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This is a well-researched and highly detailed account of L’Affaire Dreyfus. Unfortunately with so much mind-numbing detail, it is hard to see the forest for the trees. Much of the book deals with the political climate in France during the last decade of the 19th Century where there was a weak central government and many competing factions. In his “reassessment,” Chapman claims that “anti-semitism appears to have played no part in the case…” This is contrary to the majority of the literature on the Affair, including that of Emile Zola, which Chapman chalks up to the Dreyfusard (pro Dreyfus) faction having finally won in the end. Chapman concedes that there were some anti-Semites in the army, in the rabid press (particularly Edouard Drumant) and in the public at large. Initially Dreyfus may have been singled out by Col. Sandherr due to antisemitism, but, according to Chapman, he was suspected because he was an a not very well-liked artillery officer with access to classified information. Once charged, the Statistical Section (the spy department) did everything in its power to protect its reputation and officers. Despite evidence to the contrary, the Statistical Section created a conspiracy of lies and forgeries to manufacture evidence against Dreyfus. Chief among the villains was Major Hubert-Joseph Henry who forged the incriminating bordereau and petit bleu papers. Military politics played a big part in the Dreyfus court-martials. On the other side, Major Marie-Georges Picquart should be applauded for following his conscience (despite being an anti-Semite) to the detriment of his reputation and military career. According to Chapman, Zola’s “J’Accuse” and the subsequent libel case seems to be a small footnote in the ongoing battle for public opinion. While other foreign press correspondents are mentioned, Theodor Herzl, the founder of modern Zionism, is omitted. I don’t believe that Chapman himself was an anti-Semite, and I am certainly no expert on this period. But given the weight of most scholarly opinion, Chapman’s “reassessment” smacks of revisionist history.