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Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam
For students of politics, history and peace studies, this classic work is important reading for anyone interested in the history - and future - of peace and war.
402 pages, Paperback
First published September 3, 1985
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Displaying 1 - 7 of 7 reviews
July 11, 2017
Atomic Diplomacy is a classic analysis of the Postdam Conference and the effect the dropping of the Atomic bomb at Hiroshima had on US Diplomacy. The book follows the lead up to the conference at the test at Alamogordo as well as the after effect of the bomb on US strategic thinking vis a vis the Soviet Union. This analysis continues after the dropping of the bomb on Hiroshima and how post world war II diplomacy led to the cold war. The dissenting voices of Stimson and Eisenhower vs those of Brynes and the rest of the military establishment are pronounced in the book. It seeks to answer three questions about the time period.
Did the Atomic Bomb play a large role in strategic thinking leading up to Postdam regarding a strategy with the Soviet Union.
The factors of negotiating with the Soviets was the main impetus for dropping the bomb as opposed to the defeat of the Japanese empire.
That US Policy changed in 1945 as a result of the bomb and led to the start of the Cold war.
This analysis is largely borne out by the evidence presented in the book with nothing clearer then the Japanese’s were going to surrender without the use of Atomic weapons but the need to balance against the Soviets was strong and a demonstration to end the war with a display of US power was needed. The early posturing of the Cold War can clearly be seen in US strategic thinking and the appendices provides numerous primary source documents to back up these assertions including a paper by Stimson. A fair amount of time is also spent on the delaying tactic that Truman used to not really achieve any real results at Potsdam but kick decision down the road until a display of American power could be made in Japan.
Overall this is a dry read but for those truly interested in American diplomacy in the post-world war II era this is an essential read to provide context and a through provoking essay turned book. It carefully and clearly addresses the questions of diplomacy and the strategic nature of diplomacy in the post-world war II era.
Did the Atomic Bomb play a large role in strategic thinking leading up to Postdam regarding a strategy with the Soviet Union.
The factors of negotiating with the Soviets was the main impetus for dropping the bomb as opposed to the defeat of the Japanese empire.
That US Policy changed in 1945 as a result of the bomb and led to the start of the Cold war.
This analysis is largely borne out by the evidence presented in the book with nothing clearer then the Japanese’s were going to surrender without the use of Atomic weapons but the need to balance against the Soviets was strong and a demonstration to end the war with a display of US power was needed. The early posturing of the Cold War can clearly be seen in US strategic thinking and the appendices provides numerous primary source documents to back up these assertions including a paper by Stimson. A fair amount of time is also spent on the delaying tactic that Truman used to not really achieve any real results at Potsdam but kick decision down the road until a display of American power could be made in Japan.
Overall this is a dry read but for those truly interested in American diplomacy in the post-world war II era this is an essential read to provide context and a through provoking essay turned book. It carefully and clearly addresses the questions of diplomacy and the strategic nature of diplomacy in the post-world war II era.
January 23, 2018
Concentrating on Harry Truman and his immediate circle of cabinet-level advisors, Alperovitz stresses the discontinuity which the new Truman administration represented. From the very first week, the Truman administration took a "get tough" attitude toward the Soviets.
The bulk of Alperovitz's book is concerned with debates over the strategy of achieving a post-war order of peace and stability for Europe. The key to understanding the American approach to the Soviets in the final months of WWI is, according to the author, the progress on the atomic bomb. Henry Stimpson, Truman's Secretary of War, argued that in addition to the Soviet need for American money to rebuild after the war the Soviets were vulnerable to atomic intimidation. Truman accepted his argument that a confrontation with Stalin over the post-war order in Europe would best occur once the successful atomic test had occurred. As a result, Truman delayed the Potsdam conference until pressure from Churchill made further delay impossible. When Truman learned at the Potsdam Conference of the successful atomic test at Alamogordo, he took a very hard line with Stalin. As a result Potsdam saw no compromise reached over the Baltics or the post-war reparations issue.
Perhaps more contentiously revisionist is Alperovitz's argument that considerations in the Pacific war were consistently subordinated to the requirements for an American-style order in post-war Europe. Alperovitz consistently presents the argument that Truman dropped the atomic bombs on Japan to prevent Russian involvement in the Pacific. Taken to its most extreme, the tendency is to question whether Truman didn't actually drop the atomic bombs on Japan to intimidate the Soviets. Largely due to this tendency to extreme and speculative conclusions, Alperovitz's work was not warmly received by the academic community and few scholars accepted his conclusions in later years, even among the revisionists of the New Left. It would be interesting to study the popular reaction to the book, since this may reveal a different response.
