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Kırım Savaşı ve Osmanlılar
Kırım Savaşı (1853-56) Avrupa tarihinde olduğu kadar Osmanlı tarihinde de belirleyici bir dönüm noktasıdır, ama çoğunlukla Avrupalıların bakış açısından incelenip analiz edilmiştir. Buharlı ve zırhlı savaş gemileri, demiryolu, telgraf ve uzun menzilli tüfek gibi savaş sanatında devrim yaratan endüstriyel buluşlar ilk defa Kırım Savaşı’nda yaygın şekilde kullanılmış; savaş muhabirleri, yepyeni bir buluş olan fotoğraf makinesi ve kitlesel medya, cephe gerisindeki kamuoyunun hayatına savaşı ilk defa bu denli dahil etmiştir. Candan Badem’in daha önce kullanılmamış Osmanlı ve Rus arşiv kaynakları ile Batı dillerindeki mevcut literatürden derinlemesine faydalanarak yazdığı Kırım Savaşı ve Osmanlılar, bu savaşın Osmanlı devleti ile toplumu üzerindeki etkisine odaklanıyor. Savaşın mali, sosyal ve siyasi etkilerine dair yeni ve özgün görüşler ortaya koyan Badem, Osmanlıların hem aktör hem de kurban olarak öneminin altını çiziyor. Osmanlı ve Avrupa kamuoyunun durumu ile savaşın diplomatik, ekonomik ve siyasi sebeplerinin incelenmesinin yanı sıra, konuya dair oldukça hacimli literatürün eleştirel değerlendirilmesi de eserde yer alıyor.
504 pages, Paperback
First published April 1, 2010
45 people want to read
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Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews
March 17, 2019
An excellent book that opens with the author closely analyzing the total paucity of Ottoman sources on the Crimean War. It seems that that Ottoman officers wrote virtually nothing about their experiences for future generations to learn from, which shows the utter lack of concern for military tactics developing at the time. The foot soldiers, on the other hand, shared their experiences freely and inspired much popular music, poetry, and drama, which the author only quotes briefly in the very final pages of the book (394-398).
For the Ottomans, the Crimean War seems to have been a turning point. The officers were clueless as to how Europe was developing its democratic and mercantile attitudes, and the general public had recently had started to realize that Europe had obtained the power to undermine or destroy their traditional societies, but had absolutely no knowledge of what sort of beast this new Europe was or how to deal with it. The result is a general confusion on the side of the masses, including religious leaders who could articulate their political goals only in terms of jihad and jizya. When the jizya was abolished as a result of the war, the Ottoman state tried to silence Islamic dissent to this unorthodox decision by appealing to the "patriotism" of the masses -- a distinctly modern concept that was probably introduced to the public during the war itself.
On the final page of the book the author observes that during the Crimean War there were no political parties in the Ottoman Empire, either at court or in the street. This was Julius Evola's "organic state," and the common interest was in maintenance of the traditional status quo. Hence there was no reformist party able to respond to the growing European threat of economic domination.
For the Ottomans, the Crimean War seems to have been a turning point. The officers were clueless as to how Europe was developing its democratic and mercantile attitudes, and the general public had recently had started to realize that Europe had obtained the power to undermine or destroy their traditional societies, but had absolutely no knowledge of what sort of beast this new Europe was or how to deal with it. The result is a general confusion on the side of the masses, including religious leaders who could articulate their political goals only in terms of jihad and jizya. When the jizya was abolished as a result of the war, the Ottoman state tried to silence Islamic dissent to this unorthodox decision by appealing to the "patriotism" of the masses -- a distinctly modern concept that was probably introduced to the public during the war itself.
On the final page of the book the author observes that during the Crimean War there were no political parties in the Ottoman Empire, either at court or in the street. This was Julius Evola's "organic state," and the common interest was in maintenance of the traditional status quo. Hence there was no reformist party able to respond to the growing European threat of economic domination.
December 23, 2022
Eyi çalışma. Özellikle savaşın Osmanlı toplumsal ve siyasal yaşamına yansımaları, Osmanlı ıslahatlarının zihniyetini Batı ile ilişkileri bağlamında görmek için önemli.
November 19, 2012
We tend to forget that the so-called Crimean War was fought on seven fronts, including the Lower Danube, Caucasus, and Crimean Peninsula, along with the Black, Baltic, White, and Pacific seas. There are numerous studies about the Crimean War (1853-1856). However, this conflict which involved the Ottoman Empire, Russia, Britain, France, Austria, Piedmont-Sardinia, and other states is usually presented from the European point of view. Dr Candan Badem, Assistant Professor in History at Tunceli University in Turkey, presents a study that investigates the role of the Ottoman Empire in the conflict and the Crimean War’s impact on the Ottoman state and society.
In this work, Badem depicts the political, military, social, and economic situation in the Ottoman Empire under Sultan Abdülmecid (ruled 1839-1861) on the eve of the Crimean War. The author points out that the Ottoman army and navy “were still not professional in any modern European sense” (p.49). He investigates the origin of the Russo-Ottoman conflict comparing the Ottoman and European viewpoints. As such, he stresses British financial and commercial interests in maintaining Ottoman independence, the Franco-Russian dispute over the Holy Places, and Nicholas I’s foreign policy aimed at achieving Russian goals. The Tsar sent Prince A.S. Menshikov to Istanbul to diplomatically resolve the crisis over the Holy Places in favor of Russia. Menshikov’s high-handed diplomacy failed to achieve a satisfactory outcome. Britain and France then brought up their fleets into Beşika Bay at the entrance of the Dardanelles to deter Russian military action. Tension resulted in Russia invading the Danubian Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia in July 1853. The Sublime Porte immediately protested. British and French diplomats sent the so-called Vienna Note to Istanbul and St Petersburg, seeking to find a compromise, and avoid war. Negotiations over modifications to the Vienna Note broke down and the Russo-Ottoman war began near the mouth of the Danube River in October 1853.
Badem relates the battles and diplomacy of the Crimean War. In November 1853, the Ottoman Rumelian army defeated the Russians at the battle of Oltenitsa. But the event that turned the Russo-Ottoman war into a European one was the naval battle of Sinop in November 1853. The Russian Black Sea fleet attacked and destroyed the Ottoman fleet. The author points out that “the Ottoman navy, although probably the fourth or fifth naval power in the world, was not a match for the Russian Black Sea fleet in terms of training and fire power” (p.110). As a result the European balance of power was disturbed, and the British and French fleets soon entered the Black Sea in December, and their respective governments declared war against Russia in March 1854.
Badem examines the Ottoman war effort on the Danubian, Caucasian, and Crimean fronts. The author discusses the successes and failures of the Ottoman army. The Ottoman army on the Danubian front was better led and trained than the army on the Caucasian front. The French and British forced the Ottomans to play a secondary role in the Crimea. Overall, the Ottoman military effort suffered from corruption, poor leadership, and poorly trained, armed, and provisioned troops. Badem stresses that “more soldiers died of diseases, malnutrition, cold and lack of proper housing than of wounds received in battle” (p.409). The Ottoman generals failed to demonstrate a sufficient understanding of European warfare. In the end, the Ottoman Empire did not gain any significant material gains from the conflict which left it nearly financially bankrupt. Badem stresses that the Empire became part of the European States System in the Peace of Paris (1856), but was more of a European protectorate (p.403). He shows that Britain and France dictated the alliance and the Ottomans had little input. Britain and France fought the war not for the sake of the Sublime Porte but for their own interests to contain Russian expansionism. As such, relations between the Ottoman Empire and its Anglo-French allies were rather shaky.
This is a well-written, valuable study of the Ottoman Empire and the Crimean War. Badem utilizes archival sources in Turkey, Russia, and Great Britain. The book is outlandishly expensive at $229.00, but, fortunately, Brill released a paperback version of the study in 2012 which sells for $49.50 (ISBN 978-90-04-22684-5).
In this work, Badem depicts the political, military, social, and economic situation in the Ottoman Empire under Sultan Abdülmecid (ruled 1839-1861) on the eve of the Crimean War. The author points out that the Ottoman army and navy “were still not professional in any modern European sense” (p.49). He investigates the origin of the Russo-Ottoman conflict comparing the Ottoman and European viewpoints. As such, he stresses British financial and commercial interests in maintaining Ottoman independence, the Franco-Russian dispute over the Holy Places, and Nicholas I’s foreign policy aimed at achieving Russian goals. The Tsar sent Prince A.S. Menshikov to Istanbul to diplomatically resolve the crisis over the Holy Places in favor of Russia. Menshikov’s high-handed diplomacy failed to achieve a satisfactory outcome. Britain and France then brought up their fleets into Beşika Bay at the entrance of the Dardanelles to deter Russian military action. Tension resulted in Russia invading the Danubian Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia in July 1853. The Sublime Porte immediately protested. British and French diplomats sent the so-called Vienna Note to Istanbul and St Petersburg, seeking to find a compromise, and avoid war. Negotiations over modifications to the Vienna Note broke down and the Russo-Ottoman war began near the mouth of the Danube River in October 1853.
Badem relates the battles and diplomacy of the Crimean War. In November 1853, the Ottoman Rumelian army defeated the Russians at the battle of Oltenitsa. But the event that turned the Russo-Ottoman war into a European one was the naval battle of Sinop in November 1853. The Russian Black Sea fleet attacked and destroyed the Ottoman fleet. The author points out that “the Ottoman navy, although probably the fourth or fifth naval power in the world, was not a match for the Russian Black Sea fleet in terms of training and fire power” (p.110). As a result the European balance of power was disturbed, and the British and French fleets soon entered the Black Sea in December, and their respective governments declared war against Russia in March 1854.
Badem examines the Ottoman war effort on the Danubian, Caucasian, and Crimean fronts. The author discusses the successes and failures of the Ottoman army. The Ottoman army on the Danubian front was better led and trained than the army on the Caucasian front. The French and British forced the Ottomans to play a secondary role in the Crimea. Overall, the Ottoman military effort suffered from corruption, poor leadership, and poorly trained, armed, and provisioned troops. Badem stresses that “more soldiers died of diseases, malnutrition, cold and lack of proper housing than of wounds received in battle” (p.409). The Ottoman generals failed to demonstrate a sufficient understanding of European warfare. In the end, the Ottoman Empire did not gain any significant material gains from the conflict which left it nearly financially bankrupt. Badem stresses that the Empire became part of the European States System in the Peace of Paris (1856), but was more of a European protectorate (p.403). He shows that Britain and France dictated the alliance and the Ottomans had little input. Britain and France fought the war not for the sake of the Sublime Porte but for their own interests to contain Russian expansionism. As such, relations between the Ottoman Empire and its Anglo-French allies were rather shaky.
This is a well-written, valuable study of the Ottoman Empire and the Crimean War. Badem utilizes archival sources in Turkey, Russia, and Great Britain. The book is outlandishly expensive at $229.00, but, fortunately, Brill released a paperback version of the study in 2012 which sells for $49.50 (ISBN 978-90-04-22684-5).
October 18, 2010
A large number of English and French (and a smaller number of Russian and Italian) texts deal with the Crimean War. Filling a serious gap in the published record of his country's history, Dr. Badem (Okan University, Istanbul) has produced what is, I believe, the first complete English-language text on the war specifically written from the Turkish point of view. In many ways, it is an eye-opener on a cultural and governmental system very unfamiliar to Western readers. The author has conducted major in-depth studies in the Ottoman and Russian archives and has drawn freely on British and other sources, generating some 1071 scholarly references. Chapter I - 'Introduction and Review of the Sources' (45 pp.) sets the scene and adds critical reviews of the existing texts. Chapter II - 'The Origins of the War' (52 pp.) begins with an overview of the Ottoman Empire and its international relations. The question of the 'Holy Places' is viewed as no more than a pretext in the escalating movement to war. Menshikov's 'mission' is seen as a blatant attempt to browbeat the Ottoman government, with military action as the clearly anticipated fall-back position. The various futile efforts to avoid conflict are described, with an overview of European and Ottoman public opinion. Chapter III - 'Battles and Diplomacy during the War' (189 pp.) presents much information on Ottoman activities in the Crimea. Most significantly, a wealth of detail on the Danubian, Circassian and Caucasus campaigns is set out - a very high proportion hitherto entirely unknown to Western scholars. Desperate and wholly admirable Ottoman defensive actions were all too often vitiated by endemic corruption of all kinds. The text indicates that, for the Ottomans, their campaign in the Crimea was decidedly a 'side-show' compared to their struggles in the other theatres. Chapter IV - 'Financing the War' (39 pp.) is a striking account of the often repellent machinations required to provide the sinews of war, involving Rothschild and others. The staggering fact is that the annual Ottoman military expenses increased from 40% to no less than 67% of the state budget during the war - a clear illustration of the extreme stress forced upon their government. Chapter V - 'The Impact of the War on Ottoman Social and Political Life' (76 pp.) offers a vivid account of the attempted and partial liberalisation of the Ottoman state and of the profound opposition, rising to civil unrest, which that inspired. The 'Conclusion' (10 pp.) leaves little doubt that the Ottoman Empire effectively became a protectorate - drawn into the Concert of Europe, but not as an autonomous member. A Bibliography (20 pp.) and a short Index complete the text.
I judge that Dr. Badem's book is required reading for anyone interested in the wider aspects of the conflict and I recommend it whole-heartedly.
Douglas J. Austin
I judge that Dr. Badem's book is required reading for anyone interested in the wider aspects of the conflict and I recommend it whole-heartedly.
Douglas J. Austin
Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews