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On the way to language
In this volume Martin Heidegger confronts the philosophical problems of language and begins to unfold the meaning behind his famous and little understood phrase 'Language is the House of Being.' On the Way to Language enables readers to understand how central language became to Heidegger's analysis of the nature of Being. On the Way to Language demonstrates that an interest in the meaning of language is one of the strongest bonds between analytic philosophy and Heidegger.
200 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 1959
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About the author
Martin Heidegger
517 books3,240 followersMartin Heidegger (1889-1976) was a German philosopher whose work is perhaps most readily associated with phenomenology and existentialism, although his thinking should be identified as part of such philosophical movements only with extreme care and qualification. His ideas have exerted a seminal influence on the development of contemporary European philosophy. They have also had an impact far beyond philosophy, for example in architectural theory (see e.g., Sharr 2007), literary criticism (see e.g., Ziarek 1989), theology (see e.g., Caputo 1993), psychotherapy (see e.g., Binswanger 1943/1964, Guignon 1993) and cognitive science (see e.g., Dreyfus 1992, 2008; Wheeler 2005; Kiverstein and Wheeler forthcoming).
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April 6, 2022
Naming the Unknown
The first part of On the Way to Language is a discursive fictional dialogue between Heidegger and an unnamed Japanese professor. The ostensible subject of the dialogue is the meaning of the Japanese word Iki and the possibility of its translation into German. The word refers to an aesthetic embodied in things like minimalist Japanese gardens and the extremely arcane symbolism of No theatre. If I read the piece correctly the conclusion is that such translation is almost ( but not quite) impossible.
In the first instance the word Iki is defined by and in the context of all other Japanese words. Therefore the entire Japanese vocabulary would have to be incorporated into the German language. But, even more fundamentally, those wishing to understand the meaning of the word would also have to participate in the mundane details of Japanese social life. Essentially they would have to become Japanese.
But I think there is also further significance to this short piece. Heidegger was a contemporary of the tremendously influential Swiss theologian, Karl Barth. Heidegger was a philosopher with an acute but largely silent engagement with Christian theology. Barth had started publishing his massive 13 volume treatise, Church Dogmatics, in the early 1930’s just after Heidegger’s seminal Being and Time, his initial work on thinking about thinking. The content of A Dialogue on Language appears to me not only a clarification of Being and Time but also an implicit refutation of Barth.
Barth’s work is in fact more anti-philosophical than it is theological. He says comparatively little about the historical doctrine of Christianity and concentrates mainly on the inadequacy of reason when confronting the certainty of faith. In this sense, Barth is an irrationalist who condemns the impertinence as well as the impiety of philosophers who have tried to reconcile faith and reason. He cites numerous paradoxes and contradictions in Christianity - original sin, divine justice, the Incarnation, and divine omnipotence, among others - as impenetrable to human thought. He sees these not as flaws to be defended but as marks of true revelation. For him, reason is untrustworthy and knowledge is incoherent.
Heidegger’s dialogue confronts Barth’s fideistic defence of Christianity head on in a highly creative way. He starts by undermining Barth’s concept of rationality. Rationality is a commitment to dialogue not a process of logic for Heidegger. In fact, the flaws of reason are even more profound than they are for Barth. According to Heidegger, we never know what we are talking about at all. Words take on meaning from other words. And therefore meaning is in a constant state of flux. Pushed far enough to defend any position or opinion, we will eventually be forced to recognise entirely circular reasoning which is likely contrary to any historical reasoning using similar words.
Heidegger even goes beyond Barth in insisting that we never are able to acquire knowledge - not just of God but of anything at all - by seeking it. Heidegger’s dramatic claim (contrary to all pragmatism) is that our own selfish interests get in the way of learning:
This apparent concession to Barth is, however, followed by a strategic attack. Heidegger claims that we talk in order to find out what we mean by the words we are using. Heidegger’s Japanese interlocutor in the dialogue points out that language conceals as much as it reveals, thus hiding reality. As he says “We recognize that the danger lies in the concealed nature of language.” Heidegger agrees and replies:
In short, we can only avoid the dangerous trap of taking language literally by talking about things interminably in order to discover what we’re taking about (much like pragmatism). To arbitrarily cut this process of discovery off results in a form of idolatry - the divinisation of language itself (and of course the rationalisation of our own interests). The dialogue explains this rather un-European point of view: “We Japanese do not think it strange if a dialogue leaves undefined what is really intended, or even restores it back to the keeping of the undefinable.” That which is not language is thereby respected, including, of course, Barth’s “wholly other” God.
For Barth, however, the term ‘God’ is not part of language at all. It is “a denotation without connotation.” That is to say, it has no connections with any other words. It is something that really cannot be talked about at all (although he spends more than 1000 pages talking about it). But if it can’t be talked about (and Barth recognises the inadequacy of even biblical narratives; see https://www.goodreads.com/review/show...), then it is an empty cipher with no content. This is the ultimate heresy, not only because it makes God (or Jesus Christ) a meaningless symbol, but also because revelation itself is rendered suspect by its own revelation.
Thus Heidegger’s little Socratic dialogue has a theological as well as philosophical significance. It attacks Barthian fideism on its own terms and shows how it contains a fatal impiety. Naming the unknown is what we do everyday. It is when we stop thinking we need to reconsider what we have named - for example by establishing fixed dogmatic formulas - that we become the most blasphemous.
The first part of On the Way to Language is a discursive fictional dialogue between Heidegger and an unnamed Japanese professor. The ostensible subject of the dialogue is the meaning of the Japanese word Iki and the possibility of its translation into German. The word refers to an aesthetic embodied in things like minimalist Japanese gardens and the extremely arcane symbolism of No theatre. If I read the piece correctly the conclusion is that such translation is almost ( but not quite) impossible.
In the first instance the word Iki is defined by and in the context of all other Japanese words. Therefore the entire Japanese vocabulary would have to be incorporated into the German language. But, even more fundamentally, those wishing to understand the meaning of the word would also have to participate in the mundane details of Japanese social life. Essentially they would have to become Japanese.
But I think there is also further significance to this short piece. Heidegger was a contemporary of the tremendously influential Swiss theologian, Karl Barth. Heidegger was a philosopher with an acute but largely silent engagement with Christian theology. Barth had started publishing his massive 13 volume treatise, Church Dogmatics, in the early 1930’s just after Heidegger’s seminal Being and Time, his initial work on thinking about thinking. The content of A Dialogue on Language appears to me not only a clarification of Being and Time but also an implicit refutation of Barth.
Barth’s work is in fact more anti-philosophical than it is theological. He says comparatively little about the historical doctrine of Christianity and concentrates mainly on the inadequacy of reason when confronting the certainty of faith. In this sense, Barth is an irrationalist who condemns the impertinence as well as the impiety of philosophers who have tried to reconcile faith and reason. He cites numerous paradoxes and contradictions in Christianity - original sin, divine justice, the Incarnation, and divine omnipotence, among others - as impenetrable to human thought. He sees these not as flaws to be defended but as marks of true revelation. For him, reason is untrustworthy and knowledge is incoherent.
Heidegger’s dialogue confronts Barth’s fideistic defence of Christianity head on in a highly creative way. He starts by undermining Barth’s concept of rationality. Rationality is a commitment to dialogue not a process of logic for Heidegger. In fact, the flaws of reason are even more profound than they are for Barth. According to Heidegger, we never know what we are talking about at all. Words take on meaning from other words. And therefore meaning is in a constant state of flux. Pushed far enough to defend any position or opinion, we will eventually be forced to recognise entirely circular reasoning which is likely contrary to any historical reasoning using similar words.
Heidegger even goes beyond Barth in insisting that we never are able to acquire knowledge - not just of God but of anything at all - by seeking it. Heidegger’s dramatic claim (contrary to all pragmatism) is that our own selfish interests get in the way of learning:
“Thirst for knowledge and greed for explanations never lead to a thinking inquiry. Curiosity is always the concealed arrogance of a self-consciousness that banks on a self invented ratio and its rationality. The will to know does not will to abide in hope before what is worthy of thought.”
This apparent concession to Barth is, however, followed by a strategic attack. Heidegger claims that we talk in order to find out what we mean by the words we are using. Heidegger’s Japanese interlocutor in the dialogue points out that language conceals as much as it reveals, thus hiding reality. As he says “We recognize that the danger lies in the concealed nature of language.” Heidegger agrees and replies:
“I believe, of every dialogue that has turned out well between thinking beings… as if of its own accord, it can take care that that undefinable something not only does not slip away, but displays its gathering force ever more luminously in the course of the dialogue.”
In short, we can only avoid the dangerous trap of taking language literally by talking about things interminably in order to discover what we’re taking about (much like pragmatism). To arbitrarily cut this process of discovery off results in a form of idolatry - the divinisation of language itself (and of course the rationalisation of our own interests). The dialogue explains this rather un-European point of view: “We Japanese do not think it strange if a dialogue leaves undefined what is really intended, or even restores it back to the keeping of the undefinable.” That which is not language is thereby respected, including, of course, Barth’s “wholly other” God.
For Barth, however, the term ‘God’ is not part of language at all. It is “a denotation without connotation.” That is to say, it has no connections with any other words. It is something that really cannot be talked about at all (although he spends more than 1000 pages talking about it). But if it can’t be talked about (and Barth recognises the inadequacy of even biblical narratives; see https://www.goodreads.com/review/show...), then it is an empty cipher with no content. This is the ultimate heresy, not only because it makes God (or Jesus Christ) a meaningless symbol, but also because revelation itself is rendered suspect by its own revelation.
Thus Heidegger’s little Socratic dialogue has a theological as well as philosophical significance. It attacks Barthian fideism on its own terms and shows how it contains a fatal impiety. Naming the unknown is what we do everyday. It is when we stop thinking we need to reconsider what we have named - for example by establishing fixed dogmatic formulas - that we become the most blasphemous.
January 23, 2023
Language must be defended against metaphysics, argues Heidegger here; as any thinking and ideas-forming inevitably fall into metaphysics. Language is also under the continuous attack of metaphysics in the form of logic, logistics, linguistics, artificial languages, and so on. Moreover, approaching and speaking of language directly turns language into an object. As such, “the way to language” should be indirect and in the form of a never settling dialogue. “The way” is the method here; not as done in science and as ridiculed by Nietzsche as taking over the science itself, but in the experience of going along a particular way - like in a dialogue. As mortals, we cannot step outside language and capture its essence in some concept; but this is a favor and an advantage we have over gods.
For Heidegger, the essential being of language is saying as showing. Showing is always in close kinship with what it shows, and is not separated - as it is represented in the modern distinction between a sign and its signification. Saying as showing, simply means to just let something appear. Behind all this and as the moving force, is owning or appropriation of the language by the Being itself. Heidegger shows all these at length in several poems in this book; especially in how a word allows a thing to presence as a thing.
For Heidegger, the essential being of language is saying as showing. Showing is always in close kinship with what it shows, and is not separated - as it is represented in the modern distinction between a sign and its signification. Saying as showing, simply means to just let something appear. Behind all this and as the moving force, is owning or appropriation of the language by the Being itself. Heidegger shows all these at length in several poems in this book; especially in how a word allows a thing to presence as a thing.
April 6, 2021
Que belo livro! Aliás, belíssimo! A escrita de Heidegger flui de uma maneira suave, cristalina, poética e doce. Este livro aborda a «genealogia» das coisas belas, nomeadamente da poesia; este tema é muito recorrente na obra de Heidegger. Os poetas são os grandes artesãos da imortalidade.
Heidegger analisa de forma magistral alguns poemas de G. Trakl e Stefan George [dois colossos da poesia], há um diálogo no livro muito bom [diálogo entre um Japonês e o Pensador (Heidegger)], incluindo ainda importantes reflexões acerca do mistério das palavras.
Explicar mais, seria privar o futuro leitor da surpresa que é encontrar um livro tão íntimo e tão profundo.
Para quem leu «as palavras e as coisas» de M. Foucault, poderá encontrar neste livro uma reflexão totalmente diferente, menos complexa em teoria e mais rica em sentimento. Uma obra indispensável.
Muito bom.
*
"A linguagem é a casa do ser."
"Somente quando se encontra a palavra para a coisa, a coisa é coisa."
"Pois falar da linguagem seja ainda pior do que escrever sobre o silêncio."
"É a fala quotidiana que consiste num poema esquecido e desgastado, que quase não mais ressoa."
Heidegger analisa de forma magistral alguns poemas de G. Trakl e Stefan George [dois colossos da poesia], há um diálogo no livro muito bom [diálogo entre um Japonês e o Pensador (Heidegger)], incluindo ainda importantes reflexões acerca do mistério das palavras.
Explicar mais, seria privar o futuro leitor da surpresa que é encontrar um livro tão íntimo e tão profundo.
Para quem leu «as palavras e as coisas» de M. Foucault, poderá encontrar neste livro uma reflexão totalmente diferente, menos complexa em teoria e mais rica em sentimento. Uma obra indispensável.
Muito bom.
*
"A linguagem é a casa do ser."
"Somente quando se encontra a palavra para a coisa, a coisa é coisa."
"Pois falar da linguagem seja ainda pior do que escrever sobre o silêncio."
"É a fala quotidiana que consiste num poema esquecido e desgastado, que quase não mais ressoa."
September 1, 2019
Extremely challenging, which was to be expected. I did find it fascinating and despite my hope for an apolitical reading, I stand in agreement with even Richard Wolin that Heidegger must have been a mesmerizing lecturer. I found the reading of George and Trakl to be most intriguing though I fear my binding will suffer as does my appropriation. Not sure what this will engender.
March 19, 2020
Throughout this reading experience, I swung between the view that this late Heidegger is a total scam / fake mystic; and the view that he has profound insights that break from all that we typically and traditionally believe -- and the radical newness of this, as well as the content of these insights, simply require such obscure, indirect writing. I'm still not sure which view is correct. Overall, I am both frustrated and impressed.
These were the ideas I could pick up. Language is not what we typically think it is. It's easy to point to our literal vocabularies and conversational practices and call that language. But Heidegger understands the essential function of language as disclosing or showing things -- of letting things become present to us in our experience. (Heidegger does not explicitly distinguish language from other modes of making things present, such as perception; at some places he seems to imply that the things that language makes present are those that were formally absent, and perhaps the notion of absence is defined relative to perceptual presences). One can imagine that there are various observable behaviors, practices, or tools one could rely on to carry out this function. The vocabularies and practices that we typically identify as language do not reflect anything essential about language, and this identification is misleads us from the quest to discover the nature of language.
In letting things be shown, language does not consist in signs, and it does not possess meanings that are signified by those signs. According to Heidegger, this function of showing is more primordial or fundamental. Hediegger, unfortunately does not go into detail regarding the difference between his view and this semiotic view. I would love to see that; for example, it seems that two differences include that things shown aren't atomic, individuatable items like signified meanings are, and that things shown cannot be formally correlated with certain linguistic items, as signified meanings can. There are probably many more differences; the metaphor of disclosure/showing, this activity or movement, evokes a whole new way of thinking about linguistic meaning than the metaphor of two things joined, like two sides of a coin, which implicitly underlies the traditional view.
Moreover, we do not simply select the words we speak, or start off with our own intentions and express them by using language. Heidegger also understands language is be a cultural phenomenon, an immense body of all the ways communities have disclosed things, have come to make things present. He uses the metaphor of making paths through a field of snow. Once paths are made, they are part of the world, and exist independently of their makers; and while they constrain the movements of other people, they can alter these paths, too. Heidegger does not make this explicit, but he seems to understand language as essentially consisting of all the ways one ought to attend to and make meaning of things, and of all those things, that are relevant to the community that has used and developed that language. So, when we speak, we are like mere vessels or instruments that language uses to make itself known. Heidegger likes being mystical and uses imagery like this. We don't use language, but language uses us.
There's an especially lovely part (unfortunately it's just a few paragraphs) where Heidegger introduces an idea about the relation between speaking and listening. Typically, we might think that these are opposing activities; when we speak, we are not listening, and vice-versa. Heidegger, in contrast, claims that speaking and listening always happen simultaneously. To be able to speak at all, we must be able to "listen" to language itself -- it is not clear what Heidegger means by this, but perhaps it's something along the lines that we must have an encultured, deep familiarity with a language, and the possible intentions and expressions we form are given to us by language, by the social norms and regular patterns of linguistic activity that people in our community perform.
Heidegger doesn't actually go into what he means by that when we listen, we are also speaking; I can imagine that in order to be able to comprehend another's speech, we must be, in a non-literal, non-vocal way, speaking her own intentions alongside with her. This is how conversational partners can be attuned to the same ideas, coordinate, and carry out conversation. Heidegger gives this lovely description: to speak to one another is "to entrust one another mutually to what is shown."
All these ideas I've listed are found in the one lecture "The Way to Language." There are 5 pieces total in this collection, and other 4 parts either merely repeat these ideas, but in less clear ways; or, they seem to be stuffed with vacuous obscurantist passages, the source of my frustration with this book. There was a surprising large proportion of this book (maybe half of it?) that is just Heidegger's analysis of poems by some German dudes of his time. These analyses are supposed to demonstrate his points about language, but I often couldn't see how they related to any of his substantial ideas. It felt like filler to me, or Heidegger indulging himself without caring about whether his words amount to anything meaningful to students.
To readers interested in late Heidegger's views on language, I'd highly recommend (1) The Fall of Language: Benjamin and Wittgenstein on Meaning by Alexander Stern, and (2) The Language Animal by Charles Taylor. These books are a joy to read, and they offer immensely clear, detailed, and well-argued-for elaborations on these ideas that Heidegger attempts to bring up.
These were the ideas I could pick up. Language is not what we typically think it is. It's easy to point to our literal vocabularies and conversational practices and call that language. But Heidegger understands the essential function of language as disclosing or showing things -- of letting things become present to us in our experience. (Heidegger does not explicitly distinguish language from other modes of making things present, such as perception; at some places he seems to imply that the things that language makes present are those that were formally absent, and perhaps the notion of absence is defined relative to perceptual presences). One can imagine that there are various observable behaviors, practices, or tools one could rely on to carry out this function. The vocabularies and practices that we typically identify as language do not reflect anything essential about language, and this identification is misleads us from the quest to discover the nature of language.
In letting things be shown, language does not consist in signs, and it does not possess meanings that are signified by those signs. According to Heidegger, this function of showing is more primordial or fundamental. Hediegger, unfortunately does not go into detail regarding the difference between his view and this semiotic view. I would love to see that; for example, it seems that two differences include that things shown aren't atomic, individuatable items like signified meanings are, and that things shown cannot be formally correlated with certain linguistic items, as signified meanings can. There are probably many more differences; the metaphor of disclosure/showing, this activity or movement, evokes a whole new way of thinking about linguistic meaning than the metaphor of two things joined, like two sides of a coin, which implicitly underlies the traditional view.
Moreover, we do not simply select the words we speak, or start off with our own intentions and express them by using language. Heidegger also understands language is be a cultural phenomenon, an immense body of all the ways communities have disclosed things, have come to make things present. He uses the metaphor of making paths through a field of snow. Once paths are made, they are part of the world, and exist independently of their makers; and while they constrain the movements of other people, they can alter these paths, too. Heidegger does not make this explicit, but he seems to understand language as essentially consisting of all the ways one ought to attend to and make meaning of things, and of all those things, that are relevant to the community that has used and developed that language. So, when we speak, we are like mere vessels or instruments that language uses to make itself known. Heidegger likes being mystical and uses imagery like this. We don't use language, but language uses us.
There's an especially lovely part (unfortunately it's just a few paragraphs) where Heidegger introduces an idea about the relation between speaking and listening. Typically, we might think that these are opposing activities; when we speak, we are not listening, and vice-versa. Heidegger, in contrast, claims that speaking and listening always happen simultaneously. To be able to speak at all, we must be able to "listen" to language itself -- it is not clear what Heidegger means by this, but perhaps it's something along the lines that we must have an encultured, deep familiarity with a language, and the possible intentions and expressions we form are given to us by language, by the social norms and regular patterns of linguistic activity that people in our community perform.
Heidegger doesn't actually go into what he means by that when we listen, we are also speaking; I can imagine that in order to be able to comprehend another's speech, we must be, in a non-literal, non-vocal way, speaking her own intentions alongside with her. This is how conversational partners can be attuned to the same ideas, coordinate, and carry out conversation. Heidegger gives this lovely description: to speak to one another is "to entrust one another mutually to what is shown."
All these ideas I've listed are found in the one lecture "The Way to Language." There are 5 pieces total in this collection, and other 4 parts either merely repeat these ideas, but in less clear ways; or, they seem to be stuffed with vacuous obscurantist passages, the source of my frustration with this book. There was a surprising large proportion of this book (maybe half of it?) that is just Heidegger's analysis of poems by some German dudes of his time. These analyses are supposed to demonstrate his points about language, but I often couldn't see how they related to any of his substantial ideas. It felt like filler to me, or Heidegger indulging himself without caring about whether his words amount to anything meaningful to students.
To readers interested in late Heidegger's views on language, I'd highly recommend (1) The Fall of Language: Benjamin and Wittgenstein on Meaning by Alexander Stern, and (2) The Language Animal by Charles Taylor. These books are a joy to read, and they offer immensely clear, detailed, and well-argued-for elaborations on these ideas that Heidegger attempts to bring up.
February 2, 2017
To read Heidegger is like reading his thoughts - a bit in a stream-of-consciousness way, but with more order and structure. He has a tendency to start off from a simple position and then just go completely mad. And I always feel this madness rising in myself too. It is hard to describe; it isn't as if I was reading just words, printed black on white paper, it is always a direct connection to what Heidegger really thinks or tried to think. Many of his shorter works are like Marvin Gaye's songs, where the ending sequences slide in very naturally from the themes in the beginning and middle of the song and just blow my mind (like the last 1:30 minutes of Please Stay).
Anyway, enough about the general things. On the Way to Language consists of two texts: the first one is about a poem of Trakl. It gets a bit weird at first as he mostly worked with Hölderlin's and Rilkes' texts, but you soon get to see how he makes the poem fit his intentions neatly. It is one of his strongest explanations of one of his general ideas, the driving force of the Ab-Grund, lying in the middle of two opposing things, which always need, produce, create each other in barely describable nor thinkable circles. This relation between things, its presence and its absence, both at the same time, are what makes Heideggers way of thinking so fascinating. Oh and did I mention that he goes completely nuts in his interpretation of Trakl's poem? In just the exact way that I tried to explain above - it feels like absorbing a strong drug into your very brain while reading.
The following dialogue with a japanese man follows a very similar theme. There it is revealed, what I long expected while reading Heidegger: there is a heavy link between his way of thinking and the ancienct asian one. After a crazy discussion they conclude in a metaphorical and mysterious description of what language is - coming from two sides, asian philosophy from the one side and Heidegger from the other.
These are rather short texts bei Heidegger which will aid you understanding what he is trying to say and reach in his other texts - although I'm not sure if you should read this one first. Maybe no. Or maybe yes? I guess Heidegger would say both and neither at the same time.
Anyway, enough about the general things. On the Way to Language consists of two texts: the first one is about a poem of Trakl. It gets a bit weird at first as he mostly worked with Hölderlin's and Rilkes' texts, but you soon get to see how he makes the poem fit his intentions neatly. It is one of his strongest explanations of one of his general ideas, the driving force of the Ab-Grund, lying in the middle of two opposing things, which always need, produce, create each other in barely describable nor thinkable circles. This relation between things, its presence and its absence, both at the same time, are what makes Heideggers way of thinking so fascinating. Oh and did I mention that he goes completely nuts in his interpretation of Trakl's poem? In just the exact way that I tried to explain above - it feels like absorbing a strong drug into your very brain while reading.
The following dialogue with a japanese man follows a very similar theme. There it is revealed, what I long expected while reading Heidegger: there is a heavy link between his way of thinking and the ancienct asian one. After a crazy discussion they conclude in a metaphorical and mysterious description of what language is - coming from two sides, asian philosophy from the one side and Heidegger from the other.
These are rather short texts bei Heidegger which will aid you understanding what he is trying to say and reach in his other texts - although I'm not sure if you should read this one first. Maybe no. Or maybe yes? I guess Heidegger would say both and neither at the same time.
August 28, 2007
I expected this to be slow-going, a heavy and heady read of another philosopher. In fact, and maybe this is in part due to the translation, but only in part, I found the reading of this collection of essays on Language and poetry and poetic thought to be fun, inviting reflection in ways that was engaging and constantly pulling me farther, forward into the essays rather than--as is often the case for me when reading philo--making me stop for months of reflction before getting to the next pages. The styles of the essays are varied, from imagined dialogues to a line-by line close readings on german poetry, all equally satisfying. If you are studying poetry, German thought, wish to reflect on how Eastern and Western thought on language differs or is similar, or are a Holderlin or George fan, this book is for you!
Read
February 11, 2010yeah this book booked the hellouta me. several holy moments, several hours into reading, would grasp me and pull me all the way in ... but reading this from the outside is torture
July 5, 2019
This book functions as a running commentary on Heidegger’s famous line: “Language is the house of being.” It begins with a 50 page dialogue between himself and a Japanese student on the limits of language. Quite fascinating, actually. Heidegger talks about his studies with Husserl and how Being and Time was received. It then examines some difficult (!) themes in Being and Time.
(It might help to read Dugin’s intro to Heidegger. He captures Heidegger’s philosophy of language far better than I can. http://www.4pt.su/en/content/encounte... ).
Some notes from Dugin:
a) Heidegger wants to “clear” the field of language, to free it from any shackles that the older metaphysics might have placed on it.
The problem: language itself rests upon a metaphysical distinction between the sensuous and the suprasensuous. There is sound and script and the signifier. How do the two relate? Heidegger offers tentative suggestions--nothing more--that words function more than simply signifiers. They are hints. Maybe we need a word stronger than “hint.”
One of the problems with “the house of Being” is that the “being” of language isn’t itself linguistic (24). Not yet, anyway. I think the Christian metaphysician has an angle on this: The Logos himself structures both being and language.
The two-fold of being. This is “Being” and “beings.”
“Our thinking today is to think what the Greeks thought in an even more Greek manner” (39). Is “to be present” the same thing as “appearance?” This is unconcealment, a clearing. Heidegger is trying to get beyond the subject-object duality into a manner of being that takes the objective back into the subjective. So what could be that “object?” At this point Heidegger suggests the message. As Christians we could see echoes of the Word speaking to us.
Lagniappe
What does “Being” mean? There is a difference between “the Being of beings” and “Being” as “Being.” The latter means the “clearing” of Truth.
Heidegger never intended “nothingness” to function as a cipher for nihilism (19).
When Heidegger spoke of “overcoming metaphysics,” he wasn’t intending to do away with metaphysics. He simply wanted to place it within its own limits (Heidegger 20).
Experience refers the object back to the subject (36).
We aren’t speaking about language; we are speaking from language. This makes the speaking a dialogue. Here we bring back the connection of hermeneutics, of the Messenger with the message. The messenger comes from the message (actually a very good explanation of the Christian kerygma).
The Nature of Language
To undergo an experience with language is to submit to the claims of that language (57). We must rid ourselves of the habit of always hearing what we already understand.
The older streams of analytic philosophy sought to make a technical super-language. Whether that’s feasible or not (it isn’t), knowing all the details about a language still leaves with one unknown: the very experiencing of the language. Yet this raises another question: can language give you everything about that language? It seems it cannot. It seems language is always holding back something. This is what gives rise to poetry: the poet seeks to point beyond himself.
Heidegger has some remarks on his earlier essay “Building, Dwelling, Thinking.” To understand this--if we ever do--we need to know what Heidegger means by “nearness.” The World--the totality of things--has four regions: earth, sky, mortals, and “divinities” (not really gods, close to Platonic forms, but Heidegger wouldn’t dare say that). The “nearness” is a movement that holds the four regions together (104ff).
Nearness is a refusal for things to be “locked in” at “calculated distances.” What does that mean? The best way is to illustrate the ancient and medieval architecture that “moved with nature and landscapes” compared with the grisly horrors of Bauhaus architecture today. We are resisting the “reign of quantity,” to borrow a phrase from Rene Guenon.
Conclusion
The opening dialogue was fascinating. His essay “The Nature of Language” made interesting suggestions, but as is often the case with Heidegger, one wasn’t sure what his overall point was. His essay “Words” repeated a lot from “The Nature of Language.”
(It might help to read Dugin’s intro to Heidegger. He captures Heidegger’s philosophy of language far better than I can. http://www.4pt.su/en/content/encounte... ).
Some notes from Dugin:
a) Heidegger wants to “clear” the field of language, to free it from any shackles that the older metaphysics might have placed on it.
The problem: language itself rests upon a metaphysical distinction between the sensuous and the suprasensuous. There is sound and script and the signifier. How do the two relate? Heidegger offers tentative suggestions--nothing more--that words function more than simply signifiers. They are hints. Maybe we need a word stronger than “hint.”
One of the problems with “the house of Being” is that the “being” of language isn’t itself linguistic (24). Not yet, anyway. I think the Christian metaphysician has an angle on this: The Logos himself structures both being and language.
The two-fold of being. This is “Being” and “beings.”
“Our thinking today is to think what the Greeks thought in an even more Greek manner” (39). Is “to be present” the same thing as “appearance?” This is unconcealment, a clearing. Heidegger is trying to get beyond the subject-object duality into a manner of being that takes the objective back into the subjective. So what could be that “object?” At this point Heidegger suggests the message. As Christians we could see echoes of the Word speaking to us.
Lagniappe
What does “Being” mean? There is a difference between “the Being of beings” and “Being” as “Being.” The latter means the “clearing” of Truth.
Heidegger never intended “nothingness” to function as a cipher for nihilism (19).
When Heidegger spoke of “overcoming metaphysics,” he wasn’t intending to do away with metaphysics. He simply wanted to place it within its own limits (Heidegger 20).
Experience refers the object back to the subject (36).
We aren’t speaking about language; we are speaking from language. This makes the speaking a dialogue. Here we bring back the connection of hermeneutics, of the Messenger with the message. The messenger comes from the message (actually a very good explanation of the Christian kerygma).
The Nature of Language
To undergo an experience with language is to submit to the claims of that language (57). We must rid ourselves of the habit of always hearing what we already understand.
The older streams of analytic philosophy sought to make a technical super-language. Whether that’s feasible or not (it isn’t), knowing all the details about a language still leaves with one unknown: the very experiencing of the language. Yet this raises another question: can language give you everything about that language? It seems it cannot. It seems language is always holding back something. This is what gives rise to poetry: the poet seeks to point beyond himself.
Heidegger has some remarks on his earlier essay “Building, Dwelling, Thinking.” To understand this--if we ever do--we need to know what Heidegger means by “nearness.” The World--the totality of things--has four regions: earth, sky, mortals, and “divinities” (not really gods, close to Platonic forms, but Heidegger wouldn’t dare say that). The “nearness” is a movement that holds the four regions together (104ff).
Nearness is a refusal for things to be “locked in” at “calculated distances.” What does that mean? The best way is to illustrate the ancient and medieval architecture that “moved with nature and landscapes” compared with the grisly horrors of Bauhaus architecture today. We are resisting the “reign of quantity,” to borrow a phrase from Rene Guenon.
Conclusion
The opening dialogue was fascinating. His essay “The Nature of Language” made interesting suggestions, but as is often the case with Heidegger, one wasn’t sure what his overall point was. His essay “Words” repeated a lot from “The Nature of Language.”
October 17, 2013
The best evidence for my belief that Heidegger's and Wittgenstein's theories of language are intertwined....
December 10, 2019
Several months ago, I purchased this paperback in a used bookstore in Florence, AL. I started reading it and finished most of it, then put it down for several months. I picked it back up a few days ago and finished it. I don't fully recall the middle chapters, so I'm only going to discuss the first and last chapters, "A Dialogue On Language" and "Language In The Poem." "A Dialogue On Language" is a discussion between a Westerner and a Japanese person. As I recall, they talk about the differences between Eastern and Western languages. It occurred to me that because the alphabets are so drastically different, it would be hard to translate Eastern language into Western language, and vice-versa. Each are saying things that the other can't possibly understand. I see this when I read various translations of Tao Te Ching. "Language In The Poem" talks about ambiguity in poetry. I haven't read much poetry and am unfamiliar with it, so I thought I wouldn't get much out of this chapter; I was wrong. Heidegger's writing about the poetry is ambiguous itself, and it sparked my imagination to fill in the gaps. This book may have gotten 5 stars if the middle chapters were not slightly less amazing than the bookends.
July 19, 2014
Right, so this is an extremely challenging collection, Heidegger's examination of language is definitely key to his overall way of thinking, which is probably why it's so hard to get at, for a lot of these he seems more interested in pointing the way towards a meaningful inquiry than actually trying to engage and wrestle with one. And while some of these seemed sort of non-comittal, they certainly have no lack of things to say about the phenomenon itself, and a lot of what they do say seems to tie back into itself in a sort of philosophic feedback loop. If that sounds vague, it's because largely I couldn't get my mind around what he was trying to do in these essays. I felta lot less confident about what he's trying to pursue here than I do about the stuff in 'Poetry, Language, Thought.' Even taking them at just 5-10 pages a day, I think I'll need to go through these again some time later on before I can get a definite sense of them.
June 22, 2012
Ich habe Stunden und Tagen verbracht an jeder Zeile. Es hat mich wirklich bezaubert, wie Heidegger mit den Wörtern gespielt hat. Eine echte Kunstwerk für jemand, der Interesse an übersetzen und Philosophie hat. Unbedingt auf Deutsch lesen!
September 5, 2024
Хайдеггер предлагает рассматривать язык как своего рода голос богов: он может исходить от разных людей, но это не меняет того факта, что человек принадлежит языку, а не язык человеку. Таким образом, речь понимается как слушание языка: "Мы допускаем его беззвучному голосу прийти, вызывая уже имеющийся у нас наготове звук, зовя его достаточным образом к нему самому". При этом, следует стремиться не к пустому говорению, а к про-явлению языка в сказанном.
Затрагивается проблема вторжения в естес��венный язык технически-исчисляющего измерения, которое названо по-став. Именно он ответственен за стремление всё формализовать, переписать и в точности представить. Но Хайдеггер заявляет: естественное не подлежит всесторонней формализации. Более того, язык в естественной форме сам по себе перманентно осуществляет саботаж существу современной техники, озаряющей молнией вырывая всё присутствующее из простой поставимости.
Комментируя своё известную цитату о языке как доме бытия, Хайдеггер соглашается, с тем, что языки не просто различны между собою, но исходят в корне из разного существа - "так что диалог между домами оказывается почти невозможным".
Стиль весьма своеобразный, но если держать в уме фразу Хайдеггера о том, что "всякая осмысливающая мысль есть поэзия, а всякая поэзия — мысль", то чтение может стать плодотворным.
Затрагивается проблема вторжения в естес��венный язык технически-исчисляющего измерения, которое названо по-став. Именно он ответственен за стремление всё формализовать, переписать и в точности представить. Но Хайдеггер заявляет: естественное не подлежит всесторонней формализации. Более того, язык в естественной форме сам по себе перманентно осуществляет саботаж существу современной техники, озаряющей молнией вырывая всё присутствующее из простой поставимости.
Комментируя своё известную цитату о языке как доме бытия, Хайдеггер соглашается, с тем, что языки не просто различны между собою, но исходят в корне из разного существа - "так что диалог между домами оказывается почти невозможным".
Стиль весьма своеобразный, но если держать в уме фразу Хайдеггера о том, что "всякая осмысливающая мысль есть поэзия, а всякая поэзия — мысль", то чтение может стать плодотворным.
November 12, 2014
I really enjoyed the dialogue in the beginning, and I find Heidegger's thinking (he would say thinking, since he disliked calling it philosophy) fascinating as always. Since I love poetry -- one of my majors is creative writing -- I liked to see what he thought of poetry and language in general. Many of his ideas from Being and Time show up in his dialogue and lectures, but the most important part of Heidegger's corpus to know for this book is his essay entitled "Letter on Humanism." It is in this letter that he brings up the idea of language as the house of Being.
All in all, this is one of the more understandable works I've read of Heidegger's. I am not sure I agree with his ideas as I find him to be a little atavistic in thinking. For example, he speaks of the race to the moon as a tremendously evil and unnatural thing. What we need to do is look back, not forward, in order to understand Being, he says, but this turns into a hatred for technology that I disagree with. I think he is often unfair to science and the analytic tradition of philosophy.
Still, this is a must read for anyone interested in Heidegger.
All in all, this is one of the more understandable works I've read of Heidegger's. I am not sure I agree with his ideas as I find him to be a little atavistic in thinking. For example, he speaks of the race to the moon as a tremendously evil and unnatural thing. What we need to do is look back, not forward, in order to understand Being, he says, but this turns into a hatred for technology that I disagree with. I think he is often unfair to science and the analytic tradition of philosophy.
Still, this is a must read for anyone interested in Heidegger.
June 10, 2020
Language is the house of being, indeed. As per usual with Heidegger, the Teutonic thickness proves an obscurantist hedgerow encasing clearings—minuscule but not infrequent—wherein the brilliance and relevance of the essential depths the philosopher is mining startle in their openness, and provide ample food for thought. Timbered with traces of late-period Wittgenstein and ratiocinated Eastern mysticism in an expansiveness from Germany that yet draws all back into German, this proved another Heidegger tome that one struggles to imbibe while not quite bristling at the difficulties the author ineluctably endeavors to put in place.
What is appropriated, the essence of the human, is brought into its essence through language, it remains appropriated over to the essence of language and the peal of silence. This appropriating occurs insofar as the essential unfolding of language, the peal of silence, requires mortals in order to sound out as the peal of silence for the hearing of mortals. Only insofar as humans belong within the peal of silence are humans as mortals, in their manner, capable of vocalized speech.
February 3, 2022
..Мова починається там, де закінчуються слова.. так я для себе сформулював те, що зрозумів в "Дорогою до мовлення", – в момент, коли нам бракне слів, тоненьке (я так бачу) жало-язичок мови, дрижить і намацує Принципово нове, Невідоме
і чим більша потреба в цей час себе висловити, тим більше шансів оце язичком мацання спостерегти
мабуть тому, за Гайдеґґером, взагалі не варто чути те, що нам уже зрозуміло (і справді)
а ще у нього мислення це не засіб пізнання, мислення лише ..кладе борозди на ниву буття..
і це просто красиво і, водночас, очевидно. Але наскільки це очевидно людині, що не читає цю фразу в контексті "Дорогою до мови", я не знаю. Адже все рівно цієї очевидности навіть собі пояснити не можу
тобто я вкотре підтвердив власну здатність прочитати всю книгу, практично нічого в ній не розуміючи. Я справді там більше майже нічого не зрозумів. Але було красиво. А діалог Гайдеґґера з японським мислителем був просто шикарним, весь, зі штуками на кшталт:
..це вже було в ході нашої розмови, а саме там, де ми ні слова про це
не
говорили..
і чим більша потреба в цей час себе висловити, тим більше шансів оце язичком мацання спостерегти
мабуть тому, за Гайдеґґером, взагалі не варто чути те, що нам уже зрозуміло (і справді)
а ще у нього мислення це не засіб пізнання, мислення лише ..кладе борозди на ниву буття..
і це просто красиво і, водночас, очевидно. Але наскільки це очевидно людині, що не читає цю фразу в контексті "Дорогою до мови", я не знаю. Адже все рівно цієї очевидности навіть собі пояснити не можу
тобто я вкотре підтвердив власну здатність прочитати всю книгу, практично нічого в ній не розуміючи. Я справді там більше майже нічого не зрозумів. Але було красиво. А діалог Гайдеґґера з японським мислителем був просто шикарним, весь, зі штуками на кшталт:
..це вже було в ході нашої розмови, а саме там, де ми ні слова про це
не
говорили..
August 28, 2018
Il pensiero di Heidegger sul linguaggio parte dallo studio personalissimo del filosofo sulla lingua tedesca.
Tutto il suo pensiero più che universale sembra diretto allo studio del tedesco.
Togliendo il capitolo sull’analisi e sulla parafrasi di una poesia.
Lo
Si può prendere come una lettura interessante ma non basilari per la conoscenza del pensiero del filosofo.
Tutto il suo pensiero più che universale sembra diretto allo studio del tedesco.
Togliendo il capitolo sull’analisi e sulla parafrasi di una poesia.
Lo
Si può prendere come una lettura interessante ma non basilari per la conoscenza del pensiero del filosofo.
January 3, 2021
This book teaches us how Language gives us possibilities within our experience. To dissect the complex information of language is not to untangle the web of information, but to loosen the strands that crowds everthing. As Heidegger points out, "The point is to experience the unbinding bond between the web of language".
November 18, 2008
This is pretty wonderful. Deeply illuminating. I recommend this one. It will make you rethink what is "Thinking" and what are we really doing when we assume we "Understand" one another in conversation.
July 18, 2013
Good stuff. Heidegger posits being in language; in other words, you are what you speak, you speak what you are. Heidegger had a wonderful command of language; even in translation his presence is felt.
October 31, 2011
discussed here: http://www.5cense.com/11/madrid.htm
Read
April 6, 2020Anything Heidegger, I love.
May 23, 2020
Words devoted to thinking about poetry is a meaningful way to use words.
June 9, 2020
We have not yet even begun to understand what Heidegger is saying.
October 22, 2024
A DIALOGUE, AND FOUR LECTURES ON LANGUAGE
Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) was an influential and controversial German philosopher, primarily concerned with Being, and phenomenology---who was widely (perhaps incorrectly) also perceived as an Existentialist. His relationship with the Nazi party in Germany has been the subject of widespread controversy and debate [e.g., 'Heidegger and Nazism,' 'Heidegger and the Nazis,' 'Heidegger's Crisis: Philosophy and Politics in Nazi Germany,' 'Heidegger and the Question of National Socialism,' etc.]
This book was first published in 1959. The dialogue is “between a Japanese and an Inquirer.” [The Inquirer is Heidegger.] This ‘hitherto unpublished text originated in 1953/54, on the occasion of a visit by Professor Tezuka of the Imperial University, Tokyo.” (Pg. 199)
In this dialogue, Heidegger states, “The fundamental flaw of the book ‘Being and Time’ is perhaps that I ventured forth too far too early.” (Pg. 7) He explains about his use of the term ‘Hermeneutics,’ “The answer is given in the Introduction to ‘Being and Time’ (Section 7C). But I will gladly add a few remarks, to dispel the illusion that that the use of the term is accidental… The term ‘hermeneutics’ was familiar to me from my theological studies. At that time, I was particularly agitated over the question of the relation between the word of Holy Scripture and theological-speculative thinking… Without this theological background I should never have come upon the path of thinking.” (Pg. 9-10)
He says, “Thirst for knowledge and greed for explanations never lead to a thinking inquiry. Curiosity is always the concealed arrogance of a self-consciousness that banks on a self-invented RATIO and its rationality. The will to know does not WILL to abide in hope before what is worthy of thought.” (Pg. 13)
The Japanese stated, “we in Japan understood at once your lecture ‘What is Metaphysics?’ when it became available to us in 1930 through a translation … We marvel to this day how the Europeans could lapse into interpreting as nihilistic the nothingness of which you speak in that lecture. To us, emptiness is the loftiest name for what you mean to say with the word ‘Being.’” (Pg. 19)
In the lecture ‘The Nature of Language,’ Heidegger explains, “At the close of a lecture called ‘The Question of Technology’ … I said, ‘Questioning is the piety of thinking.’ ‘Piety’ is meant here in the ancient sense: obedient, or submissive, and in this case submitting to what thinking has to think about.” (Pg. 72)
He observes, “Neither the ‘is’ nor the word attain to thinghood, to Being, nor does the relation between ‘is’ and the word, the word whose task it is to give an ‘is’ in each given sentence… What, then, does the poetic experience with the word show as our thinking pursues it? It points to something thought-provoking and memorable with which thinking has been changed from the beginning, even though in a veiled manner. It shows what is there and yet ‘is’ not… If our thinking does justice to the matter, then we may never say of the word that it is, but rather that it gives---not in the sense that words are given by an ‘it,’ but that the word itself gives. The word itself is the giver. What does it give? To go by the poetic experience and by the most ancient tradition of thinking, the word gives Being. Our thinking, then, would have to seek the word, the giver which itself is never given, is this ‘there is that which gives.’” (Pg. 87-88)
He concludes this lecture, “Language, Saying of the world’s fourfold, is no longer only such that we speaking human beings are related to it in the sense of a nexus existing between man and language. Language is, as world-moving Saying, the relation of all relations. It relates, maintains, proffers, and enriches the face-to-face encounter of the world’s regions, holds and keeps them, in that it holds itself---Saying---in reserve. Reserving itself in this way, as Saying of the world’s fourfold, language concerns us, us who as mortals belong within this fourfold world, us who can speak only as we respond to language.” (Pg. 107)
In ‘The Way to Language,’ he notes, “We are not capable of seeing the nature of language in the round because we, who can only say something by saying it after Saying, belong ourselves within Saying. The monologue character of the nature of language finds its structure in the disclosing design of Saying. That design does not and cannot coincide with the monologue of which Novalis is thinking, because Novalis understands language dialectically, in terms of subjectivity, that is, within the horizon of absolute idealism. But language is monologue. This now says two things: it is language ALONE which speaks authentically; and, language speaks LONESOMELY.” (Pg. 133-134)
This book will be of keen interest to those studying Heidegger, and the development of his thought.
Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) was an influential and controversial German philosopher, primarily concerned with Being, and phenomenology---who was widely (perhaps incorrectly) also perceived as an Existentialist. His relationship with the Nazi party in Germany has been the subject of widespread controversy and debate [e.g., 'Heidegger and Nazism,' 'Heidegger and the Nazis,' 'Heidegger's Crisis: Philosophy and Politics in Nazi Germany,' 'Heidegger and the Question of National Socialism,' etc.]
This book was first published in 1959. The dialogue is “between a Japanese and an Inquirer.” [The Inquirer is Heidegger.] This ‘hitherto unpublished text originated in 1953/54, on the occasion of a visit by Professor Tezuka of the Imperial University, Tokyo.” (Pg. 199)
In this dialogue, Heidegger states, “The fundamental flaw of the book ‘Being and Time’ is perhaps that I ventured forth too far too early.” (Pg. 7) He explains about his use of the term ‘Hermeneutics,’ “The answer is given in the Introduction to ‘Being and Time’ (Section 7C). But I will gladly add a few remarks, to dispel the illusion that that the use of the term is accidental… The term ‘hermeneutics’ was familiar to me from my theological studies. At that time, I was particularly agitated over the question of the relation between the word of Holy Scripture and theological-speculative thinking… Without this theological background I should never have come upon the path of thinking.” (Pg. 9-10)
He says, “Thirst for knowledge and greed for explanations never lead to a thinking inquiry. Curiosity is always the concealed arrogance of a self-consciousness that banks on a self-invented RATIO and its rationality. The will to know does not WILL to abide in hope before what is worthy of thought.” (Pg. 13)
The Japanese stated, “we in Japan understood at once your lecture ‘What is Metaphysics?’ when it became available to us in 1930 through a translation … We marvel to this day how the Europeans could lapse into interpreting as nihilistic the nothingness of which you speak in that lecture. To us, emptiness is the loftiest name for what you mean to say with the word ‘Being.’” (Pg. 19)
In the lecture ‘The Nature of Language,’ Heidegger explains, “At the close of a lecture called ‘The Question of Technology’ … I said, ‘Questioning is the piety of thinking.’ ‘Piety’ is meant here in the ancient sense: obedient, or submissive, and in this case submitting to what thinking has to think about.” (Pg. 72)
He observes, “Neither the ‘is’ nor the word attain to thinghood, to Being, nor does the relation between ‘is’ and the word, the word whose task it is to give an ‘is’ in each given sentence… What, then, does the poetic experience with the word show as our thinking pursues it? It points to something thought-provoking and memorable with which thinking has been changed from the beginning, even though in a veiled manner. It shows what is there and yet ‘is’ not… If our thinking does justice to the matter, then we may never say of the word that it is, but rather that it gives---not in the sense that words are given by an ‘it,’ but that the word itself gives. The word itself is the giver. What does it give? To go by the poetic experience and by the most ancient tradition of thinking, the word gives Being. Our thinking, then, would have to seek the word, the giver which itself is never given, is this ‘there is that which gives.’” (Pg. 87-88)
He concludes this lecture, “Language, Saying of the world’s fourfold, is no longer only such that we speaking human beings are related to it in the sense of a nexus existing between man and language. Language is, as world-moving Saying, the relation of all relations. It relates, maintains, proffers, and enriches the face-to-face encounter of the world’s regions, holds and keeps them, in that it holds itself---Saying---in reserve. Reserving itself in this way, as Saying of the world’s fourfold, language concerns us, us who as mortals belong within this fourfold world, us who can speak only as we respond to language.” (Pg. 107)
In ‘The Way to Language,’ he notes, “We are not capable of seeing the nature of language in the round because we, who can only say something by saying it after Saying, belong ourselves within Saying. The monologue character of the nature of language finds its structure in the disclosing design of Saying. That design does not and cannot coincide with the monologue of which Novalis is thinking, because Novalis understands language dialectically, in terms of subjectivity, that is, within the horizon of absolute idealism. But language is monologue. This now says two things: it is language ALONE which speaks authentically; and, language speaks LONESOMELY.” (Pg. 133-134)
This book will be of keen interest to those studying Heidegger, and the development of his thought.
January 17, 2026
Unterwegs zur Sprache war für mich ein Buch, das mehr nachwirkt, als man beim ersten Lesen glaubt. Schon im Titel steckt dieser Gedanke einer Reise, nicht durch Räume, sondern durch Denken und Sprechen und genau das spürt man auf jeder Seite. Für jemanden, der sich sonst eher mit Romanen und Thrillern beschäftigt, war es eine echte Herausforderung, aber eine lohnenswerte.
Der Einstieg ist nicht leicht. Heideggers Sprache wirkt dicht und anspruchsvoll, und anfangs hatte ich oft das Gefühl, eher um Worte als um Verständnis zu ringen. Man muss sich wirklich Zeit nehmen und oft langsam lesen, weil jede Formulierung so vielschichtig ist. Das ist manchmal zwar langweilig, aber definitiv nicht „einfach“. Wer eine klare, lineare Argumentation erwartet, wird hier eher ins Stocken kommen.
Sobald man aber den Zugang findet, entfaltet Unterwegs zur Sprache eine ganz eigene Sogkraft. Heidegger geht der Frage nach, was Sprache eigentlich ist, nicht nur als Werkzeug der Verständigung, sondern als Heimat unseres Denkens und unseres Seins. Wie er zeigt, dass wir nicht nur mit Sprache leben, sondern in Sprache, hat mich stark beeindruckt. Einige Passagen waren für mich regelrecht erhellend, weil sie etwas benennen, was ich schon manchmal gefühlt, aber nie so klar gedacht habe.
Besonders gut gefallen hat mir, wie organic der Text aufgebaut ist: Die einzelnen Gedanken und Reflexionen fügen sich wie Schritte auf einem Weg, auf dem man manchmal zurückblicken muss, bevor man vorwärtskommt. Es ist kein Buch, das man „wegliest“ im klassischen Sinn, sondern eines, das man erlebt. Genau das macht den Reiz aus und auch die Herausforderung.
Es gibt Stellen, die sich ziehen oder repetitiv wirken, und nicht jeder Gedanke erschließt sich sofort. Aber gerade diese Tiefe, diese Schichten von Bedeutung, sind am Ende auch das, was Unterwegs zur Sprache zu einem lohnenden Werk macht. Für mich war es kein Buch, das ich „verschlungen“ habe, sondern eines, das mich nach dem Lesen weiter begleitet und in Gedanken gehalten hat.
Fazit: Unterwegs zur Sprache ist ein forderndes, ernstes philosophisches Buch, das seine Stärke in der Tiefe der Reflexion über Sprache und Sein findet. Der Anfang fordert Geduld, aber wer diese Zeit investiert, wird mit einer sehr gewichtigen Auseinandersetzung mit dem, was Sprache wirklich bedeutet, belohnt. Kein einfacher Lesespaß, aber ein bereicherndes geistiges Erlebnis.
Der Einstieg ist nicht leicht. Heideggers Sprache wirkt dicht und anspruchsvoll, und anfangs hatte ich oft das Gefühl, eher um Worte als um Verständnis zu ringen. Man muss sich wirklich Zeit nehmen und oft langsam lesen, weil jede Formulierung so vielschichtig ist. Das ist manchmal zwar langweilig, aber definitiv nicht „einfach“. Wer eine klare, lineare Argumentation erwartet, wird hier eher ins Stocken kommen.
Sobald man aber den Zugang findet, entfaltet Unterwegs zur Sprache eine ganz eigene Sogkraft. Heidegger geht der Frage nach, was Sprache eigentlich ist, nicht nur als Werkzeug der Verständigung, sondern als Heimat unseres Denkens und unseres Seins. Wie er zeigt, dass wir nicht nur mit Sprache leben, sondern in Sprache, hat mich stark beeindruckt. Einige Passagen waren für mich regelrecht erhellend, weil sie etwas benennen, was ich schon manchmal gefühlt, aber nie so klar gedacht habe.
Besonders gut gefallen hat mir, wie organic der Text aufgebaut ist: Die einzelnen Gedanken und Reflexionen fügen sich wie Schritte auf einem Weg, auf dem man manchmal zurückblicken muss, bevor man vorwärtskommt. Es ist kein Buch, das man „wegliest“ im klassischen Sinn, sondern eines, das man erlebt. Genau das macht den Reiz aus und auch die Herausforderung.
Es gibt Stellen, die sich ziehen oder repetitiv wirken, und nicht jeder Gedanke erschließt sich sofort. Aber gerade diese Tiefe, diese Schichten von Bedeutung, sind am Ende auch das, was Unterwegs zur Sprache zu einem lohnenden Werk macht. Für mich war es kein Buch, das ich „verschlungen“ habe, sondern eines, das mich nach dem Lesen weiter begleitet und in Gedanken gehalten hat.
Fazit: Unterwegs zur Sprache ist ein forderndes, ernstes philosophisches Buch, das seine Stärke in der Tiefe der Reflexion über Sprache und Sein findet. Der Anfang fordert Geduld, aber wer diese Zeit investiert, wird mit einer sehr gewichtigen Auseinandersetzung mit dem, was Sprache wirklich bedeutet, belohnt. Kein einfacher Lesespaß, aber ein bereicherndes geistiges Erlebnis.
May 6, 2025
I'm quite torn on reviewing this book. On some level, I feel as though I didn't understand Heidegger's lectures enough to criticize them, then on the other hand I feel I made observations worthy of recording during my reading. To begin, I believe the translation left much to be desired, there were instances of odd wording, where I ended up having to substitute words of similar meaning for words with which I, personally, felt they did not fit. Not to say that I misconstrued the meaning of the text, but rather that for words like "bearings", in the first dialogue, I felt "meaning" fit much better; it made much more sense to me, and I understood "bearings" to be indicative of "meaning" anyways.
Regardless, now onto the Heidegger's ideas. I believe his statement that "language is the house of being" is rooted in a Kantian understanding of perception, that in which logical forms of judgement inform our intuitions to make conjectures; conjectures which are then communicated through language. In that way, language is rooted in intuition, thus if what offers to us intuitions cannot be known, as Kant and Hume argue, then what truly offers language cannot be known. I wish Heidegger would have arrived to some conclusion upon this idea, rather it seemed his lectures bumbled around the idea.
I did really appreciate his usage of poetry to facilitate his analysis, though it felt overbearing at some times. Certain conjectures too, such as "poetry being the closest to thinking," were merely stated without explanation, and if they were explained, they were so marred by metaphor it was difficult to understand the genuine philosophical connotations.
Regardless, now onto the Heidegger's ideas. I believe his statement that "language is the house of being" is rooted in a Kantian understanding of perception, that in which logical forms of judgement inform our intuitions to make conjectures; conjectures which are then communicated through language. In that way, language is rooted in intuition, thus if what offers to us intuitions cannot be known, as Kant and Hume argue, then what truly offers language cannot be known. I wish Heidegger would have arrived to some conclusion upon this idea, rather it seemed his lectures bumbled around the idea.
I did really appreciate his usage of poetry to facilitate his analysis, though it felt overbearing at some times. Certain conjectures too, such as "poetry being the closest to thinking," were merely stated without explanation, and if they were explained, they were so marred by metaphor it was difficult to understand the genuine philosophical connotations.
April 28, 2023
Of course it’s mind blowing but I can’t shake this feeling that the essential status MH gives language here is kind of arbitrary: sometimes it just feels like he’s mapping the Ereignis structure on that of Sprache (the Word is not, but it gives what is (the Thing) the gift of being). It never became clear to me why language was not just a model of Ereignis, but the thing itself. Die Sage ist die Weise, in der das Ereignis spricht: how? How is it the only way? That’s my only concern. Other than that the Trakl essay is truly beautiful, the dialogue with the Japanese guy can be cringe at times, the commentary on George is the best combination of clear and dense (especially section iii of das Wesen der Sprache, even though again, the whole final pages about Zeit zeitigt and Raum räumt don’t seem to have anything intrinsically to do with language).
— Well yes but the claims are made in language and it’s part of the point
— Fair enough; but I still feel uneasy: like we’re conflating two levels of explanation or exposition
— Well yes but the claims are made in language and it’s part of the point
— Fair enough; but I still feel uneasy: like we’re conflating two levels of explanation or exposition
March 14, 2024
This was the text we read from for the entire term for my Heidegger class, and while it did take me about three weeks to finally understand what was being discussed, once it clicked it was a very interesting phenomenology of language and its relation to us. Reading companion texts like “The Question of Technology” and “Building, Dwelling, Thinking” also enhanced my literacy. While I have no inclination to ever read more Heidegger, I thought this was one of the most challenging but rewarding texts I have read thus far. Nothing will top Ulysses though.
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