1. WHAT IS THE BOOK ABOUT AS A WHOLE?
- About the coming technological revolution connected with the progress of ICT's and the implications for various facets of humanity.
2. WHAT PROBLEMS DID THE AUTHOR TRY TO SOLVE?
- My feeling is that the main goal of the author was to "reinvent" or provide a better terminology and definitions of concepts that we are going to be dealing a lot more in the coming years - basically form a mental toolset for further discussions on this topic.
3. WHAT IS BEING SAID IN DETAIL, AND HOW?
-Many things! I guess I'll try to go through the most impactful terms consecutively.
First, second, and third-order technologies - first order technology rests between human and nature (hat, sandals, sunglasses - the sun is a prompter of such technology, a human is an interacting user), second is between a human user and a first-order technology, third is between technologies, removing the cumbersome human user from the loop completely (think backend services you don't even see, servers, power plants,...).
Information and communication technologies (ICTs) and the possibility of third-order technologies and their seamless integration and exponential growth creates the infosphere. Infosphere is basically a merger of the "online" and "the real" life - creating something we can call on-life experience (constantly being connected to the internet, intertwined with the technology and using it as an extension of our minds). Once we are able to interpret reality informationally, then what is informational can become real.
Informational friction, the notion of how difficult information transfer from sender to receiver might be, can be used to redefine privacy in a more up-to-date sense. Inforgs - inforganisms are basically information theory synonyms of humans - we just need to think of ourselves as collections of pieces of information. When the inforganism decides to share information with another inforganism, they basically create a multi-agent system (a relationship, be it personal, business,...). The more informations they share, the more intersections they have, the more inter-dependent they are.
Envelopes - the notion of enveloping the world to accommodate technologies, which can be a threat. Setting up a copper wire around the garden so the robot does not go off your lawn, basically forming and building our environments with the accommodation and usability for our technologies first instead of our human-ape needs.
4. IS THE BOOK TRUE, IN WHOLE OR PART?
- Yes, there are many interesting and on-point definitions and terms, which enable us to take a step back and think about the world in a different perspective (for example education and taking art, music, graphics, programming, English, mathematics, body, just as languages, means to an end, not the end themselves).
5. WHAT OF IT?
- These new perspectives are worth keeping and saving for further use in debates, to push the discourse further and enable a rational debate with proper terminology and definitions at hand. New world needs new words, and this book certainly provides some insightful and innovative mental concept frameworks about the inevitable future.
6. WHY THE RATING?
- For my taste there were too many filler passages. So I believe the actual valuable content might have been more squeezed. On the other hand it is understandable that proper terms need proper definitions.
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ICTs are modifying the very nature of, and hence what we mean by, reality, by transforming it into an infosphere. Infosphere is a neologism coined in the seventies. It is based on ‘biosphere’, a term referring to that limited region on our planet that supports life. It is also a concept that is quickly evolving. Minimally, infosphere denotes the whole informational environment constituted by all informational entities, their properties, interactions, processes, and mutual relations. It is an environment comparable to, but different from, cyberspace, which is only one of its sub-regions, as it were, since the infosphere also includes offline and analogue spaces of information. Maximally, infosphere is a concept that can also be used as synonymous with reality, once we interpret the latter informationally. In this case, the suggestion is that what is real is informational and what is informational is real. 12 It is in this equivalence that lies the source of some of the most profound transformations and challenging problems that we will experience in the near future, as far as technology is concerned.
This radical transformation is also due to the fundamental convergence between digital tools and digital resources. The intrinsic nature of the tools (software, algorithms, databases, communication channels and protocols, etc.) is now the same as, and therefore fully compatible with, the intrinsic nature of their resources, the raw data being manipulated. Metaphorically, it is a bit like having pumps and pipes made of ice to channel water: it is all H2O anyway. If you find this questionable, consider that, from a physical perspective, it would be impossible to distinguish between data and programs in the hard disk of your computer: they are all digits anyway. Such a digital uniformity between data and programs was one of Turing’s most consequential intuitions. In the infosphere, populated by entities and agents all equally informational, where there is no physical difference between processors and processed, interactions become equally informational. They all become interpretable as ‘read/write’ (i.e., access/alter) activities, with ‘execute’ the remaining type of process. If Alice speaks to Bob, that is a ‘write’ process, Bob listening to her is a ‘read’ process, and if they kiss, then that is an instance of ‘execute’. Not very romantic, but accurate nonetheless.
As a consequence of the informatization of our ordinary environment, some people in hyperhistorical societies are already living onlife, in an infosphere that is becoming increasingly synchronized, delocalized, and correlated. Although this might be interpreted, optimistically, as the friendly face of globalization, we should not harbour illusions about how widespread and inclusive the evolution of information societies is or will be. Unless we manage to solve it, the digital divide 24 may become a chasm, generating new forms of discrimination between those who can be denizens of the infosphere, and those who cannot, between insiders and outsiders, between information-rich and information-poor. It will redesign the map of worldwide society, generating or widening generational, geographic, socio-economic, and cultural divides, between Generation Z+ and Generation Z− . Yet the gap will not be reducible to the distance between rich and poor countries, because it will rather cut across societies. We saw in Chapter 1 that prehistorical cultures have almost entirely disappeared, perhaps with the exception of some small tribes in remote corners of the world. The new divide will be between historical and hyperhistorical ones. We might be preparing the ground for tomorrow’s informational slums.
