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Alsos
Near the end of World War II, as Allied armies swept across battle-torn Germany and leading scientists at Los Alamos were racing to assemble the atomic bombs America would drop over Japan later that summer, General Leslie Groves, the military head of the Manhattan Project, established Alsos, a unit of scientists, soldiers, and secret agents to find the Nazi Germany’s physicists and technicians working on the development of a German atomic bomb and to determine how far along they were. In this book, Samuel Goudsmit, the Dutch-American physicist who was the scientific leader of the Alsos mission, recounts the mission and its findings.
“Alsos is more than a dramatic chronicle of how Goudsmit and his staff accompanied Allied troops in order to ferret out German atomic secrets and round up German scientists who might have been working on a fission bomb. It is also an overview and critique of the German research establishment under Nazi control.” — Albert Moyer, American Scientist
“Highly readable and informative... [T]he immediacy of Goudsmit’s experience makes this memoir of enduring value... inspired story-telling that provides in retrospect a great deal of information on the operations of the postwar intelligence teams... An extraordinary book.” — Alan Beyerchen, New Scientist
“Samuel Goudsmit... the scientific leader of Alsos... tells the fascinating story of the mission’s work... To the extent that the average citizen is permitted to learn how his servants spend his money for the purpose of insuring his safety, it will be useful for every intelligent American to hear Goudsmit’s story and ponder his views. In any case, Alsos is highly entertaining... Goudsmit’s assessment of Nazi war science is excellent... There are a lot of things in Goudsmit’s book that we had better keep in mind.” — Paul Ridenour, The New York Times
“[Goudsmit’s] short memoir is a thrilling combination of detective story and scientific deduction.” — Stephen Budiansky, Wall Street Journal
“[Alsos] is the compelling story of what the Germans did [to develop an atomic bomb], what went wrong and why.” — Lee Dembart, Los Angeles Times
“For the history of science this chatty little book is surely one of the most important books to emerge from World War II, since it is the account of one of the most absorbing war assignments to fall to the lot of any scientist.” — Henri Guerlac, Isis, A Journal of the History of Science Society
“Alsos is more than a dramatic chronicle of how Goudsmit and his staff accompanied Allied troops in order to ferret out German atomic secrets and round up German scientists who might have been working on a fission bomb. It is also an overview and critique of the German research establishment under Nazi control.” — Albert Moyer, American Scientist
“Highly readable and informative... [T]he immediacy of Goudsmit’s experience makes this memoir of enduring value... inspired story-telling that provides in retrospect a great deal of information on the operations of the postwar intelligence teams... An extraordinary book.” — Alan Beyerchen, New Scientist
“Samuel Goudsmit... the scientific leader of Alsos... tells the fascinating story of the mission’s work... To the extent that the average citizen is permitted to learn how his servants spend his money for the purpose of insuring his safety, it will be useful for every intelligent American to hear Goudsmit’s story and ponder his views. In any case, Alsos is highly entertaining... Goudsmit’s assessment of Nazi war science is excellent... There are a lot of things in Goudsmit’s book that we had better keep in mind.” — Paul Ridenour, The New York Times
“[Goudsmit’s] short memoir is a thrilling combination of detective story and scientific deduction.” — Stephen Budiansky, Wall Street Journal
“[Alsos] is the compelling story of what the Germans did [to develop an atomic bomb], what went wrong and why.” — Lee Dembart, Los Angeles Times
“For the history of science this chatty little book is surely one of the most important books to emerge from World War II, since it is the account of one of the most absorbing war assignments to fall to the lot of any scientist.” — Henri Guerlac, Isis, A Journal of the History of Science Society
272 pages, Kindle Edition
First published January 1, 1947
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Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews
April 8, 2018
Amazing story of the author's experience locating, interviewing and often arresting leading scientists in Germany immediately on the heels of the allied invasion. The Alsos team often went into villages where German scientists had been employed while the allies were still gaining control of the area. The secret objective was to determine the status of nuclear research in Germany as the US developed the atom bomb. The concern was that German scientists had 2 years head start on developing nuclear weapons and that the Nazis might be on the verge of using them in the waning days of WW2.
December 31, 2021
Certainly interesting and readable but overall a little disappointing. It was written with a purpose in 1947 and that purpose was not really to document the allied mission to capture German physicists and research in the closing days of ww2. While it does do that at least half the book is devoted to the bumbling of the nazi regime and the hubris of German scientists who believed they were far ahead in the race for the secret to atomic energy and a bomb and were incredulous and disbelieving when in captivity they learned of the Hiroshima bomb. It was postwar politics that inspired the author (who was in the mission) to write the book as a cautionary tale for American science warning them not to get complacent. Thus the book is a little thin in its detail of the actual mission.
January 19, 2024
One of the true, real life secret squirrel esque capers. Dr. Goudsmit ( which I kept wanting to spelt Goldsmith) was a physicist in charge of the Alsos Mission, one of the first scientific- espionage-armed forces collaborations in WWII.
Great read that is not talking down to the reader. Accessible and engaging
Great read that is not talking down to the reader. Accessible and engaging
May 14, 2023
però cal llegir-lo tenint present la intenció de l'autor :)
September 15, 2008
(review is incomplete.)
Recently while skimming a copy of "Physical Review Letters" I read a short essay about their founding editor, Dr Goudsmit. It recommended reading this book, his WWII memoir. Goudsmit had a mission which places him at a critical locus in scientific history: in 1944 and 1945 he was assigned to travel to Germany with the invading American Army, capture the top German nuclear bomb scientists, and interrogate them, to find out how close Nazi Germany was to getting the bomb. For anyone who was intrigued by the mysteries in the stage play "Copenhagen," Goudsmit's work stands at the very beginning of those political/historical/scientific questions.
The book is a brisk read, cheerful recounting the excitement of cloak-and-dagger work, the nuisance of Army bureaucracy, and various amusing anecdotes of wartime Europe and army life. In this regard, it is no different than many "war memoirs." Published a little more than a year after the war ended, it shows signs of being hastily written and edited, a quick book indented to make the author a bit of money and raise a voice in on public matters. Inexplicable redundancies appear, for instance the story of a Gestapo inquiry about Heisenberg is repeated two or three times without advancing any new information it.
Goudsmit was an accomplished theoretical physicist who had trained in Europe with some of the world's best minds, and contributed significantly to atomic and nuclear theory in the 1930s. For some unexplained reason, he wasn't tapped like many of his colleagues to work on the Manhattan Project, and instead spent the early war years at the MIT Radiation Lab developing radar. When the Army asked him to lead the "Alsos mission," it was his chance to do something critical for his country at the forefront of his expertise. However, Goudsmit's mission turned out to be something of a fizzle, because it soon became clear that the Nazis were nowhere near getting the bomb. Especially after this revelation, the Alsos team was never very well staffed, and its duties devolved into arresting the important German physicists and giving them quick interrogations. Tnen they were shipped to Britain to be interned, and that's where they were at the moment of their epiphany, i.e. when the news of Hiroshima broke. Sadly, by that time, they were well out of Goudsmit's hands, or he would have had a much more interesting story to tell.
Much of his lack of knowledge (e.g. hiroshima) was deliberately the army keeping info from him so he couldn't reveal it to this captives or in the unlikely event that he himself was capture.
Despite having only a limited role in uncovering the Nazi atom bomb program, Goudsmit makes a very good attempt at a comprehensive description of that program, and tries to answer the question of why they did not in fact get the bomb. compelling case that german scientists failed to make progress not because of conscience but a variety of factors: departure of persecuted scientists, poor management, hierarchy that kept younger scientists from usefully challenging the work of their elders, infighting among government agencies and cliques of scientists, lack of initiative, the meddling of managers promoted for their Nazi loyalty and not scientific talent, antisemitism which prevented widespread teaching of Einstein's work and therefore stunted the education of new students, time wasted protecting the laboratories from allied bombing
shabby politicking by e.g. weiszacker(?) who sucked up to Nazi leaders, and self-delusional attitudes of e.g. heisenberg and ???? who thought they would save German science
side topics
german scientific organization and bureaucracy
industrial espionage
slave labor
goudsmit's personal meetings with old colleagues, the strange experience of for instance interrogating an old mentor and ordering him arrested.
his visit to his parents' abandoned apartment
interrogation and intelligence methods. most important to get documents, interrogation seldom worked unless guided by documents. ardent nazis broke and talked, while pure scientists kept quiet.
almost no mention whatsoever of russians (despite several mentions of japanese!) obvious question on the mind of someone in 1947 picking up this book is, why didn't the Nazis get the bomb, and what can this tell us about whether the russians will get one?!
Recently while skimming a copy of "Physical Review Letters" I read a short essay about their founding editor, Dr Goudsmit. It recommended reading this book, his WWII memoir. Goudsmit had a mission which places him at a critical locus in scientific history: in 1944 and 1945 he was assigned to travel to Germany with the invading American Army, capture the top German nuclear bomb scientists, and interrogate them, to find out how close Nazi Germany was to getting the bomb. For anyone who was intrigued by the mysteries in the stage play "Copenhagen," Goudsmit's work stands at the very beginning of those political/historical/scientific questions.
The book is a brisk read, cheerful recounting the excitement of cloak-and-dagger work, the nuisance of Army bureaucracy, and various amusing anecdotes of wartime Europe and army life. In this regard, it is no different than many "war memoirs." Published a little more than a year after the war ended, it shows signs of being hastily written and edited, a quick book indented to make the author a bit of money and raise a voice in on public matters. Inexplicable redundancies appear, for instance the story of a Gestapo inquiry about Heisenberg is repeated two or three times without advancing any new information it.
Goudsmit was an accomplished theoretical physicist who had trained in Europe with some of the world's best minds, and contributed significantly to atomic and nuclear theory in the 1930s. For some unexplained reason, he wasn't tapped like many of his colleagues to work on the Manhattan Project, and instead spent the early war years at the MIT Radiation Lab developing radar. When the Army asked him to lead the "Alsos mission," it was his chance to do something critical for his country at the forefront of his expertise. However, Goudsmit's mission turned out to be something of a fizzle, because it soon became clear that the Nazis were nowhere near getting the bomb. Especially after this revelation, the Alsos team was never very well staffed, and its duties devolved into arresting the important German physicists and giving them quick interrogations. Tnen they were shipped to Britain to be interned, and that's where they were at the moment of their epiphany, i.e. when the news of Hiroshima broke. Sadly, by that time, they were well out of Goudsmit's hands, or he would have had a much more interesting story to tell.
Much of his lack of knowledge (e.g. hiroshima) was deliberately the army keeping info from him so he couldn't reveal it to this captives or in the unlikely event that he himself was capture.
Despite having only a limited role in uncovering the Nazi atom bomb program, Goudsmit makes a very good attempt at a comprehensive description of that program, and tries to answer the question of why they did not in fact get the bomb. compelling case that german scientists failed to make progress not because of conscience but a variety of factors: departure of persecuted scientists, poor management, hierarchy that kept younger scientists from usefully challenging the work of their elders, infighting among government agencies and cliques of scientists, lack of initiative, the meddling of managers promoted for their Nazi loyalty and not scientific talent, antisemitism which prevented widespread teaching of Einstein's work and therefore stunted the education of new students, time wasted protecting the laboratories from allied bombing
shabby politicking by e.g. weiszacker(?) who sucked up to Nazi leaders, and self-delusional attitudes of e.g. heisenberg and ???? who thought they would save German science
side topics
german scientific organization and bureaucracy
industrial espionage
slave labor
goudsmit's personal meetings with old colleagues, the strange experience of for instance interrogating an old mentor and ordering him arrested.
his visit to his parents' abandoned apartment
interrogation and intelligence methods. most important to get documents, interrogation seldom worked unless guided by documents. ardent nazis broke and talked, while pure scientists kept quiet.
almost no mention whatsoever of russians (despite several mentions of japanese!) obvious question on the mind of someone in 1947 picking up this book is, why didn't the Nazis get the bomb, and what can this tell us about whether the russians will get one?!
Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews