Beyond the Beach examines the Allied air war against France, especially from April through June 1944. During this period, General Dwight David Eisenhower, as Allied Supreme Commander, took control of all American, British, and Canadian air units, including the heavy bombers of RAF Bomber Command and the United States Army Strategic Air Forces. Rather than employ these aerial systems in a strategic manner, attacking targets deep in Germany, he used them for his own tactical and operational purposes. Employing bombers as, virtually, his long-range artillery he, through his air staff and commanders, directed the destruction of bridges, rail centers, ports, military installations, and even French towns, with the intent of preventing German reinforcements from interfering with Operation Neptune, the Allied landings on the Normandy beaches. This intense bombing operation, conducted against a friendly occupied state, resulted in a swath of physical and human destruction across northwest France. Ultimately, this air offensive resulted in the death of over 60,000 French civilians and an immense amount of damage to towns, churches, buildings, and works of art.
This book explores, therefore the relationship between ground and air operations and its effects on the French population. It begins by considering the three broad groups the air operations involved: the occupied French, the occupying Germans, and Eisenhower's headquarters. It then examines the doctrine and equipment used by Allied air force leaders to implement the supreme commander's plans. Next, it examines each of the eight major operations, called lines of effort, that coordinated the employment of the thousands of fighters, medium bombers, and heavy bombers that prowled the French skies that spring and summer of 1944. Each of these sections discusses the operation's purpose, conduct, and effects upon both the military and the civilian targets. Finally, the book explores short and long term effects of these operations and argues that this ignored narrative should be part of any history of the D-Day landings.
Whatever other purpose this study serves it shines much-needed light on a subject that has mostly been glossed over; the collateral damage wrought by the USAAF and the RAF on friendly civilian populations in the pursuit of victory in the European Theater of Operation. While the more hard-hearted might shrug and simply say such is the cost of total war, Bourque notes that when one contemplates the prickliness of American relations with post-1945 France, it's easy to believe that 60000-to-70000 dead (due to the campaigns against transportation and the German Vengeance Weapon installations) contributed to a sense of bad faith.
Most damning from Bourque's perspective was Bernard Montgomery's insistence that "choke points" were needed as barriers to German counter-offensives on D-Day, obstacles created by leveling a perimeter of towns on key roads via area bombing, and which Dwight Eisenhower gave his ground force commander total support on. The sad thing is that obliterating these communities seemed to bring no operational benefit whatsoever; "destroying the village to save it" indeed. Call this another corrective to the still prevalent "good war" narrative; at least I've always wondered about target towns such as St. Lo (at least since the 1970s), and the fate of the local people caught in the maelstrom.
That I don't give this work the full five stars is a function of less-than-sparkling prose and the sense that better books are to come on this side of World War II. One has to start somewhere though.