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The Grand Strategy of the Habsburg Empire
The Empire of Habsburg Austria faced more enemies than any other European great power. Flanked on four sides by rivals, it possessed few of the advantages that explain successful empires. Its army was not renowned for offensive prowess, its finances were often shaky, and its populace was fragmented into more than a dozen ethnicities. Yet somehow Austria endured, outlasting Ottoman sieges, Frederick the Great, and Napoleon. The Grand Strategy of the Habsburg Empire tells the story of how this cash-strapped, polyglot empire survived for centuries in Europe’s most dangerous neighborhood without succumbing to the pressures of multisided warfare.
Taking readers from the War of the Spanish Succession in the early 1700s to the Austro-Prussian War of 1866, A. Wess Mitchell argues that the Habsburgs succeeded not through offensive military power or great wealth but by developing strategies that manipulated the element of time in geopolitical competition. Unable to fight all of their enemies at once, the Habsburgs learned to use the limited tools at their disposal―terrain, technology, and treaty-allies―to sequence and stagger their contests, drive down the costs of empire, and concentrate scarce resources against the greatest threat of the moment. Rarely holding a grudge after war, they played the “long game” in geopolitics, corralling friend and foe alike into voluntarily managing the empire’s lengthy frontiers and extending a benign hegemony across the turbulent lands of middle Europe.
A study in adaptive statecraft, The Grand Strategy of the Habsburg Empire offers lessons on how to navigate a messy geopolitical map, stand firm without the advantage of military predominance, and prevail against multiple rivals.
Taking readers from the War of the Spanish Succession in the early 1700s to the Austro-Prussian War of 1866, A. Wess Mitchell argues that the Habsburgs succeeded not through offensive military power or great wealth but by developing strategies that manipulated the element of time in geopolitical competition. Unable to fight all of their enemies at once, the Habsburgs learned to use the limited tools at their disposal―terrain, technology, and treaty-allies―to sequence and stagger their contests, drive down the costs of empire, and concentrate scarce resources against the greatest threat of the moment. Rarely holding a grudge after war, they played the “long game” in geopolitics, corralling friend and foe alike into voluntarily managing the empire’s lengthy frontiers and extending a benign hegemony across the turbulent lands of middle Europe.
A study in adaptive statecraft, The Grand Strategy of the Habsburg Empire offers lessons on how to navigate a messy geopolitical map, stand firm without the advantage of military predominance, and prevail against multiple rivals.
416 pages, Hardcover
First published June 26, 2018
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About the author
A. Wess Mitchell
5 books10 followersAaron Wess Mitchell is the Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs at the United States Department of State. The former president of the Center for European Policy Analysis in Washington, DC, Mitchell holds a B.A. in History from Texas Tech University, a M.A. from the Center for German and European Studies at Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, and a Ph.D. in Political Science from the Otto Suhr Institut für Politikwissenschaft at Freie Universität in Berlin, Germany.
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November 26, 2022
The Grand Strategy of the Habsburg Empire, by A. Wess Mitchell, is an excellent examination of 17th and 18th century Habsburg grand strategy. The Austrian Empire of this book is the Empire that came after the War of Spanish Succession, and the separation of Spain and its colonies from the Habsburg family domains. Mitchell focuses on rump Austria and its near domains - Hungary, Croatia, Bohemia, Northern Italy, and eventually, the Banat, and Galicia and Lodomeria. These were the main Austria domains, and were the focus of Austria's grand strategy initiatives. And these initiatives were desperately needed, as Austria was beset on all sides by rivals and foes. Beset by internal turmoil, economic issues, and a neighbourhood of predatory rivals, Austria required deep thinking on grand strategy, and it did so with great gusto.
