"Fortune is a fickle courtesan," Napoleon once said.
His life is an example of this.
As the author notes at the beginning, his main goal in writing this book was "to examine how he became ‘Napoleon’ and achieved what he did, and how it came about that he undid it." Having finished this biography, I would say that he largely succeeded in conveying his perspective.
It was a long, involved read, but the page count is justified given how eventful Napoleon's life was. All the principal episodes of his life and career are covered without overwhelming the reader with details.
Adam Zamoyski portrays Napoleon as a great general and tactician, yet a poor strategist. According to the author, Napoleon usually acted tactically, responding to circumstances without an overall strategy. While I tend to agree with this assessment, especially given how Napoleon's career ended, I would add that the distinction between tactics and strategy is often blurred and easier to discern in hindsight.
Zamoyski points out that "Napoleon did not start the war that broke out in 1792 when he was a mere lieutenant and continued, with one brief interruption, until 1814." He adds that responsibility for the hostilities cannot be placed squarely on one side or the other because "all the belligerents must share the blame."
We will examine the transformations that Napoleon - born Napoleone Buonaparte - experienced throughout his life. He began as a young, somewhat idealistic man who wished to help his native Corsica gain independence. He then became a French officer imbued with the ideas and ideals of the French Revolution. He appears to have been loyal to the revolutionary authorities, successfully fighting the enemies of the French Republic, until the coup that granted him power and made him the first consul. Having consolidated power, he was not a dictator, at least at first. He probably truly wanted to serve the nation, basing his legitimacy on the nation's will. Modernizing reforms were carried out. The financial situation was more or less stabilized after the turbulent years of the Directory. Roads and bridges were built. Napoleon and his team supported the arts and sciences. The famous civil code was introduced. Socio-political institutions were built and strengthened.
However, as the saying goes, "Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely." Napoleon's policies and ways of handling matters grew increasingly despotic, hectoring, and voluntaristic.
Increasing grandiosity also marked his foreign policy. One example of Napoleon's voluntarism was his treatment of Holland and his brother Louis, whom he declared King of Holland.
It is interesting how Napoleon was perceived in the lands he conquered. His image mutated from liberator to oppressor. Initially, many regarded him as a liberator, even though the French often plundered the conquered territories' wealth. However, the opposition and resentment against Napoleon and his French troops grew.
While Napoleon didn't deem it necessary to change anything after his military successes, his opponents were learning from him and modernizing their military forces. Furthermore, the French emperor thought, he could rely on the manpower of the territories he conquered and draft more people into his armies. Bonaparte was not as reckless with the lives of his soldiers as is sometimes assumed.
With such enterprises as the military involvement in Spain, which ultimately failed, Napoleon outstretched his capabilities.
After divorcing his first wife, Josephine, the emperor needed to find a bride with a royal pedigree.
Napoleon wished to marry the young sister of Alexander I who had just turned fifteen to cement an alliance against the British and to tickle his vanity. But the Russian tsar was stalling, never seriously considering giving his sister to the French emperor, and Napoleon made up his mind to marry Marie-Louise, the eighteen-year-old daughter of the emperor of Austria.
Napoleon was a master of propaganda, with a talent for self-promotion and making a big show out of even a small victory. He knew how to rally people to his persona. He carefully crafted his own image through numerous announcements about his successes. He often exaggerated the losses of his enemies and downplayed the French casualties. Yet, exaggerating and embellishing victories requires that victories be achieved. Over the years, Napoleon fashioned an image of himself as "someone out of the ordinary, courageous, wise, modest, but also decisive and above all successful."
Believing in his destiny, he often showed bravery and steadiness under fire and did not spare himself. His self-confidence had an assuring effect on people in moments of crisis.
But when the course of events turned against him, his armies were outnumbered and Paris was threatened by the foreign powers, the emperor of the French was forced to admit defeat and abdicate. Fortune that had long favored him seemed to have abandoned him.
The author offers a balanced account of Napoleon’s downfall. Did it begin in Spain or with his decision to invade Russia? Was Napoleon's defeat at the Battle of Leipzig the beginning of the end?
The war with Russia was a rather improvident move. The French emperor hesitated, not seeing the purpose of this new war. But if he wanted to successfully enforce the Continental blockade and maintain his system in Europe, he needed Russia to be in line with his policies. If he could not achieve this by negotiation, which he obviously preferred, he would fight. Napoleon was accustomed to relying on military means to solve problems. The fact that he saw the legitimacy of his rule in his victories and military glory made him particularly eager not to show weakness. He always sought a strong position from which to negotiate on his terms.
These, coupled with the intransigence of the Russian tsar, led Napoleon to invade Russia. He had allies, if untrustworthy, who were forced to join his army.
Even after crossing the Niemen, Napoleon hoped to reach a peace settlement with Tsar Alexander I, believing that the Russian ruler had been manipulated by his entourage and the British. He underestimated Alexander’s determination to confront him.
Having spent his childhood maneuvering between his father (Pavel I) and grandmother (Catherine II), Alexander developed a certain plasticity and ability to hide his true intentions.
After he had had to abandon the remnants of his army in Russia and hastily return to Paris, Napoleon seems to have had several opportunities to save the situation and extricate himself from the looming fiasco. For instance, he could have played on the conflicting interests of the allies (Prussia, Russia, Austria, and Britain). He could have accepted the Austrian peace proposals, which were quite favorable to France, given the circumstances and the fact that the French resources were diminishing while those of its enemies were growing. Victor at Austerlitz and Marengo, the mature Napoleon was still a great general who knew how to win battles, but he failed to seize some of the opportunities that could have prevented his downfall.
Napoleon was denied death on the battlefield or by attempted suicide. He was sent to Elba. His decision to try to return to power, when he left his exile on the island of Elba, landed in France, and dashed for Paris, quickly turned into another disaster. The Bourbons, who had been restored by the allied powers, were not popular, except in some staunchly royalist regions. This allowed Napoleon to return to the scene and install himself as the ruler of France.
But after the defeat at Waterloo, Napoleon was forced to abdicate the second time. Some of his entourage encouraged him to "dare the last time," seize dictatorial power, and galvanize the French population by declaring ‘la patrie en danger’. However, this time Napoleon was not ready to dare. He was reluctant to unleash civil unrest. The author describes him as "curiously detached and incapable of reaction." But perhaps he was able to see that all his efforts would be in vain. As he himself said on one of those days, "I did not come back from Elba in order to flood Paris with blood." He did not want to aggravate the debacle and go down in history as a man who brought destruction to his capital.
Circumstances, it should be added, encouraged Napoleon's decision to escape from Elba.
Napoleon had plans to flee to the United States but ended up boarding the British ship. It seems that Napoleon may have hoped to find asylum in England. In his own words, he wished, "like Themistocles, to come and sit by the fireside of the British people." He was to be sent to the island of St Helena in the South Atlantic to spend the rest of his life.
You almost feel sympathy for this fatally wounded lion, but then you start thinking about the more than 50,000 men who were killed and injured at Waterloo in the wake of Napoleon's return to power.
The fallen emperor appears to have had a tendency in his last years on St Helena to exonerate himself and find fault with others. His bitterness during his captivity on the island is psychologically understandable, and many would probably behave this way if they happened to have it all and then lose it all. However, he revealed his manipulative side by portraying himself as a 'victim' of unjust persecution by British 'jailers.'
With Napoleon's death, he began a new life as a myth.
The author does not seem to like Napoleon, and it can be felt in his description of Napoleon's appearance. He insists Napoleon be short, though some assessments say he was of medium height. Zamoyski cites eyewitnesses who described Napoleon as small and short and were unimpressed by the French ruler's looks. I would add that the way someone's physical appearance is perceived owes much to the beholder.
In describing the relationship between Napoleon and Maria Walewska, the author seems to lend credence to a certain rumor.
I would have liked to see more excerpts from Napoleon's letters in this biography.
The book's strength lies in the author's evenhandedness in addressing the subject matter. If he does not sympathize with Napoleon, he does not sympathize with anyone else either. He often highlights the mediocrity of Napoleon's opponents, especially in war.
Zamoyski mentions that the British exploited Bonaparte’s actions in Jaffa (Palestine), where he ordered the execution of the prisoners and the French troops sacked the town taken by assault, in their propaganda. But "British troops behaved no better during the concurrent war in India against the Mahrattas, or later in the Peninsular War."
To sum up, if you are going to read more than one biography of Napoleon, I recommend including this one.