What do you think?
Rate this book
Waterloo: The Campaign of 1815 #2
Waterloo: The Campaign of 1815, Volume 2: From Waterloo to the Restoration of Peace in Europe
Winner of the 2019 RUSI Duke of Wellington Medal for Military HistoryWinner of the 2017 Society for Army Historical Research Templer MedalShortlisted for Military History Monthly's Book of the Year AwardThe first of two groundbreaking volumes on the Waterloo campaign, this book is based upon a detailed analysis of sources old and new in four languages. It highlights the political stresses between the Allies, and their resolution; it studies the problems of feeding and paying for 250,000 Allied forces assembling in Belgium during the undeclared war, and how a strategy was thrashed out. It studies the neglected topic of how the slow and discordant Allies beyond the Rhine hampered the plans of Blcher and Wellington, thus allowing Napoleon to snatch the initiative from them. Napoleons operational plan is analyzed (and Soult's mistakes in executing it). Accounts from both sides help provide a vivid impression of the fighting on the first day, 15 June, and the volume ends with the joint battles of Ligny and Quatre Bras the next day.
- GenresHistoryNonfiction
866 pages, Kindle Edition
First published December 19, 2017
24 people are currently reading
87 people want to read
About the author
John Hussey
16 books2 followersAfter reading History at Cambridge John Hussey spent 30 years working for BP around the world including the Congo in the 1960s and Nigeria in the 1970s. He was awarded an OBE in 1971. He has written many articles on British military history, mainly on the Napoleonic and First World Wars, and served as a member of the International Historical Committee for the restoration of the Waterloo Battlefield. He is a Fellow of the Royal Historical Society.
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews
February 21, 2019
The second volume of this series looks at the battle of Waterloo and its aftermath. It is a multi-faceted battle with many aspects. Hussey doesn't go into extreme detail, but does try to cover the most important points, such as la Haye Sainte, which both sides seemed to ignore until late in the day on June 18. He also emphasizes the importance of the actions of Uxbridge and Picton in foiling d'Erlon's effort. The number of casualties in this great battle reflect the intensity of the fighting. Napoleon had to win to keep his dream alive.
The second half of the book dealt more with the aftermath of the battle as the Allies closed in on France. Frankly, I did not find it as interesting, but the consequences for Europe were immense. After 25 years of war, peace finally seemed at hand, although as we know the problems of the future were there just under the surface. New ideas were simmering which would boil over once again.
One extra plus for the book are the maps. Most of the key positions are well represented.
The second half of the book dealt more with the aftermath of the battle as the Allies closed in on France. Frankly, I did not find it as interesting, but the consequences for Europe were immense. After 25 years of war, peace finally seemed at hand, although as we know the problems of the future were there just under the surface. New ideas were simmering which would boil over once again.
One extra plus for the book are the maps. Most of the key positions are well represented.
May 3, 2021
The clash between the French and a British-Prussian coalition army at Waterloo in 1815 may be the most written about battle in history. Its bicentennial spawned a new list of titles about it. Among them is John Hussey's magisterial two-volume study of the Hundred Days campaign.
Hussey, a fellow of the Royal Historical Society, brings an unconventional background to his project. After studying history at Cambridge, he worked for British Petroleum for three decades, a job that took him around the world and gave him the chance to learn both French and German. In retirement, he turned to military history and in the late 1990s began to publish a stream of articles on Waterloo. He has also participated in efforts to restore the battlefield to its original condition. The volume under review here completes a project that required decades of research and study about the events of 1815. That expertise is apparent on every page of this magnum opus.
To read the rest of my review, click on this link:
http://www.miwsr.com/2021-032.aspx
Hussey, a fellow of the Royal Historical Society, brings an unconventional background to his project. After studying history at Cambridge, he worked for British Petroleum for three decades, a job that took him around the world and gave him the chance to learn both French and German. In retirement, he turned to military history and in the late 1990s began to publish a stream of articles on Waterloo. He has also participated in efforts to restore the battlefield to its original condition. The volume under review here completes a project that required decades of research and study about the events of 1815. That expertise is apparent on every page of this magnum opus.
To read the rest of my review, click on this link:
http://www.miwsr.com/2021-032.aspx
December 15, 2018
This second volume and concluding part of John Hussey's history of the Battle of Waterloo will be the standard in the history of Waterloo for a long time.
At times it can be a bit long, with descriptions and so forth, but, the crux of the battle and all the major players are given equal review and a concise history of the battle has been written.
At times it can be a bit long, with descriptions and so forth, but, the crux of the battle and all the major players are given equal review and a concise history of the battle has been written.
August 9, 2022
Volume two of Hussey’s epic Waterloo history is almost a mirror image of volume one, kicking off with the brief pause of the 17th June, before rapidly launching into the excitement and confusion of the 18th, and Waterloo itself. And there's a lot of confusion, something Hussey conveys extremely well. In fact, with admirable and almost paradoxical clarity.
Hussey paints a picture in which the Prussians don't come off too well in terms of staff work, with only Müffling shining in his role as liaison between Wellington and Blücher. Gneisenau, on the other hand, comes over as alternately timid and anxious or peevishly aggressive. And the lack of clear communication from the Prussian side becomes an oft-repeated lament.
Anyway, volume two quickly grips the reader with its intense and detailed coverage of the action of the 18th, opting for the classic 'Five Acts' approach (can anyone remind me who it was that first came up with that approach?), which works extremely well. And, as he does with the whole history across both volumes, Hussey always gets over both his own views and those of others, even where they diverge, supporting his own position with clear and reasoned argument. It's a very compelling account.
Whilst Grouchy, d'Erlon and Ney have long been whipping boys for those whose admiration of Napoleon will brook no exceptions to his undeniable (if flawed) genius, that is not so here. Hussey lays the blame for the ultimate French defeat clearly and squarely at Napoleon's feet. One of the major problems stemmed from what could and often had been, in other times, one of the major strengths of Napoleon's leadership style: his desire to keep total control under his own hand.
As Hussey paints the picture, this left Ney, brought in at the last moment, both emotionally slighted and practically uncertain; arriving on the eve of battle, with no formed staff, troops were added and subtracted from his command willy-nilly, as Napoleon - constantly changing his plans as he reacted to the evolving situation, sometimes under mistaken apprehensions - saw fit. It was this situation that then lead to d'Erlon wandering around between Quatre Bras and Ligny, not only not benefitting French fortunes at either, but actually causing problems.
And, as Hussey has it, Grouchy in the Waterloo campaign was a man of two modes. Up until he learned of Napoleon's decisive defeat he was vacillating and cautious, most likely too in awe of his imperial master to act decisively on his own initiative. And yet once he knew France was militarily beaten, he suddenly rediscovered his leadership mojo, and skilfully extricated his force, the one remaining part of the Armée du Nord that remained intact, safely returning it to France.
Unlike Grouchy, d'Erlon wound up both lost on the 16th, and defeated on the 18th. That the latter attack ultimately failed was a surprise to all, and in some major respects this was due to the 'fox hunt' style attack of the British and Allied cavalry. According to Hussey Napoleon's basic approach, though lacking in subtlety, most likely would've worked, in particular with an earlier start. But he also notes that communication at the top of the French army was no longer what it had once been, back in Berthier's day, and speculates on whether perhaps Grouchy and d'Erlon should've swapped roles with Davout and Suchet.
Hussey's coverage of the battle itself is superbly lucid, and highly exciting. And I also very much enjoyed how he managed to keep all the various narrative strands both separate, yet active and mutually reinforcing (unlike, all too often, the troops on the ground!). He also addresses some of the partisan nationalist bickering that's marred post-Waterloo history writing, and manages to come to very soundly reasoned and well supported conclusions of his own, whilst allowing for the differing views of other authorities.
Whilst Hussey clearly admires Wellington, and shows how reasonable he was in comparison to, for example, the alternately strident or gloomy Gneisenau, his is not a hagiographic portrayal by any means. Wellington committed sins of both omission and commission. In the former category he failed to give preparatory orders early enough - hence the 'humbugged' bit - and even on the day, his disposition remained mistakenly over-weighted to the West. And worst of all, whilst Hougoumont was thoroughly prepared, La Haye Sainte was dangerously passed over.
Hussey's admiration for Blücher is perhaps more straightforward, like the man himself: whilst Wellington had gifts that allowed him to operate extremely well both on the battlefield and in the corridors of power, Blücher was simply 'that old devil' (as Boney put it); you could knock him down -and this campaign illustrated this quite literally - but he'd be on his feet and into the saddle, and back on the attack, if not the next day, then the day after.
Having visited the battlefields myself twice (2014 and 2015), there was a special resonance when reading this account: having stood by the stone commemorating some of the actions of Mercer's RHA troop, and viewed a plaque attached to the church wall at Plancenoit, all the many place names and actions that took place and are so ably narrated here came vividly to life for me.
There's a lot of literature on Waterloo, that epoch-ending battle that finally brought the Napoleonic era to a definite full-stop. And a surprising amount of that literature is very good. But for me this is right up there with the best. A massive account - about 1,000 pages of narrative (that's not including notes, etc.) - that gave me huge pleasure to read, and has left me feeling far better informed on this fascinating chapter in European history.
Hussey paints a picture in which the Prussians don't come off too well in terms of staff work, with only Müffling shining in his role as liaison between Wellington and Blücher. Gneisenau, on the other hand, comes over as alternately timid and anxious or peevishly aggressive. And the lack of clear communication from the Prussian side becomes an oft-repeated lament.
Anyway, volume two quickly grips the reader with its intense and detailed coverage of the action of the 18th, opting for the classic 'Five Acts' approach (can anyone remind me who it was that first came up with that approach?), which works extremely well. And, as he does with the whole history across both volumes, Hussey always gets over both his own views and those of others, even where they diverge, supporting his own position with clear and reasoned argument. It's a very compelling account.
Whilst Grouchy, d'Erlon and Ney have long been whipping boys for those whose admiration of Napoleon will brook no exceptions to his undeniable (if flawed) genius, that is not so here. Hussey lays the blame for the ultimate French defeat clearly and squarely at Napoleon's feet. One of the major problems stemmed from what could and often had been, in other times, one of the major strengths of Napoleon's leadership style: his desire to keep total control under his own hand.
As Hussey paints the picture, this left Ney, brought in at the last moment, both emotionally slighted and practically uncertain; arriving on the eve of battle, with no formed staff, troops were added and subtracted from his command willy-nilly, as Napoleon - constantly changing his plans as he reacted to the evolving situation, sometimes under mistaken apprehensions - saw fit. It was this situation that then lead to d'Erlon wandering around between Quatre Bras and Ligny, not only not benefitting French fortunes at either, but actually causing problems.
And, as Hussey has it, Grouchy in the Waterloo campaign was a man of two modes. Up until he learned of Napoleon's decisive defeat he was vacillating and cautious, most likely too in awe of his imperial master to act decisively on his own initiative. And yet once he knew France was militarily beaten, he suddenly rediscovered his leadership mojo, and skilfully extricated his force, the one remaining part of the Armée du Nord that remained intact, safely returning it to France.
Unlike Grouchy, d'Erlon wound up both lost on the 16th, and defeated on the 18th. That the latter attack ultimately failed was a surprise to all, and in some major respects this was due to the 'fox hunt' style attack of the British and Allied cavalry. According to Hussey Napoleon's basic approach, though lacking in subtlety, most likely would've worked, in particular with an earlier start. But he also notes that communication at the top of the French army was no longer what it had once been, back in Berthier's day, and speculates on whether perhaps Grouchy and d'Erlon should've swapped roles with Davout and Suchet.
Hussey's coverage of the battle itself is superbly lucid, and highly exciting. And I also very much enjoyed how he managed to keep all the various narrative strands both separate, yet active and mutually reinforcing (unlike, all too often, the troops on the ground!). He also addresses some of the partisan nationalist bickering that's marred post-Waterloo history writing, and manages to come to very soundly reasoned and well supported conclusions of his own, whilst allowing for the differing views of other authorities.
Whilst Hussey clearly admires Wellington, and shows how reasonable he was in comparison to, for example, the alternately strident or gloomy Gneisenau, his is not a hagiographic portrayal by any means. Wellington committed sins of both omission and commission. In the former category he failed to give preparatory orders early enough - hence the 'humbugged' bit - and even on the day, his disposition remained mistakenly over-weighted to the West. And worst of all, whilst Hougoumont was thoroughly prepared, La Haye Sainte was dangerously passed over.
Hussey's admiration for Blücher is perhaps more straightforward, like the man himself: whilst Wellington had gifts that allowed him to operate extremely well both on the battlefield and in the corridors of power, Blücher was simply 'that old devil' (as Boney put it); you could knock him down -and this campaign illustrated this quite literally - but he'd be on his feet and into the saddle, and back on the attack, if not the next day, then the day after.
Having visited the battlefields myself twice (2014 and 2015), there was a special resonance when reading this account: having stood by the stone commemorating some of the actions of Mercer's RHA troop, and viewed a plaque attached to the church wall at Plancenoit, all the many place names and actions that took place and are so ably narrated here came vividly to life for me.
There's a lot of literature on Waterloo, that epoch-ending battle that finally brought the Napoleonic era to a definite full-stop. And a surprising amount of that literature is very good. But for me this is right up there with the best. A massive account - about 1,000 pages of narrative (that's not including notes, etc.) - that gave me huge pleasure to read, and has left me feeling far better informed on this fascinating chapter in European history.
October 8, 2023
The Great Battle Reviewed...
The second volume of what is perhaps the most authoritative work on the final campaign of the Napoleonic Wars, this second book covers the great battle itself, and its aftermath, impact and legacy, in great detail. Highly recommended!
Grade: A-
The second volume of what is perhaps the most authoritative work on the final campaign of the Napoleonic Wars, this second book covers the great battle itself, and its aftermath, impact and legacy, in great detail. Highly recommended!
Grade: A-
March 23, 2021
A companion to the first Volume. Well written. The strength of the book is not in the description of the battle.
Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews