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Utilitarianism: For and Against
Two essays on utilitarianism, written from opposite points of view, by J. J. C. Smart and Bernard Williams. In the first part of the book Professor Smart advocates a modern and sophisticated version of classical utilitarianism; he tries to formulate a consistent and persuasive elaboration of the doctrine that the rightness and wrongness of actions is determined solely by their consequences, and in particular their consequences for the sum total of human happiness. In Part II Bernard Williams offers a sustained and vigorous critique of utilitarian assumptions, arguments and ideals. He finds inadequate the theory of action implied by utilitarianism, and he argues that utilitarianism fails to engage at a serious level with the real problems of moral and political philosophy, and fails to make sense of notions such as integrity, or even human happiness itself. This book should be of interest to welfare economists, political scientists and decision-theorists.
160 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1973
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 32 reviews
August 17, 2007
I wonder: does anyone read Smart's half of this book anymore?
Williams loathes utilitarianism, which gives his attack some verve, but his attack seems totally inconclusive. He does manage to show that utilitarianism would, in extreme situations, have counter-intuitive consequences, and that it is very demanding. Any utilitarian would be happy to admit as much. He doesn't show what he tries to, that utilitarianism makes agency unintelligible.
The last line of the essay expresses a hope that we won't hear about utilitarianism for much longer. That reveals that Williams underestimates how deep utilitarian thinking runs in the modern world.
Williams loathes utilitarianism, which gives his attack some verve, but his attack seems totally inconclusive. He does manage to show that utilitarianism would, in extreme situations, have counter-intuitive consequences, and that it is very demanding. Any utilitarian would be happy to admit as much. He doesn't show what he tries to, that utilitarianism makes agency unintelligible.
The last line of the essay expresses a hope that we won't hear about utilitarianism for much longer. That reveals that Williams underestimates how deep utilitarian thinking runs in the modern world.
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November 12, 2017EXTREME AND RESTRICTED UTILITARIANISM 344-354
May 8, 2017
I'm taking a university class on this book, so this was a first reading and I'll slowly and carefully re-read it over the course of this semester. Let me just already say that Williams hate for utilitarianism is just as entertaining as it's misguided. I'm almost looking forward to my final paper on this now (I will regret writing this sentence, once I'm actually working on it, obviously).
November 2, 2016
Intuitively, utilitarianism is the simplest of all philosophies. Its mantra, “the greatest good for the greatest number,” seems like an obvious way to make decisions both large and small.
But as is always true, nothing is as simple as it seems – and utilitarianism is no different. In “Utilitarianism For & Against,” Bernard Williams does a pretty good job of eviscerating the system most prominently advanced by Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill. J. J. C. Smart does the best he can in the “For” essay in this brief volume, but the odds are stacked against him. To see why, an analysis of the core phrase, “the greatest good for the greatest number,” will make it clear.
Let’s start with the first word, “the.” Seems simple enough, but “the” is a definite article, meaning there is a definite “greatest good.” But wouldn’t it make more sense to substitute “a” for “the”? After all, it’s become clearer and clearer in the 21st century that absolutes, especially in the complex world of human behavior, are hard to come by. Some might say a particular set of actions or values is “the greatest good,” but others might point to a different system and make just as strong a case.
How about “greatest”? Usually, this is interpreted in some kind of numerical value, but why should it be? The answer is that it’s easier, supposedly, to add things up than it is to assign value. For example, when we call Alexander “the Great,” we are measuring him against other drunken conquerors, and by a set of value calculations, come to the conclusion that he is somehow superior.
But “great” is a complex word. For example, Athens in the 5th century BC was considered one of the “great” eras in history. It was, of course, based on a society with 30% slaves and women tucked in back rooms and never allowed to speak. The wealth of the society was derived from silver mines, which were worked by slaves who died in great numbers in order to lay the foundation for the superb philosophy and drama that emerged from that time.
So was the product of the Athenian efflorescence “great”? Did it produce the “greatest good for the greatest number”? Some very practical and material folks would argue that there are plenty of plays, plenty of philosophers, and that the world wouldn’t be more or less “great” without those efforts. I would disagree, but consider this: Let’s say a similar state, with similar negative conditions for many of its citizens, produced medical advances that saved millions of lives.
