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World War II at Sea: A Global History
Author of Lincoln and His Admirals (winner of the Lincoln Prize), The Battle of Midway (Best Book of the Year, Military History Quarterly), and Operation Neptune (winner of the Samuel Eliot Morison Award for Naval Literature), Craig L. Symonds ranks among the country's finest naval historians. World War II at Sea is his crowning achievement, a narrative of the entire war and all of its belligerents, on all of the world's oceans and seas between 1939 and 1945.
Here are the major engagements and their interconnections: the U-boat attack on Scapa Flow and the Battle of the Atlantic; the "miracle" evacuation from Dunkirk and the scuttling of the French Navy; the pitched battles for control of Norway fjords and Mussolini's Regia Marina; the rise of the Kidö Butai and Pearl Harbor; the landings in North Africa and New Guinea, then on Normandy and Iwo Jima. Symonds offers indelible portraits of the great naval leaders-FDR and Churchill (self-proclaimed "Navy men"), Karl Dönitz, François Darlan, Ernest King, Isoroku Yamamoto, Louis Mountbatten, and William Halsey, while acknowledging the countless seamen and officers of all nationalities whose lives were lost during the greatest naval conflicts ever fought. World War II at Sea is history on a truly epic scale.
Here are the major engagements and their interconnections: the U-boat attack on Scapa Flow and the Battle of the Atlantic; the "miracle" evacuation from Dunkirk and the scuttling of the French Navy; the pitched battles for control of Norway fjords and Mussolini's Regia Marina; the rise of the Kidö Butai and Pearl Harbor; the landings in North Africa and New Guinea, then on Normandy and Iwo Jima. Symonds offers indelible portraits of the great naval leaders-FDR and Churchill (self-proclaimed "Navy men"), Karl Dönitz, François Darlan, Ernest King, Isoroku Yamamoto, Louis Mountbatten, and William Halsey, while acknowledging the countless seamen and officers of all nationalities whose lives were lost during the greatest naval conflicts ever fought. World War II at Sea is history on a truly epic scale.
770 pages, Hardcover
First published April 13, 2018
582 people are currently reading
2810 people want to read
About the author
Craig L. Symonds
45 books242 followersCraig Lee Symonds is a retired professor and former chairman of the history department at the United States Naval Academy. He earned both his MA (1969) and Ph.D. (1976) from the University of Florida.
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October 31, 2020
“As if a giant hammer had smashed down on her amidships, the Hood broke in half, her bow jackknifing upward to a forty-five-degree angle while flames and smoke soared into the sky. Watching from the Bismarck, [Captain] Lindemann’s adjutant, Burkard Mullenheim-Rechberg, recalled seeing ‘a mountain of flame and a yellowish-white fireball bursting up between her masts and soaring into the sky. White stars, probably molten pieces of metal, shot out from the black smoke and followed the flame, and huge fragments, one of which looked like the main turret, whirled through the air like toys.’ Within seconds, she was gone. The biggest ship in the Royal Navy and the pride of the fleet for more than two decades simply disappeared. Of the more than fifteen hundred men in her crew, only three survived…With hardly a pause to contemplate this astonishing spectacle, Lindemann turned the Bismarck’s guns on the Prince of Wales, and almost at once, a 15-inch shell struck the new British battleship on her bridge, killing everyone there except the captain, the chief yeoman, and the leading signalman. There was so much carnage on the bridge that blood ran down through the voice tube and dripped onto the plotting table…”
- Craig Symonds, World War II at Sea
Craig Symonds’s World War II at Sea is a book I almost passed on. This occurred for a couple reasons. First, we have that title. World War II at Sea? It’s hard to think of a more uninspired or pedantic name for a book. It sounds like one of those half-assed collections of WWII photos that you find on the bargain shelf at Barnes & Noble. I know you’re not supposed to judge books by their covers (or titles). But I do. All the time.
Second, I hesitated because of the subtitle: A Global History. I’m always a bit skeptical of one-volume histories of huge subjects, and this is a huge subject. Most of the earth is water; during World War II, most of the world was at war. Add the two together, and you got a lot of ground (I mean liquid) to cover, even in 647 pages of text, even with an author with Symonds’s sterling reputation (he is a prolific writer/historian and professor emeritus at Annapolis). When I see a phrase like “global history,” I associate it with adjectives like “impersonal” and “generalized” and “superficial.”
By now, you’ve probably realized that I did not pass on World War II at Sea, despite that bland title (Symonds also wrote The Civil War at Sea, so coming up with catchy monikers is clearly not his thing).
You’ve also probably realized, based on those little stars up above, that I enjoyed it. I enjoyed it a lot. The main reason: while this might be touted as a global history, it is first and foremost an intimate history. It puts the human participants front and center. No matter how big the story gets (spoiler alert: it gets big), it is always centered on a person with a name, dealing with the most intense, momentous, and often deadly experience in his life. On a huge canvas, Symonds paints with a fine brush, looking for the telling details, the meaningful anecdote, the well-constructed set-piece.
World War II at Sea takes us from 1939 to 1945, from the earliest Nazi sub attacks in the Atlantic to the Japanese surrender aboard the USS Missouri. Symonds structures the narrative chronologically, rather than thematically, meaning that there is some bouncing between operational theaters. Symonds chose this framework in order to prove a point: that all these different theaters were connected, like the threads of a giant spider’s web. To pull on one thread sent shivers along all the others. An amphibious landing over here meant an inability to protect a convoy over there. One of the leitmotifs of World War II at Sea is the inestimable value of resources in war, and how the allocation of those scare resources oftentimes proves the difference.
(It is also worth noting that taking a chronological approach does not cause any confusion, for the reason that a lot of the main action in the Atlantic took place before Japan bombed Pearl Harbor and opened a massive second global front. Thus, Symonds doesn’t have to do a ton of toggling back and forth).
Symonds starts things out with a wonderful little introduction set at the London Conference of 1930, where the sea-powers of the world were gathering to draft the rules of naval warfare. This neatly lays out the geo-military context of the war to come, as well as providing a whiff of tragic irony, the knowledge that there would be no rules, and that no one on the sea, or beneath it, or above it, would be safe.
As soon as this intro concludes, Symonds thrusts us onto Günther Prien’s Nazi submarine, U-47, as it sneaks into the main British anchorage as Scapa Flow. He builds the scene gradually, with memorable details such as the aurora borealis flickering overhead; a car passing by on a coastal road, “so close that its headlights washed the sub’s conning tower”; the hiss of air escaping ballast tanks, replaced by the burble of salt water, and followed by “an unnatural quiet as the submarine descended through the frigid North Sea waters and settled gently on the bottom.”
The sub attacks, firing a spread of torpedoes at the Royal Oak:
Though he does not have the space for full biographies of the captains and admirals, Symonds never neglects to give us at least a sentence or two that tells us who they were, providing a bit of insight into their decisions.
Finding the mini-arcs within the grand tale allows Symonds to create memorable scenes while still covering all the things he wants to cover. And he wants to cover a lot. Along with the battles, Symonds does a fine job of detailing the changes in tactics and technology that occurred throughout the war. War is an exercise in adaptation, and that is certainly true with World War II. (Early in the war, the British used biplanes to attack the Italians at Taranto. Biplanes! By the war’s end, jet planes had been put to use. That’s a lot of change to deal with).
He also goes to some length to demonstrate the importance of logistics and cooperation to the Allied cause. In Symonds’s view, three things allowed the Allies to prevail over the Axis powers: (1) England holding out alone against Nazi Germany; (2) the Russians bleeding the Nazis in the U.S.S.R.; and (3) Allied (see: American) industrial superiority. This last element, America’s manufacturing prowess, was not a piece of luck, though it is often deprecated by historians who extol the fighting prowess of the Germans and the sacrifices of the Russians as superior to the contributions of the U.K. and the U.S. However, as Symonds shows, being able to harness the vast industrial might of a fractious democracy was a skill, and one that was necessary for ultimate victory. And all that factory work would have been wasted without command of the seas.
(The fact that America was able to devote such overwhelming resources to both the European and Pacific theaters of operations cannot be overstated. I mean, the U.S. was basically waging the two largest wars in history simultaneously).
As for cooperation, despite the constant friction between Stalin, Roosevelt, and Churchill, they at least phoned ahead before launching a new invasion. The same could not be said for the Germans, the Japanese, and the Italians, who all sort of did what felt right in the moment. Symonds shows how well-planned combined operations can win a history-changing battle (such as D-Day) or mitigate a baleful defeat (as at Dunkirk).
Part of the reason World War II at Sea is so successful (and feels so comprehensive) is that it sticks to its theme. I’d go so far as to say that Symonds is a bit masterful in his ability to stay focused. I’ve read several books purporting to be about naval warfare in the Pacific, that nevertheless couldn’t help but follow the drama onto various islands such as Saipan and Iwo Jima. Symonds does not do this. He will give you enough information about what’s happening onshore to make strategic sense, but he does not go further. His chapter on the Normandy landings, for example, is dedicated solely to Operation Neptune, the seaborne aspect of the D-Day invasion. You will not learn about the Rangers of Point du Hoc in this book; rather, you will discover how difficult it is to transport and supply tens of thousands of men invading a continent.
Symonds’s self-imposed discipline is all the more remarkable considering that he has written on several of these topics before. For instance, despite having authored an entire book on the battle of Midway, Symonds deals with it here in only a relatively few pages. That allows him to spend time on other corners of the sea war that he might otherwise have skipped. This is a book that manages to be both concise and detailed; both expansive and efficient. The balance Symonds achieves is effortlessly exquisite.
You and I probably differ on what we’d consider summer beach reads. To me, this is a marvelous beach book. In fact, I read it on a lakeshore while pretending to watch my kids fish. It is paced like a novel; it is written with narrative grace and verve; and it is researched with a scholar’s care. This is top-shelf history of a kind that I am always searching for and only infrequently find.
- Craig Symonds, World War II at Sea
Craig Symonds’s World War II at Sea is a book I almost passed on. This occurred for a couple reasons. First, we have that title. World War II at Sea? It’s hard to think of a more uninspired or pedantic name for a book. It sounds like one of those half-assed collections of WWII photos that you find on the bargain shelf at Barnes & Noble. I know you’re not supposed to judge books by their covers (or titles). But I do. All the time.
Second, I hesitated because of the subtitle: A Global History. I’m always a bit skeptical of one-volume histories of huge subjects, and this is a huge subject. Most of the earth is water; during World War II, most of the world was at war. Add the two together, and you got a lot of ground (I mean liquid) to cover, even in 647 pages of text, even with an author with Symonds’s sterling reputation (he is a prolific writer/historian and professor emeritus at Annapolis). When I see a phrase like “global history,” I associate it with adjectives like “impersonal” and “generalized” and “superficial.”
By now, you’ve probably realized that I did not pass on World War II at Sea, despite that bland title (Symonds also wrote The Civil War at Sea, so coming up with catchy monikers is clearly not his thing).
You’ve also probably realized, based on those little stars up above, that I enjoyed it. I enjoyed it a lot. The main reason: while this might be touted as a global history, it is first and foremost an intimate history. It puts the human participants front and center. No matter how big the story gets (spoiler alert: it gets big), it is always centered on a person with a name, dealing with the most intense, momentous, and often deadly experience in his life. On a huge canvas, Symonds paints with a fine brush, looking for the telling details, the meaningful anecdote, the well-constructed set-piece.
World War II at Sea takes us from 1939 to 1945, from the earliest Nazi sub attacks in the Atlantic to the Japanese surrender aboard the USS Missouri. Symonds structures the narrative chronologically, rather than thematically, meaning that there is some bouncing between operational theaters. Symonds chose this framework in order to prove a point: that all these different theaters were connected, like the threads of a giant spider’s web. To pull on one thread sent shivers along all the others. An amphibious landing over here meant an inability to protect a convoy over there. One of the leitmotifs of World War II at Sea is the inestimable value of resources in war, and how the allocation of those scare resources oftentimes proves the difference.
(It is also worth noting that taking a chronological approach does not cause any confusion, for the reason that a lot of the main action in the Atlantic took place before Japan bombed Pearl Harbor and opened a massive second global front. Thus, Symonds doesn’t have to do a ton of toggling back and forth).
Symonds starts things out with a wonderful little introduction set at the London Conference of 1930, where the sea-powers of the world were gathering to draft the rules of naval warfare. This neatly lays out the geo-military context of the war to come, as well as providing a whiff of tragic irony, the knowledge that there would be no rules, and that no one on the sea, or beneath it, or above it, would be safe.
As soon as this intro concludes, Symonds thrusts us onto Günther Prien’s Nazi submarine, U-47, as it sneaks into the main British anchorage as Scapa Flow. He builds the scene gradually, with memorable details such as the aurora borealis flickering overhead; a car passing by on a coastal road, “so close that its headlights washed the sub’s conning tower”; the hiss of air escaping ballast tanks, replaced by the burble of salt water, and followed by “an unnatural quiet as the submarine descended through the frigid North Sea waters and settled gently on the bottom.”
The sub attacks, firing a spread of torpedoes at the Royal Oak:
[T]he results were spectacular. A massive plume of water, as high as the ship’s superstructure, erupted amidships, followed in quick succession by two more. Pieces of the ship flew skyward, and flames in a variety of colors – blue, red, and yellow – shot up into the night. Black smoke roiled up from the spaces below, and the big ship began listing heavily to starboard. Within minutes, she was sinking. Several of the watertight doors had been dogged shut for safety, and now they blocked the way as hundreds of men tried to scramble out from the lower decks. As the big battleship slowly rolled over, the giant 15-inch gun turrets broke off and toppled into the sea. As they did, more flames shot up from inside the ship. Those of the crew who had managed to make their way topside jumped into the frigid water…
Though he does not have the space for full biographies of the captains and admirals, Symonds never neglects to give us at least a sentence or two that tells us who they were, providing a bit of insight into their decisions.
Finding the mini-arcs within the grand tale allows Symonds to create memorable scenes while still covering all the things he wants to cover. And he wants to cover a lot. Along with the battles, Symonds does a fine job of detailing the changes in tactics and technology that occurred throughout the war. War is an exercise in adaptation, and that is certainly true with World War II. (Early in the war, the British used biplanes to attack the Italians at Taranto. Biplanes! By the war’s end, jet planes had been put to use. That’s a lot of change to deal with).
He also goes to some length to demonstrate the importance of logistics and cooperation to the Allied cause. In Symonds’s view, three things allowed the Allies to prevail over the Axis powers: (1) England holding out alone against Nazi Germany; (2) the Russians bleeding the Nazis in the U.S.S.R.; and (3) Allied (see: American) industrial superiority. This last element, America’s manufacturing prowess, was not a piece of luck, though it is often deprecated by historians who extol the fighting prowess of the Germans and the sacrifices of the Russians as superior to the contributions of the U.K. and the U.S. However, as Symonds shows, being able to harness the vast industrial might of a fractious democracy was a skill, and one that was necessary for ultimate victory. And all that factory work would have been wasted without command of the seas.
(The fact that America was able to devote such overwhelming resources to both the European and Pacific theaters of operations cannot be overstated. I mean, the U.S. was basically waging the two largest wars in history simultaneously).
As for cooperation, despite the constant friction between Stalin, Roosevelt, and Churchill, they at least phoned ahead before launching a new invasion. The same could not be said for the Germans, the Japanese, and the Italians, who all sort of did what felt right in the moment. Symonds shows how well-planned combined operations can win a history-changing battle (such as D-Day) or mitigate a baleful defeat (as at Dunkirk).
Part of the reason World War II at Sea is so successful (and feels so comprehensive) is that it sticks to its theme. I’d go so far as to say that Symonds is a bit masterful in his ability to stay focused. I’ve read several books purporting to be about naval warfare in the Pacific, that nevertheless couldn’t help but follow the drama onto various islands such as Saipan and Iwo Jima. Symonds does not do this. He will give you enough information about what’s happening onshore to make strategic sense, but he does not go further. His chapter on the Normandy landings, for example, is dedicated solely to Operation Neptune, the seaborne aspect of the D-Day invasion. You will not learn about the Rangers of Point du Hoc in this book; rather, you will discover how difficult it is to transport and supply tens of thousands of men invading a continent.
Symonds’s self-imposed discipline is all the more remarkable considering that he has written on several of these topics before. For instance, despite having authored an entire book on the battle of Midway, Symonds deals with it here in only a relatively few pages. That allows him to spend time on other corners of the sea war that he might otherwise have skipped. This is a book that manages to be both concise and detailed; both expansive and efficient. The balance Symonds achieves is effortlessly exquisite.
You and I probably differ on what we’d consider summer beach reads. To me, this is a marvelous beach book. In fact, I read it on a lakeshore while pretending to watch my kids fish. It is paced like a novel; it is written with narrative grace and verve; and it is researched with a scholar’s care. This is top-shelf history of a kind that I am always searching for and only infrequently find.
October 24, 2018
With this volume, Dr. Symonds once again proves he is one of the best naval historians currently writing. In this narrative, he takes the reader through WWII at sea from the sinking of the British battleship HMS Royal Oak by a U-Boat at Scapa Flow in the beginning days of the war through to last American Naval Air raids on Japan in August of 1945.
He has arranged the narrative chronologically and by theater. While discussing events in one theater of operations, Dr. Symonds looks how those actions affected actions in another. For example, he looks at the how need of escort vessels in the Mediterranean shorted the availability of those escorts in the North Atlantic. In many case early in the war, convoys had only one or two escort vessels leading to excessive merchant ship losses. While discussing naval operations in the Med, he looks at operational problems Italy, Britain’s major opponent in that theater of war, had. Their problems can be summed up in one work – OIL. As the author explains, ship for ship, the Italian Navy matched up well with what Britain had available for Mediterranean operations. Italy’s big problem was fuel or lack thereof. This lack severely constricted Italian Naval operations, but at the same time its mere presence tied up major British Naval units.
Another topic that Dr Symonds illustrates well is the split in philosophy in the German Naval High Command. Adm Raeder, who was the overall commander, wanted a surface fleet, not so much as to go toe-to-toe with Britain ala Jutland, but as a raiding force to menace and sink Britain’s merchant Navy. Adm Donitz, the U-Boat Commander, also wanted to sink as many merchant ships as possible, but he thought the way to do it was through U-Boats. In describing this polarization in thinking, the author does a good job of telling how this made neither branch of the Kriegsmarine ready for war in September 1939.
Later in the narrative, Dr. Symonds looks at and contrasts the German submarine effort in the Atlantic with the American effort in the Pacific. He states that the German’s lost the Battle of the Atlantic because even at the height of their success in 1942/3 they were barely sinking more shipping than the Allies (mainly the US) could produce. The Americans on the other hand, by late 1944 had virtually destroyed the Japanese merchant fleet and were running out of targets
Dr. Symonds makes the point that the main difference in between the two sides was the US capability to produce prodigious amounts of material and because of that, they were able to replace losses both quickly and in many cases with better equipment. He also makes the point that even the US’ logistic ability had its limits. He uses the availability of LST to illustrate this point. The shortage of LSTs was a main factor in the timing of amphibious operations in both the Mediterranean theater and for Overlord. Yet at the same time there were enough of them for the US to mount Overlord and the invasion of Saipan almost simultaneously.
To sum up my thoughts, the author has produced a smooth flowing and very readable history. About the only problems I had with the narrative are some minor factual errors that should have been caught. For example when the author is telling the story of the Guadalcanal campaign, he twice in three pages refers to the 7th Marine Division. To my knowledge, there was not a 7th Marine Division (certainly not in 1942), but there was a 7th Marine Regiment (that was part of the 1st Marine Division) that deployed to Guadalcanal after the first Marines waded ashore. In another section, when discussing the USS West Virginia in the later stages of the war, Dr. Symonds says she had 9 16 inch/45 caliber main guns. I know she was rebuilt after Pearl Harbor, but they didn’t change her main armament – she had 8 16 inch/45 caliber rifles as her main armament.
Other than things like that, which only someone who had read WAY, WAY too much WW II history would know, this is a 4.5 star read - would have rounded up for GR. I would take 1/2 star off for the errors so it is 4 stars for Goodreads. I highly recommend this for anyone interested in naval warfare or WW II.
He has arranged the narrative chronologically and by theater. While discussing events in one theater of operations, Dr. Symonds looks how those actions affected actions in another. For example, he looks at the how need of escort vessels in the Mediterranean shorted the availability of those escorts in the North Atlantic. In many case early in the war, convoys had only one or two escort vessels leading to excessive merchant ship losses. While discussing naval operations in the Med, he looks at operational problems Italy, Britain’s major opponent in that theater of war, had. Their problems can be summed up in one work – OIL. As the author explains, ship for ship, the Italian Navy matched up well with what Britain had available for Mediterranean operations. Italy’s big problem was fuel or lack thereof. This lack severely constricted Italian Naval operations, but at the same time its mere presence tied up major British Naval units.
Another topic that Dr Symonds illustrates well is the split in philosophy in the German Naval High Command. Adm Raeder, who was the overall commander, wanted a surface fleet, not so much as to go toe-to-toe with Britain ala Jutland, but as a raiding force to menace and sink Britain’s merchant Navy. Adm Donitz, the U-Boat Commander, also wanted to sink as many merchant ships as possible, but he thought the way to do it was through U-Boats. In describing this polarization in thinking, the author does a good job of telling how this made neither branch of the Kriegsmarine ready for war in September 1939.
Later in the narrative, Dr. Symonds looks at and contrasts the German submarine effort in the Atlantic with the American effort in the Pacific. He states that the German’s lost the Battle of the Atlantic because even at the height of their success in 1942/3 they were barely sinking more shipping than the Allies (mainly the US) could produce. The Americans on the other hand, by late 1944 had virtually destroyed the Japanese merchant fleet and were running out of targets
Dr. Symonds makes the point that the main difference in between the two sides was the US capability to produce prodigious amounts of material and because of that, they were able to replace losses both quickly and in many cases with better equipment. He also makes the point that even the US’ logistic ability had its limits. He uses the availability of LST to illustrate this point. The shortage of LSTs was a main factor in the timing of amphibious operations in both the Mediterranean theater and for Overlord. Yet at the same time there were enough of them for the US to mount Overlord and the invasion of Saipan almost simultaneously.
To sum up my thoughts, the author has produced a smooth flowing and very readable history. About the only problems I had with the narrative are some minor factual errors that should have been caught. For example when the author is telling the story of the Guadalcanal campaign, he twice in three pages refers to the 7th Marine Division. To my knowledge, there was not a 7th Marine Division (certainly not in 1942), but there was a 7th Marine Regiment (that was part of the 1st Marine Division) that deployed to Guadalcanal after the first Marines waded ashore. In another section, when discussing the USS West Virginia in the later stages of the war, Dr. Symonds says she had 9 16 inch/45 caliber main guns. I know she was rebuilt after Pearl Harbor, but they didn’t change her main armament – she had 8 16 inch/45 caliber rifles as her main armament.
Other than things like that, which only someone who had read WAY, WAY too much WW II history would know, this is a 4.5 star read - would have rounded up for GR. I would take 1/2 star off for the errors so it is 4 stars for Goodreads. I highly recommend this for anyone interested in naval warfare or WW II.
January 4, 2019
WWII is not an a subject for which I have much enthusiasm. Blame it on all those WWII movies I watched as a kid and then add the History Channel, at least while it still carried history programming, and I guess I have just OD'd on the subject. Nevertheless, there are good histories available on that war but I tend to need a credible recommendation before I spend money on a book dealing with that period. The review of a GR friend (thanks Matt) caught my eye a couple of months ago and I ordered it. I still think Bezos should pay commissions to GR members that recommend books that result in sales for Amazon. My friend's review was spot-on. This is a great book.
What earns this book 5 stars from me is that it is a history as history should be written and taught. Most histories confine themselves to a geographic area and a time and then ignore everything else that might be happening beyond that area or time. As an example of why this is so wrong how does one learn about our War of 1812 without understanding what was going on in Europe with Napoleon or what was happening in India or the Caribbean? When it comes to WWII virtually all historians confine themselves to either the European or the Pacific theaters as though these conflicts were occurring in different wars. They were not and this author makes that incredibly clear. The overriding concern of this history is the demonstration of how what happened in one area of this war affected matters in other areas thousands of miles apart in some instances. It is also made clear how the morale or enthusiasm of troops, while important, was not the critical element to success in modern warfare. What was critical was the means of supporting your troops. Napoleon was correct when he said that an army traveled on its stomach and with the advances in technology and the geographic scope of wars resources and logistics became the key to success.
Symonds illustrates that having a large military force was nice but if you couldn't feed and supply them then it was a meaningless possession. Russia had an army in the millions but without support from Allied convoys these soldiers would have starved and run out of ammunition and melted away from German advances. Instead it was the Germans that were unable to meet the logistical challenges WWII presented them with. The same thing occurred to the Japanese in the Pacific once the U.S. recovered from Pearl Harbor and energized their industrial behemoth. Of course the industrial strength of the U.S. was also useless unless the materiel they produced was able to be delivered to where it was needed. This is where the Navy became the critical component of the war. Symonds demonstrates the evolution of naval values and priorities in WWII and how naval resources were so important in both theaters of operation and how each theatre affected operations in the other. Symonds also illustrates how the complexity of modern warfare is magnified by the difficulties of national alliances and the cooperation of separate military branches reluctant to cooperation both within their own national military as well as with those of other allied nations. Eisenhower was not chosen for his job because of his military expertise but for his diplomatic and personnel talents and it was a heaven sent selection.
At just short of 650 pages of text this book is extremely well formatted and a relatively easy read inspite of its length. It is a vast and complex subject and while it allegedly is focused on the naval contributions in that war many troop and air components are included when necessary. Of course this book is an overview and a good one at that so there is not a lot of detail regarding specific engagements. However, enough detail is provided so that the reader is definitely given a proper of understanding of the subject under discussion. Without question this is one of the best histories I have ever read and grants the reader a thorough understanding of the interplay of the elements involved in WWII. I can't recommend this book strongly enough for WWII enthusiasts.
What earns this book 5 stars from me is that it is a history as history should be written and taught. Most histories confine themselves to a geographic area and a time and then ignore everything else that might be happening beyond that area or time. As an example of why this is so wrong how does one learn about our War of 1812 without understanding what was going on in Europe with Napoleon or what was happening in India or the Caribbean? When it comes to WWII virtually all historians confine themselves to either the European or the Pacific theaters as though these conflicts were occurring in different wars. They were not and this author makes that incredibly clear. The overriding concern of this history is the demonstration of how what happened in one area of this war affected matters in other areas thousands of miles apart in some instances. It is also made clear how the morale or enthusiasm of troops, while important, was not the critical element to success in modern warfare. What was critical was the means of supporting your troops. Napoleon was correct when he said that an army traveled on its stomach and with the advances in technology and the geographic scope of wars resources and logistics became the key to success.
Symonds illustrates that having a large military force was nice but if you couldn't feed and supply them then it was a meaningless possession. Russia had an army in the millions but without support from Allied convoys these soldiers would have starved and run out of ammunition and melted away from German advances. Instead it was the Germans that were unable to meet the logistical challenges WWII presented them with. The same thing occurred to the Japanese in the Pacific once the U.S. recovered from Pearl Harbor and energized their industrial behemoth. Of course the industrial strength of the U.S. was also useless unless the materiel they produced was able to be delivered to where it was needed. This is where the Navy became the critical component of the war. Symonds demonstrates the evolution of naval values and priorities in WWII and how naval resources were so important in both theaters of operation and how each theatre affected operations in the other. Symonds also illustrates how the complexity of modern warfare is magnified by the difficulties of national alliances and the cooperation of separate military branches reluctant to cooperation both within their own national military as well as with those of other allied nations. Eisenhower was not chosen for his job because of his military expertise but for his diplomatic and personnel talents and it was a heaven sent selection.
At just short of 650 pages of text this book is extremely well formatted and a relatively easy read inspite of its length. It is a vast and complex subject and while it allegedly is focused on the naval contributions in that war many troop and air components are included when necessary. Of course this book is an overview and a good one at that so there is not a lot of detail regarding specific engagements. However, enough detail is provided so that the reader is definitely given a proper of understanding of the subject under discussion. Without question this is one of the best histories I have ever read and grants the reader a thorough understanding of the interplay of the elements involved in WWII. I can't recommend this book strongly enough for WWII enthusiasts.
October 17, 2018
Smooth, well-written chronological summary of the naval aspects of War II. Not surprisingly, Symonds contends it wasn’t the bomb, nor code-breaking, nor radar that won the war: each of those explanations has been advanced in diverse books. Rather, it was U.S. technological prowess in shipbuilding. For example, he shows, in the Battle of the Atlantic, that while closing the air gap, adding Jeep carriers to each convoy, and battling million of fanatical Russians helped, by 1943, America simply was producing more tonnage than U-boats could sink.
It’s a good, if not edge-of-your-seat, one-volume work.
It’s a good, if not edge-of-your-seat, one-volume work.
October 22, 2018
A massive synthesis of the emerging interpretations of naval warfare in World War II, more a narrative than an analysis, but not without insights. In particular, Symonds spends a decent amount of the book on logistics, ship construction, and amphibious warfare tactics. Not enough to bore but certainly enough to give a fuller of appreciation of these aspects next to the classic narrative of admirals and fighting ships. There are minor errors that will make a World War II naval nerd shriek, such as Royal Oak going twenty-eight knots. The wars in the Baltic and Mediterranean Sea are a bit sparse and the Black Sea is mentioned not at all. I came away even less impressed with Churchill's military acumen, although I am not sure that was Symonds' intention. That said, this is a good book that makes it clear that command of the seas was one of the leading reasons the Allies won and the Axis lost.
April 17, 2018
I try to keep looking for ways to interact with my kids in new ways. My son loves reading about military history, so I though I would add a book on that topic to my reading list. Reading it together would give us more things to talk about.
Oxford University Press was kind enough to send me a review copy of its upcoming release: World War II at Sea: A Global History by Craig L. Symonds. My son and I jumped in and enjoyed this narrative of the naval war and all of its belligerents, on all of the world’s oceans and seas, between 1939 and 1945.
If that sounds like a lot. It is. At almost 800 pages, it’s a tremendous collection of the events of World War II through the lens of big steel ships.
I have to admit, I knew bits and pieces of World War II history, but I never put it all together to figure out the chronology of events and how they related to each other.
The book opens with 1930 London Conference, an early attempt at an arms treaty. The goal was to limit the tonnage of naval ships to prevent a build up in naval power among Great Britain, France, Italy, the United States and Japan. The arguments over the numbers of battleships at the beginning of the war become out of touch. Mr. Symonds shows how these limitations on naval warfare become misplaced as the strategies and purpose of the navies changed rapidly during the war. WWII brought major technological advances in warfare that radically changed naval strategy. That conference failed to address aircraft carriers. By the end of the war, aircraft carriers were the key naval strength.
World War II at Sea covers all of these major engagements and their interconnection with other aspects of the conflicts:
the U-boat attack on Scapa Flow
the Battle of the Atlantic
the “miracle” evacuation from Dunkirk
the battles for control of Norway fjords
Mussolini’s Regia Marina, the fourth-largest navy in the world, but ineffective for a lack a fuel
Japanese naval power of the Kidö Butai
Pearl Harbor
Midway
the forced neutrality of the French navy and eventual scuttling
the landings in North Africa and into Italy
the Normandy invasion
I found the story-telling to be top notch. It’s not easy to keep no many battles, ship and personalities in context. I found Mr. Symonds to have done a masterful job of illuminating the mechanics of large-scale warfare in water and the key role it played.
As for my son, he knew most of this information separately. He appreciated so much being put together in place to add more context to the underlying events. He felt it was too brief at times for the areas he wanted to dive more deeply into.
Oxford University Press was kind enough to send me a review copy of its upcoming release: World War II at Sea: A Global History by Craig L. Symonds. My son and I jumped in and enjoyed this narrative of the naval war and all of its belligerents, on all of the world’s oceans and seas, between 1939 and 1945.
If that sounds like a lot. It is. At almost 800 pages, it’s a tremendous collection of the events of World War II through the lens of big steel ships.
I have to admit, I knew bits and pieces of World War II history, but I never put it all together to figure out the chronology of events and how they related to each other.
The book opens with 1930 London Conference, an early attempt at an arms treaty. The goal was to limit the tonnage of naval ships to prevent a build up in naval power among Great Britain, France, Italy, the United States and Japan. The arguments over the numbers of battleships at the beginning of the war become out of touch. Mr. Symonds shows how these limitations on naval warfare become misplaced as the strategies and purpose of the navies changed rapidly during the war. WWII brought major technological advances in warfare that radically changed naval strategy. That conference failed to address aircraft carriers. By the end of the war, aircraft carriers were the key naval strength.
World War II at Sea covers all of these major engagements and their interconnection with other aspects of the conflicts:
the U-boat attack on Scapa Flow
the Battle of the Atlantic
the “miracle” evacuation from Dunkirk
the battles for control of Norway fjords
Mussolini’s Regia Marina, the fourth-largest navy in the world, but ineffective for a lack a fuel
Japanese naval power of the Kidö Butai
Pearl Harbor
Midway
the forced neutrality of the French navy and eventual scuttling
the landings in North Africa and into Italy
the Normandy invasion
I found the story-telling to be top notch. It’s not easy to keep no many battles, ship and personalities in context. I found Mr. Symonds to have done a masterful job of illuminating the mechanics of large-scale warfare in water and the key role it played.
As for my son, he knew most of this information separately. He appreciated so much being put together in place to add more context to the underlying events. He felt it was too brief at times for the areas he wanted to dive more deeply into.
June 26, 2022
No se hace pesado y estructura muy bien todas las batallas marítimas de la Segunda Guerra Mundial, desde los primeros ataques de submarinos y la flota de superficie alemana hasta los desesperados y suicidas intentos de Japón, cuando ya su Armada Imperial estaba destrozada o hundida.
Quizá se le pueda reprochar cierta ingenuidad al examinar algunas acciones y sus derivaciones geopolíticas, como el lanzamiento de las bombas atómicas; pero, por lo demás, en lo que es el corazón del libro, no cuestiona ni entra en polémicas. Se ciñe a los hechos históricos y hace bien.
Una historia de épica, sangre y salitre.
Quizá se le pueda reprochar cierta ingenuidad al examinar algunas acciones y sus derivaciones geopolíticas, como el lanzamiento de las bombas atómicas; pero, por lo demás, en lo que es el corazón del libro, no cuestiona ni entra en polémicas. Se ciñe a los hechos históricos y hace bien.
Una historia de épica, sangre y salitre.
December 24, 2018
This is an extraordinary history book about WWII. It focuses on the Naval aspects of the War and deals with the German, British, American, Italian, and French navies. A comprehensive and well-written account of the naval actions during WWII.
I especially liked that he didn't make judgments about the actions of characters (MacArthur, Halsey, etc.) just tried to present the facts.
The author has written previously about the Navy during the D-Day landings and the Battle of Midway so any slight to this 2 events are covered in th0se books
I highly recommend this to anyone interested in the history of this War.
I especially liked that he didn't make judgments about the actions of characters (MacArthur, Halsey, etc.) just tried to present the facts.
The author has written previously about the Navy during the D-Day landings and the Battle of Midway so any slight to this 2 events are covered in th0se books
I highly recommend this to anyone interested in the history of this War.
January 22, 2020
Excellent naval history of WWII
February 25, 2024
I’m speechless and sobbing. What a history, what a book.
May 17, 2018
A good survey of the war at sea...a surprisingly fast read for such a heavy topic
July 3, 2021
This was a book that I had in my cart for over a year to pick up and read. I knew this was going to be epic, so I wanted to wait for the paperback before finally pulling the trigger. I tend to do better with bigger books in paperback form then big hardbacks. Just me. Well it took well over a year before the paperback showed up on the scene but by then I had moved on to other books and was between books on my Audible so I ended up getting that route instead. By then the hype was real in my head. I was a HUGE fan of Symond's book on the Battle of Midway. So I knew this would be like if Spielberg did a TV episode on one key battle in WW2, and then decided to do a whole trilogy on one theater (Oh wait he has). Yeah Symonds is that good. So how did it turn out. This is exactly what I thought it would be. But in a way that worked against it the end. Let me explain. The book was everything I wanted it to be except, I didn't really learn much new. The details are there, the personal accounts are there, and the authors frankness of the facts is there (which come across as opinion but let's face facts folks). What kept this from being a truly great book is I think it just didn't do anything that blew my mind. It is a GREAT book. But I think my expectations were too high. Too many fawning reviews, and his last book being so amazing the bar was set high. I recommend this book whole-heartedly especially if you want one big macro view of this portion of the war. But if you've already read a bunch of books on the war in the Pacific or Atlantic I just don't see what point there is here unless you are a total WW2 completionist that will read a 500 page book to learn one new nugget of information like MacArthur like grilled cheese sandwiches. Again, this is a great great book. Wonderful. Symonds is a master and I can't wait for his next book. But it's long and thorough while not bringing a whole lotta new to an already crowded subject.
July 7, 2021
Very complete history of WWII across the oceans and seas, including considerations of two front wars, subsea and air power. Plenty of maps and photos supplement a text that is not at all dry.
This book delivers a ton of evidence but doesn't completely answer the oft-asked questions - is air power sufficient? Were battleships worthless - or all ships, as Hitler came to believe? While not explicitly called out, this book does an excellent job of showing how technology improvements were also a key concern in the naval war.
Added this to my reading list when it was released in 2018, not disappointed. Lives up to the hype received on the back cover. Took me some time to read it, and thanks to a liberal covid renewal policy at the library. Will acquire a copy for my reference shelf - and looking forward to reading more from this excellent author.
This book delivers a ton of evidence but doesn't completely answer the oft-asked questions - is air power sufficient? Were battleships worthless - or all ships, as Hitler came to believe? While not explicitly called out, this book does an excellent job of showing how technology improvements were also a key concern in the naval war.
Added this to my reading list when it was released in 2018, not disappointed. Lives up to the hype received on the back cover. Took me some time to read it, and thanks to a liberal covid renewal policy at the library. Will acquire a copy for my reference shelf - and looking forward to reading more from this excellent author.
December 23, 2019
Para hacerse una idea aproximada, y bastante general, de lo que fue la batalla en el mar durante la II Guerra Mundial.
March 11, 2024
This is a wonderful book, so well written it flows like a novel at times making it a joy to read. Above all, I was particularly grateful for the abundance of very useful maps.
The subject, the naval history of World War II, is extremely complex and while there are other worthy books detailing specific aspects or even theatres of the naval conflict across the globe, none that I have read combine such lucidity and accessibility as this book achieves.
Although Mr Symonds is a US naval historian, he has written an unbiased account of a huge variety of naval actions which included a number of nations’ navies. He doesn’t try to create heroes or villains, but matter of factly delivers accounts which allows the reader to develop his or her own opinion - Halsey in particular made me wonder, as did the performance of a number of Japanese admirals - certainly the idea that both the US and Japanese had similar Naval traditions, thereby resulting in some of the more bemusing command decisions on either side, was food for thought.
Given the scope and size of the Pacific war, much of the book was given over to this theatre and rightly so, but that did not mean other theatres failed to get their due - it was gratifying for example that the Battle of the Atlantic or efforts in the Mediterranean were duly recognised and related.
There was certainly a naval historian’s bias that much of the success of the Allies was down to their Navies, but I didn’t mind that. What I did find compelling was that the structure of the book allowed the reader to enjoy seeing how tactical, technical and strategic developments evolved during the naval war. In any case, Mr Symonds does suitably acknowledge both allies and other service arms when it comes to attributing reasons for final success.
On the slightly negative side, I have read elsewhere that there are errors in the book which some may find troublesome - I personally can live with the idea that HMS Hood may not, at one time, have had the largest calibre guns as written, or that British Admirals aren’t “starred” in the way their US counterparts are, but perhaps it irritates some.
More prosaically I would have liked to read more about the British contribution in the Pacific - perhaps Halsey’s and King’s reworking of history worked a little after all?
However, in conclusion, I can’t recommend this book highly enough - as a one volume history it’s easily digestable, it is superbly written and ties together a very complex aspect of WWII into a very satisfying package indeed.
The subject, the naval history of World War II, is extremely complex and while there are other worthy books detailing specific aspects or even theatres of the naval conflict across the globe, none that I have read combine such lucidity and accessibility as this book achieves.
Although Mr Symonds is a US naval historian, he has written an unbiased account of a huge variety of naval actions which included a number of nations’ navies. He doesn’t try to create heroes or villains, but matter of factly delivers accounts which allows the reader to develop his or her own opinion - Halsey in particular made me wonder, as did the performance of a number of Japanese admirals - certainly the idea that both the US and Japanese had similar Naval traditions, thereby resulting in some of the more bemusing command decisions on either side, was food for thought.
Given the scope and size of the Pacific war, much of the book was given over to this theatre and rightly so, but that did not mean other theatres failed to get their due - it was gratifying for example that the Battle of the Atlantic or efforts in the Mediterranean were duly recognised and related.
There was certainly a naval historian’s bias that much of the success of the Allies was down to their Navies, but I didn’t mind that. What I did find compelling was that the structure of the book allowed the reader to enjoy seeing how tactical, technical and strategic developments evolved during the naval war. In any case, Mr Symonds does suitably acknowledge both allies and other service arms when it comes to attributing reasons for final success.
On the slightly negative side, I have read elsewhere that there are errors in the book which some may find troublesome - I personally can live with the idea that HMS Hood may not, at one time, have had the largest calibre guns as written, or that British Admirals aren’t “starred” in the way their US counterparts are, but perhaps it irritates some.
More prosaically I would have liked to read more about the British contribution in the Pacific - perhaps Halsey’s and King’s reworking of history worked a little after all?
However, in conclusion, I can’t recommend this book highly enough - as a one volume history it’s easily digestable, it is superbly written and ties together a very complex aspect of WWII into a very satisfying package indeed.
November 20, 2025
Comprehensive and comprehensible, this book covers the naval side of World War II. I think the strength of this book is the clarity with which the different major (and minor) events of WW2 are contextualized. Despite the breadth of the topic, the author does a masterful job integrating small details and interesting tidbits into the broader outline and narrative of the book.
Other books sometimes give you the “boots on the ground” perspective or a million details about each battle, but this book really struck a great balance in giving sufficient detail to keep it interesting without letting the momentum of the story get bogged down.
For example, much to my surprise and delight, the ship that my grandfather later served on in the Korean War was mentioned specifically by name (instead of generically as “an American destroyer”) in one of the chapters. Made my day!
It’s a long book, but I think Symonds is one of the best communicators when it comes to naval histories. 5 stars!
Other books sometimes give you the “boots on the ground” perspective or a million details about each battle, but this book really struck a great balance in giving sufficient detail to keep it interesting without letting the momentum of the story get bogged down.
For example, much to my surprise and delight, the ship that my grandfather later served on in the Korean War was mentioned specifically by name (instead of generically as “an American destroyer”) in one of the chapters. Made my day!
It’s a long book, but I think Symonds is one of the best communicators when it comes to naval histories. 5 stars!
May 17, 2022
Excellent. Could not recommend more.
December 28, 2024
An excellent, detailed account of naval strategy, battles and personalities during World War II, for the allies and axis powers.
August 12, 2024
Readable and well thought out analysis of the war at sea during WWII.
March 28, 2020
An interesting telling of the war at sea, providing a insight into the challenges of each of the navies in the various theaters.
May 23, 2018
This well written book covers the naval war of World War II between the years 1939 and 1945. It offers a global perspective of the major engagements. The author expertly tells about the mechanics of warfare on the sea and explains about the nature of the war. The entire naval history of World War II is recounted in one volume. This is a great addition on this subject for your library. I received a copy of this book compliments of Goodreads Giveaway for a review.
February 7, 2024
Magnificent history of World War II, told entirely from the naval perspective. From U Boats in the Atlantic to aircraft carriers at the Battle of Midway, Craig Symonds tells the whole story in a narrative style that's thorough and detailed but never tedious. The big picture becomes amazingly clear and there are countless anecdotes about the men in command and the common sailors manning the guns.
The one complaint I have is that this author was a professor at the US Naval Academy for thirty years, yet he has absolutely nothing to say about the role of African-American men in the US Navy. On the one hand, black men have been serving in combat in US Naval ships since the American Revolution. Even Teddy Roosevelt acknowledged in his epic naval history that there were plenty of black sailors in the War of 1812. And until the end of the Civil War the US Navy was integrated, with black and white sailors serving side by side on the new iron-clad ships in combat.
But by the beginning of World War II the US Navy was completely segregated. There were no black officers and no black midshipmen at the US Naval Academy. The only blacks men allowed to serve were "mess boys" who waited on tables serving food and drink to white officers. This was a disgrace, but the author has nothing to say about it. He doesn't even acknowledge black naval heroes like Dorie Miller, who manned a heavy machine gun on his own initiative and was one of the first to die at Pearl Harbor. What possible reason was there to leave this out?
I wonder how many black midshipmen took classes with this idiot when he was an instructor at Annapolis. I wish they all could have got together and thrown a surprise party for him late one night. Sort of like the party Paul Baumer and his friends throw for Himmelstoss right before they go up to the front in All Quiet On The Western Front!
The one complaint I have is that this author was a professor at the US Naval Academy for thirty years, yet he has absolutely nothing to say about the role of African-American men in the US Navy. On the one hand, black men have been serving in combat in US Naval ships since the American Revolution. Even Teddy Roosevelt acknowledged in his epic naval history that there were plenty of black sailors in the War of 1812. And until the end of the Civil War the US Navy was integrated, with black and white sailors serving side by side on the new iron-clad ships in combat.
But by the beginning of World War II the US Navy was completely segregated. There were no black officers and no black midshipmen at the US Naval Academy. The only blacks men allowed to serve were "mess boys" who waited on tables serving food and drink to white officers. This was a disgrace, but the author has nothing to say about it. He doesn't even acknowledge black naval heroes like Dorie Miller, who manned a heavy machine gun on his own initiative and was one of the first to die at Pearl Harbor. What possible reason was there to leave this out?
I wonder how many black midshipmen took classes with this idiot when he was an instructor at Annapolis. I wish they all could have got together and thrown a surprise party for him late one night. Sort of like the party Paul Baumer and his friends throw for Himmelstoss right before they go up to the front in All Quiet On The Western Front!
December 1, 2019
To get right to the heart of the matter, I looked forward to reading Professor Symonds' book with a great deal of anticipation, but instead came away disappointed. This disappointment doesn't stem from poor writing, but from rather sloppy research. For example, in describing American carrier movements preceding the Pearl Harbor raid, he has USS Enterprise delivering aircraft to Midway (actually it was Wake Island) and USS Hornet doing the same at Wake (Hornet was still undergoing sea trials off the East Coast and wouldn't reach the Pacific for another four months) while making no mention of USS Lexington. This, along with numerous other mistakes, detracts from what could be an essential volume for anyone seeking a good overall view of WW2 naval operations. On the plus side, his discussing the various factions (Treaty vs. Imperial Way) within the Imperial Japanese Navy and how they affected policy and operational matters were enlightening and new to this reader, leaving him only wanting to know more.
Hopefully, a revised edition with corrections will come out in the future and will make "World War II at Sea" a true masterpiece.
Hopefully, a revised edition with corrections will come out in the future and will make "World War II at Sea" a true masterpiece.
September 11, 2018
Craig Symonds, a lifelong Navy man, might be considered somewhat partial his own Service, but that partiality doesn't dim the brilliance of his survey of the crucial role played by Allied naval forces in World War II. He argues forcefully and persuasively that Allied naval superiority was one of the three reasons the Allied forces prevailed in the war (the other two being British determination at the beginning of the war and the resilience of the Red Army). Whether he's right about this or not doesn't affect the reader's enjoyment of this powerful and highly readable history of the naval war. His approach is chronological, and swings back and forth between the European and Pacific theaters. He focuses clearly on strategy, politics, and detailed descriptions of battles, blending them together beautifully. He uses contemporaneous quotes and lively prose, bringing historical events to life. Even WW II experts may learn new things from this book, and all can benefit from the author's judgments and insights. Highly recommended.
September 13, 2018
With war history I tend to gravitate towards personal stories or accounts of individual episodes, because military strategy and maneuvering tends to go over my simple little head. Or I am just too lazy to really concentrate on understanding it. No problems here. This book takes an enormous subject and renders it consumable for even the dimmer-witted. It was frequently, dare I say it, a page-turner. (I did pace myself, though, the incomprehensible destruction and loss of life get a little overwhelming in too large of doses....so much I had never heard of before, and apparently the public never heard about at the time.) Terrific book.
February 13, 2019
Solid one-volume history that balances strategic analysis and the individual narrative nicely. Only gripe is the editing, which was very poor. Any ambitious history book has mistakes; but consistent errors in naval-specific issues is a bad look for a naval historian. The R-class battleships weren't "limited to 28 knots," USS Wainright in 1942 was a destroyer, not a cruiser, etc. These may seem like nitpicks, but there are tons of examples like this. Again, errors happen, but routine errors of ship related facts, classes, specs, etc. in a book about naval history is a bit more than just routine typos. It feels a bit like it was rushed into print.
July 12, 2022
Porywająca! Wspaniała! Doskonała narracja, doskonałe wyważenie między obrazem całości a fascynującymi szczegółami. Wszystkie postaci z krwi i kości, wiadomo skąd przychodzą i co nimi kieruje. No, to się po prostu czyta jak najlepszą fabułę. Tam jest nawet suspens i zwroty akcji :D Nie mam zielonego pojęcia o marynarce a czytałem z wypiekami na twarzy. To jest arcyciekawe! Na dodatek po mistrzowsku zredagowana i wydana - mapki, dobrze opisane fotografie, logiczna struktura rozdziałów, indeks, setka stron przypisów i bibliografii, porządna twarda oprawa i szycie.
February 13, 2021
A very thorough account of the massive naval battles during WW2. As expected all the major sea conflicts are covered: Dunkirk, Pearl Harbor, Midway, Iwo Jima, invasion of Italy and ofcourse D-Day. A good overall account...almost too much to cover but manages to include fascinating accounts of submarine tactics, personality sketches of the major commanders and very good explanation of naval movements to understand the battles. Yet another book confirming the "greatest generation" indeed.
August 13, 2018
“World War II at Sea: a global history,” by Craig L. Symonds (Oxford, 2018). Yep, that’s what it is. Symonds was chair of the department of naval history at the US Naval Academy, where he is currently distinguished professor of maritime history. He carries his erudition lightly. This is a wonderful book. I knew much of what he recounts here, and was a little puffed up at finding that I had read a number of the books he cites. But Symonds really does provide a full-bodied, detailed, expansive portrait of the war at sea---beginning with the London Naval Conference of 1930, which set the limits for warship construction among all the world’s navies. Although Japan was able to increase its percentage of warships closer to the British and American numbers, the Japanese military thought it was a defeat. And five months after the close of the conference, the Nazi party became the second-largest party in Germany. The story is presented chronologically, which is very helpful for me because I did not have a clear sense of when the Graf Spee, Bismarck, Norway operations, sinking of Prince of Wales and Repulse, took place. He gives clear explanations for the Norway fighting, and does not take Churchill to task for the muddles. Though he is very clear that Churchill stuck his hand in way too much and too deeply, sometimes bypassing the proper channels to send messages and orders to operational commanders. His descriptions of the battles are succinct, precise and clear. He explains what was going on in the Mediterranean, and how much of a near-run thing it was, especially Operation Pedestal which got the tanker Ohio to Malta, kept barely afloat by two British destroyers. That gave the air defense in Malta six weeks of fuel---desperately needed. As the war progresses, his focus moves from the Med and Atlantic to the Pacific, where most of the naval action took place. The Japanese pretty much outfought the Americans in just about every battle---their night optics and the Long Lance torpedoes were a deadly combination. The problem for the Japanese (other than the fact that the US outproduced them by exponential amounts) is that the admirals did not seem to have a killer instinct. Time and again they pulled back on the cusp of strategic victory: Savo Island, Komandorski Islands, even Leyte Gulf. The Americans, on the other hand, were fierce no matter the odds and no matter how much they screwed up (which they did over and over). He spends quite a bit of time describing the extraordinary output of American industry, supplying materials for two fronts at sea, and sending weapons and vehicles to the Russians, and supplying the British. It’s not so much that the Americans defeated the Japanese at sea---by the end of 1942 or so, the US had no heavy cruisers left in the Pacific, and at one point had no carriers at all. It’s that they took the losses and kept on coming. New ships, better ships, more ships, better munitions, better technology, overwhelmed the Japanese. Eventually (Washington vs Kirishima the first best example) radar beat optics for precision and fire control. He describes in detail the various landing craft, almost none of which existed before the war. He spends a good deal of time on the LST, which transformed the amphibious war but of which there were not enough to supply all the invasion forces. D-Day was almost postponed because of the shortage of LSTs. He is even-handed about the leadership, but makes clear that Halsey screwed up several times but had the charisma and PR to outweigh Spruance in the public eye (poor analogy: South Dakota vs Washington. SD was driven out of the fight; Washington sank Kirishima. But SD had to return to the States to repair damage, and so became known, while Washington stayed to fight and did not get the headlines.) Anyway, superb.
https://global.oup.com/academic/produ...
https://global.oup.com/academic/produ...
April 6, 2021
A fascinating and engrossing analysis of how the allies - primarily Great Britain the United States and Australia - eventually defeated the Axis powers by sheer weight of production of all manner of shipping, from aircraft carriers to battleships to landing craft. I was staggered to read of just how, as World War II ground on, the allies were able to put to sea massive armadas comprising both capital ships - aircraft carriers and battleships down to corvettes and destroyers.
Despite being perhaps the 'high water mark' of the capital ship, World War II marked the point at which the battleship had never been more vulnerable to air power and the emergence of the submarine. World War II witnessed the last time that massive battleships and battle-cruisers would trade blows from miles away. Despite being a threat to allied convoys, the German battleship, Turpitz barely ventured forth from her Norwegian fjord, constrained by Hitler's reluctance to sacrifice her for the sake of sinking a few merchant ships, and her vulnerability to threats from the Royal Air Force, the mode of attack that would eventually result in her destruction.
Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor stunned the world and heralded the beginning of the end for the preeminence of the battleship in naval conflict; by the same token, Pearl Harbor underscored the strategic reach of the aircraft carrier in conducting operations, often thousands of miles from home.
Even with the benefit of hindsight, historians of World War II have - correctly, in my opinion - judged the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor as an epic and foolish gamble. Maybe, spurred on by the momentum gained from grabbing portions of Manchuria, and the arrogance of its military leadership, Japan genuinely believed that a shattering blow against the US Pacific fleet would bring America to the negotiating table; of course, it had the opposite effect on public opinion.
It took a while for the shock and outrage of the attack to stir the 'slumbering giant' into action, but within a year-and-a-half after Pearl Harbor, the United States was producing quantities of ships and associated equipment at a staggering rate. Symonds quantifies precisely the point at which the allies could produce ships of all types and sizes faster than Japan and Germany could sink them. Once that point was reached, then surpassed, it became only a matter of time before the Atlantic and the Pacific would be dominated by the allied navies.
Symonds describes in gripping and dramatic detail the key naval actions of World War II, and the technological factors that - aside from production - tilted the odds in favor of the allies. One such element was radar; hard as it is to believe these days, but hostilities on the high seas were often not initiated until the enemy had been sighted by lookouts. This 'leveled the playing field' significantly, and even - especially where such weapons as the Japanese Long Lance torpedoes were concerned - gave the Japanese a decisive, if temporary, advantage. Reliance on human lookouts also brought the antagonists often into close quarter exchanges that, particularly at night, resulted in confusion and, not infrequently, damage being incurred by friendly fire.
With the advent of radar, however, the allies gained a decisive advantage. With radar, the captain of an aircraft carrier could not only be alerted to an incoming threat, but could launch his own aircraft at a Japanese fleet many miles away, thereby retaining the element of surprise.
These huge fleets - the likes of which we will never see again, given the evolution of warfare - were dependent upon their ability to access oil to maximize their fighting ability. Of course, the same applied to land armies and their equipment Tellingly, Symonds narrates how Rommell's Afrika Korps literally came to a standstill due to the inability of German convoys and planes to refuel the tanks and armored personnel carriers necessary for waging war in the desert of North Africa.
Ironically, perhaps, one of the central reasons for Japan to take the fateful decision to strike at Pearl Harbor centered on its dependence on oil as the means for establishing its superiority in the region.
For a short time, Japan's conquests enabled its planners, statesmen, soldiers and citizens to believe that the dream of a 'Greater Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere' would become reality. That dream gradually withered as America unleashed its potential for a level of production undreamed of in the history of warfare.
Despite being perhaps the 'high water mark' of the capital ship, World War II marked the point at which the battleship had never been more vulnerable to air power and the emergence of the submarine. World War II witnessed the last time that massive battleships and battle-cruisers would trade blows from miles away. Despite being a threat to allied convoys, the German battleship, Turpitz barely ventured forth from her Norwegian fjord, constrained by Hitler's reluctance to sacrifice her for the sake of sinking a few merchant ships, and her vulnerability to threats from the Royal Air Force, the mode of attack that would eventually result in her destruction.
Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor stunned the world and heralded the beginning of the end for the preeminence of the battleship in naval conflict; by the same token, Pearl Harbor underscored the strategic reach of the aircraft carrier in conducting operations, often thousands of miles from home.
Even with the benefit of hindsight, historians of World War II have - correctly, in my opinion - judged the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor as an epic and foolish gamble. Maybe, spurred on by the momentum gained from grabbing portions of Manchuria, and the arrogance of its military leadership, Japan genuinely believed that a shattering blow against the US Pacific fleet would bring America to the negotiating table; of course, it had the opposite effect on public opinion.
It took a while for the shock and outrage of the attack to stir the 'slumbering giant' into action, but within a year-and-a-half after Pearl Harbor, the United States was producing quantities of ships and associated equipment at a staggering rate. Symonds quantifies precisely the point at which the allies could produce ships of all types and sizes faster than Japan and Germany could sink them. Once that point was reached, then surpassed, it became only a matter of time before the Atlantic and the Pacific would be dominated by the allied navies.
Symonds describes in gripping and dramatic detail the key naval actions of World War II, and the technological factors that - aside from production - tilted the odds in favor of the allies. One such element was radar; hard as it is to believe these days, but hostilities on the high seas were often not initiated until the enemy had been sighted by lookouts. This 'leveled the playing field' significantly, and even - especially where such weapons as the Japanese Long Lance torpedoes were concerned - gave the Japanese a decisive, if temporary, advantage. Reliance on human lookouts also brought the antagonists often into close quarter exchanges that, particularly at night, resulted in confusion and, not infrequently, damage being incurred by friendly fire.
With the advent of radar, however, the allies gained a decisive advantage. With radar, the captain of an aircraft carrier could not only be alerted to an incoming threat, but could launch his own aircraft at a Japanese fleet many miles away, thereby retaining the element of surprise.
These huge fleets - the likes of which we will never see again, given the evolution of warfare - were dependent upon their ability to access oil to maximize their fighting ability. Of course, the same applied to land armies and their equipment Tellingly, Symonds narrates how Rommell's Afrika Korps literally came to a standstill due to the inability of German convoys and planes to refuel the tanks and armored personnel carriers necessary for waging war in the desert of North Africa.
Ironically, perhaps, one of the central reasons for Japan to take the fateful decision to strike at Pearl Harbor centered on its dependence on oil as the means for establishing its superiority in the region.
For a short time, Japan's conquests enabled its planners, statesmen, soldiers and citizens to believe that the dream of a 'Greater Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere' would become reality. That dream gradually withered as America unleashed its potential for a level of production undreamed of in the history of warfare.
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