one wades through the events of 1947-49 discussed in the book with a fine comb. The Berlin Blockade was the singular event that forced the Western alliance to follow the path of winning the hearts through constructive aid to ensure that the isolated and strategically critical city did not fall into the hands of the Soviets.

While there were visionaries and humanitarians, history-altering organizations/policy frameworks, including the beginnings of the Nato and the European Union, were borne out of the realpolitik. Perversely, the emergence of the Cold War and a bipolar world set at least a part of the world on an excellent, progressive path.

The world may have two superpowers competing once again. The world is also witnessing a re-emergence of Russian anxieties over Nato expansion. The book provides excellent context to many of the events that surround us in Europe at present and offers a long list of things to ponder for a bipolar, geopolitical world of the coming decades. Lastly, the book's un-discussed lesson is the role of accidents and unintended outcomes - for the 1947-49 phase, it all turned out to be perfect for the Western block. Perhaps, it was the good luck the world deserved after the ruinous war. However, politicians' half-baked actions performed for personal or parochial considerations, but with long-lasting, global implications, may not work out so well again.

[Martijn Reintjes · Rating 3 out of 5]

Sure I heard about the Marshall Plan a bit in school, but I never realised how much this plan shaped post-war Europe and in fact, the rest of the world. It really shows how rising the tide benefits all boats.

Although the Marshall Plan was brilliant, it of course also created a lot of tension in the world. So with all boats, I obviously mean all Western European boats. But when those boats rose, they also took with them the boats of the rest of the world.

Hmmm, why am I talking about boats now?

Anyways: super interesting piece of history which I'm shocked that I never learned much about in school in the Netherlands (which got helped a lot with this plan). It also gives a clear view of how the world evolved in the last 70 years and why we are now where we are now.

I give the book only 3 stars, as it was a bit dense and it followed the: "and then, and then, and then" structure a bit too much, which made it quite dull.

~~~
The Marshall Plan will go down in history as one of America's greatest contributions to the peace of the world.
Harry S. Truman

[Massimo Pigliucci · Rating 5 out of 5]

It helps make sense of where we are now

Steil’s masterful treatment of the Marshall Plan and the beginning of the Cold War reads like a page turning thriller. But it’s much more than that. It’s the key to understanding not just the history of the Cold War but why we are now in the midst of dangerous and open ended conflict with Russia. The last chapter in particular allows the reader to clearly connect a lot of historical dots that might not make sense otherwise. But don’t just skip there, read the book from the beginning, it will pay off handsomely. If anyone ever asks you what’s the point of reading history, hand them a copy of this book and shut them up.

[R · Rating 4 out of 5]

I have a professor said a good book is not determined by how much you enjoyed the book but what you learned from the book. He does not read fun books or guilty pleasures, or even just well written entertaining books but the books he recommends are usually well written and entertaining but also will expand your knowledge, and or provide a different perspective. He did not recommend this book but it was well written, some sections were more entertaining than others and I learned a great deal from this book.

I had, of course, heard of the Marshall Plan as it has taken on all the aspects of legend but I knew very little about the Marshall Plan or its consequences on the world stage and how it shaped Europe and the relationship between the United States, Western Europe, and the Soviet Union. Well worth the read and lays out the history and consequences as well as introducing the characters involved in the early years of the Cold War.

[rdgit · Rating 4 out of 5]

The Marshall Plan by Benn Steil

The Marshall Plan is an extremely well documented and extensively researched examination of how the plan changed the world in the late 1940’s, 50’s and even today. After World War II our European allies were on the verge of economic collapse. Those allies were ripe for Russian takeover but with great forethought, the Marshall Plan thwarted Russian dreams by helping Europe rebuild economically, reinforcing the strong bond between our allies and the US.
As stated earlier, the book is extensively researched. If you are looking for an extremely comprehensive account of the Marshall Plan, this will be a fascinating read. It can, however, seem overly documented if you are looking for a lighter read.

[Marks54 · Rating 4 out of 5]

I just noticed this new history of the Marshall Plan and jumped in to read it. Books on the Marshall Plan are not normally page turners - I am still stuck in working through Michael Hogan’s history of the plan. Perhaps the allure is the chance to read about a capably crafted and somewhat successful instance of US foreign policy that involved Russia. Perhaps it is even simpler than that - foreign policy in the modern age is so difficult to craft and has such difficulty enduring that an instance that turned out well is worth remembering. This story would probably make for a good musical in the right hands.

Benn Steil has written an engaging account of the Marshall Plan. The story starts with the end of World War 2 and the disappointments of Yalta and Potsdam and moves through the articulation of the Truman Doctrine, the development of the Marshall Plan to implement the Truman Doctrine, and the rise of the NATO alliance after the Berlin blockade as a means for securing the rebuilding of Europe against potential military threats from the Soviet Union. This is a complex story that starts with a recognition of how interwar mistakes after World War 1 helped bring on World War 2. This recognition, along with immediate traumas in Greece and Turkey, spurred a recognition of the need for economic development to permit reconstruction and remove the temptations for political subversion. This intuition led to the idea of a broad continent wide program to promote European self-sufficiency. This was played out in the midst of the Soviet Union’s assumption of control over Eastern Europe and the internal politics of multiple states and the two emergent superpowers. Add to all this the amazing personalities that drove these processes and you have an epic story.

This is a complex book with lots of themes developed. There are a few striking takeaways.

1) Doing foreign policy for high stakes requires a plan - some sort of idea or story that ties lots of actrivities together and justifies on solid and persuasive terms. Ideas matter - well thought out ideas really matter.
2) Effective implementation also matters. It is often hard to see how anything of consequence ever happens according to plan (at least somewhat). Skill at following through is critical but receives too little attention in the media or in historical accounts more generally.
3) Foreign policy and national security strategy is a team sport. Without a skillful team, it is hard to see how a President or Secretary of State can succeed. Indeed, having a skilled and disciplined team is to guarantee of persistent success. Look at what happened with Korea in Truman’s second term.
4) Whatever happened to bipartisan US foreign policy? The support provided by Congress was critical to the key decisions in this book - and they have helped shape US foreign policy ever since. I am at a loss to see anything resembling this bipartisanship in recent decades - whatever one’s party affiliation may be. Toxic domestic politics harms our foreign policy and national security.
5) History has a long reach - the final chapters of the book reflect on how the early Cold War decisions such as those associated with the Marshall Plan, continued to be influential decades later with the breakup of the Soviet Union and the recent rise of Putin’s Russia.
6) It is hard to wrap one’s head around the complexities of situations like those facing the US in Europe between 1947 and 1949. Fallible decision makers trained largely in domestic politics have to decide on matters that affect millions and that bring together military, political, economic, social, and cultural issues in situations where some choices are much better than others and were do-overs are not granted. What could happen? ...and the Marshall Plan was a set of situations in which things generally worked out. With all of the anniversaries going around, however, there are plenty of examples of where it did not work out so well.

Benn Steil’s book is well worth reading.

[Nestor Rychtyckyj · Rating 4 out of 5]

This 600-page book covers one of the most important eras in history: from the end of World War II in Europe to our present conflicts with Russia. As we all learned in high school – the Marshall Plan helped rebuild Europe and the creation of NATO eventually led to the collapse of the Soviet Union. But history didn’t stop there and the ramifications of those days are still very evident today.

Benn Steil takes us back into Europe in 1946 and shows how the inevitable conflict between the US and the USSR started with the fate of a postwar Germany. A United States that had historically avoided all overseas political entanglements quickly changed its mind and built the foundation of what we still have 7o years later: a strong and democratic Germany that is the economic center of Europe. This was certainly no pre-ordained result in 1946, but it showed how a divided government with a Democrat in the White House and a Republican congress worked together to pass the Marshall Plan. Communism was pushed d back and Europe waited for 40 years for the Iron Curtain to come down.

The author has a knack for taking a lot of rather mundane information and turning it into a fascinating history. Truman, Marshall, Clay, Acheson and others outmaneuver Stalin and Molotov and even convince the French and British (with some financial blackmail) that a strong Germany is needed. He covers economics, politics and mind-numbing financial details that allow Western Europe to recover and shows only a military commitment by the USA in the form of NATO makes it possible for the Marshall Plan to succeed.

The book continues through the collapse of the USSR and the expansion of NATO to countries in Eastern Europe and ends with the current “new cold war” that exists with a new authoritarian Russia under Putin. Here Steil finally loses me – throughout the book he mentions that certain sacrifices were made to preserve western Europe – the people in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and other countries were given up to Stalin. After the fall of the USSR these people naturally wanted to have nothing to do with Russia and eagerly sought membership in NATO and the European Union. This seems to be unacceptable to Russia, which requires that its neighboring countries be subservient. Steil recommends that the USA acknowledge the “reality of a Russian sphere of influence” and that the people in Eastern Europe should continue to suffer in perpetuity
because Russia cannot co-exist with any independent country near its borders.

It’s a fascinating book, but I would think that by now we should know that appeasing dictators never turns out well in the end.

[Andrew Canfield · Rating 4 out of 5]

The conclusion of peace in Europe following the Second World War merely set the stage for decades of power politics to come. The competition between its two great victors, the Soviet Union and the United States, quickly became the longest running struggle of the twentieth century.

The crucial early stages of this tug of war are outlined by author Ben Steil in The Marshall Plan: Dawn of the Cold War. With the British empire’s post-1945 collapse and the claim to vast new tracts of conquered territory by the Soviet Union, the European continent was ripe for picking by the latter barring proactive effort by the United States.

Despite conferences like Potsdam and Yalta having provided some shape to the postwar international order, it quickly became apparent that the hard line Communists running the show in Moscow would not be content to let developments run their natural course. If their behavior toward the peoples of their conquered zones during the war was any indication, it was apparent Russia was not about to take a laissez faire approach to the areas left in their jurisdiction.

With defeated Germany an occupation zone divided between the Communists and capitalist powers, America sought a self-sustaining Germany while Russia seemed intent on holding down its development (something supported to a lesser extent by a fearful France). Absent Germany's industrial production coming back, its prospects of providing an economic regeneration of the continent, much less to even be self-supporting, seemed bleak. The Soviets seemed fine with this being the case, while the U.S. saw it as imperative that the battle-scarred continent get back on its feet sooner rather than later (and certainly in a manner in which the Russians could not claim credit).

U.S. policymakers feared Communists coming to power in nations ranging from Italy and France to Poland and Greece as the Soviets used both under the radar and transparent moves to expand their reach into as many capitals as possible. This is where the Marshall Plan-namesake of General George C. Marshall, who figures as one of the book’s key players-comes into play.

Lasting from 1947 until 1952, the Marshall Plan consisted of billions of dollars in U.S. government aid (not Lend-Lease style loans) provided to European nations the State Department deemed most at risk of falling to Communism. The theory went, essentially, that economic want and deprivation would make desperate European populations ripe for the Communist picking. With many economies left ravaged by the recently concluded world war, an ideological tug-of-war between the capitalist west and totalitarian east seemed bound to play out.

The counterpart to Marshall on the Soviet side is played by V.M. Molotov, the volatile Soviet foreign minister who stormed out of a 1947 Paris meeting over postwar settlements when it became clear America would be extending economic aid-ostensibly doled out to undermine Russian influence-to the region. Plenty about the book, which was published in 2018, is relevant to current events in eastern Europe. The lack of good faith on both sides, with Russian and American diplomats accusing the other of breaking their commitments, has improved little since the late 1940s.

Aside from Marshall, State department policy planners George Kennan and Dean Acheson play huge roles in the narrative. Each of these men’s contributions to planning the post-World War Two architecture are extensively detailed by Steil. Kennan’s shift from a hawkish supporter of Soviet containment to one critical of policies with too militaristic of a bent is an interesting arc as the book progresses.

Senator Arthur Vandenburg is shown to be critical in getting the Marshall Plan through Congress. Vandenberg, a formerly isolationist Republican, was heavily leaned on by Democratic president Harry Truman for legislative support while shepherding the plan through that branch. Many tax-cutting Republicans were not inclined to back the ERP’s (European Recovery Program was the Marshall Plan’s official title) price tag of thirteen billion dollars, which would be ten times that amount in today’s dollars and would result in a massive boost in government spending. But Senator Vandenberg’s backing and General Marshall’s credibility brought sufficient votes to get the plan passed.

Some on the right like Senator Taft of Ohio remained staunch opponents, as did those on the left with a soft spot for the Soviets like Henry Wallace. But these voices lost out in the debate, and defeat of the Communists at the ballot box in a vote in Italy shortly after the Marshall Plan’s passage were held up as early evidence that it would prevent Moscow from expanding its orbit westward.

The Marshall Plan is explained as the non-military complement to the Truman Doctrine, an exemplary exercise in soft power. The willingness to see through the Berlin airlift demonstrated America's willingness to back up its words and dollars with single-minded determination; this resolve was shown to be a shot across the bow toward Russian expectations that America would lack firmness when postwar European push came to shove.

That NATO went on to be founded as a military alliance a short while later was held up by some contemporaries as evidence of the plan’s failure. This was owing to the fact that early arguments for the aid were based on its likelihood to reduce the necessity of American promises of military assistance or commitments in the region. While Steil does not ultimately label the Marshall Plan a failure, his commentary at the conclusion (which he steers clear of in the body of the book) makes clear his disapproval of NATO’s expansion.

With respect to its perception in Russia, Steil compares the expansion of NATO to the Treaty of Versailles. While he seems to view the Marshall Plan as largely a success, the author argues that NATO moving eastward was essentially a spiking of the football at a defeated, post-1991 Russia which only gave ammunition to Kremlin hard liners like Vladimir Putin. To be clear, aside from this concluding portion the book steers clear of commentary on the matter. Overall, it is a deeply informative look at several important early years of the Cold War which are still reverberating today.

Readers will especially appreciate this recounting in the light of present events. Today's tension in eastern Europe is given scope by this well-paced work of nonfiction. The Marshall Plan: Dawn of the Cold War extensively covers the psyche and reasoning of the decision makers in both the free and Communist world during the crucial years of 1947-1952, and it goes a long way toward explaining the roots of today's concerns about how far Russia's sphere of influence is bound to expand.

-Andrew Canfield Denver, Colorado

[John Plowright · Rating 5 out of 5]

“The most unsordid act in history” is how Churchill famously described the Marshall Plan (recycling a phrase he’d originally applied to the Lend-Lease Bill) and there’s no denying that in offering financial assistance to war-ravaged Europe, the United States was moved in part by compassion. This was, however, far from the full story and at least as important was the economic desire to regenerate Europe as a market for American exports and the political and ideological desire to use this largesse to help contain communism.

Benn Steil’s ‘The Marshall Plan’ is focused firmly on the last of these three motivations, as is evident from his book’s subtitle: ‘Dawn of the Cold War’. In time the US administration came to the realization that man cannot live by bread alone and that if its investment in western Europe was to be protected it was necessary to remove the sickle from its throat, deterring Soviet aggression by abandoning isolationism for good and entering into a peacetime military alliance.

Although Truman later described the Marshall Plan and NATO as “two halves of the same walnut” it is clear from Steil’s admirable account that this is not how Marshall had originally conceived the plan but that Soviet reactions to it, including the takeover of Czechoslovakia and the Berlin Blockade, persuaded key figures such as Arthur Vandenberg, that Marshall Aid needed to be buttressed by some security arrangement.

Steil is well placed to write this history, not only as the author of the acclaimed ‘Battle of Bretton Woods’ but as someone who has immersed himself in the literature, including new material from American, Russian, German and Czech sources. His book is not as radical a departure in interpretation as he might like to claim but it should nevertheless become the standard text on the subject given the clarity and comprehensiveness of his exposition.

[Blaine Welgraven · Rating 5 out of 5]

"The formulation would, in spite of the mind-numbing details that would come to define the Marshall program, be the deal in a nutshell--that the United States would underwrite a basic standard of living in the participating countries to afford them the space to liberalize and integrate their economies. In essence, the State Department was tendering the largest foreign aid program in history as a social shock absorber for the largest structural adjustment program in history."

"Communism is gone from Europe, but geography has not changed."

"The Marshall Plan is remembered as one of the great achievements of American foreign policy not merely because it was visionary but because it worked. It worked because the United States aligned its actions with its interests and capacities in Europe, accepting the reality of a Russian sphere of influence into which it could not penetrate without sacrificing credibility and public support. Great acts of statesmanship are ground in realism no less than idealism. It is a lesson we need to relearn."

--Benn Steil, The Marshall Plan

The best historical narrative I've read in some time, effortlessly synthesizing the political, economic, and structural elements of Europe's post-World II landscape to elucidate the Marshall Plan's conception, birth, and ultimate maturation into what we recognize today as modern Europe. Highly recommend.

[Ian Beardsell · Rating 3 out of 5]

Benn Steil's scholarly assessment of the Marshall Plan was perhaps slightly closer to 3.5 stars, but I sometimes got caught up in some convoluted sentences I had to read a couple of times to ensure I understood them. Otherwise, this was a very detailed and, I believe, accurate assessment of the events in the early days of the Cold War that led to the Marshall Plan and NATO. I felt the author also did a fantastic job of analyzing the success of the plan given its original intentions, along with describing the long term after-effects that still echo today.

If you want to learn more about the key players of global diplomacy that were concerned with rebuilding Europe and containing Communism after history's most devastating war-- George Marshall, Dean Acheson, George Kennan, Ernest Bevin, Molotov and more--this will be right up your alley, but folks wanting more of a general overview of this period may find it too deep.

[Rowena Abdul Razak · Rating 5 out of 5]

Excellent book

Great book. Excellent in detail, about the intricacies of the Marshall Plan, the relations between the US and Europe and the Soviet Union and the plan’s key players. Last two chapters provided an elegant analysis of the Plan’s legacy, its recent implications and how it is linked to ongoing tensions between Russia and the West. I particularly enjoyed the relationship between the Plan, NATO and the EU. Superb scholarship.

[Emilija · Rating 3 out of 5]

Thank you to the publishers for providing an ARC of this book through NetGalley.

Really dry, really detailed and seriously in need of a timeline. This felt less about the Marshall Plan, which did have major importance for Europe in the aftermath of the world war, and more about the personalities of the leader and foreign secretary type person in the USSR, America and to some extent, Britain.

[Matthew Rohn · Rating 3 out of 5]

I think explains the Marshall Plan and orbiting postwar diplomacy well but (1) so much of it is about conflict over midcentury monetary policy which most people just won't find interesting and (2) the last section about NATO expansion as an echo of the Marshall Plan is not well linked and feels very tacked on

[Patrick Berg · Rating 3 out of 5]

Decent, very very dense. Not the most interesting story, but its hard to make a bunch of guys arguing about money that interesting. Read this in 2 days 😭😭😭

[David Lubin · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is a well researched and well presented summary of the events over the four years that followed World War 2 in the European Theater. It specifically addresses the plan put forth by Secretary of State George Marshall to support the recovery of the European nations while at the same time dividing Germany to keep the USSR from controlling the entire country. The players involved the heads of state of all the Western European nations as well as the US Congress and President Truman. Against them was the Soviet Union under Josef Stalin, a mastermind at getting what he wanted. As often is the case, really interesting events can sometimes be boring due to the endless amount of political wrangling as each side tries to overcome the other. That is the case in parts here because there was so much going on behind the scenes. But the book is honest enough to present both sides and does so well enough that it is worth the time spent to read it.

[Thomas Terence · Rating 5 out of 5]

A good history of post World War II reconstruction in Europe. The Americans and the Soviets had different ideas and this clash, a cold war, would linger over the world for decades.