This work represents the culmination of a long period of interest in an evolutionary view of religious development over the long durée, with Bellah’s first publication on this subject coming in his 1964 article, “Religious Evolution,” wherein he first develops his theoretical model. Here he attempts to delineate a macrohistory of religion in terms of five evolutionary stages. For Bellah, these stages are not discrete but accumulative, with each earlier stage persisting in certain ways within the newly evolved dispensations of the successive stages, a recurring theme in his work. Conversely, he also emphasizes that the later evolutionary forms of religion “already exist in some sense in the religious system” of the earliest forms of religion. His schema involves the evolutionary stages of 1) primitive, 2) archaic, 3) historical, 4) early modern, and 5) modern religion. While he hints at a full book length treatment even as far back as this article, this work would not come until almost half a century later. In Religion in Human Evolution, he updates the terminology of his stages in renaming the “primitive” – which is certainly loaded with unfortunate and unintended associations – with “tribal” religion, and replacing the “historical” with Jaspers’ “axial age,” indicating the earliest textual or literate phase of religions, where Bellah finds, with Jaspers, pivotal cross-cultural transformations in the evolution of human religiosity. While Jaspers mostly lurked in the background of the other theorists, in Bellah there is the most sustained reconsideration of Jaspers’ axial theory, integrated into his evolutionary model.
He also limits his analysis in this work to the first three stages – the tribal, archaic, and axial - with a proposed treatment of the final two – the early modern and modern – unfortunately never coming to fruition prior to Bellah’s passing in 2013. However, much of Bellah’s other work has focused on the transformations of religion in the modern and contemporary period, especially toward forms of noninstitutionalized “civil religion” permeating individual and social life. Here we will examine Bellah’s theory as proposed in Religion in Human Evolution, though I will also give some attention to the contemporary persistence of these earlier stages in modern culture. For one, Bellah is perhaps the only thinker considered here who has connected his macrocosmic deep-historical account to the analysis of modern religiosity, if only briefly, with Farmer et al. ending their model of the commentarial engine with the 15th century collapse of manuscript traditions, and Witzel and van Binbsergen’s models terminating mostly in the early centuries of the common era. But like these other thinkers, he is also looking to the deep past to shed light on our contemporary situation, and sees “big history,” of which his work is an instance, as a necessary corrective to the threat posed by pervasive cultural-historical amnesia in wide swathes of present humanity. To lose access to the past is to foreclose hope for the (human) future.
His method is influenced by Max Weber’s notion of “ideal types,” in which specific representative examples are given for each phase of religion discussed. Thus, his theory’s macrocosmic dimensions are achieved via the construction of particular stages and the examination of a number of examples from each phase, a method which, though it cannot be totally exhaustive or encyclopedic, does still aim at universal inclusion through this representative sampling. Insofar as he seeks to describe the earliest evolutionary phases of human religion, his theory is also macrocosmic in terms of its search for origins, in this case those of religion as such, which are found not only in its earliest forms but additionally in the processes of animal and mammalian evolution.
For the tribal stage he selects Australian Aboriginal religion, particularly the Walbiri, the Amazonian Kalapalo, and the North American Navajo. The latter represent for him a kind of transitional case of development toward the next phase, the archaic, and also show a degree of influence from the somewhat archaicized Pueblo culture, who at that time had been influenced by contact with the fully archaic (in Bellah’s view) Mesoamerican civilizations. In terms of Witzel’s findings, and those of the geneticists he relies on, the Walbiri would represent the Gondwana populations who first migrated out of Africa and who have been in relative isolation from Laurasian populations until the 19th century. The Kalapalo are representative of the fist wave of Laurasian migrants into the Americas, while the Navajo, part of the Na-Dene language family, migrated much later into the continent around 10,000 years ago.
Bellah’s vision of religious evolution is significantly oriented around the social conditions of the cultures involved at each stage, defining them according to the dominant modes of social interaction and structuring. The tribal stage is thus characterized as being fundamentally egalitarian, with a relative lack of hierarchy and of societally institutionalize forms of dominance, though not lacking, as in the animal world, some forms of dominance in the social realm. But individual expressions of exaggerated tendencies toward dominance are heavily regulated by the tribal moral community through the collective enforcement of powerful norms which “negatively sanction despotic behavior and protect the family,” a kind of active “reverse dominance hierarchy.” Like the tribal groups, the powerful beings that are the focus of religion and ritual in these systems exhibit the same kind of egalitarian relationships. In many cases they are seen as ancestors of humanity, whose myths depict them as having shaped the features of the natural world. They are powerful but do not control or rule over the natural world, but are subject to it in a way similar to human beings. Human beings participate through ritual in the identities and activities of these beings.
For the archaic stage of religion, Bellah draws his examples from pre-contact Hawaii – representing the transition from tribal to archaic state - and the Bronze Age cultures of Mesopotamia, Egypt, and Shang and Zhou era China. Mesoamerica would also fit his model as an archaic early state, but the data were insufficient for their inclusion. In such societies, in which agriculture and early states have developed, the earlier tribal egalitarianism has given way to societies characterized by class hierarchies, especially that of the priesthood and ruler(s). The ruler(s) become the focus of religious ritual, acting as the more or less sole conduit to the world of divinity. The powerful beings of tribal religion are transformed into gods who control the natural world and are worshipped rather than participated in. They also exhibit the same kind of hierarchical relationships that exist in society, with pantheons headed by divine rulers.
Finally, the axial period – by far the most extensively treated stage – is represented by four cases: ancient Israel, Greece, China, and India. Unlike the other stages which seem to be more independent of absolute temporal dating – the tribal examples being relatively recent or contemporary but without the necessary social and civilizational features which would attend archaic transformation and the Hawaiian archaic example being much later (18th century) than the other Bronze age cases – these axial civilizations are all located within the same temporal vista, first defined by Jaspers, of 800 to 200 BCE. For Bellah, the changes in the essential religious structure are attendant upon societal changes and conditions which call forth greater levels of complexity in the sphere of religion – bigger, more complex societies which have developed novel representational and mental capacities necessitate more complex religious forms which reflect these developments. Among these social factors are population size and density, technological developments like literacy, forms of political organization, class hierarchy, monetary systems, and so on. The axial transformations in particular exhibit social and cognitive changes related to the development of full rather than craft literacy (as in archaic cultures) and the concomitant development of theoretical reflection on existing religious myths and the social hierarchies justified by them. Those who undertook such reflection and subsequent reimagination of the mythic worlds were religious virtuosos whose social critiques were underpinned and inspired by powerful visionary experiences that transcended and relativized the cosmos. In place of archaic class dominance and inequality, they emphasized universal ontological and ethical truths whose origins transcended phenomenal reality, establishing in this respect a pattern of dualistic cosmologies such as have been described in Farmer et al.’s model of bifurcation (chapter one) and van Binsbergen’s “absolute transcendence” (chapter three).
Such developments in the religious sphere are, like biological evolution, oriented toward greater complexity and greater freedom of organisms, both individual and social. “At each stage the freedom of personality and society has increased relative to the environing conditions,” he writes, as “the relation of man to the conditions of his existence has been conceived as more complex, more open and more subject to change and development.” He defines evolution as:
“a process of increasing differentiation and complexity of organization which endows the organism, social system or whatever the unit in question may be, with greater capacity to adapt to its environment so that it is in some sense more autonomous relative to its environment than were its less complex ancestors.”
Yet these environmental pressures are not the whole story, because this evolutionary process also works by modifying, not abandoning what came before. The process is aggregative, forming an undivided whole, though one qualified by various dominant stages with their attendant cultural reformulations. Yet unlike Witzel, Bellah does not track specific mythemes genetically, nor like van Binsbergen, does he posit diffusion as a significant factor in the common features he finds in various stages of religious evolution. Like Farmer et al., he recognizes the role of the cultural realm, but not, like them, in terms of the information environment alone but rather in terms of the general prevailing social conditions. Bellah also recognizes, as we saw with Witzel and van Binsbergen, the way his treatment of big history itself implicitly verges into the realm of myth, in this case the macrocosmic myths of origins and quasi-encyclopedic wholeness. All history is conceived in a similar way in its being remembered from the vantage point of the present – “history is our myth” – and refers to what he and others are doing as essentially “mythistory.” There is a sense in which we carry the cultural history of evolutionary development within us, such that even the most temporally distant cultural worlds considered are in some way more familiar than we realize. Bellah thus sees himself as engaging in a kind of Platonic anamnesis or remembering of what has been forgotten, not from the world of forms but from the human past.