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The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Spinoza
"I had read the book before in the shorter Harper Torchbook edition but read it again right through--and found it as interesting and exciting as before. I regard it as one of the seminal books in the history of ideas. Based on a prodigious amount of original research, it demonstrated conclusively and in fascinating details how the transmission of ancient skepticism was a bital factor in the formation of modern thought. The story is rich in implications for th history of philosophy, the history of science, and the history of religious thought. Popkin's work has already inspired further work by others--and the new edition takes account of this, most importantly the work of Charles Schmitt. The two new chapters extend the story as far as Spinoza, with special reference to the beginnings of biblical criticism. . . . Popkin's history is of great potential interest to a wide readership--wider than most specialist publications and wider than it has (so far as I can tell) reached hitherto."--M.F. Burnyeat, Professor of Philosophy, University College London
356 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1964
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Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews
July 20, 2018
Charming history of the rediscovery and adoption of ancient skepticism at the foundation of modern philosophy.
The pyrrhonian version of skeptical doctrine is much more radical than the academic variant; the latter simply held that ‘nothing can be known,’ but the pyrrhonists did not accept even this proposition (xv). The point is to suspend judgment on all propositions and thereby achieve the desired aesthetic end of ataraxia, the state of being untroubled. (We shall recall of course that the object of doctrines such as derridean solicitation is precisely to trouble things, to shake them in their entirety, to arouse them at their foundation.) The ‘suspension’ is epoche (93), also an aesthetics.
The central issue for pyrrhonian doctrine is rehearsed in Sextus Empircus, the ‘problem of the criterion,’ wherein the value of evidence is contingent upon the evaluative assumptions employed (3). This becomes leftwing epistemology 101 to a certain extent (Mannheim’s paradox, say, Sloterdijk on enlightened false consciousness, and all of ideology theory), but also appears in the analytic tradition (Willy Sellars) and the philosophy of science (Kuhn, perhaps).
This text has broad historical coverage, examining, for instance, Luther vs. Erasmus on the delegation problem (7), Pico della Mirandola (20 ff), Rabelais (22), Agrippa (23 ff), Ramus (28 ff), Bruno (35 ff), Sanchez (37 ff), and so on.
The oddity is that power captured neo-pyrrhonian doctrine early, manifesting in the counter-reformation as an anodyne fideism that adhered to thoughtless faith in Catholicism while using the arguments of Sextus to disrupt the reformation, pagan ideas, and so on. The basic insight is that skepticism means that nothing can be known through our efforts, including what is required to change society meaningfully—so the recommendation is to acquiesce in the status quo (here, Roman Church domination and monarchism) for simplicity’s sake--ataraxia therefore as inherently conservative. Erasmus liked this, and so would Thoreau centuries later.
The main proponent of this sort of thinking was Montaigne, who recommends ignorance as the properly religious posture for obedience (45). Popkin identifies Montaigne as providing the ideology of the French counter-reformation (47), and for whom the problem of the criterion leads to a “bottomless pit of complete doubt” (52). Some may think of pyrrhonian skepticism in Montaigne as a blind alley, but Popkin regards it as crucial for the formation of modern thought (54). Montaigne, the ‘French Socrates’ (56), had a number of epigones: Charron (59 ff), Camus (63 ff), Veron (70 ff), Maldonat (79 ff), and so on—all of whom seem to figure in the process of the destruction of ‘objective rationality’ as conceived of in Horkheimer’s Eclipse of Reason, incidentally.
Gassendi (99 ff), whose opponents placed him in an atheist typology (112), even though he was fideistic and preferred acatalepsia, is a major figure in early science, and an opponent of Descartes. Gassendi will be concerned about ‘indicative signs’ that warrants belief (142)—which makes science at its inception a linguistic matter: what signifier permits us to draw a specific conclusion? Gassendi will come to believe that one of the more important revolutions is the separation of science from metaphysics (145)—we can have pragmatic knowledge without ontological certainty, say—skepticism as a means to liberate the modern world from the fetters of the ancient. Author considers him the link between Galileo and Newton (146) (and will later note that Newton himself was interested in plenty of mystical ideas).
His ambit included Sorel, a believer in ‘common sense’ (cf. Hume later and then Davidson much later) and a source of the Cartesian dream argument (124). Bacon opined in this connection that ‘sense deception’ is not the problem—but what always remains is the ideological criterion that is used to interpret sense data, and of course the warrant that the senses indicate something about the world. Objections to skepticism never get around these problems, and arguments against skepticism simply denounce as heretic or beg the question by drawing conclusions that mimic Aristotelian assumptions.
Mersenne (129 ff) follows, who is said to contend that “in spite of the fact that this sort of metaphysical basis cannot be found, we can know something about appearances or effects, namely how to manage in the world of shadows” (132); the notion of management of a fallen world should of course set off our agambenian alarms.
Other opponents of skepticism included Herbert, who complained of the contemporary ‘sorry state of learning’ (151), a familiar dunning-kruger refrain that we still hear from assholes such as Ayn Rand. Herbert would try to defeat skepticism with ’common notions’ found in all ‘normal persons’ (154), the standard answer that assumes the conclusion against which skepticism has successfully argued. Another opponent: Silhon, who adopts Pascal’s Wager (169) and based anti-skepticism on the cogito, but ran with it a different direction than Descartes (166).
Descartes took the cogito to defeat the dream argument and the demon argument (the latter his own invention that diminishes all remnants of certainty post-dream argument (180)). Comically, even though Descartes started with rejection of all doubts based on his constructions atop the cogito, he ultimately ends up at “we must accept what we are forced to believe, even if false” (205)—which certainly disappointed all of the anti-skeptics out there.
Post-Cartesian developments include La Peyrere, who developed anti-scriptural skepticism (a new thing, as those before were all fideists); he wished to change no facts but only interpretations of them (223), and Spinoza, the arch-skepticist in religion and arch-anti-skepticist in science & reason (230 ff), who is generally very charming and sympathetic.
Good times to be had by all. Lively, informative, and worthy of one’s attention overall.
The pyrrhonian version of skeptical doctrine is much more radical than the academic variant; the latter simply held that ‘nothing can be known,’ but the pyrrhonists did not accept even this proposition (xv). The point is to suspend judgment on all propositions and thereby achieve the desired aesthetic end of ataraxia, the state of being untroubled. (We shall recall of course that the object of doctrines such as derridean solicitation is precisely to trouble things, to shake them in their entirety, to arouse them at their foundation.) The ‘suspension’ is epoche (93), also an aesthetics.
The central issue for pyrrhonian doctrine is rehearsed in Sextus Empircus, the ‘problem of the criterion,’ wherein the value of evidence is contingent upon the evaluative assumptions employed (3). This becomes leftwing epistemology 101 to a certain extent (Mannheim’s paradox, say, Sloterdijk on enlightened false consciousness, and all of ideology theory), but also appears in the analytic tradition (Willy Sellars) and the philosophy of science (Kuhn, perhaps).
This text has broad historical coverage, examining, for instance, Luther vs. Erasmus on the delegation problem (7), Pico della Mirandola (20 ff), Rabelais (22), Agrippa (23 ff), Ramus (28 ff), Bruno (35 ff), Sanchez (37 ff), and so on.
The oddity is that power captured neo-pyrrhonian doctrine early, manifesting in the counter-reformation as an anodyne fideism that adhered to thoughtless faith in Catholicism while using the arguments of Sextus to disrupt the reformation, pagan ideas, and so on. The basic insight is that skepticism means that nothing can be known through our efforts, including what is required to change society meaningfully—so the recommendation is to acquiesce in the status quo (here, Roman Church domination and monarchism) for simplicity’s sake--ataraxia therefore as inherently conservative. Erasmus liked this, and so would Thoreau centuries later.
The main proponent of this sort of thinking was Montaigne, who recommends ignorance as the properly religious posture for obedience (45). Popkin identifies Montaigne as providing the ideology of the French counter-reformation (47), and for whom the problem of the criterion leads to a “bottomless pit of complete doubt” (52). Some may think of pyrrhonian skepticism in Montaigne as a blind alley, but Popkin regards it as crucial for the formation of modern thought (54). Montaigne, the ‘French Socrates’ (56), had a number of epigones: Charron (59 ff), Camus (63 ff), Veron (70 ff), Maldonat (79 ff), and so on—all of whom seem to figure in the process of the destruction of ‘objective rationality’ as conceived of in Horkheimer’s Eclipse of Reason, incidentally.
Gassendi (99 ff), whose opponents placed him in an atheist typology (112), even though he was fideistic and preferred acatalepsia, is a major figure in early science, and an opponent of Descartes. Gassendi will be concerned about ‘indicative signs’ that warrants belief (142)—which makes science at its inception a linguistic matter: what signifier permits us to draw a specific conclusion? Gassendi will come to believe that one of the more important revolutions is the separation of science from metaphysics (145)—we can have pragmatic knowledge without ontological certainty, say—skepticism as a means to liberate the modern world from the fetters of the ancient. Author considers him the link between Galileo and Newton (146) (and will later note that Newton himself was interested in plenty of mystical ideas).
His ambit included Sorel, a believer in ‘common sense’ (cf. Hume later and then Davidson much later) and a source of the Cartesian dream argument (124). Bacon opined in this connection that ‘sense deception’ is not the problem—but what always remains is the ideological criterion that is used to interpret sense data, and of course the warrant that the senses indicate something about the world. Objections to skepticism never get around these problems, and arguments against skepticism simply denounce as heretic or beg the question by drawing conclusions that mimic Aristotelian assumptions.
Mersenne (129 ff) follows, who is said to contend that “in spite of the fact that this sort of metaphysical basis cannot be found, we can know something about appearances or effects, namely how to manage in the world of shadows” (132); the notion of management of a fallen world should of course set off our agambenian alarms.
Other opponents of skepticism included Herbert, who complained of the contemporary ‘sorry state of learning’ (151), a familiar dunning-kruger refrain that we still hear from assholes such as Ayn Rand. Herbert would try to defeat skepticism with ’common notions’ found in all ‘normal persons’ (154), the standard answer that assumes the conclusion against which skepticism has successfully argued. Another opponent: Silhon, who adopts Pascal’s Wager (169) and based anti-skepticism on the cogito, but ran with it a different direction than Descartes (166).
Descartes took the cogito to defeat the dream argument and the demon argument (the latter his own invention that diminishes all remnants of certainty post-dream argument (180)). Comically, even though Descartes started with rejection of all doubts based on his constructions atop the cogito, he ultimately ends up at “we must accept what we are forced to believe, even if false” (205)—which certainly disappointed all of the anti-skeptics out there.
Post-Cartesian developments include La Peyrere, who developed anti-scriptural skepticism (a new thing, as those before were all fideists); he wished to change no facts but only interpretations of them (223), and Spinoza, the arch-skepticist in religion and arch-anti-skepticist in science & reason (230 ff), who is generally very charming and sympathetic.
Good times to be had by all. Lively, informative, and worthy of one’s attention overall.
December 10, 2011
I've read a slightly older version the text with a different title. Nevertheless, it is a great overview of the skeptical crisis brought on by the advent of the Reformation, the rediscovery of Greek texts (especially Sextus Empiricus) and the developments associated with the scientific revolution. The text is extremely readable, with frequent summaries at key points so that one is never at sea with respect to the larger argument. The writing style is accessible--non-specialists should still be able to follow the larger trains of thought here. Informed by broad and deep reading in dozens of thinkers, the book summarizes philosophical trends without compromising rigor or detail. The book's central argument is that, despite a number of proposed responses, the challenge of Pyrrhonism remained fundamentally unanswered, even by the great and most promising attempt by Descartes. The basic question of how we can guarantee that we know what we think we know thus becomes a central problem for modern philosophy because of the challenge posed by revived Pyrrhonism during the years of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation. A good survey, clearly written.
November 4, 2016
An amazing history tracing the history of scepticism in European philosophy from the Renaissance to the 17th century. Richard Popkin presents a well-researched and orderly study in concise and clear terms. While showing how successive sceptics and their critics interacted with and influenced others, Popkin never obfuscates the issues each thinker was trying to deal with individually; one comes away with a clear understanding of what Erasmus, Gassendi, Descartes, Spinoza, etc., were trying to accomplish through their writings, whether one was expounding on, defending, or overcoming the sceptical approach to scientific and religious knowledge. Of special interest to someone wanting to pursue the study of scepticism further are both the extensive notes and bibliography the comprise a full third of the book.
May 8, 2017
Un modèle d'érudition et de clarté d'exposition à propos de ce qui a été la crise majeure de l'histoire intellectuelle occidentale au XVIème-XVIIème siècle. En refusant l'autorité de l'Eglise catholique, les Réformateurs ouvrent la boîte de Pandore : comment connaître la vérité ? Et d'ailleurs la connaissance de la vérité est-elle possible ? Les différentes réponses à ses questions sont minutieusement étudiées : chez Erasme, Montaigne, les "libertins érudits", Mersenne, Gassendi, Descartes, Spinoza...
Mon seul regret c'est que l'auteur se limite au domaine français et hollandais, et élude la question du scepticisme et de ses réfutations dans la philosophie anglaise, irlandaise, écossaise : chez Hobbes, Locke, Boyle, Berkeley, Hume...
Mon seul regret c'est que l'auteur se limite au domaine français et hollandais, et élude la question du scepticisme et de ses réfutations dans la philosophie anglaise, irlandaise, écossaise : chez Hobbes, Locke, Boyle, Berkeley, Hume...
March 28, 2018
Does exactly what it says on the tin. Clear and concise history and discussion of various points in the relevant developments.
November 27, 2016
Saggio fondamentale che traccia le origini dello scetticismo moderno - posizioni che si svilupperanno nel pragmatismo e nel positivismo, e che contribuiranno in maniera decisiva allo sviluppo del procedimento scientifico moderno.
Il problema scettico rispunta dalle profondità dell'antichità greco-romana per affondare il dogmatismo della scolastica, affiancarsi brevemente al cattolicesimo in difesa dell'ortodossia contro la Riforma, in una particolare posizione chiamata "cattolicesimo pirroniano", essere strenuamente opposto da Cartesio e snobbato come inconsistente da Spinoza, e confermarsi come scoglio con cui i sistemi filosofici, dal Cinquecento in poi, hanno dovuto confrontarsi.
Grande studio, dedicato al filosofo della scienza Imre Lakatos.
Il problema scettico rispunta dalle profondità dell'antichità greco-romana per affondare il dogmatismo della scolastica, affiancarsi brevemente al cattolicesimo in difesa dell'ortodossia contro la Riforma, in una particolare posizione chiamata "cattolicesimo pirroniano", essere strenuamente opposto da Cartesio e snobbato come inconsistente da Spinoza, e confermarsi come scoglio con cui i sistemi filosofici, dal Cinquecento in poi, hanno dovuto confrontarsi.
Grande studio, dedicato al filosofo della scienza Imre Lakatos.
Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews