"This book should be read by all practitioners and serious students of national security as the guide for avoiding failures and miscalculations in using American military power." --Gen. Colin L. Powell, USA (Ret.), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (1989-1993) and 65th Secretary of State Anatomy of Failure is part Von Clausewitz, part Tom Clancy, with personal insights by Harlan K. Ullman that brilliantly translate why the United States, the most powerful nation on earth, has so often fallen short of its objectives. --Michael Lord Dobbs, creator of the series House of Cards Why, since the end of World War II, has the United States either lost every war it started or failed in every military intervention it prosecuted? Harlan Ullman's new book answers this most disturbing question, a question Americans would never think of even asking because this record of failure has been largely hidden in plain sight or forgotten with the passage of time. The most straightforward answer is that presidents and administrations have consistently failed to use sound strategic thinking and lacked sufficient knowledge or understanding of the circumstances prior to deciding whether or not to employ force. Making this case is an in-depth analysis of the records of presidents from John F. Kennedy to Barack Obama and Donald Trump in using force or starting wars. His recommended solutions begin with a "brains-based" approach to sound strategic thinking to address onne of the major causes of failure ----the inexperience of too many of the nation's commanders-in-chief. Ullman reinforces his argument through the use of autobiographical vignettes that provide a human dimension and insight into the reasons for failure, in some cases making public previously unknown history. The clarion call of Anatomy of Failure is that both a sound strategic framework and sufficient knowledge and understanding of the circumstance that may lead to using force are vital. Without them, failure is virtually guaranteed.
Refreshingly straightforward, Ullman examines Presidential administration decision making dating back to Korea forward. In his critique his constant theme was to illustrate the global and domestic context each President faced and how, generally speaking, a lack of strategic thinking often led to disastrous outcomes. A notable exception was the single term presidency of George H. W. Bush who Ullman described as the best prepared candidate in the recent era to govern.
One sad irony author Ullman points out is America loves a tagline to describe complex theory, strategy and policy. Unfortunately, his book is a tagline. It is short on solution. It actually falls back on Powell and Weinberger doctrines that were incredibly sound but ignored with successive presidencies. So America's wars and interventions have been, "misinformed, contrived, baseless, ignorant, or just wrong." In fact, Ullman calls The Second Iraq war, "the greatest American strategic catastrophe since the Civil War".
It is amazing given this stark history that so few Americans question their country's military effectiveness given the investment and importance placed on its fighting forces. It is also shameful how veterans of these conflicts are treated. Why does that crap continue? There is such a disconnect at the beginning of a fight and when that fight ends. No lesson is ever learned for long.
Americans go to war with an American sensibility. It has been, "embedded in our decision-making DNA." This lack of understanding of the enemy and its culture is a huge miss. Americans assume everyone thinks they way they do (dangerous mirror-imaging). And there is perpetual fall-back on technology and massive firepower. These two factors have not worked when America chooses to war.
American has been fighting for the last one hundred years. World War 1, War on Alcohol, World War 2, Korea, The Cold War, Vietnam, War on Drugs, The Gulf War, War on Terror, Afghanistan, Iraq. War is the economic engine of America. Ullman argues there is no existential threat to America but they will always find one. It is just good business.
Going forward, American leadership will be only more challenged when it comes to a fight. Leaders face bitter bipartisanship, social media dysfunction, a 24-hour news cycle, and a political system focused on elections not governing. Even smart people will falter in this environment (or you get the same leader ... McNamara/Rumsfeld). Ullman calls for deep strategic thinking (it scares me that this was ever absent), understanding changing strategic environments, leaving outdated concepts behind (e.g., peacekeeping, nation-building), avoiding using simplistic soundbites to represent difficult and complex issues (Shock & Awe...it began as a doctrine and became a cartoon), and having clear goals and objectives for any intervention.
Ullman believes the American military is "bankrupt". No amount of funding will beat a determined enemy. No large military will beat an asymmetrical force. His theory that uncontrolled internal cost growth is the biggest threat to the American military may have made for a better book.
I have three suggestions for America. America should be spreading peace and democracy. When it sends its forces into the world, those have not been the goals for a long time. Second, know thy enemy so you know what you are getting into. Lastly, American is now soul-searching. Before sending a young lad from Michigan or woman from North Carolina in harm's way, the country needs to know itself. Cultural arrogance and more and bigger weapons have not worked. It will not going forward.
Okay, this will be a first and one I'm embarrassed to have to admit to. I'm actually going to cross post a review and I admit it isn't fair to this author, but I just wrote a stellar review written by one of his peers on EXACTLY the same subject matter, AND I've referred to both authors and both books in many discussions this week in reference to the ongoing Afghan evacuation debacle. I have limited time these days and simply can't justify sitting here an hour to reword and retype exactly what I just typed, so I'm going to put my review of Donald Stoker's book here and assert this Ullman's book is equally good, valid and recommended. I hope he'll understand. I have some limitations...
Excellent, excellent book that I just finished reading through twice before rating or commenting on it. The author, Dr. Donald Stoker, is not someone I've had the pleasure to meet, although I know many of his associates, but I'm very familiar with his credentials, which are impeccable and I've recommended this book, and Dr Stoker's observations, relentlessly for quite some time, especially this week, the week of the Afghan evacuation debacle. As I've been writing in many forums, in response to many comments by outraged or enraged individuals determined to blame one president or one this or that, quit with the mudslinging! 20 years. Longest war in US AND Afghan history. Two different political parties, two administrations each. There's no one person to blame -- that's simply naive and using such a disaster for a political hatchet job. I've repeated cited this book as well as Dr Harlan Ullman's similar "Anatomy of Failure: Why America Loses Every War It Starts" to people wanting to throw mud everywhere but themselves, ie us. I actually responded to the esteemed Admiral James Stavridis on LinkedIn yesterday -- whom I admire tremendously -- when he wrote "There are many reasons for the failures of the Afghan army, but one is certainly that we, the US military, did not train the right kind of army. We need to own that failure and learn from our mistakes."
My response was this: "Admiral, I agree, just as I typically do with most of your assessments. But I have to ask Why? Why did we fail to train the “right” kind of army? (I think there were many more variables than merely that.) Haven’t we seen this before? One whopper that comes to mind is the ARVN. Other more recent ones could possibly be included. I agree we have to learn from our mistakes, but haven’t we had sufficient chances at that by now? I still get ticked at how we supported France financially & materially in their effort to recolonize Indochina until the administration decided to terminate that at Dien Bien Phu — which should have given us fantastic opportunities at Lessons Learned, only for the US to simply essentially replace them & make many of the very same mistakes that doomed the French. Obviously it’s not that simple but character space is limited. After observing the French debacle & experiencing our own (& I’m trying to leave political blame games out & merely focus on what & how transpired for both & how to correct that), after knowing general staff in following years dedicated to doctrine change, it seems to me we’re not particularly good at learning from our mistakes. I’m sure you know Donald Stoker. Maybe he has some points?"
I doubt Stoker saw that or will see this but I would like to think his analysis & scholarship have paid off in & to some degree & I've appreciated his scholarship enough to have earned a PR bonus! ;) Honestly, quite a few readers on his LI site & my own agreed and I think this book may be tough for some people to swallow, but sometimes the truth hurts. As I told someone else, resort to any excuses you want, but I can't think of a single administration that hasn't suffered some sort of "failure" going all the way back through JFK & I'm sure we could get technical & keep analyzing, but I think that big picture assessment should be sufficient, because frankly isn't it enough? I had a discussion with a retired Marine officer today about this & I stated "When you have to withdraw, lick your wounds, conduct post-engagement analyses to 'learn' what went wrong & it’s now seemed to become as predictable as politicians dying to shed (American) blood in an open-ended, ill defined conflict -REPEATEDLY- I’d like to hope someone smarter than me has noticed that’s become the norm. Saying each time that “We have to learn from our mistakes” only to keep repeating them is proof you haven’t learned." He wholeheartedly agreed. And I suspect he's smarter than me.
Look folks, my family has fought, bled & died in service to America. I'm a (actually true, as in not seditious traitor) patriot. But there's nothing unpatriotic about asking tough questions, admitting to repeated failures & freaking actually DOING something to fix them rather than rinse, wash, repeat every 20 years. It makes us look stupid, & it IS stupid. For those who can handle the pain, this book should be damned required reading for all. Most highly recommended!
I enjoyed most of this book, and the few parts I didn’t may not be that important (though I’ll mention them below).
The attention-grabbing title just isn’t true, though. We have won at least one war we started, Desert Storm 1, in which we threw Iraq out of Kuwait. The author, in fact, lauds George H. W. Bush as one of the most qualified and successful presidents we’ve had in generations.
I wish the author had talked more about failures in intelligence by the CIA and FBI. America almost certainly would not have gone to war with Iraq in 2003 if the reports of non-existent WMD had been correct. The catastrophe of 9/11, and all that’s followed since, would not have occurred if the agencies had connected the dots. It’s not as if the Saudi student-pilots weren’t on the FBI’s radar, not as if bin Laden was unknown to the CIA, especially after the first World Trade Center bombing in 1993 or the Kenyan and Tanzanian embassy bombings in 1998.
That the author’s solution – “brains-based approach” – doesn’t discuss an overhaul in our intelligence agencies is for me a fatal flaw.
But the book is valuable for reminding us of our faults: • Electing, in the past 26 years, astonishingly incompetent presidents, starting with Bill Clinton, continuing with George W. Bush, then Barack Obama (arguably the worst of all), and now Donald Trump (elected only because his opponent was so widely disliked). (I liked Ronald Reagan – who didn’t? – but on his watch we had Iran-Contra and the Beirut barracks bombings. Yes, he was instrumental in our winning the Cold War, but I’d give most of the credit to Mr Gorbachev.) None of the four Commanders-in-Chief served in the military (except George Bush, and he was a reservist who never served overseas). • Insufficiently funding a military strong enough to make our adversaries decide not to test us. • And a number of others, but which pale in comparison to the above two.
The book was for me a fine review of the major events and administrations of my life, starting with John Kennedy and ending with Barack Obama.
The author’s anecdotes were fascinating, and secured his credibility with this reader. He has sat with and influenced many of the world’s leaders. America is fortunate to have had him on our side.
Now for a few nits I must pick. • Discussing the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the author writes (on page 57) “Egypt and other Arab states had preemptively attacked Israel.” Preemptively? That sure sounds like a judgment to me, and one I sure don’t share. I always thought it was a sneak attack on the holiest day of the Jewish year. • He supports the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran to a degree that makes me, in fact, question his judgment. • He lacks appreciation for our pursuit and elimination of targeted enemies. For example, if Abu Musab al-Zarqawi had not been tracked down and killed in Iraq, that country would certainly have descended into full civil war (as Zarqawi intended) between its Shiites and Sunnis.
The main take-away I got from the book is that our decision-making at the highest levels has been taken for granted by the American voter. The presidency has devolved into a popularity contest. (And now we're hearing Oprah for President?) We must do better. (If we survive the next three years, and yes, I’m mostly glad Donald Trump is president.) We simply can't afford not to.
It took me forever to finish because there were just a lot of scapegoating presidents for poor picks in their cabinets and not having the skills necessary for a commander-in-chief. These people boast and lie to be the president and care more about rewarding people who supported their campaign than those who actually are fit to be in these decisions. Ullman is quite critical of generals in these positions, and also, when they aren’t in these positions, or there are too many generals, what solution is being presented? We’ve spent more than we’ve ever spent on the military every year, and our taxpayer money goes to bombs that are given to continue to inflict genocide on Palestinian people—hooray? I enjoyed it when he shits on the president, but his man loves daddy bush. I'm not sure why he only talks about Iran-contra and when the US was directly responsible for the fall of Vietnam (JFK had the CIA kill Diem), but none of the other coups we started that spoil? It’s almost like you can’t radicalize a terror group and give them weapons and instruct them to turn on the government in power without thinking, why are we listening to these folks who have clear US-centric interests? I Like when he talks about the hollow force of the military spending and is critical of cost but also seems to suggest cutting domestic costs like veteran benefits and healthcare, which is not gonna take care of the F-35 cost and their million-dollar helmets…A whole lot of obvious takes, not sure I would recommend to anyone unless they need something to put them to sleep at night.
Author tells us about his involvement in many policy discussions relating to military matters for some years back. He also explains clearly our misplaced reliance on the surgical strike capabilities of drones and how ineffective is torture which has never been shown effective even if it might be satisfying to hit somebody after we have been embarrassed in battle.
Trump turn abouts, changing views He called Nato obsolete; now it is important. He promised to punish China as a currency manipulator; now Chinese president XiJinping is good friend. Promised to reduce foreign entanglements but is involved with Korea, Syria. proposed defense increases have been reduced, Afghanistan troops increased p. 2006
Having just finished Ronan Farrow's book about the death of diplomacy, this book became a natural addition to what happens next. As the title aptly states, because the US does not enter wars with an end strategy in mind, we get caught in quagmires. Afghanistan is the best example of that as is Iraq. Although Ullman offers potential solutions, it is doubtful any of them will be followed. The political divisiveness will n ver allow it to happen.
This book kept me attention throughout. Well written and quite interesting.
Scary analysis of the weaknesses of a representative government that can’t get its act together when planning by sound bite and failing to ask “What’s next?” We have to realize foreign policy is not just the State and Defense Departments’ responsibility and we have think about the long game after we know completely what we are getting into.
Post WW II strategic thinking: According to the author, not enough of it. This is a superficial (which author acknowledges) look at recent American conflicts. The evaluations of the president’s are interesting.