Back in my high school years, in St. Louis, I had a very productive day at the Main Branch of the St. Louis Public Library. I'd primarily gone there to research obscure lines of the Ruy Lopez Opening in their copy of von Bilguer's Handbuch des Schachspiels. (This would lead to an incident, in a rated Federation tournament, in which a high-ranking player furiously demanded to know, "Is that even playable?" out loud, in violation of the rules, during a game. Alas for him, it was.)
I had taken the opportunity to walk the shelves a bit, and came across a book of essays (I no longer remember its title or range), two of which I read. The first was an essay on Brutus, by Edward Gibbon, of Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire fame. He took on the reputation of Marcus Junius Brutus the Younger, who most people know from Shakespeare, and just eviscerated it. Point by point he detailed the selfish, despotic, and criminal behavior of this "noblest of Romans." That was quite an eye-opener.
And then I found a brief note by T. E. Lawrence, the famed Lawrence of Arabia, explaining to his fellow British officers how to behave in support of the Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire, in World War I. It was originally published in August of 1917 in the Arab Bulletin, which was a briefing paper for the Foreign Office, and the military intelligence folks. It went to about two dozen recipients, though they would often share key things from it; as would happen in this case.
The Viet Nam War was going on at the time, and I was to be in the lottery for it. Despite the clear statement by Lawrence that his remarks were "meant to apply only to Bedu" in the current theater of the current war, it was also clear to me that Lawrence was laying down some General Theories of Insurrection. And that we, the US and United Nations, were going to lose the Viet Nam War, because we were doing everything wrong. I was a bit stunned, because Lawrence was being convincing about a war he'd not even lived to observe.
This slim little volume (it'll take you well less than an hour to read Lawrence's bit), written as 27 Commandments, has an Introduction by John Hulsman, who gets it. He was on the advisory committee on our occupation of Iraq, and quit because they wouldn't listen. Lawrence was his touchstone.
There's an afterword by David Rhodes, who's a bit breezier, and perhaps not as perceptive, but that could just be my take.
Anyway, this little book is worth reading, worth owning, and historically very important.
As an example, let me quote Article 2: "Learn all you can about your Ashraf and Bedu. Get to know their families, clans and tribes, friends and enemies, wells, hills and roads. Do all this by listening and by indirect inquiry. Do not ask questions. Get to speak their dialect of Arabic, not yours. Until you can understand their allusions, avoid getting deep into conversation or you will drop bricks. Be a little stiff at first." While this is, indeed, specific, one can readily abstract this to any Intelligence situation.
Highly recommended.