The focus of this book is on some of the strategies that Austria employed to maintain its internal stability and territorial integrity over the 17th and 18th centuries. Austria used a variety of methods. On the battlefield, a culture of defense arose. The Habsburgs were keen fort builders, and some of the most stunning forts constructed in human history were built by them in Northern Italy. They employed map making to conceptualize spaces and pick the most efficient and effective locations for forts, to inflict maximum casualties on an attacking foe, and control fronts and territories with less manpower (and therefore, in a more cost effective manner). The Austrians used this tactic on its Western peripheries, mapping closely its border regions, and employing defensive strategies on its fronts. It also developed tactics around moving forces forward quickly, rather than en masse, to try and capture strategic and important river crossings, or cities and towns that would force an enemy to the bargaining table early. On the Ottoman front, the Austrians were beset by annual and regular light raids which could pose an existential threat to their heartlands if not carefully managed. To cope with this, the Austrians constructed fort-villages and watchtowers along their militarized districts with the Ottomans, and utilized irregular troops themselves to counter raid and provide guerilla warfare on any enemies within their interior. These troops also proved handy in Austria's many wars with France and Prussia, harrying the supply lines of Western troops and siege groups, and inflicting greater defeat on retreating enemies.
A second, and arguably more important avenue, was diplomacy. Austria was keen to build systems of security into its foreign policy, to stop warfare before it started. This developed into a largely conservative statecraft, which sought stability through diplomacy, and used compromise to placate enemies abroad, and rebellions at home. Austria was beset by foes; a hungry Prussia sought to gobble up Austria's German allies and even its own territory. The Ottomans on the south were in a slump, but this instability allowed for regular harassment by marauding armies. The Russians were growing immensely in this region as well, threatening the survival of Austria's buffer states in Wallachia and Moldova, and threatening to replace the Ottoman's as a major threat to the South. A weak Poland-Lithuania also saw an encroaching threat from the North - an avenue the Austrians had not had to worry about for a long while. In the West, a hegemonic France loomed, always a threat to the security of Austria's territories and allies in the Netherlands, Western Germany, and Italy. Austria used a system of preventative alliances, culminating in its Congress of Europe, to quell unrest, address conflict through negotiation, and create defensive alliances to quell sudden attacks. It also heavily utilized buffer states. Austria, as the nominal head of the Holy Roman Empire, had a number of subordinate German states, with varying degrees of allegiance, at its disposal. These states were mercurial allies at best, and often times more of a hinderance in terms of providing support or allegiance. What they made up for was their ability to "offshore" defense costs. Austria had its allies construct a series of forts on its Western boundaries, and often staffed them with local allies or its own soldiers. These forts served as a first line of defense against an encroaching France, and allowed the costs of constructing, supplying and maintaining a fort to fall on its allies, and outside its own coffers. Similar strategies were explored in the South in Wallachia and Moldova, and in Italy. States like Saxony, Tuscany, and Cologne were staunch allies of Austria, and provided numerous benefits including an extension of power into regions beyond its own borders.
This was a fascinating book that does a good deal to dispel the "second sick man of Europe" trope often placed on the Austrian Empire. This was an Empire focused on survival. Mitchell does well to note the strategic shifts in Austria throughout the Prussian onslaught, as well as the revolutionary era that spawned Austria's greatest existential threat, Republican France. And Austria did quite well. It was almost constantly at war, broke, and surrounded by foes, and yet it survived mostly intact, and indeed went through periods of great resurgence, due to its innovative grand strategy. Mitchell offers a brief policy analysis at the end, focusing on how Austrian state policy in this era can reflect the current position of the United States. I always enjoy reading on the Habsburgs - the great survivalists, and it is interesting to see a slight uptick in analysis over the last few years, as defensive strategy begins to creep into the minds of Western scholars and statespersons. An interesting read, and one not to be missed.
The focus of this book is on some of the strategies that Austria employed to maintain its internal stability and territorial integrity over the 17th and 18th centuries. Austria used a variety of methods. On the battlefield, a culture of defense arose. The Habsburgs were keen fort builders, and some of the most stunning forts constructed in human history were built by them in Northern Italy. They employed map making to conceptualize spaces and pick the most efficient and effective locations for forts, to inflict maximum casualties on an attacking foe, and control fronts and territories with less manpower (and therefore, in a more cost effective manner). The Austrians used this tactic on its Western peripheries, mapping closely its border regions, and employing defensive strategies on its fronts. It also developed tactics around moving forces forward quickly, rather than en masse, to try and capture strategic and important river crossings, or cities and towns that would force an enemy to the bargaining table early. On the Ottoman front, the Austrians were beset by annual and regular light raids which could pose an existential threat to their heartlands if not carefully managed. To cope with this, the Austrians constructed fort-villages and watchtowers along their militarized districts with the Ottomans, and utilized irregular troops themselves to counter raid and provide guerilla warfare on any enemies within their interior. These troops also proved handy in Austria's many wars with France and Prussia, harrying the supply lines of Western troops and siege groups, and inflicting greater defeat on retreating enemies.
A second, and arguably more important avenue, was diplomacy. Austria was keen to build systems of security into its foreign policy, to stop warfare before it started. This developed into a largely conservative statecraft, which sought stability through diplomacy, and used compromise to placate enemies abroad, and rebellions at home. Austria was beset by foes; a hungry Prussia sought to gobble up Austria's German allies and even its own territory. The Ottomans on the south were in a slump, but this instability allowed for regular harassment by marauding armies. The Russians were growing immensely in this region as well, threatening the survival of Austria's buffer states in Wallachia and Moldova, and threatening to replace the Ottoman's as a major threat to the South. A weak Poland-Lithuania also saw an encroaching threat from the North - an avenue the Austrians had not had to worry about for a long while. In the West, a hegemonic France loomed, always a threat to the security of Austria's territories and allies in the Netherlands, Western Germany, and Italy. Austria used a system of preventative alliances, culminating in its Congress of Europe, to quell unrest, address conflict through negotiation, and create defensive alliances to quell sudden attacks. It also heavily utilized buffer states. Austria, as the nominal head of the Holy Roman Empire, had a number of subordinate German states, with varying degrees of allegiance, at its disposal. These states were mercurial allies at best, and often times more of a hinderance in terms of providing support or allegiance. What they made up for was their ability to "offshore" defense costs. Austria had its allies construct a series of forts on its Western boundaries, and often staffed them with local allies or its own soldiers. These forts served as a first line of defense against an encroaching France, and allowed the costs of constructing, supplying and maintaining a fort to fall on its allies, and outside its own coffers. Similar strategies were explored in the South in Wallachia and Moldova, and in Italy. States like Saxony, Tuscany, and Cologne were staunch allies of Austria, and provided numerous benefits including an extension of power into regions beyond its own borders.
This was a fascinating book that does a good deal to dispel the "second sick man of Europe" trope often placed on the Austrian Empire. This was an Empire focused on survival. Mitchell does well to note the strategic shifts in Austria throughout the Prussian onslaught, as well as the revolutionary era that spawned Austria's greatest existential threat, Republican France. And Austria did quite well. It was almost constantly at war, broke, and surrounded by foes, and yet it survived mostly intact, and indeed went through periods of great resurgence, due to its innovative grand strategy. Mitchell offers a brief policy analysis at the end, focusing on how Austrian state policy in this era can reflect the current position of the United States. I always enjoy reading on the Habsburgs - the great survivalists, and it is interesting to see a slight uptick in analysis over the last few years, as defensive strategy begins to creep into the minds of Western scholars and statespersons. An interesting read, and one not to be missed.
September 4, 2020
A fascinating look inside how a cultural diverse state survives and thrives in a competitive world, surrounded by rivals from all sides. The European Union can definitely take a few pages our of this book
January 31, 2019
Unfortunately the study lacks the necessary depth required by a topic of such magnitude.
August 1, 2022
Det är svårt att nog rekommendera denna. Det är inte en enkel bok, men den är djävulskt pedagogisk, och dessutom välskriven. Fokus är hanterandet av Österrikes strategiska situation under imperietiden.
Argumentet är att Österrikes stora utmaning var att 1) det var omgivet av potentiella hot och 2) inte hade resurser att hantera alla. Utifrån det presenterar författaren hur landets diplomater, furstar och militärer hanterat dessa svårigheter under 300 år. Det är en väldigt spännande läsning, som mynnar ut i ett antal konkreta och lösryckbara råd.
För politiknördar såväl som möpar och historienördar är detta väl värt att läsa.
Argumentet är att Österrikes stora utmaning var att 1) det var omgivet av potentiella hot och 2) inte hade resurser att hantera alla. Utifrån det presenterar författaren hur landets diplomater, furstar och militärer hanterat dessa svårigheter under 300 år. Det är en väldigt spännande läsning, som mynnar ut i ett antal konkreta och lösryckbara råd.
För politiknördar såväl som möpar och historienördar är detta väl värt att läsa.
October 16, 2019
Very interesting story about an empire that you don't really hear much about. The Habsburg empire was by no means in a position to be the military might of Europe and it had many troubles with a ethnically heterogeneous population. Surrounded by Great Powers on all sides it was still able to survive through the modernisation of the 18th and 19th century by shaping a grand strategy - playing the other powers off each other; maintaining buffer zone principalities, and trying to control what time and in what sequence it could fight.
March 7, 2025
Sokkal fontosabb kötet, mint gondolnánk. Kiragadja a magyar olvasót abból az intellektuális/fölrjazi izolációból, ami az osztrákokat és a birodalomat a történelmi szemlélődésünk során szinte megbélyegzünk. A szélesebb birodalmi spektrumban a magyarok csak apró buborékok és sokkal jelentéktelenebbek, mint ahogy azt a saját történelmi képünkből hisszük.
Ezen felül nagy tanulsága van Magyarország jelenére nézve is. A közel félezer oldalas rendkívül izgalmas olvasmányt, a spoilveszély vállalása mellett ugyanis sokkal tömörebben, pár mondatban is össze lehet foglalni.
A 600 éven át élő birodalom bukását, a szerző nézőpontjából, alapvetően két fontos tényező indikálta: az egyik Ferenc József azon téveszméje, hogy az intellektualizmus a forradalmárok és a parlementi liberálisok képzetének összefonódása. Ez gyorsan elhatalmasodó tudásellenességbe csapott át, mígnem pár évtized alatt oda jutott a korábban kiváló startégiai megfontolásairól ismert osztrák hadsereg, hogy a tisztikar nemcsak lenézte a tanulást, de gyaúsnak is tartotta azt. Innen talán nem kell folytatni sem, tudás nélkül nincsenek jó, de legfőképpen helyes döntések, a földbeállás elkerülhetetlen a valósággal találkozva, ami hamar be is következett.
A másik az elszigetelődés, ami szegről-végről az előbbiekkel kéz a kézben jár. Szövetségesek nélkül ugyanis még a legnagyobb hatalmak sem életképesek és azokat pár évtized alatt elkotyavetyélte a birodalom... Hát így ért véget 600 év története...
És hogy mi a mi tanulságunk belőle? Pontosabban mi a Red Flag? Hát hogy ugyanezt tolja a magyar diplomácia/politika, vagy akárhogy is hívják...
Ezen felül nagy tanulsága van Magyarország jelenére nézve is. A közel félezer oldalas rendkívül izgalmas olvasmányt, a spoilveszély vállalása mellett ugyanis sokkal tömörebben, pár mondatban is össze lehet foglalni.
A 600 éven át élő birodalom bukását, a szerző nézőpontjából, alapvetően két fontos tényező indikálta: az egyik Ferenc József azon téveszméje, hogy az intellektualizmus a forradalmárok és a parlementi liberálisok képzetének összefonódása. Ez gyorsan elhatalmasodó tudásellenességbe csapott át, mígnem pár évtized alatt oda jutott a korábban kiváló startégiai megfontolásairól ismert osztrák hadsereg, hogy a tisztikar nemcsak lenézte a tanulást, de gyaúsnak is tartotta azt. Innen talán nem kell folytatni sem, tudás nélkül nincsenek jó, de legfőképpen helyes döntések, a földbeállás elkerülhetetlen a valósággal találkozva, ami hamar be is következett.
A másik az elszigetelődés, ami szegről-végről az előbbiekkel kéz a kézben jár. Szövetségesek nélkül ugyanis még a legnagyobb hatalmak sem életképesek és azokat pár évtized alatt elkotyavetyélte a birodalom... Hát így ért véget 600 év története...
És hogy mi a mi tanulságunk belőle? Pontosabban mi a Red Flag? Hát hogy ugyanezt tolja a magyar diplomácia/politika, vagy akárhogy is hívják...
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
July 2, 2022
I've held an interest in this empire ever since I saw a map showing the various ethnicities overlaid over the outline of the whole. The entire thing struck me as being wildly improbable and almost Heath Robinson. Grand, but totally ludicrous, like a neighbour who has put a tower on his garden shed. Hence that's why I bought this book.
It opens with the War of the Spanish Succession and more or less closes with the Austro-Prussian War of 1866, as Wess argues that that saw the eclipse of traditional Habsburg strategic management. He demonstrates that these were based upon buffer states, using terrain and buying time until an aggressor was either exhausted or beset by an hostile coalition. These points are well made, but it's perhaps arguable how unique the Habsburgs were in developing a Grand Strategy and how much was events playing out over 160 years and being seen as a grand strategy in hindsight.
This book is a bit repetitive in places and also a touch disjointed. The chapter concerning Frederick the Great is by far the best, as Mitchell seems to hit a high gear here and his prose almost flows like a narrative, which makes this easily the most readable and enjoyable part. The maps and diagrams are pretty bland and in many cases would have benefited from being larger.
I found this book to be informative whilst only being intermittently interesting.
It opens with the War of the Spanish Succession and more or less closes with the Austro-Prussian War of 1866, as Wess argues that that saw the eclipse of traditional Habsburg strategic management. He demonstrates that these were based upon buffer states, using terrain and buying time until an aggressor was either exhausted or beset by an hostile coalition. These points are well made, but it's perhaps arguable how unique the Habsburgs were in developing a Grand Strategy and how much was events playing out over 160 years and being seen as a grand strategy in hindsight.
This book is a bit repetitive in places and also a touch disjointed. The chapter concerning Frederick the Great is by far the best, as Mitchell seems to hit a high gear here and his prose almost flows like a narrative, which makes this easily the most readable and enjoyable part. The maps and diagrams are pretty bland and in many cases would have benefited from being larger.
I found this book to be informative whilst only being intermittently interesting.
October 21, 2024
Deep thinking and lessons learned from a 600 year Empire
Wes Mitchell tackles a difficult subject that spans centuries and gives novel insights into the question of how a relatively weak empire managed its external and internal problems successfully for so long. The Habsburg and later Austrian Empire faced enemies at every point of the compass. Some were quite powerful, like the Turkish Ottoman empire, and then faded. Others were weaker, like imperial Russia, that kept growing stronger all the time. And still others were strong the whole time, such as Bourbon and later, Napoleonic France. Eventually, the Empire ran out of time, resources, and cunning leaders, and succumbed to external forces on all sides, but the achievement of generation after generation of Austrian diplomats, generals, and political leaders is the remarkable story told in this book.
Wes Mitchell tackles a difficult subject that spans centuries and gives novel insights into the question of how a relatively weak empire managed its external and internal problems successfully for so long. The Habsburg and later Austrian Empire faced enemies at every point of the compass. Some were quite powerful, like the Turkish Ottoman empire, and then faded. Others were weaker, like imperial Russia, that kept growing stronger all the time. And still others were strong the whole time, such as Bourbon and later, Napoleonic France. Eventually, the Empire ran out of time, resources, and cunning leaders, and succumbed to external forces on all sides, but the achievement of generation after generation of Austrian diplomats, generals, and political leaders is the remarkable story told in this book.
August 21, 2025
Some books you read and you get the feeling that the author had a page count, resulting in each page overwhelming you with new information; some books you read and you get the feeling that the author had a page count, resulting in each page being a repetition of the previous. I found this book to be the latter.
The book was interesting, but I do wish that the author provided some general context to the many major events that the Habsburgs found themselves tangled in.
The book was interesting, but I do wish that the author provided some general context to the many major events that the Habsburgs found themselves tangled in.
January 17, 2023
Excelente!
Un libro que ilustra las necesidades de desarrollar una estrategia basada en una clara conciencia de las limitaciones que impone permanente la realidad, particularmente porque el control de las personas sobre su destino es siempre tenue, si no tiene la lucidez y sabiduría para reconocer los estrechos márgenes de nuestra !libertad de acción.
Un libro que ilustra las necesidades de desarrollar una estrategia basada en una clara conciencia de las limitaciones que impone permanente la realidad, particularmente porque el control de las personas sobre su destino es siempre tenue, si no tiene la lucidez y sabiduría para reconocer los estrechos márgenes de nuestra !libertad de acción.
December 3, 2018
Fascinating read into the geopolitical and military strategy of the Habsburg rulers in defending their oft-surrounded territories from the Ottomans, Prussians, Russians, French etc. (the list goes on)
November 7, 2022
Dear Dr A. Wess Mitchell,
One of my areas of research is early modern European conflict, so I read your “The Grand Strategy of the Habsburg Empire” with great interest.
Let me begin by saying that the book is extremely well executed. As someone who knows something about this subject already, I still learned a lot, and particularly benefited from your discussion of the role of the importance of the ‘Militargrenze’. Your synthesis in the epilogue is excellent and cogent as well. States should only use Fabian tactics if they’re buying time for an advantageous moment -- but when you’re literally at the center of Europe, swings in the balance of power due to third parties happen a lot!
I’m writing because I recently published some research that I think might be of interest to you. The paper attached, is about the role of royal family connections in preventing European wars from 1495-WWI. We create a data-set combining the genealogies of the royal families of Europe with data on bilateral wars (relying on Wright’s A Study of War as the main source) and other covariates. Because marriage is endogenous, and therefore OLS estimates of the effect of family connections on war would be biased, we focus on the non-political deaths of people important to the royal family network. We show that after the death of a network-important mutual connection, the chance of war increases. The size of the effect is such that going from having their children (prince and princess) being married to having no family connection at all raises the chance of war at 8 percentage points per year. This is a very large effect, given the overall hazard rate of war between a pair of countries in a given year is 4%.
Why do I bring this up? Well because I think that the role of dynastic politics and family connections was underappreciated in your book as a tool for Habsburg diplomacy and grand strategy -- even in the post-1700 period you are concerned with. To give one particular example -- one of the riddles your book leaves the reader with is why Metternich (and his successor, to a lesser extent) were so gifted in spinning the tops in Europe. I think the answer lies in the Habsburg network of princesses and family allies married across Europe, many of them daughters and granddaughters of Maria Theresa. Maria’s placement of her descendants in turn was part of an explicit dynastic strategy you can read about in her letters. Quantitatively, the share of rulers who were connected by family ties increased from about 25% in the 1700s to 75% or 90% in the 1800s. I think you can make a real case that Habsburg marriage strategy in the 100 years previous put Metternich in a strong position to succeed keeping his tops spinning. And remember -- the Holy Alliance was explicitly a fraternity.
It isn’t any disservice to your great contribution on strategy to say that I think it leaves out this detail, but I do have to admit I disagreed with your offhand remark that “At most, there is the vague image of Austria succeeding in its early days through marriage.” I’m trying to fill in that vagueness with this research :)
One of my areas of research is early modern European conflict, so I read your “The Grand Strategy of the Habsburg Empire” with great interest.
Let me begin by saying that the book is extremely well executed. As someone who knows something about this subject already, I still learned a lot, and particularly benefited from your discussion of the role of the importance of the ‘Militargrenze’. Your synthesis in the epilogue is excellent and cogent as well. States should only use Fabian tactics if they’re buying time for an advantageous moment -- but when you’re literally at the center of Europe, swings in the balance of power due to third parties happen a lot!
I’m writing because I recently published some research that I think might be of interest to you. The paper attached, is about the role of royal family connections in preventing European wars from 1495-WWI. We create a data-set combining the genealogies of the royal families of Europe with data on bilateral wars (relying on Wright’s A Study of War as the main source) and other covariates. Because marriage is endogenous, and therefore OLS estimates of the effect of family connections on war would be biased, we focus on the non-political deaths of people important to the royal family network. We show that after the death of a network-important mutual connection, the chance of war increases. The size of the effect is such that going from having their children (prince and princess) being married to having no family connection at all raises the chance of war at 8 percentage points per year. This is a very large effect, given the overall hazard rate of war between a pair of countries in a given year is 4%.
Why do I bring this up? Well because I think that the role of dynastic politics and family connections was underappreciated in your book as a tool for Habsburg diplomacy and grand strategy -- even in the post-1700 period you are concerned with. To give one particular example -- one of the riddles your book leaves the reader with is why Metternich (and his successor, to a lesser extent) were so gifted in spinning the tops in Europe. I think the answer lies in the Habsburg network of princesses and family allies married across Europe, many of them daughters and granddaughters of Maria Theresa. Maria’s placement of her descendants in turn was part of an explicit dynastic strategy you can read about in her letters. Quantitatively, the share of rulers who were connected by family ties increased from about 25% in the 1700s to 75% or 90% in the 1800s. I think you can make a real case that Habsburg marriage strategy in the 100 years previous put Metternich in a strong position to succeed keeping his tops spinning. And remember -- the Holy Alliance was explicitly a fraternity.
It isn’t any disservice to your great contribution on strategy to say that I think it leaves out this detail, but I do have to admit I disagreed with your offhand remark that “At most, there is the vague image of Austria succeeding in its early days through marriage.” I’m trying to fill in that vagueness with this research :)
March 31, 2024
While I'm not quite as impressed with the author as he is with himself, this is a useful examination of how the Habsburg state steered a viable course of survival by the use of effective diplomacy and making the most of those geographical features that aided its chances, thus providing still useful lessons in statecraft under circumstances of constrained options. Mitchell's conclusions on the demise of Habsburg power is that this was not a foreordained outcome; this is despite the rise of ethnonationalism, the introduction of railroads (which eroded Habsburg defensive options), and the ever-present enmity of the House of Prussia. For Mitchell, the key point is that Francis Joseph made bad policy choices in terms of prioritizing military power (but doing so in a very inefficient fashion), failing to forge effective alliances, and forgetting the Habsburg rule of thumb that anything that didn't facilitate the survival of the House of Austria should be sacrificed without too much sentiment. I will admit that it's hard to grant the author all the seriousness he probably deserves, in as much as he recently left the service of the Trump Administration to spend more time with his family.
Originally written: September 10, 2019.
P.S. That Dr. Mitchell seems to have carved out a respectable position for himself at the United States Institute of Peace, in the wake of publishing this work, makes me take it more seriously (March 31, 2024).
Originally written: September 10, 2019.
P.S. That Dr. Mitchell seems to have carved out a respectable position for himself at the United States Institute of Peace, in the wake of publishing this work, makes me take it more seriously (March 31, 2024).
Displaying 1 - 13 of 13 reviews