And according to a study conducted by the electronics retailer PIXmania in 2013, 6 tweets are the preferred way to start a relationship in the UK. It takes on average 224 tweets to start a relationship, compared to 163 text messages, 70 Facebook messages, 37 emails, or 30 phone calls. And once in a relationship, more than a third of interviewed couples admit to exchanging saucy texts and explicit pictures with each other, so-called sexting. It all starts and ends at a distance, as ICTs are also the preferred means to end a relationship: 36 per cent do it by phone, 27 per cent by text message, and 13 per cent through social media. Meeting in real life to say goodbye is so old-fashioned.
And second, because social media also represent an unprecedented opportunity to be more in charge of our social selves, to choose more flexibly who the other people are whose thoughts and interactions create our social personality, to paraphrase Proust, and hence, indirectly, to determine our personal identities. Recall how the construction of your social self (who people think you are) feeds back into the development of your self-conception (who you think you are), which then feeds back into the moulding of your personal identity (who you are). More freedom on the social side also means more freedom to shape oneself.
The real educational challenge in hyperhistorical societies is increasingly what to put in the curriculum not how to teach it. The how is easy, not because it is straightforwardly feasible, but because it is more clearly understood. Digital technologies in the classroom are an old phenomenon. A century after Turing’s birth, universities are rushing to put their courses online, and the market of e-learning is blooming. There is much to be said in favour of (distance) e-learning, when it is not a form of ‘unmanned teaching’ or merely cheap outsourcing. As its supporters rightly stress, it has made a vast reservoir of educational contents available to millions of people, and it promises to deliver even more to ever more. ICTs may allow a degree of didactic customization unprecedented in non-elitist contexts: the personalization of the educational experience for millions of individuals. But all this is a matter of delivery policies, methods, techniques, and technologies. If it is taken to be a solution of how to educate Generation Z and the others which will follow, then we are mistaking a painkiller for a cure. The real headache is not the how. Since the late eighties we have become enthusiastic about MOOs (text-based online virtual reality systems for multiple users connected at the same time), literary hypertexts, glove-and-goggle VR (virtual realities), HyperCard, Second Life, and now MOOCs (massive open online courses). More fashions and further acronyms will certainly follow. Yet the real headache is the what. There is no clear and fixed answer to the educational what-question in hyperhistorical societies. Not only because we have never been here before, but also because, as in the past, the answer still depends on the answer to another question: what education is for.
1. knowledge: information Alice has (there is a monster) 2. insipience: information that Alice is aware she is missing (where is the monster hiding?) 3. uncertainty: information about which Alice is uncertain (are my weapons sufficient to kill the monster?) 4. ignorance: information that Alice is not aware she is missing (if only she knew that she is missing the fact that there is a magic weapon!) Education has always had the goal of increasing (1) and decreasing (2), (3), and (4).
Regarding (1), in a world awash with easily accessible information, cheap ICTs, and a plentiful intellectual workforce, increasing basic knowledge has become easy, hence the success of MOOCs based on interactive participation and open access through the Web. The educational problem with (1) is that new information always requires some old background information to become meaningful and useful, and to be appropriated critically. So we need to understand how much and what kind of background information—things one needs to know, independently of whether one may check them on Wikipedia if necessary—Alice needs to acquire in order to be educated today. Regarding (2), education should teach us the limits of our knowledge, what kind of information we do not have but might want to acquire, and hence a good taste for the right sort of questions we should ask. We are all insipient: it is how we handle our degree of insipience that makes a difference. So, the educational problem with (2) becomes which kind of unknowns Alice should be taught to be aware of today. Regarding (3), education should teach us to be careful about what we think we know, and hence the art of doubting and being critical even of the seemingly certain. We are all fallible, it is how we handle our degree of fallibility that makes a difference. So, the educational problem with (3) becomes what kind of uncertainties Alice should be taught today. As for (4), it is an internal problem. This is why only we can describe it for Alice. If Alice knew what she does not know that she is missing, she would be insipient or uncertain about it, not ignorant, after all. Now, imagine that we could talk to Alice: at a stroke, we could tell her that she is missing some information about the existence of a magic sword, so that particular instance of her ignorance would be erased. This is what a more globalized education across geographical borders and academic boundaries can do. It cannot erase humanity’s ignorance, but it can place each human being on one side of the same divide, even if, by definition, we, as humanity, do not know where that divide is. Let me explain using the same example. Suppose Bob knows that he does not know where the magic sword is, but he is not even aware of missing the information that there is a monster nearby. If Alice and Bob share their insipience, then they can decrease their ignorance: together they will know that they do not know both where the monster is and where the magic sword is. It may sound funny, but this is a great improvement. Internal ignorance is decreased, even if external ignorance may not be (what Alice and Bob as a group are unaware that they are missing—imagine both of them being ignorant about the existence of a friendly wizard).
Using our previous example, the game of knowledge includes players, watchers, and designers. A fact-based education and a skill-based education are strategies for players. They both address Alice as a user, not as a producer of information. The risk is to develop a ‘luxury box’ reaction, with watchers enjoying the knowledge game without actually playing. It used to be called an ivory tower. Meanwhile, an important part of the real business of education takes place at the game-designer level. We need to teach Alice-the-user how to play the game of knowledge successfully, Alice-the-intellectual how to observe and study the game critically, and Alice-the-designer how to devise the whole game properly. So the question becomes: what sort of abilities should we privilege and teach to tomorrow’s curators, producers, and designers of information? The answer seems to me quite obvious: the languages through which information is created, manipulated, accessed, and consumed. By this I do not mean only one’s own mother tongue, the full mastery of which is the first, basic, necessary step for any other form of education. I also mean English (or whatever language will one day be the international medium of communication), mathematics, programming, music, graphics, and all those natural and artificial languages in which Alice and the new generations need to be proficient at an early stage of their development, in order to be able to understand critically the accessible information, create and design new information, and share it with others.
More than a century later, in the same way that the information revolution is best understood as a fourth revolution in our self-understanding, privacy requires an equally radical reinterpretation, one that takes into account the informational nature of our selves and of our interactions as inforgs. Such a reinterpretation is achieved by considering each person as constituted by his or her information, and hence by understanding a breach of one’s informational privacy as a form of aggression towards one’s personal identity. This interpretation of privacy as having a self-constituting value is consistent with the fact that ICTs can both erode and reinforce informational privacy, and hence that a positive effort needs to be made in order to support not only Privacy Enhancing Technologies but also constructive applications, which may allow users to design, shape, and maintain their identities as informational agents. The value of privacy is both to be defended and enhanced.
The sharing of private information with someone, implicitly, especially by doing things together, or explicitly, is based on a relation of profound trust that binds the agents involved intimately. This coupling is achieved by allowing the agents to be partly constituted as selves by the same information. Visually, the informational identities of the agents involved now overlap, at least partially. The union of the agents forms a single unity, a supra-agent, or a new multi-agent individual. Precisely because entering into a new supra-agent is a delicate and risky operation, care should be exercised before ‘melding’ oneself with other individuals by sharing personal information or its source, such as common experiences.
Confidentiality is an intimate bond that is hard and slow to forge properly, yet resilient to many external forces when finally in place, as the supra-agent is stronger than the constitutive agents themselves. Relatives, friends, classmates, fellows, colleagues, comrades, companions, partners, teammates, spouses, and so forth may all have experienced the nature of such a bond, the stronger taste of a ‘we’. But it is also a bond brittle and difficult to restore when it comes to internal betrayal, since the disclosure, deliberate or unintentional, of some personal information in violation of confidence can entirely and irrecoverably destroy the privacy of the new supra-agent born out of the joining agents, by painfully tearing them apart. The ‘we’ is strongly armoured against ‘the other’, but extremely fragile against the internal betrayal from ‘one of us’.
When Odysseus returns to Ithaca, he is identified four times. Argos, his old dog, is not fooled and recognizes him despite his disguise as a beggar, because of his smell. Then Eurycleia, his wet-nurse, while bathing him, recognizes him by a scar on his leg, inflicted by a boar when hunting. He then proves to be the only man capable of stringing Odysseus’ bow. All these are biometric tests no Arnaud du Tilh would have passed. But then, Penelope is no Bertrande either. She does not rely on any ‘unique identifier’ but finally tests Odysseus by asking Eurycleia to move the bed in their wedding-chamber. Odysseus hears this and protests that it is an impossible task: he himself had built the bed around a living olive tree, which is now one of its legs. This is a crucial piece of information that only Penelope and Odysseus ever shared. By naturally relying on it, Odysseus restores Penelope’s full trust. She recognizes him as the real Odysseus not because of who he is or how he looks, but in a constitutive sense, because of the information that only they have in common and that constitutes both of them as a unique couple. Through the sharing of this intimate piece of information, which is part of who they are as a couple, identity is restored and the supra-agent is reunited. There is a line of continuity between the roots of the olive tree and the married couple. For Homer, their bond was like-mindedness (Ὁμοφροσύνη); to Shakespeare, it was the marriage of true minds.
Twitter engineers later wrote that ‘humans are core to this system’.4 The meaning should be clear. ‘Core components’ of ICTs is how we are being perceived. Our rating and ranking activities are exploited in order to improve the performance of some ICTs. As an example, one may refer to Klout, an online service that uses social media analytics to rank users according to their social influence online. Paraphrasing the title of a recent book on Klout,5 enthusiastic customers are turned into powerful marketing forces. Other examples of useful employment of human brains by smart systems multiply daily. ‘Human inside’ is becoming the next slogan. The winning formula is simple: smart machine + human intelligence = clever system.