India's China war

by Neville Maxwell

THIS RARE/ANTIQUE BOOK PUBLISHED IN THE YEAR 1950 BY Calcutta HAVING 476 PGS AND SIZE 8.50*5.50 WRITTEN IN English. THE BOOK IS IN READABLE CONDITION Originally in Unbound with some issues like loose binding and some Pin Holes. THE IMAGE OF THIS BOOK IS GIVEN FOR YOUR REFERENCE. WE CAN REBIND THE SAME IN LEATHER BINDING FOR EXTRA $ 25.

Genres: History, India, China, Nonfiction, War

480 pages, Hardcover

First published January 1, 1970

Reviews

[Amit Tiwary · Rating 5 out of 5]

Over the years I was pondering what triggered Chinese ambitions/aggression to come to my motherland? Why the diplomacy failed? Why the discussions failed? Why the greatest statesman of the time, JLN, failed to anticipate this war/failed to stop this war? Why the Panchsheel ideology failed when China endorsed that? Why was there a mockery of Peaceful Co-Existence and it turned out to be 'Armed Co-Existence'?

I had so many more questions and I was constantly looking for the answers. And then I got two books to read back to back. I read first the 'Himalayan Blunder by Brigadier John Dalvi". The book was so informative. But I had issues with the book. That book was repetitive and had a tone of an angry soldier. That book also failed to provide me the view point from China and view point of the other superpowers of the time towards the war.

And then I read this book. It has everything I was looking out to understand this war of 1962. The book is aptly titled as 'India's China War'. I will recommend this book to everyone who want to get details of 1962 war with China.

It is THE book on the topic and I highly recommend this to the interested.

[avneet kumar · Rating 2 out of 5]

India’s China War by Neville Maxwell is a comprehensive read full of facts, figures and footnotes to support its arguments. However, it is the perception of the author that makes the literature seem an official Chinese document where-in the author tries hard to blame India for being the aggressor, then as a country which pushes for the military action against a country which is not ready for anything other than diplomatic solutions but still as a country which somehow does not pursue military modernisation to lay stake on its claims. There are few glaring contradictions in the book of more than 500 pages which can’t claim brevity as an excuse to miss out on few glaring facts. Some of them are listed below: –

1. While a lot of emphasis has been laid to India’s acceptance of McMahon line as the international boundary unilaterally, no mention has been made about the reasons for China’s selective rejection of the same line. While the same line was accepted in Burma and Tawang, which was a part of Tibet as mentioned by the author was not an area of dispute, Aksai Chin suddenly was. Again, China’s unilateral claims over Aksai Chin and building up of a road in the region has been passed off as a historical claim while the same theory for boundary claims has been rejected throughout the book.

2. China’s claims for most of the regions is based on a singular fact that all the territories were once part of Tibet, and yet neither the validity of military action on Tibet nor the validity of document signed by Tibet have been questioned.

3. India’s recognition of both PRC and Tibet has been passed off lightly while China not bringing Arunachal Pradesh on the negotiation table has been hailed as a great diplomatic measure.

4. The exchange of diplomatic conversations have been opinionated to be always friendly from the Chinese side and aggressive from the Indian side giving an impression that the war was forced upon on the Chinese.

5. A very little account of Chinese military preparations for war has been given emphasis upon. Wars or not conducted over days or weeks. It takes months and years to prepare for war. In fact, the author does mention that India’s forward policy started at the backdrop of the presence of a Chinese brigade sized force already in the region, no explanations to that has been provided. An exhaustive account of the deliberate preparations have found space in Brigidier Dalvi‘s account in his book ‘Himalayan Blunder’, while the same was somehow missing in the book. Probably, the most visible signs of intentions of going for war is the comparison between the military preparedness of both the nations.

6. Probably, a brief mention about the cultural disparity between the evolving thought process of the two nations could have found a mention to understand the reasons for the way diplomacy shaped in these two Asian giants. While, India seamlessly continued with the British legacy of boundaries, bureaucracy and even diplomatic culture without any prejudice, the same did not happen with PRC. PRC in fact went on to reject anything that had been signed by the previous governments. And so, while India was preparing white papers to prove its claims, China was amassing an army on the border following Mao’s theory of negotiations from a position of strength. The same culture is true in recent examples as well including the claims in the South China Sea.

7. Complete book tries to bring the factors of India’s rigid policy towards boundary disputes claiming it to be the main cause of war, the reasons as to why the same was not resort to conclusion has been neglected in the end, however, without failing to mention that it was a show of humility from the Chinese side.

8. The author himself mentions that Nehru was respected in China and specially for his foreign policies. And that the general attitude towards Nehru changed only after 1959. However, instead of blaming the Dalai Lama factor as the most important factor for war, the author suggestively puts India’s forward policy as the most important factor. He dedicated a complete 100 page chapter on the policy, although discussing about the policy only in last few pages of the chapter and discussing everything to Gen Manekshaw , Indus water Treaty, liberation of Goa throughout the chapter. Probably going for war with a country on the issue of one person would have put China into a poor light. Probably, the change in Chinese Attitude towards Pakistan since 1959 was a mere co-incidence. And probably, the fact that the border disputes itself started with the LongJu incident at the end of August 1959 was also a coincidence.

9. There are numerous such instances where the book reflects the Chinese narrative of not being the aggressor and the failures of the Indian foreign policy. However, the book is a must read not only to understand the other side of the story and a divergent analysis but also to understand how opinions can be built upon by the same facts into different manners. The selective selection of emphasis to bring out a predetermined opinion and still make it look like a lengthy work of research is something that one can only admire in the book.

10. It is a must read for all readers aspiring to be avid China watchers and for readers interested in the 1962 India China war with a recommendation that this book must not be the sole source of knowledge on the subject. Rather, the facts must be taken from this book and analysed with other books on the subject, like Himalayan Blunder by Brigadier JP Dalvi, China’s India War by Bertil Linter, 1962 the work that wasn’t by Shiva Kunal Verma et cetera, to develop a holistic view on the subject.

[Nick · Rating 5 out of 5]

Its about the 1962 indo chinese war.

Its really frustrating to read this. Its almost unbelievable that Nehru and his cabinet was really this foolish, deceptively/manipulative, and aggressive. Like, if this is true then Nehru is one of the worst political leaders I've ever read about for this war alone. Kaul is also completely awful, as was basically everyone involved in this from the Indian side. The extremity of these facts more than anything else, is what makes me suspect that this is a biased presentation. The Chinese also come off as eminently reasonable and charitable.

But I do believe it, or at least enough of it. Its pretty detailed and well sourced. It does seem like this war was entirely Nehru/Congress/India's fault. That they idiotically perpetuated an archaic Colonial forward policy on China, without the empire to back it up. They pushed their claims as far as possible into China, and refused to negotiate on the topic (probably because they knew their arguments, based on the Shimla convention and other colonial era treaties and maps which were themselves machinations of British aggression and deception, were bullshit). Meanwhile telling the world that they were totally open to negotiation and that it was the Chinese who were recalcitrant. Nehru told completely different stories to the press, to the Chinese, and to his cabinet. His casuistry and intentional deception are almost like a racist caricature of an evil brahmin. And his arrogance, nepotism, strongmanism, and "idealistic" (deluded) impracticality are like a caricature of the worst sort of early Indian/Congress leader.

Its so characteristic of India then and now, to make idiotic decisions based on considerations like pride and humiliation, magical thinking, overzealous nationalism, obedience to strongmen or charismatic fools, an excessive emphasis on personal connection, or just randomness rather than having any sort of concrete or well considered strategy to achieve their objectives.

The war was also a distinctly secular, bourgeois-post-colonial-socialist disaster. Hindutva or Hindu chauvinism have nothing to do with this story. Even nationalism insofar as it played into this, seems a bit astroturfed.

And due to all of this thousands of people died, tons of money was wasted, India's relationship with China was spoiled, India's international reputation took a nosedive, and the Pakistan-China alliance was set up to prosper. Oh yeah and India was left geostrategically much weaker than if he had just settled the border issue diplomatically, as the Chinese had repeatedly offered.

The book is quite good though. It explains all of this in excruciating detail. Every blunder, every infuriating fuckup is dissected play by play. The Chinese view of the situation is also examined, though to a much lesser extent. The British colonial context for the McMahon line and India's land claim is set up quite well.

I really should read an alternate take though because WOW this certainly makes it seem obviously one-sided in terms of who is to blame for the war. I do think the author probably goes soft on the Chinese, and that they probably were not as charitable as he portrayed them. Its also worth noting that although the book went through a slight update in 2015, it is rather old. Originally published in 1970. So its a lot closer to the events than perhaps it should be to have some objectivity, and the sourcing no doubt suffers as a result of that.

[Nishu Thakur · Rating 2 out of 5]

pro China. Very biased. Avoid it.
Instead read China's India War: Collision Course on the Roof of the World or Himalayan Blunder: The Angry Truth About India's Most Crushing Military Disaster by J.P. Dalvi.

[Rajiv Chopra · Rating 2 out of 5]

This book by Neville Maxwell could have been good. He writes well, and with a journalist's flair.

Unfortunately, his research and understanding of geopolitics is poor. I agree with his assertion that Nehru was largely to blame for the 1962 conflict. I also agree that Nehru is to take a large part of the blame for our poor preparedness.

However, he has painted the Chinese in almost saintly, divine colours. This is naive and stupid. Neville Maxwell did not take the trouble to even mention the manner in which the Chinese overtook Sinkiang (now XinJiang) and Tibet. He dismissed the Simla Conference in a cavalier fashion.

Read the book to get a different perspective on the old war, but take his writing with a ton of salt.

[Dan Cohen · Rating 2 out of 5]

A thorough and professionally written book, but rather slow, lacking in interest, and repetitive. It takes a cynical view of Indian politics and politicians and attributes the war for the most part to them. The author also exonerates China for the most part. I've no knowledge to contradict the author's conclusions but it felt a little biased - it's hard to believe that things were as black and white as described here.

[SHUBHAM SUPANE · Rating 1 out of 5]

Books Are lot of fake information and mislead peoples, reality is vice-versa, reading this type and propaganda books are threat to society

[Tariq Mahmood · Rating 4 out of 5]

Why did Nehru order it’s army against China over Aksai Chin refusing all of China’s endeavours to negotiate over a disputed border? This brilliant and detailed book gives penetrating reasons into a unique political period of a new country still trying to come to grips over the stigma of its artificial creation. For years, British colonial masters had ignored Indians, indulging them over trivial matters only, at the same keeping the most important aspects of running a nation like foreign policy and defence matters to strictly British. This resulted in creating a deep neurosis among the Indian leadership. Not only did the Indians consider British as the only powerful people in the world but they also became obstinate, arguing for the right to be taken seriously enough to run their own country. These Nationalist Indian leaders when they finally became all powerful developed an ideology of denial where they saw a ‘win’ when confronted with loosing argument. They also became highly sensitive to the idea of a mythical border of India, an argument they had employed successfully with their British masters to create their artificial India. A term their colonial masters had used to counter arguments for an independent India. This refusal to engage in any cross border talks with China as well as successful ‘police actions’ against the Nizam of Hyderabad in 1948 as well as an European power (Portuguese) in Goa 1961, encouraged a popularity seeking Nehru to send his under equipped army with an impossible supply line against China. The Chinese not only routed the Indian army but followed it up by declaring a unilateral ceasefire permanently rattling the Indian government, bringing out the ghosts of British colonial masters all over again. Has India learned to get over its neurosis yet?

[Raj Sinha · Rating 3 out of 5]

Even though this book is long, meandering, academic and arduous, it is extremely well researched. Therefore for those who are curious about the 1962 China War, it is a must read.

There are two basic facts on which it is based.

One, that pacifist India assumed that its natural affinity (cultural and religious) with Tibet would be respected and understood by all, including the newly formed communist regime of China.

And two, that China with Mao at its helm, always viewed Tibet as its own territory and used India's good relations with Tibet cunningly and at the appropriate time to accuse it of imperialist intentions towards Tibet. It then used this 'accusation' as a convenient excuse to attack India - to save Communism from the evils of Imperialism!

These two aspects make it simple to comprehend the 1962 war between India and China and its triggering source - the border dispute between the two countries. A complex web of history, geography and political (mainly British) intrigue and subterfuge led to it. While China assiduously prepared to deal with it from 1950 itself, the unsuspecting India did not.

At both ends of the Himalayas, no-man's-lands still separated China and India when these became independent in the mid-twentieth century; their quarrel arose from the need to translate those zones into lines, and from the failure to agree on a method. There were two major areas of contention between the two countries, A & C as below:

A) Aksai Chin: (Desert of White Stones)

Contiguous with Ladakh, Aksai Chin, was demarcated as part of Indian territory by British India in the mid 19th century through a tripartite meeting between themselves, Tibet and China. In late 19th century (30 years later) the sleeping Chinese, who always claimed fealty, suzerainty, sovereignty (what have you) over Tibet, objected and discarded such a demarcation. This was the start of the border dispute between India and China in the 'North Western Frontier'.

b) With Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan converted into a chain of protectorates, the British were content to rest their boundary there beneath the Himalayan foot-hills. This became the safe (from rival powers) middle sector or the mid-section of the boundary between India and China which never came under any dispute.

C) The McMahon Line:

To the east of Bhutan lay a scattering of separate tribes, thinly populating a sixty-mile-broad belt of mountainous, densely jungled country. Here was another no-man's-land, acceptable as a frontier to those responsible (in this instance Britain) for the defence of India.
In 1915 a bilateral agreement between Tibet and Britain led to the McMahon map with the McMahon Line annexing some two thousand square miles of Tibetan territory into India (referred to as NEFA or the 'North Eastern Frontier' in this review).

The policy of the Indian Government that came into existence in 1947 diverged not at all from that of the departed British. India's stand was that the Sino-Indian boundaries had long been fixed by custom and tradition, and for the major part of their length confirmed by treaty and agreement.
The Tibetan Government was at this time seeking to give legal status and international recognition to the de facto independence it had enjoyed since 1911. The exclusion of China's authority from Tibet was plainly in India's interest both because of its cultural and religious affinity with Tibet and because the peace loving Tibet acted as a buffer zone between India and China.
However, as soon as the People's Republic of China was established (October 1st, 1949) the Chinese army marched into Tibet and made clear its intention to stake its exclusive claim over it.
Nehru's astonishingly naive support for the Chinese (by not supporting Tibet's appeal to the U.N.) was bitterly opposed in Parliament, especially by Sardar Patel who even warned him of dire future consequences of such a timid stance (when China was not in any position of strength) and urged him to show more gumption and aggressive support to ensure full independence for Tibet. Nehru of course turned a deaf ear to Patel's urgings and stuck to what was to become one of India's most bitter and sarcastic phrases - Hindi-Cheeni Bhai Bhai!

By 1958 the two no-man's-lands which the imperial era had left at opposite ends of the SinoIndian frontier had been occupied. On the NEFA side by India (the McMahon Line) and in the north western side by China (Aksai Chin).

The conflict of claims over Aksai Chin came into the open vide the discovery of a road by an Indian patrol party that China had built in that area - this road afforded a vital road link between Xinjiang and Tibet which was critical to the Chinese Army's logistics (for war) capabilities in Tibet.

However the first shooting affray of the boundary dispute took place on August 25th, 1959 at a place called Longju in NEFA. On the western front too things were moving slowly but surely towards collision. On October 21st in the same year an Indian patrol party of 70 was attacked by the Chinese and nine Indian soldiers were killed.

To searching and direct questions on India's preparedness for war if it came to that , Prime Minister Nehru loftily said 'I can tell this House', (Lok Sabha), 'that at no time since our independence, and of course before it, were our defence forces in better condition, in finer fettle....'
Such was a Prime Minister's self deception as later events were to show.

In late 1959 China suggested 'status quo' of the border dispute pending discussion and negotiation without any further military action by either side. This meant the McMahon Line as the definition of the border on the north eastern side, (which suited India), and the actual line of control which INCLUDED Aksai Chin as part of China as the north western frontier (Aksai Chin had all along been considered as part of Indian territory by India as well as Tibet).

The Indian Government, by aggressively describing the Chinese presence in Aksai Chin as an act of aggression, brought upon itself the obligation to do something about this. This was a classic self-acquired Catch-22 situation by the Indian government - India could not accept the Chinese presence in Aksai Chin and it did not have the capability to go into an all out war with the military might of China either.

So what did it do? It decided to flex its muscles by sending patrol parties into Aksai Chin in the hope that the barrel of the Chinese guns would not turn towards it and even if it did, the gun would only fire blanks! This approach came to be known as India's Forward Policy.
This knee-jerk righteousness exhibited by India was in sharp contrast to the methodical and soft-spoken manner in which the Chinese had been planning for such an eventuality for 12 years!

It's astounding to note Nehru's immaturity in this context - both in his political naïveté in comprehending the clear and present threat from China as well as his absence of understanding of India's unpreparedness for engaging in war on the physically punishing Himalayan frontiers. Furthermore his shameless weakness for wily navigators of nehruvian tributaries, who were also highly incompetent and unfit for the high positions they occupied (Defence Minister V K Krishna Menon and General B M Kaul, Chief of General Staff, being two such leading if flickering lights) sent India into unmanageable and suicidal terrains.

General Kaul pushed the armed forces into the implementation of the forward policy in the Aksai Chin area (sending patrols deep into Chinese occupied territories without any back up plan in case of armed reaction by by the 5 to 10 times stronger Chinese Army). General Thapar, his boss and the Chief of the Army (therefore Kaul's boss) disagreed but only in opinion. In mid 1961, China unambiguously warned India of retaliation by force, not only in the north-western sector but also in NEFA. Nehru and Company dismissed China's warnings as mere posturing!

Came November 1962. The Chinese had unlimited back up, Indians had zilch. It would be staggering to add here (but I must) the absence even of boots in the list of shortages our forward troops suffered from - rifles, guns, mortars, tanks, transport vehicles, ammunition and woollens) - furthermore these deprivations must be viewed alongside the prevailing weather conditions which were arctic in severity! These stark and bare facts would shortly freeze the blood of the entire Nation.

The brainless and diabolic bravado of General Kaul overruled protestations of other army commanders and ordered his own version of the forward policy in NEFA too where the Chinese were absolutely quiet and in observance of the McMahon Line, to set up more posts in eyeball to eyeball proximity of the Chinese posts. The terrain was so treacherous that our posts could not be easily reached in an emergency with any kind of support.

As late as October 1962 Nehru was still telling journalists that in NEFA the advantage lay with India. Plainly, there was deception somewhere; if Nehru was not deliberately misleading the public, then he had been deliberately misled by some of his senior military advisers including of course Generals Thapar and Kaul. Defence Minister Krishna Menon too must either have been woefully misled or wilfully misleading because it was he, in the absence of Nehru (who was incredibly in England) who ordered the Chief of the Armed Forces General Thapar to evict the Chinese from the Thag La ridge (north of Tawang in NEFA - today's Arunachal Pradesh), IF NEEDED BY FORCE.

There followed a spate of events and decisions too many and depressing to enumerate (including flight-out-of-fright by General Kaul to New Delhi on two occasions) of which the long and short was that on October 20th 1962 China attacked our troops who had been ordered into a suicidal mission to wrest the Thag La ridge from the waiting Chinese looking down at them.
(The order had been issued incredibly by General Kaul from the comfort of his warm bedroom in New Delhi.)

The Chinese attacked our forward positions simultaneously on the North Western front and by November 20th (exactly a month after the war had begun) our brave soldiers on the two frontiers had been decimated, routed, taken prisoner or driven out in totality - no organised Indian military force was left either in NEFA or in Aksai Chin.

On November 21st, out of the blue, the Chinese announced unilateral cease fire across the entire Sino-Indian border from East to West, and withdrawal of its troops. The War was over. The Chinese claimed they had not invaded India but only undertaken a short and punitive expedition.

Be that as it may, militarily the Chinese victory was complete, the Indian humiliation and defeat absolute.
A rumour (news) soon came that General Kaul had been taken prisoner by the Chinese. President Radhakrishan then made an observation which in a way underscored the complete humiliation that the Nation had suffered. He said that the news was "UNFORTUNATELY UNTRUE" - Gen Kaul had not been taken prisoner by the Chinese!!

In Parliament, Nehru sat silent. His old dominance of the House was gone for good and so was his reputation as a world leader (he had spearheaded the Non Aligned Movement but in panic had begged Kennedy for American Air strikes on the marauding Chinese Army).
As a nation too we lost stature and respect and its resultant psyche remains stigmatised in the minds of most Indians from that era.

In Nehru's defence it must be said that if he was not a member of a 3 judge bench (himself, Krishna Menon and Kaul) that had passed a death sentence on his troops, it was a mind-boggling error of judgment on his part both politically and militarily. But no matter how one chooses to interpret, I can't help but ask myself: What would a self-respecting politician do under such circumstances?
Historically, PM Nehru, tried to shield Krishna Menon and when his party refused to listen to him, he 'threatened' to resign himself. His bluff for once was called and he had to ask Def Minister Menon to resign. That was all that happened!
Less than two years later Nehru passed away, perhaps a broken and guilt-ridden old man.
________

Footnote 1: In such a long book I was hoping to come across actual stories of high morals, valour and sacrifice but there are none that the author has recounted. It's a purely academic book. However some luminous names do shine through - Brig John Dalvi, General Daulat Singh, General Umrao Singh to name a few and finally towards the end General J N Choudhury and General Sam Maneckshaw who took over the reins from those who stood in disgrace.

Footnote 2: As a result of our seeking and getting support from the Americans in 1962, American arms aid to India continued. The Pakistanis protested in alarm. But when the aid did not stop, the Pakistanis got so incensed that they pushed thenselves into an attempt to shake Kashmir out of India's grip by force and this set off their three-week war in 1965. So in a contrived way the 1962 China invasion paved the way for the Indo-Pak war in 1965 that changed world political dynamics and affiliations to an astonishing degree.

_______________

[Deepak · Rating 3 out of 5]

This book gives out the exact details about the 1962 war between india and china. It has got the chinese point of view in going for war against india. It was a great insight in the era when china suddenly turned hostile against india after initial years of friendship. It was really very informative and leads us to think again about who was actually responsible for the debacle. It also give out the detail of the history which lead to confusions,strifes and eventually the war

[Kulpreet Yadav · Rating 5 out of 5]

It's a well-written book, no doubt about that. Neville was the "Time" correspondent based in Delhi during the war and he definitely had a ringside seat from where he watched the actions, particularly the ones in Delhi if not in NEFA or Ladakh. Though I wouldn't want to take away one star (or maybe two) from my rating due to the fact that this book is clearly pro-Chinese, I would still like to mention it. Reason: Over 95% of the book is drawn from Indian or international, non-Chinese sources.

Having said that, the book is written objectively and does bring attention to a few players of the time who were responsible for India's humiliating defeat at the hands of the Chinese. Not that those responsible have successfully hidden their blunders, because almost the whole nation knows about them, reading these accounts does bring their crimes to the fore (call them lapses if you wish).

Not a light read, yes, it still is a page-turner that's packed with useful information for both scholars and general readers alike. In any case, this is a must-read book and deservedly sought after by those who are interested in learning more about post-independence India.

[Aravindh Kumar · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is a very well-researched account of the 1962 war. My words would only add to the mountain of praise for this book. Nevertheless, a few words- the language is florid, the insight into the characters of the main players - Nehru, Menon, Kaul, Dalvi, etc. - is rich in details and references are given wherever possible. The author attempts to explain the motivation behind each move of the main players, by drawing from published/unpublished material wherever possible and making deductions otherwise. This book is a must for any amateur historian interested in modern Indian history as it also throws light on the political and the military scene of newly-independent India.

[Akhil · Rating 4 out of 5]

The book was written and released in 1972. This was a time when China was opening up to Western world and needed a positive image in those countries. The book has to be read from the perspective that it was released in this crucial period of Chinese History. Thus various 'facts' written is actually fabrication written in a manner to show India as the aggressor. To get a real perspective, it is recommended that book be read first and followed by China's India War which debunks most of the writings of the current book.
All in all, a good propoganda material which was welcomed and rightly hailed by the Chinese too when it was released.

[Viku Kuthiala · Rating 5 out of 5]

A must read after reading Himalayan Blunder by Brig. Dalvi. Well written, states facts as they are. India has been let down by its political leaders, shame that they have professed to be great leaders whereas they had no idea of realpolitik and how to secure the interests of the nation.
The real tragedy: since 62 we have still not learnt any lessons and the political class continues to deny arms, weapons, aircraft etc to the forces and At the same time is too idiotic to work out negotiated settlements with its neighbours.

[Anand · Rating 4 out of 5]

A different perspective on India's China war. The book nicely presents the diplomatic turmoil and the military chaos that we suffered during this time and also the roots of the geographic conflict.

Most of the available readily books speak about the conflict from the Indian angle (highly recommend the book Himalayan Blunder by J.P. Dalvi) but Maxwell presents a different angle to the whole narrative.

Worth a read !

[Anshuman Dangwal · Rating 4 out of 5]

An eye opening account of one of the biggest self made disasters by the polity and military of India at the time. The author though does present a slightly biased version of events leaning towards the Chinese version but still a must read. Broadens one's perspective towards understanding the genesis of the border war and present day delima faces by the two nations.

[Neelesh Pant · Rating 4 out of 5]

detailed

[Max Baruah · Rating 3 out of 5]

First of all, the book is unnecessarily quite long....the writer could have reduced the script.

Although a good read, however the writer seems to be pro China & anti India; having wholly accused the Indian politics of that time & of Nehru for the '62 blunder. What was going on inside China, was not clearly portrayed. Unlike JP Dalvi's 'Himalayan Blunder', this books gives a very biased explanation of the situation.

[Vinay Payyapilly · Rating 3 out of 5]

I heard stories about the China war mostly from my mom. There were things that never quite fit in and this book shone light on many of those areas. It is a must-read for anyone trying to understand all sides of this very fascinating conflict between two big nations.

Mr. Maxwell's writing though leaves a lot to be desired. I had to read many sentences over and over again to get the meaning since he writes very complex sentences. You have been warned.

[Mahesh · Rating 3 out of 5]

simply shows how unprepared indias leadership was to the chinese designs and how an issue which could have been settled was turned int a conflict on borders. the book shows criminal negligence on part of nehru to secure indian borders. However the book seems to have a tilt towards china