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Chicago Studies in American Politics
From Politics to the Pews: How Partisanship and the Political Environment Shape Religious Identity
One of the most substantial divides in American politics is the “God gap.” Religious voters tend to identify with and support the Republican Party, while secular voters generally support the Democratic Party. Conventional wisdom suggests that religious differences between Republicans and Democrats have produced this gap, with voters sorting themselves into the party that best represents their religious views.
Michele F. Margolis offers a bold challenge to the conventional wisdom, arguing that the relationship between religion and politics is far from a one-way street that starts in the church and ends at the ballot box. Margolis contends that political identity has a profound effect on social identity, including religion. Whether a person chooses to identify as religious and the extent of their involvement in a religious community are, in part, a response to political surroundings. In today’s climate of political polarization, partisan actors also help reinforce the relationship between religion and politics, as Democratic and Republican elites stake out divergent positions on moral issues and use religious faith to varying degrees when reaching out to voters.
Michele F. Margolis offers a bold challenge to the conventional wisdom, arguing that the relationship between religion and politics is far from a one-way street that starts in the church and ends at the ballot box. Margolis contends that political identity has a profound effect on social identity, including religion. Whether a person chooses to identify as religious and the extent of their involvement in a religious community are, in part, a response to political surroundings. In today’s climate of political polarization, partisan actors also help reinforce the relationship between religion and politics, as Democratic and Republican elites stake out divergent positions on moral issues and use religious faith to varying degrees when reaching out to voters.
336 pages, Hardcover
Published August 17, 2018
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Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews
November 14, 2022
While very well researched, there wasn’t anything I found to be groundbreaking. Definitely interesting insights here and there, but I also thought those insights could have been explained in more detail and explored further to make this more interesting.
May 15, 2026
This began as a dissertation and is a rather dry, difficult read focusing on data, graphs, tables, and studies. Its primary purpose is to take us through the research that shows that we do not vote our faith. "Rather, this book shows that partisan identities can profoundly shape identification with and engagement in the religious sphere." (p.3) Americans are watching this take place in real time. As the church becomes a more welcoming space for white males, women are, for the first time in history, leaving in sizable numbers.
That wasn't always the case. "It was not until the 1970s that moral order and traditional values became a central focus of religious teachings in evangelical churches. (p.11) Despite evangelicals abiding by a literal interpretation of the Bible and holding on to other orthodox beliefs throughout the centuries, the changing evangelical leadership and community upended evangelicals' beliefs and how evangelicals applied these beliefs to the world around them. " (p.11) New means of communication and political rallying gave rise to a group of elites who held enormous sway over evangelical believers. Groups such as the Moral Majority and men like Franklin Graham and Jerry Falwell began to influence their listeners more in politics than in religion. "Religious broadcasting, which grew increasingly popular in the 1970s and 1980s, allowed religious elites' messages to reach a wide audience of conservative Christians. . . Religious elites, therefore, had a broad audience at their disposal as they sought to generate support for their causes. Moreover, the number of political discussions taking place on religious broadcasting increased over the course of the 1970s and 1980s." (p. 30) Republican candidates had not always spoken openly about their "faith", but once the unholy marriage of political causes and elite messengers took place, the party began to see the value in evangelical voters. "Falwell formed the Moral Majority only after leaders of the secular New Right approached him and promised support in the form of direct-mail lists, organizational support, and training of state and regional leaders. (Wilcox 1992a:12) Religious conservatives, therefore, did not enter politics by happenstance; Republican political elites helped religious elites enter the political spheres. (p. 31) This caused large-scale shifts in official party positions, candidate rhetoric, and the salience of moral issues. (p.35)
Evangelical spaces, such as churches and the audiences of radio and TV programs, breed Republican voters. "Politically homogeneous social groups and an associated absence of countervailing information not only encourage the creation of durable bonds between religious and partisan identities but may also fuel further political animosity toward the opposing party." (p. 6). John Fea, in his book Believe Me, spoke of how it would have been impossible for many conservative Christians to vote for Hillary Clinton, regardless of who ran against her, because the Clinton Presidency had been the target of so much vitriol in these circles.
This close tie between "Republican elites and religious conservatives has pushed liberals and moderates out of religion." (p.58) It isn't that evangelicals vote with "a Christian worldview." It's that they have insisted that their conservative worldview is the Christian one. They don't read the Bible to gain a perspective; they enforce their perspective on the Bible.
The simple truth is, for the majority, political identity outweighs their spiritual identity. While "one third of this generation maintained the same level of church attendance between 1965 and 1973, nearly two-thirds had the same partisan affiliation." (p. 71)
One of the by-products of this is that "Three-quarters of independents in 1965 came to identify with a party by 1973. (p.71) Partisan leaners - that is, those who initially report being politically independent but lean toward one of the parties - look virtually indistinguishable from those who readily identify as partisans" (p. 84)
So loyal have voters become to their respective parties that people change their policy preferences, not their political identity. (p. 81) The simple truth is, "People do not choose their party affiliation to be consistent with a set of political beliefs or specific attitudes; rather, they use their partisan identities when adopting ideologies or policy preferences." (p. 8-9)
Again, this is a hard slog of a read (very dry) but well worth it for those interested in religious politics. An excellent look at the data that drives it.
That wasn't always the case. "It was not until the 1970s that moral order and traditional values became a central focus of religious teachings in evangelical churches. (p.11) Despite evangelicals abiding by a literal interpretation of the Bible and holding on to other orthodox beliefs throughout the centuries, the changing evangelical leadership and community upended evangelicals' beliefs and how evangelicals applied these beliefs to the world around them. " (p.11) New means of communication and political rallying gave rise to a group of elites who held enormous sway over evangelical believers. Groups such as the Moral Majority and men like Franklin Graham and Jerry Falwell began to influence their listeners more in politics than in religion. "Religious broadcasting, which grew increasingly popular in the 1970s and 1980s, allowed religious elites' messages to reach a wide audience of conservative Christians. . . Religious elites, therefore, had a broad audience at their disposal as they sought to generate support for their causes. Moreover, the number of political discussions taking place on religious broadcasting increased over the course of the 1970s and 1980s." (p. 30) Republican candidates had not always spoken openly about their "faith", but once the unholy marriage of political causes and elite messengers took place, the party began to see the value in evangelical voters. "Falwell formed the Moral Majority only after leaders of the secular New Right approached him and promised support in the form of direct-mail lists, organizational support, and training of state and regional leaders. (Wilcox 1992a:12) Religious conservatives, therefore, did not enter politics by happenstance; Republican political elites helped religious elites enter the political spheres. (p. 31) This caused large-scale shifts in official party positions, candidate rhetoric, and the salience of moral issues. (p.35)
Evangelical spaces, such as churches and the audiences of radio and TV programs, breed Republican voters. "Politically homogeneous social groups and an associated absence of countervailing information not only encourage the creation of durable bonds between religious and partisan identities but may also fuel further political animosity toward the opposing party." (p. 6). John Fea, in his book Believe Me, spoke of how it would have been impossible for many conservative Christians to vote for Hillary Clinton, regardless of who ran against her, because the Clinton Presidency had been the target of so much vitriol in these circles.
This close tie between "Republican elites and religious conservatives has pushed liberals and moderates out of religion." (p.58) It isn't that evangelicals vote with "a Christian worldview." It's that they have insisted that their conservative worldview is the Christian one. They don't read the Bible to gain a perspective; they enforce their perspective on the Bible.
The simple truth is, for the majority, political identity outweighs their spiritual identity. While "one third of this generation maintained the same level of church attendance between 1965 and 1973, nearly two-thirds had the same partisan affiliation." (p. 71)
One of the by-products of this is that "Three-quarters of independents in 1965 came to identify with a party by 1973. (p.71) Partisan leaners - that is, those who initially report being politically independent but lean toward one of the parties - look virtually indistinguishable from those who readily identify as partisans" (p. 84)
So loyal have voters become to their respective parties that people change their policy preferences, not their political identity. (p. 81) The simple truth is, "People do not choose their party affiliation to be consistent with a set of political beliefs or specific attitudes; rather, they use their partisan identities when adopting ideologies or policy preferences." (p. 8-9)
Again, this is a hard slog of a read (very dry) but well worth it for those interested in religious politics. An excellent look at the data that drives it.
August 22, 2019
Had to dig hard for a pretty simple thesis. Well researched.
Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews