The Chinese Invasion Threat: Taiwan's Defense and American Strategy in Asia

by Ian Easton

"Are war clouds gathering in Asia? Will China make good on threats to invade Taiwan? What would this conflict mean for America and the world? Exposing internal Chinese military documents and restricted-access studies, The Chinese Invasion Threat explores the secret world of war planning and strategy, espionage and national security. From a historic spy case that saved Taiwan from communist takeover to modern day covert action programs, and from emergency alert procedures to underground coastal defense networks, this is the untold story of the most dangerous flashpoint of our times."

"Easton offers a brilliant, thick description of China's invasion plans, Taiwan's plans to repel an invasion, potential invasion scenarios, and how the U.S. might respond. Throughout the incredible level of detail, and the vast number of plans, locations, weapons systems, operations and doctrines it presents, Easton's clarity of order and logical presentation keep everything firmly under control.

Where would it arrive? When would it come? How would China attack Taiwan?

Easton paints the way the island-nation would be attacked with a fine calligraphy brush, detailing how the landings would go, what would happen if the PRC got a foothold, and what weapons would be deployed where and how."

Democratic-ruled Taiwan poses an existential threat to China's communist leaders because the island, located some 90 miles off the southeast coast "serves as a beacon of freedom for ethnically Chinese people everywhere," the book states.

"What Easton has done is provide a vital warning to America and its allies, China could try to invade Taiwan as early as the first half of the next decade."

Easton is a Washington-based think tank Project 2049 Institute research fellow and a former National Chengchi University student.

Genres: China, War, Military Fiction, Politics, Asia, Nonfiction, History

406 pages, Paperback

Published October 3, 2017

Reviews

[D · Rating 4 out of 5]

Likes

- Substantial research based on both PLA and Taiwanese publications in Chinese language
- Considered many variables when evaluating the war between China and Taiwan, especially on
how the weather/climate/geography will be important factors in this war
- The military analyses appear to be quite technical, at least from a rookie's perspective

Dislikes

- Way too many assumptions, especially on the brittleness PLA soldiers' mental health
- The author came too easily to the conclusion that Taiwan will be able to defeat China
- The author made the Taiwanese spy operations in China sound too easy to succeed, while the
Chinese spy operations in Taiwan too easy to fail. For example, the author made "encouraging the
Chinese autonomous regions to rise up against the Chinese government" sounds like "a piece of
cake"
- The author overestimated the eagerness of Chinese people to desire democracy, and underestimated
the eagerness of Chinese people to be ruled by an extremely nationalistic authoritarian government.
Western journals tend to assume democracy as a universal value. (Not to say I am against
democracy, but I am stating this as a matter of fact)

I give this book a four stars despite many dislikes because there really isn't enough attention from the West put into the geopolitical matters in the Taiwan straits, or even Taiwan as a country in general. It is refreshing to see someone working in Washington actually thinking about how a Chinese invasion to Taiwan would play out and publishing his research.

[Ellery Hamann · Rating 3 out of 5]

I decided to read this book because I'm interested in cross-strait relations and the United States' role in them. I wanted to learn more about this very complex issue especially since I have lived in Taiwan for over 7 years. This is one of very few books in English that deals directly with the questions of what it would mean for Taiwan, the US, and the world if China were to invade Taiwan. There are a number of really great things about this book, and at the same time there are a number of glaring oversights and style issues.

The book is nicely organized into 8 chapters with the beginning chapters dealing with the main question "why invade Taiwan?" and how Taiwan is an evolving flashpoint. It then moves on to a chapter on warning signs. From there, there are three long and detailed chapters: China's war plans, Taiwan's defense plan, and American strategy (which also includes some general political analysis of Taiwan and China as well.) Lastly, the book concludes with a reflective chapter titled "What lies ahead."

The opening three chapters give the reader a general understanding of the history of the issue and PRC and PLA's general point of view and position. This is obviously helpful but the chapters were admittedly quite dull and dense. (I, in fact, put the book down for about two months before picking it up again because of how dense it was.) Then, the two chapters that follow them are an extremely detailed overview of China's war plans and possible issues China might have during an invasion. When I say extremely detailed I really mean it. It is about 100 pages of excruciating detail. I felt I was getting far more information about military plans than I would ever want to know. I didn't read this book to learn about the fine details of PRC military planning. I had no idea a majority of this book would be about military plans rather than political analysis. Although surely military plans are an important part of understanding cross-strait relations and what a possible invasion would entail, political analysis is what I am more interested.

That said, as I read those two chapters there were countless times I was surprised to learn something new about military plans that surprised me. I had no idea, for example, of any of the details of how amphibious military operations actually work, or that there are exactly 14 beaches where the PLA could invade. I feel it would have been better for Easton to sum up all this information and edit it down to perhaps 50 pages instead of 100.

The next chapter, "How Taiwan would fight" was also extremely detailed information on military plans but from the Taiwanese perspective. Although that is of course interesting and important, the human side of things was almost entirely missing. There was little mention of the human cost of such a war or what the experience would be like for the average citizen. Neither was there any mention of what it would mean for the non-Taiwanese people living in Taiwan of which there is a large population. Nor was there any discussion of Taiwanese opinion, or how the two main political parties in Taiwan may have different policies when it comes to defense. Easton mentions very little about any of this and instead chooses to focus only on military war plans.

The most compelling part of the book was arguably the seventh and eight chapters where Easton finally talks more about the inner workings of the CCP, common myths about Taiwan and China's relations, and the US's failed policies in Asia and failed support of Taiwan. Easton makes the case very compellingly for protecting Taiwan and democracy and also lays out throughout the book quite clearly that Taiwan has very strong defense. I was alarmed to learn how good of a position Taiwan is in. I had always believed the conventional wisdom, which Easton correctly calls a myth, that Taiwan is weak and fragile. This is often on the lips of many Taiwanese people I know and most foreigners in Taiwan. China's propaganda is powerful.

The most glaring oversight in the book, and one of the reasons I have to give it only three stars, is the complete absence of talking about the difference between the DPP and the KMT, the two main political parties in Taiwan. Somehow Easton never mentions how pro-China the KMT is or how easily the KMT would give in to China's demands and give up and surrender in a war scenario. This is an overwhelmingly astonishing oversight. On top of this, Easton maintains throughout the book that China's ultimate goal is annexation of Taiwan by any means necessary. Although that is true, Easton never once mentions that China would prefer to slowly erode Taiwan's democracy and sign some sort of peace agreement to have "one country, two systems." Of course only a KMT president would ever sign such an agreement, and yet there is no mention of any of this in the book at all.

Putting those grave oversights aside, I think there's a great deal to learn from this book and Easton's contribution is enormous, particularly because there is such little deep research into this topic in English. Easton is also diligent with the sources and took very seriously what sources he used. At the end of the book there is an entire appendix that is 40 pages long where he explains his choices for sources and how he deciphered good ones from unusable ones. This is then followed by an astonishingly long bibliography of Chinese and English sources.

If you are interested in cross-strait relations just know what you're getting into when you start this book. It may not be exactly what you're expecting.

[Rob Hocking · Rating 3 out of 5]

This book - produced by "The Project 2049 Institute" - describes in detail China's motives for wanting to annex Taiwan, why it has not done so already, and what the challenges are should it try to do so in the future. It covers in detail China's likely battle plan as well as Taiwan's most likely defensive strategy. Most of it is covered in extreme detail.

While I enjoyed reading the book, and I think that at least some of what I read is accurate (for example, the extremely detailed discussion of the issues associated with crossing the Taiwan strait as far as weather is concerned, and what that means about the likely timing of any amphibious invasion), I just have no way of knowing if what the book says is true. The author explains that he drew heavily on "classified PLA internal documents", and even listed them in an appendix. Here is a typical appendix entree:

Informatized Army Operations
Publisher: National Defense University
This book was published in June 2014, and published again in June 2015. It was printed by the Nanjing Army Command Academy. It is marked "Military Internal Distribution" (軍內發行) on the back cover and the back of the first page.

So this leaves me wondering - if these books really are classified internal military documents, how the hell did the author get his hands on them? Why does he bother to tell us that the book is marked "Military Internal Distribution" on the inside cover? Is it because this is his only evidence that it really is classified? Did he just walk into a bookstore and find it? I can't tell if the PLA just planted a bunch of books labelled "classified" in bookstores around China in the hopes that people like the author would find them and base their assumptions about Chinese invasion plans on them, or if the author has some more sophisticated way of getting his hands on internal documents, and he just can't tell us what it is because doing so would compromise his method. This leaves me with no way of knowing if I can believe what I just read.

Some of what I read was verifiable. When the author made certain specific, falsifiable statements such as

“One major test of Taiwan's response system came on the evening of June 27th, 2015, when tragedy struck a seaside water park outside Taipei. The Formosa Fun Coast in Bali was hosting a theme dance party that night, featuring colored corn starch thrown into the air in the style of a Hindu festival. As the revelry was heating up, the powder suddenly ignited, creating a horrific fireball that caused over 500 casualties. Most were severe burn victims, who found themselves trapped on a fiery dance stage or inside a drained-out wave pool. The explosion instantly triggered defense early warning nets. Unbeknownst to the party goers, they were raving in one of Taiwan's most dangerous potential invasion zones, an area heavily monitored by the military in case of Chinese attack. The deadly fireball led national authorities to activate emergency procedures originally designed for the defense of greater Taipei. Rapid reaction units, having regularly practiced deployments to the area before, quickly arrived on scene and had a triage station and evacuation operation set up in record time.”

I could just ask my Taiwanese friends about the statement. Many falsifiable statements (this one included) passed the test. However, other statements - while technically falsifiable - were much harder to verify:

"From the perspective of PLA planners, however, the most horrific beach obstacle facing them would be what they call "the seawalls of fire". According to Chinese military texts, Taiwan's invasion beaches are protected by secret underwater pipelines, designed for pumping flammables out into the shallows. Just as the first waves of PLA amphibious troops were storming ashore, Taiwanese officers would open pipe valves to create a thick film of oil and gasoline. This unstable slick would be lit off by artillery shells and gunfire, creating sheets of fire that could consume the invaders all along the blackened beach lines".

No one I have talked to - including my uncle whose friend is a retired Taiwanese Army General - has been able to verify or refute this (I've just now asked the General's wife directly - perhaps she will have more luck). How do I know if it is true?

What the author says about the likely Chinese battle plan is plausible. He believes that the PLA will first "soften up" Taiwan's defences with a period of intense bombing and electronic warfare, possibly combined with a blockade, before actually landing any troops. The idea is to wipe out as much as possible Taiwan's navy and air force, hopefully kill the president and wipe out as much of the government as possible, and destroy Taiwanese communication systems, before crossing the strait. Part of why this is plausible is that we know China has been building thousands of missile silos along the coast opposite Taiwan. This is public knowledge. What he says about Taiwan's defense - that the island has thousands of secret underground hangers hidden in the mountains in which large parts of the air force are hidden - so that they could survive in the initial wave of cruise missiles - and that the island is also covered with fake hangers full of fake planes in order to trick the PLA into wasting missiles - is much harder to verify.

The author would occasionally commit what is in my mind the worst crime a person can commit - worse even than murder - that is, the crime of asserting things without evidence. For example, he would say things like "PLA leaders are the stars of a Leninist system that advances political loyalists and family insiders at the cost of weeding out talented professional warriors". When I read something like this, my thought is "Oh, how interesting! I'm so excited to read about the examples of political loyalists and family insiders who got jobs that should have gone to more talented individuals, which the author is now obviously about to provide to back up his statement, as to do otherwise would be the same as not making the statement at all". I would then be disappointed when these examples would not be forthcoming, and the author would instead jump to a new idea.

So, in the end while I feel like I've had some interesting food for thought, I'm unable to draw any concrete conclusions. I suppose the simplest thing to do is to just continue to live in Taiwan, wait for the invasion to come, and then see for myself how it plays out.

[Lauren · Rating 1 out of 5]

This book is not entirely without its merits...but it comes pretty close. Most fundamentally, it appears to have been copyedited (if not written) in a hurry. Borrow rather than buy it. As a researcher in this field, I also have some qualms with how Easton presents his sources. Texts that are open-source and publicly available -- though one must know what bookstore in Taipei to head to first -- are treated as 'internal' and 'classified', as if they have somehow been leaked out of China for his own use.

The chapter about Taiwan's defense capabilities is delusional at best, as are many of the assumptions about survivability and how conflict would evolve. The author says he spent ten+ years in Taiwan, but I'm not entirely certain where he drew his conclusions about the island's defense, or the capabilities of the conscripted and reserve forces. They fundamentally do not comport with reality. Overall, I found myself frustrated by the imbalances in the book. To sell Taiwan as "safe" from China is a gross underestimation of China's growing military capabilities and political ambitions. Though the book has its utility, i.e. putting materials that would otherwise remain in Chinese into English, it leads an uninformed reader wildly astray through several hundred pages of dangerous assumptions about the state of security in the Taiwan Strait.

[Daniel · Rating 4 out of 5]

The author, makes a thorough presentation and analysis of the invasion plan of Taiwan which has been formulated and updated by Communist China on a continuous basis since 1949. That was the year when the Communists won the Civil War on mainland China against the Nationalists. The Nationalists had seeked refuge on the island of Taiwan; the island state has become a prosperous and modern democracy of 24 million people. The author has made use of historical, official, public and leaked information; defectors and spies have been valuable sources over the years. Some of the information is official, since it is a permanent goal of the PRC (People’s Republic of China) and especially of Xi Jinping for Taiwan to be reunited with mainland China. But a communist police state of 1,4 billion people does not just simply incorporate another state with a relatively small population of 24 million people living in a democratic regime without dire consequences; the PRC has promised to eradicate Taiwanese institutions and eliminate its leadership and thinkers.

Discussion about the probability of an armed conflict:
The motivation for the invasion of Taiwan is historical, ideological and emotional. The Taiwanese are seen by the PRC CCP (Chinese Communist Party) as former enemies from the Civil war who have set up their own dissident province. The Taiwanese have been successfull at establishing a well run state with a different political culture whose citizens enjoy freedoms and can exercize their human rights within a democratic country. The existence of a democratic state on their doorstep is an irritant for the CCP because its mere presence is a demonstration to the world that a group of ethnic chinese can enjoy a high level of quality of life and prosperity in a different system of government that contradicts the values of the CCP. For a while, the CCP has tried to convince through various means the ROC (Republic of China, Taiwan) of pacifically reuniting with the PRC; the whole world now knows after the destruction of democratic institutions and the elimination of freedoms and rights in Hong-kong that the One China, two systems was an empty and false slogan, typical of authoritarian propaganda; promises were simply deception. As a consequence the peaceful reunification scenario is now dead for Taiwan, not that it ever was credible. What remains are military options. Military options which include the programmed assasination of the political leaders of Taiwan, the jailing of intellectuals and of all dissenters and their families. One can imagine that this is the type of information which motivates your enemy to fight to the bitter end. By adopting those policies, China has made it impossible for Taiwan to accept any type of deal with the PRC; there is just no trust. So both sides are preparing for military conflict.

The PRC then can only annex Taiwan through military action culminating with an invasion and occupation scenario. Taiwan’s goal is to repel invasion forces and to ensure that the cost of invasion would prove to be unacceptable for the CCP and the mainland chinese population. The PRC considers the reunification as strictly an internal matter for China, while Taiwan presents itself as an autonomous state able to make its own decisions about its future. The authoritarian vs democratic regime conflict is part of the Taiwanese narrative to help it gather support from democratic states, especially with the US which was an ally of Nationalist China and has remained actively supportive of Taiwan. The PRC narrative focuses on the historical colonization of part of its territory by europeans states and the invasion and violent occupation by Japan from 1931 to 1945. The inhabitants of the island of Taiwan were under japanese occupation for 50 years prior to 1949; for generations they have not been part of the political and cultural make up of mainland China. The assimilation policies of the japanese administration succeeded in getting 70% of the island population to be able to speak japanese by 1940. As a result of this historical context, Taiwanese citizens consider the PRC to be a foreign entity and a threat to their way of life. To them reunification is a mental construct of the CCP with an ideological and political purpose that is not grounded in reality. Reunification is seen by the CCP as a remedy for past historical injustices and it is formulated as a deeply emotional issue. The official CCP line is that it wants to liberate Taiwan, supposedly from the excesses of capitalist societies, but the Taiwanese on the contrary clearly see reunification as an act of brutal annexation towards becoming a satellite prison state.

The resolve of the CCP towards a military invasion in order to achieve the reunification goal seems to be quite strong: Xi Jinping is now the permanent Head of State, ensuring his longevity in the role even after having possibly pursued unpopular policies. He cannot be removed from his position and he has centralized more decison making power centered in his office. He has eliminated his competitors by using the pretext of fighting corruption and had them removed by politically controlled tribunals. The official CCP position statement is that independent tribunals are a western characteristic that does not belong in a successfull communist society. In communist China, public opinion bears no influence on the decisions made by the state which is of course the status of all countries without a free press, independant tribunals and free and fair elections and freedom of speech. In these circumstances Xi Jinping has very limited accountabilty for his decisions, which increases the level of his risk taking ability and the probability of higher risk choices being made. Xi-Jiping has put individuals with a high degree of loyalty in senior positions. The author notices that this creates another unknown about the PLA leadership: several senior military officers owe their careers to political affinity with the regime: will they act with competence or on the contrary believe their own propaganda?

The capture of Taiwan by military force is a threat to neighbor states and for Japan in particular : 80% of japanese commerce comes from ships steaming in proximity with the Strait of Taiwan. Taiwan is also a major trading partner in the world being a major source for micro-chips and other high end goods. Any disruption of its manufactured products and trade would have repercussions on the economy of several developed countries. The PLA attack plan acknowledges that fact but states that weakening Western democracies politically and economically is one of their long term objectives. The PRC has eliminated the autonomy of Hong-Kong and potentially reduced its economic capability and financial leadership; but it is an acceptable cost for the CCP because it is an ideological goal and within the framework of creating a unified One China state that dominates as a regional power. It is seen as a step on the path to becoming a global super power. These are the main known parameters for the CCP decision for invasion. Westerners would be wise to view the PRC CCP decison making process to be quite different from their own and not to judge it in relationship with their own experience. Rationality in decision making is relative to a country’s culture, power structure and leadership of the moment.

The CCP PLA invasion plan:
The CCP war plan is that of an agressor and the Taiwanese war plan is of course of a defensive nature ; both are studied, described and discussed by the author. The CCP PLA (People’s LIberation Army) is the military arm of the Chinese Communist Party. Officially it is not a national army since every political structure and institution in China belongs to the Communist Party. Each military organization reflects the CCP structure and culture as it is headed by both an operational head and a political officer who has the authority and final say over decisions. How that two-headed leadership structure would impact the decison making process for military operations at different levels is an unresolved question at the moment. Numerous organizational studies show that divided leadership roles and responsibilities generally create confusion and are a source of friction and internal conflicts.

The invasion plan is made of several detailed sequential steps. There are many challenges to consider when formulating this invasion plan: first and foremost, crossing the 80 to 225 miles wide Taiwan Strait is deemed feasible for only four months (March/April) (September\October) per year because of currents and prevailing climatic conditions. Crossing such a very active body of water is difficult and in the best of circumstances would take at least 15 hours of steaming during which an invasion fleet would be submitted to sustained enemy fire. Achieving an element of surprise is almost impossible because of satellites, spies, and numerous pre-invasion activities easy to detect. The build-up of logistics and troops would be visible from some of the Taiwanese islands in very close proximity to the mainland some of which are only 2 to 6 miles from the shore of the PRC. The invasion would have been preceeded by attacks using missiles targeted at communications and military infrastructures, airports, military bases and ports. Cyber attacks will aim at the disruption of telecommunications, communications and the electrical grid. Air superiority over the invasion fleet is required by the PLA because if it is insufficient the invasion force would be in peril. Coasts would have to be cleared of mines for the invasion fleet or fleets depending on the number of target areas for the invasion. Because of the nature of the geography only 14 beaches are available for such a venture and Taiwan is reducing sea access and adding defenses on a continuous basis; that includes numerous bunkers, mountain tunnels, defensive positions on higher ground. The PLA plan even predicts ferocious close combats like those seen in Guam between the US and the japanese during WW2. Below is a summary of the plan:

The invasion phases: Excerpt from the book: Joint Island Attack Campaign
Phase 1. Blockade and Bombing. Main objectives: Obtain uncontested control over the airwaves, airspace, and seascapes across Taiwan Strait.
Missions: Execute massed missile raids behind screen of electronic and cyber attacks . Secure air superiority. Battle Taiwanese naval fleet. Blockade major ports. Bomb Taiwan.
Phase 2. Amphibious Landing. Main objectives: Capture beaches, ports, and airfields near Taipei and other targeted cities.
Missions: Gather invasion forces. Attack Kinmen, Matsu, and Penghu. Embark amphibious troops. Sail
armadas across the Strait. Clear mines and beach obstacles. Anchor and disembark troops. Conduct surprise assaults on targeted beaches, sea ports, and airstrips. Land multiple amphibious divisions in two major waves of attack
Phase 3. Combat on the Island (Urban and Mountain Warfare) Main objectives: Occupy Taiwan and impose will on the survivors.
Missions: Secure footholds on Taiwan. Build up major landing zones and offload massive army. Capture strategic terrain and military bases inland. Capture Taipei and other major cities. Institute martial law . Clear defenders out of mountains.

The PLA has studied amphibious invasion operations conducted in Europe and in the Pacific during world war two to help build its plan since it is lacking military experience of its own in organizing such an attack. It conducts regular exercises on a specially designated island but it cannot reproduce in totality what the opposition will be like in the case of Taiwan. Among the many challenges that will present themselves to the PLA are the difficulty of establishing and maintaining a foothold on beaches despite their firepower and with their own paratroopers attacking ennemy structures from inland. Taiwanese troops will be fighting on familiar soil while the PLA army will be facing many unknowns.

Amongst the numerous logistical issues the author underlines the difficulty of having sufficient and appropriate shipping means to make the crossing in a timely fashion. Civilian ships will need to be adapted to new roles and these ships will not have the survivability of military naval vessels if and when attacked. If the troops have to come on board ahead of time and go through 15 hours of navigation in seas with waves of 6 to 10 feet then many will be suffering from nausea and their fighting ability will suffer. Another unknown is how the CCP will react if taiwanese missiles and bombs hit military targets on the mainland?

The Taiwanese response:
Acknowledging that the two military forces facing one another are quite disproportionate in their overall strength, Taiwan has adopted a so called porcupine strategy to defeat a direct invasion and have the ability to survive a blockade. The porcupine is not the biggest of beasts but it is quite capable of inflicting injuries and pain to a predator and repel an attack. Building survivable military hardware, communications and detection equipment is of the utmost importance to achieve this porcupine strategy. For instance, mobile platforms for short and mid range missiles can shoot and then be rapidly moved to another location to evade detection. During WW2 the japanese built very strong defenses on Taiwan as they were expecting an invasion from MacArthur’s troops. But it did not happen as the allies had a change of objective. The Taiwanese have expanded those original bunkers and tunnels over the past seventy years and created whole networks of interconnected facilities with defensive capabilities not easily detectable by most means. Mountains are known to internally hide several dozens of military jets who can execute their missions and then be protected from retaliation. Military equipment is also hidden in proximity of invasion target areas. Radars, satellites, naval and aerial resources are available to defend the territory. Important buildings have been hardened, installations transfered underground in secret areas. Layers of decoys deployed will increase odds of survability for infrastructures and communications. The PLA invasion fleet will be under attack from its planes, ballistic, mid and short range missiles, ships, submarines and attack helicopters. Cruise missiles can be shot from planes and mobile units from the island. Taiwan will also conduct attacks against military targets on the Chinese mainland in proximity to the shore. Taiwan has well trained armed forces reflecting the US model. Its military organization is competent, modern, capable and hundreds of thousands of trained reservists are available on a very short term basis.

The whole nation has been living is the shadow of an invasion threat for the last seventy years and it has built its forces and systems accordingly. Emergency legislation, regulations, plans have been put in place and are constantly updated; the general population is aware and participates in regular exercises. Taiwan can count on quality military hardware, it would have benefitted from having had access to the lastest military technology but the US has restrained Taiwan’s ability to purchase its most up to date hardware as a measure of appeasement to the PRC. Recent events may have a bearing on changing that policy. Taiwan may also count on its allies for gathering military intelligence. In case of a major military breakthrough by the PLA on the island of Taiwan, ballistic missiles might be fired against significant PRC targets on the mainland in proximity of the major population centers to act as a dissuasive step and force the PLA to retreat and get the mainland chinese population to experience the effects of war on its own territory. Such actions may however provoke a dangerous escalation of hostilities.

Wildcards:
There are many wildcards in such an event, after all a plan is just the summary of a planning effort and things will not happen as written once the shooting starts.

Wildcard number one: how will the US and Japan react in the case of an invasion of Taiwan? In 1996 the US used the presence of two carrier groups to successfully act as a dissuasive force to get the PLA to stop its harassment activites towards Taiwan. But since then the PLA has built long range planes, attack submarines and purpose built anti-ship ballistic missiles with satellite tracking ability which might deter the US Navy carrier groups from venturing in proximity of Taiwan. Will there be direct military assitance provided by the US and Japan? What would be the lag time for the assistance to be provided by the US and Japan?

Wildcard number two: what if the PLA strikes with a surprise attack without any warning such as not engaging in visible pre-invasion activities? In that scenario, ballistic missiles would be massively shot during an holiday on Taiwan. The objective would be the destruction of all communications, radar and satellite facilities, the sinking of fleets in harbor, the destruction of planes and missiles on the ground, of major production facilities and governmental administrative buildings. The invasion would not be able to proceed immediately because of a lack of build-up of a fleet but Taiwan would have been severely crippled. This is a nightmare scenario as a ballistic missile fired from mainland China takes only 7 and a half minutes to reach Taiwan. A big challenge for Taiwan is to mitigate the risks related to this scenario.

This book was written 4 years ago and the political climate has evolved since. Russia and China have had many strategic discussions on a personal level between the two dictators over that period of time. Both states are agressively pursuing policies of stealing territory from neighbor states by using hybrid warfare methods. Taiwan and the South China Sea are targets of China; Ukraine and the Baltic states are russian targets. Several analysts, think tanks and scholars have noted that the Trump administration has weakened the network of alliances built by the US since the second world war and sensing this, both dictators may want to take advantage of the situation. The US democracy appears to be strung by internal issues and is more divided than ever. Will political resolve be weakened behind the strongest mititary on the planet? Would Russia and China synchronise military actions in order to divide the resources of democracies to counter them?

[Barry Sierer · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is book is an examination of the probabilities and scenarios associated with a military attack on the Island of Taiwan by PLA military forces. Easton delves various details of how these operations might play out without giving away critical details associated with Taiwan’s defenses.

The agenda of the of the book is clearly pro-Taiwan. The main theme centers around the idea that there is hope for Taiwan if an attempted invasion occurs (regardless of whether or not the US intervenes to help) from a military of point of view and that the west has a great deal to loose strategically, economically, politically, and morally if Taiwan is allowed to fall under the thumb of People’ Republic of China.

[Al · Rating 5 out of 5]

This book should be vital reading for all defence practitioners and international security theorists.

It delves deeply into all sides of operational level activity that could form an invasion of Taiwan.

What I have learnt from this excellent study will stay with me for a very long time and no doubt be used for references when necessary.

[Ben · Rating 4 out of 5]

It Is Happening?

What a week.
This was a very timely read.

This book was very good.
I did have a few problems with how speculative this book was, but it was still pretty interesting when it came to strategy and how wars begin.
It also did a great job at describing the economic fallout of a war - even if it is just a war being threatened and not an actual war.

Would highly recommend reading this now.

4.2/5

[Javier Delgado · Rating 4 out of 5]

A concise but detailed book about a hypothetical Chinese invasion of Taiwan. Pretty useful as the authors present different scenarios as well as the view from both sides of the strait. If you want to know about what may lie ahead in the Taiwan Strait, this is the book.

[Rolf Brown · Rating 5 out of 5]

The book to read if you want to understand the military situation, between China, Taiwan and the United States. The author has exceptional access to untranslated military planning documents and assessments giving the work a great deal of depth.

[Mark K. Vogl · Rating 5 out of 5]

Extraordinary, essential read for American and Free world military officers and national strategists. This work is an exhaustive analysis of the 21st Century Sino - Taiwan relations, and the elements concerning a military attempt by the Chinese Communist Party to occupy and absorb Taiwan into the People's Republic of China. The book is well written, clear, and succinct in many complex political, geo, weather, technological and military aspects of a war between these nations. Throughout the work I was amazed and in awe of Mr. Easton's clear sighted evaluation of all aspects of a possible invasion of Taiwan. He has done the work necessary to give the reader a sound idea, and a good reference for any military planning concerning hostility between China and Taiwan.

[X · Rating 4 out of 5]

Useful book to understand better the conflict. I enjoyed the details on how Taiwan could prepare itself for war. The book contradicts China's narrative that conquest and victory would be inevitable. Contrary to that narrative, invading Taiwan would be extremely difficult and almost impossible if the US, Japan, Australia and other powers decided to get involved.

[Liu · Rating 3 out of 5]

tl;dr: Taiwan's really hard to invade

[Özgür · Rating 3 out of 5]

Very one-sided pro-American view of the conflict.

[Chandler Compton · Rating 4 out of 5]

Insightful, enlightening, informative, but also way too one-sided in favor of Taiwan’s capabilities. Inspired me to hear the Chinese side of the argument.

[SLAM · Rating 5 out of 5]

Some rosey colored argumentation, but the detail and sourcing is excellent.

[Trent Prestegar · Rating 4 out of 5]

A good if not a little dated analysis of the possible outcomes should China decide to invade Taiwan