The bulk of Alperovitz's book is concerned with debates over the strategy of achieving a post-war order of peace and stability for Europe. The key to understanding the American approach to the Soviets in the final months of WWI is, according to the author, the progress on the atomic bomb. Henry Stimpson, Truman's Secretary of War, argued that in addition to the Soviet need for American money to rebuild after the war the Soviets were vulnerable to atomic intimidation. Truman accepted his argument that a confrontation with Stalin over the post-war order in Europe would best occur once the successful atomic test had occurred. As a result, Truman delayed the Potsdam conference until pressure from Churchill made further delay impossible. When Truman learned at the Potsdam Conference of the successful atomic test at Alamogordo, he took a very hard line with Stalin. As a result Potsdam saw no compromise reached over the Baltics or the post-war reparations issue.
Perhaps more contentiously revisionist is Alperovitz's argument that considerations in the Pacific war were consistently subordinated to the requirements for an American-style order in post-war Europe. Alperovitz consistently presents the argument that Truman dropped the atomic bombs on Japan to prevent Russian involvement in the Pacific. Taken to its most extreme, the tendency is to question whether Truman didn't actually drop the atomic bombs on Japan to intimidate the Soviets. Largely due to this tendency to extreme and speculative conclusions, Alperovitz's work was not warmly received by the academic community and few scholars accepted his conclusions in later years, even among the revisionists of the New Left. It would be interesting to study the popular reaction to the book, since this may reveal a different response.
November 24, 2018
Interesting, but a little dated at this point. It would probably be useful to read something more contemporary on the debate around the use of nuclear weapons.
March 27, 2021
helps illustrate how the US nuclear monopoly affected early Cold War foreign policy.
March 8, 2014
The real problem with Alperovitz is there is a mountain of evidence contradicting his position. Truman, who was not a military man, may have written "Fini Japs" at Potsdam in his diary once he was told the Soviets would enter the war with Japan but a little research comes up with a memorandum from George Marshall that stated it would more than likely take both an invasion of Japan by the United States as well as the Soviets attacking them in China to convince the Japanese to surrender.
The truth is there are numerous examples that refute Alperovitz's hypothesis about the Japanese being ready to surrender. One of the best ones is that a meeting was held the day after Hiroshima (which would be the day before Nagasaki) of the Supreme War Council in Japan. The Japanese were discussing their terms for surrender. Beyond the retention of the emperor, which was the only term they ended up getting, they wanted three additional terms including control of their own disarmament, no occupation of the Japanese home islands, and prosecution of their own war criminals. The Japanese military hierarchy was just a little too stubborn for it's own good that day. In summation while it would be fair to say the Japanese were seeking to surrender on their own terms, terms which no U.S. policymaker in his right mind would have supported. If you want a good counter-argument to this book I suggest Robert Maddox's Weapons for Victory.
The truth is there are numerous examples that refute Alperovitz's hypothesis about the Japanese being ready to surrender. One of the best ones is that a meeting was held the day after Hiroshima (which would be the day before Nagasaki) of the Supreme War Council in Japan. The Japanese were discussing their terms for surrender. Beyond the retention of the emperor, which was the only term they ended up getting, they wanted three additional terms including control of their own disarmament, no occupation of the Japanese home islands, and prosecution of their own war criminals. The Japanese military hierarchy was just a little too stubborn for it's own good that day. In summation while it would be fair to say the Japanese were seeking to surrender on their own terms, terms which no U.S. policymaker in his right mind would have supported. If you want a good counter-argument to this book I suggest Robert Maddox's Weapons for Victory.
January 29, 2014
Puts forth theory that pacific war was about to end (Japan about to surrender) and atomic bomb was used to intimidate Soviets, not defeat Japan. Not particularly convincing overall, but certainly demonstrates that the US had Soviets and postwar landscape in mind as war drew to its inevitable conclusion.
February 23, 2015
The Bomb was definately used not to defeat Japan or to prevent the loss of American lives in an upcoming invasion. Japan was done and ready to end the war and have peace. Truman used the bomb to better his position in terms of negotiating with Stalin, but unfortunately old Papa Joe had nuclear balls and really didn't give in to Truman's position in regards to eastern Europe.
Displaying 1 - 7 of 7 reviews