So how do you measure “the greatest good”? Are the lives of those slaves who last a month in the silver mines, and their suffering, “worth” the lives saved down the road? Are the values espoused by a society of no concern in these kinds of calculations?
It might be easy to make this determination with medicine, which is in a way directly comparable to the suffering of the human beings who might have contributed to advances in that field, but it when it gets to squishy subjects such as philosophy or drama, the math, if it exists, becomes more complex.
And that leads us to the thorniest issue of all: the meaning of the word “good.” To bring up the Greeks again, it was believed by many in that society that “beauty” equaled “good.” We would not agree with that now, nor would we agree with sequestering women, nor would we agree with what the Greeks called “democracy.” Our ideas of good have changed, and we can anticipate that those ideas will change in the future as well.
And then there are questions about such things as clean water, healthy food, a thriving environment. These things have value, these things are “good,” but how do you measure them? How do you compare them?
And then even more confusing is the “calculation” of future value. We might all be able to agree that “the greatest good” could be measured in the impact on people living right now, but what about people 15 years from now? What about people 100 years from now? (This is much of the argument about global warming, as short-term thinking values economic production in the here and now more than some unknown climactic of effects in the future.) And what about people 1,000 years from now, or 10,000 years?
This leads us to the phrase “for the greatest number,” and naturally, this is somewhat confusing as well. Let’s return to classical Athens, where a few benefited greatly from the suffering of the many. One could argue that future results justify this particular system, as “the greatest number” lies far in the future. Presumably, Aristotle and Sophocles will still have value in the 22nd century, just as they did in the 2nd century, and so those slaves who suffered and died in the silver mines did so in the name of utilitarianism.
Or, does “the greatest number” mean that whatever is defined as “good” should be evenly distributed throughout an entire society, now and in the future? “Greatness,” then, would be subsumed to “the greatest number.”
But to get back to the book that triggered these thoughts, “Utilitarianism For & Against” holds up surprisingly well considering it was written in the 1970s, and both Smart and Williams managed to maintain readability while still dealing with the thorny issues of philosophy.
If nothing else, the book makes one think about utilitarianism, and it’s seemingly clear and simple message. Thinking is almost always a good thing, and thinking about how best an individual or society should make decisions is definitely a good thing.
Is it the “greatest good”? Sorry, I’m not going there.
But as is always true, nothing is as simple as it seems – and utilitarianism is no different. In “Utilitarianism For & Against,” Bernard Williams does a pretty good job of eviscerating the system most prominently advanced by Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill. J. J. C. Smart does the best he can in the “For” essay in this brief volume, but the odds are stacked against him. To see why, an analysis of the core phrase, “the greatest good for the greatest number,” will make it clear.
Let’s start with the first word, “the.” Seems simple enough, but “the” is a definite article, meaning there is a definite “greatest good.” But wouldn’t it make more sense to substitute “a” for “the”? After all, it’s become clearer and clearer in the 21st century that absolutes, especially in the complex world of human behavior, are hard to come by. Some might say a particular set of actions or values is “the greatest good,” but others might point to a different system and make just as strong a case.
How about “greatest”? Usually, this is interpreted in some kind of numerical value, but why should it be? The answer is that it’s easier, supposedly, to add things up than it is to assign value. For example, when we call Alexander “the Great,” we are measuring him against other drunken conquerors, and by a set of value calculations, come to the conclusion that he is somehow superior.
But “great” is a complex word. For example, Athens in the 5th century BC was considered one of the “great” eras in history. It was, of course, based on a society with 30% slaves and women tucked in back rooms and never allowed to speak. The wealth of the society was derived from silver mines, which were worked by slaves who died in great numbers in order to lay the foundation for the superb philosophy and drama that emerged from that time.
So was the product of the Athenian efflorescence “great”? Did it produce the “greatest good for the greatest number”? Some very practical and material folks would argue that there are plenty of plays, plenty of philosophers, and that the world wouldn’t be more or less “great” without those efforts. I would disagree, but consider this: Let’s say a similar state, with similar negative conditions for many of its citizens, produced medical advances that saved millions of lives.
So how do you measure “the greatest good”? Are the lives of those slaves who last a month in the silver mines, and their suffering, “worth” the lives saved down the road? Are the values espoused by a society of no concern in these kinds of calculations?
It might be easy to make this determination with medicine, which is in a way directly comparable to the suffering of the human beings who might have contributed to advances in that field, but it when it gets to squishy subjects such as philosophy or drama, the math, if it exists, becomes more complex.
And that leads us to the thorniest issue of all: the meaning of the word “good.” To bring up the Greeks again, it was believed by many in that society that “beauty” equaled “good.” We would not agree with that now, nor would we agree with sequestering women, nor would we agree with what the Greeks called “democracy.” Our ideas of good have changed, and we can anticipate that those ideas will change in the future as well.
And then there are questions about such things as clean water, healthy food, a thriving environment. These things have value, these things are “good,” but how do you measure them? How do you compare them?
And then even more confusing is the “calculation” of future value. We might all be able to agree that “the greatest good” could be measured in the impact on people living right now, but what about people 15 years from now? What about people 100 years from now? (This is much of the argument about global warming, as short-term thinking values economic production in the here and now more than some unknown climactic of effects in the future.) And what about people 1,000 years from now, or 10,000 years?
This leads us to the phrase “for the greatest number,” and naturally, this is somewhat confusing as well. Let’s return to classical Athens, where a few benefited greatly from the suffering of the many. One could argue that future results justify this particular system, as “the greatest number” lies far in the future. Presumably, Aristotle and Sophocles will still have value in the 22nd century, just as they did in the 2nd century, and so those slaves who suffered and died in the silver mines did so in the name of utilitarianism.
Or, does “the greatest number” mean that whatever is defined as “good” should be evenly distributed throughout an entire society, now and in the future? “Greatness,” then, would be subsumed to “the greatest number.”
But to get back to the book that triggered these thoughts, “Utilitarianism For & Against” holds up surprisingly well considering it was written in the 1970s, and both Smart and Williams managed to maintain readability while still dealing with the thorny issues of philosophy.
If nothing else, the book makes one think about utilitarianism, and it’s seemingly clear and simple message. Thinking is almost always a good thing, and thinking about how best an individual or society should make decisions is definitely a good thing.
Is it the “greatest good”? Sorry, I’m not going there.
March 7, 2022
Gostei do livro, mais da primeira parte (do "For"), um pouco por causa do meu bias por consequencialismo e muito porque o Smart escreve bem e de forma acessível. Mas a segunda parte também não é má, apesar de ser bem chata por vezes: tem algumas (ênfase em algumas) críticas que me fizeram pensar bastante.
February 13, 2018
I was contemplating how to introduce this book and recount a recent encounter with Caitlin. Caitlin, the master reviewer, the inspiration of my writing, possibly the nicest person you’ll ever meet - I would, in no uncertain terms, fly over to Melbourne for her.
So as I was saying, I ran into Caitlin at - would you believe it? - the sandy outskirts of Perth. Cottesloe happens to be prime location as it turns out, not only for “people stalking” but also for pre-season soccer trainings, for no rival clubs would ever brave tackling and scoring in that quicksand by the shore.
Back to Cat-watch. As I disembark at the car park, I think I recognise that distinctive cat walk. Caitlin is making her approach towards the Indiana.
“Caitlin!”
“Oh my gosh, how did you recognise me with sunglasses?”
She’s her usual down-to-earth and easy going self. I postpone my soccer training for a chance to chat. We walk for a bit. I’m rapidly undermining my excuses as to why I was late if my coach ever gets a Goodreads account (not unlikely considering he’s a USC English major). I have the pleasure of meeting the female-engineer with her daughter beneath the shade of a Norfolk pine but alas, have little more time to talk Philosophy with this honours student. And so I content myself with (arguably) taking the Utilitarian action: going to training to satisfy my coach and team mates over the pleasure of staying with Caitlin. I am an enthusiast of Philosophy as an art - pretty uneducated thus far, but intrigued by it nonetheless. It’s the questions that span our entire existence; right vs wrong, science vs religion, free will vs determinism - the latter very Arcadia (1993). Please never ask me about any of it, because I have a very, very limited understanding of how the arguments go. Philosophy is a fantastic study, because for all it’s higher order pondering, it never dithers in conceding that a good deal of the forces that govern our existence (or is it the forces we govern?) are ambiguous, arguable, and...mystery at large.
Utilitarianism For and Against - as its name suggests - provides both sides of an ethical theory that stems back at least to the 18th and 19th century. The classic mantra: that we should aim for “the greatest good for the greatest number”.
Whilst I largely agree with J. J. C Smart and the pioneers of Utilitarianism (Bentham, Mill, and the Chinese philosophers: the Mohists), our year 9 study of Le Guin’s The Ones Who Walk Away from Omelas, and ATAR Politics has, over time, bestowed a healthy scepticism in me towards this way of stance. Smart provides a very clear and solid set of arguments for Utilitarianism, while remaining open to its criticisms. He establishes his position as an adherent of act-Utilitarianism and wavering ideal utilitarian. A good rule-of-thumb established by Rawls (which Smart largely agrees with) is the guideline that “happiness should only be maximised in a way that doesn’t cause anyone to be less happy than they would otherwise be”. Whilst Smart concedes that this isn’t completely sacrosanct, it’s a good sort of middle-position that counters the ‘cold-hearted’ views on Utilitarianism, and one I’d be happy to agree to.
On the other hand we have Bernard Williams who quite effectively rebuts the propositions made by utilitarians with Smart at the vanguard. The most interesting point he made for me was the idea of the “psychological effect on the agent” that occurs as a result of some utilitarian decisions. The individual may personally feel they are making an immoral (or bad) decision, but Utilitarianism necessarily dismisses their concerns as irrational if it results in a “greater good” for everyone else. This, Bernard argues, leads to alienation of a person from their own moral identity and integrity - a fair point that does make one rethink their position in support of Utilitarianism.
At last this book has found a place amongst my “finishing reading” pile, and I can go back to stalking Caitlin at the beach. It’s so déjà-vu! I’m up near the car park talking Trump and the upcoming season with a friend and our coach. From this vantage point, in my peripheral vision, I see Caitlin walking along the shore with her mum. The sun is just setting and she looks relaxed and happy in her black dress. Maybe I’m stylising it, but even from up here, everything looks so beautiful. From a good 200m away I can see the waves lap up to meet her, the wind blowing through her hair. She’s at a place in her mind, unaffected by any thought of whether her next step will “maximise happiness”. Her movements are smooth, unhurried and graceful - maybe they are the sum of millions of neural transmissions that could be charted and calculated. It surprised me somewhat when I discovered a series of equations integrated into this Philosophical study. It can quantify a concept down to a selection of curves and straight edges, placed in some resemblance of logical order. But I still think about those symbols, printed onto the page, a place where moral and ethical thought meet mathematics. Coincidental meetings with Caitlin at the beach are a little far from Utilitarianism and moral consideration. Fate moves agents that can put deep thought into such questions, but could also have a good catch up before a move to Melbourne instead. Utilitarianism is...not special. It will drive you and your limbs to go play soccer in summer heat. The foot that kicks - and walks along the sandy footpath and the shore. The product of 300 odd years of philosophical thinking, and it works just as well to compel me to go to soccer training, as it doesn’t to stop a 10 minute talk with a fabulous, intelligent, and immensely charismatic friend before she goes out into the big bad world of the Eastern states.
Good luck Caitlin!💕 - go show ‘em how it’s done👊🏼😜
So as I was saying, I ran into Caitlin at - would you believe it? - the sandy outskirts of Perth. Cottesloe happens to be prime location as it turns out, not only for “people stalking” but also for pre-season soccer trainings, for no rival clubs would ever brave tackling and scoring in that quicksand by the shore.
Back to Cat-watch. As I disembark at the car park, I think I recognise that distinctive cat walk. Caitlin is making her approach towards the Indiana.
“Caitlin!”
“Oh my gosh, how did you recognise me with sunglasses?”
She’s her usual down-to-earth and easy going self. I postpone my soccer training for a chance to chat. We walk for a bit. I’m rapidly undermining my excuses as to why I was late if my coach ever gets a Goodreads account (not unlikely considering he’s a USC English major). I have the pleasure of meeting the female-engineer with her daughter beneath the shade of a Norfolk pine but alas, have little more time to talk Philosophy with this honours student. And so I content myself with (arguably) taking the Utilitarian action: going to training to satisfy my coach and team mates over the pleasure of staying with Caitlin. I am an enthusiast of Philosophy as an art - pretty uneducated thus far, but intrigued by it nonetheless. It’s the questions that span our entire existence; right vs wrong, science vs religion, free will vs determinism - the latter very Arcadia (1993). Please never ask me about any of it, because I have a very, very limited understanding of how the arguments go. Philosophy is a fantastic study, because for all it’s higher order pondering, it never dithers in conceding that a good deal of the forces that govern our existence (or is it the forces we govern?) are ambiguous, arguable, and...mystery at large.
Utilitarianism For and Against - as its name suggests - provides both sides of an ethical theory that stems back at least to the 18th and 19th century. The classic mantra: that we should aim for “the greatest good for the greatest number”.
Whilst I largely agree with J. J. C Smart and the pioneers of Utilitarianism (Bentham, Mill, and the Chinese philosophers: the Mohists), our year 9 study of Le Guin’s The Ones Who Walk Away from Omelas, and ATAR Politics has, over time, bestowed a healthy scepticism in me towards this way of stance. Smart provides a very clear and solid set of arguments for Utilitarianism, while remaining open to its criticisms. He establishes his position as an adherent of act-Utilitarianism and wavering ideal utilitarian. A good rule-of-thumb established by Rawls (which Smart largely agrees with) is the guideline that “happiness should only be maximised in a way that doesn’t cause anyone to be less happy than they would otherwise be”. Whilst Smart concedes that this isn’t completely sacrosanct, it’s a good sort of middle-position that counters the ‘cold-hearted’ views on Utilitarianism, and one I’d be happy to agree to.
On the other hand we have Bernard Williams who quite effectively rebuts the propositions made by utilitarians with Smart at the vanguard. The most interesting point he made for me was the idea of the “psychological effect on the agent” that occurs as a result of some utilitarian decisions. The individual may personally feel they are making an immoral (or bad) decision, but Utilitarianism necessarily dismisses their concerns as irrational if it results in a “greater good” for everyone else. This, Bernard argues, leads to alienation of a person from their own moral identity and integrity - a fair point that does make one rethink their position in support of Utilitarianism.
At last this book has found a place amongst my “finishing reading” pile, and I can go back to stalking Caitlin at the beach. It’s so déjà-vu! I’m up near the car park talking Trump and the upcoming season with a friend and our coach. From this vantage point, in my peripheral vision, I see Caitlin walking along the shore with her mum. The sun is just setting and she looks relaxed and happy in her black dress. Maybe I’m stylising it, but even from up here, everything looks so beautiful. From a good 200m away I can see the waves lap up to meet her, the wind blowing through her hair. She’s at a place in her mind, unaffected by any thought of whether her next step will “maximise happiness”. Her movements are smooth, unhurried and graceful - maybe they are the sum of millions of neural transmissions that could be charted and calculated. It surprised me somewhat when I discovered a series of equations integrated into this Philosophical study. It can quantify a concept down to a selection of curves and straight edges, placed in some resemblance of logical order. But I still think about those symbols, printed onto the page, a place where moral and ethical thought meet mathematics. Coincidental meetings with Caitlin at the beach are a little far from Utilitarianism and moral consideration. Fate moves agents that can put deep thought into such questions, but could also have a good catch up before a move to Melbourne instead. Utilitarianism is...not special. It will drive you and your limbs to go play soccer in summer heat. The foot that kicks - and walks along the sandy footpath and the shore. The product of 300 odd years of philosophical thinking, and it works just as well to compel me to go to soccer training, as it doesn’t to stop a 10 minute talk with a fabulous, intelligent, and immensely charismatic friend before she goes out into the big bad world of the Eastern states.
Good luck Caitlin!💕 - go show ‘em how it’s done👊🏼😜
February 4, 2021
I guess it’s fine. Probably better if you like philosophy.
September 30, 2023
1. Anti-realism
The utilitarian contributor writes from a non-cognitivist perspective and thus “renounce[s] the attempt to prove the act-utilitarian system.”[1] I’ve spent a lot more time reading moral realists, so it was interesting to see this perspective. His goal is mainly to try to remove obstacles to belief in utilitarianism so that people’s natural attitudes can lead them there:
I think that’s a sensible approach; my experience is that people’s problem with utilitarianism is not usually that they don’t grasp the motivation for it all, but rather that they think it has some problematic implications. Still, the anti-realist position remains a bit mystifying to me. If I thought my own ethical views were ultimately just arbitrary preferences, I think that belief would make me feel those preferences less strongly, and care less about whether other people shared them.
2. Deluded Sadist thought experiment
This thought experiment Smart mentions does a good job of drawing out one of the contentious implications of at least the hedonistic variety of utilitarianism:
I think you can even make this thought experiment a little less abstract: many ordinary real people do take pleasure in suffering that they inaccurately believe others are undergoing. Some major religious traditions teach that most humans go to hell forever, and some adherents seem to (or claim to? or try to?) see this as a beautiful fact. If (unrealistically) this delusion had no harmful side effects, would the pleasure it gives those who believe it make it a desirable belief? I’m inclined, uncomfortably, to say yes.
3. Ordering states
The non-utilitarian contributor points out something I hadn’t really thought about before:
Williams uses this as the basis for some unexpected psychosocial speculation. He thinks consequentialism starts to look attractive when societal changes force people to confront situations that were unthinkable in their traditional worldview—situations where they must choose among unacceptable choices.
Mostly I just think the bolded portion is a cute little aphorism. But Williams is making an interesting point that I missed at first. If I understand correctly, his concern is that confrontation with such insane situations in the modern world has reasonably pushed people to give up the notion “that there was nothing which was right whatever the consequences”[6], but that the leap to believing “the different idea that everything depends on consequences”[7] is a rash overreaction.
My reply would be simply that this is not why I’m a consequentialist. I didn’t think, oh no, I need a way to compare all situations, and latch on to consequentialism because it was the first suggestion I came across. Rather, I thought, what reasons are there for preferring one action to another, and consequentialist reasons seemed the most persuasive.
4. Integrity
Williams famously (or at least, famously enough for me to have heard of it before) complains that utilitarianism requires people to compromise their integrity. He gives two thought experiments to support this[8]; the gist is:
1. George must decide whether to take a job assisting a company whose business he believes to be immoral. Utilitarianism requires him to do it, because it would help his family, and because if he refuses then the job will go to someone who does it even more efficiently.
2. Pedro threatens to kill 20 people unless Jim kills one of them. Utilitarianism requires Jim to do it, since one death is clearly better than the same death plus 19 other deaths.
Williams says:
Williams considers a couple ways a utilitarian might try to argue that George shouldn’t take the job and Jim shouldn’t kill anyone: “the psychological effect on the agent”[10] and “the precedent effect”[11]. The former, as Williams notes, is most compelling in the George scenario, whereas:
This gets near the heart of why I don’t find the Jim scenario to be a problem for utilitarianism. If I really knew that my choice would make the difference in whether 1 person or 20 people died, and I knowingly chose the route that would lead to 20 deaths in order to avoid myself having a particular causal relation to any of the deaths, it seems like I’m making a self-centered choice. And if caring about other people is one of my core commitments, then making such a self-centered choice feels like a betrayal of my own principles and a violation of my integrity!
Williams thinks this “squeamishness” line of argument only explains why Jim choosing to kill would make sense within a utilitarian worldview; he does not think it is an adequate response to a non-utilitarian who believes that choosing to kill would violate their personal integrity:
First of all, yes we can, it’s just a question of whether we should. Part of the point of thought experiments is precisely to invite us to consider things from multiple viewpoints in order to evaluate which viewpoint is most compelling. Secondly, our moral feelings are highly affected by our moral beliefs, and both may change when we try considering the situation from an impartial perspective.
One last thing I want to say about these thought experiments, which applies widely to ethical thought experiments in general: the discussion don’t usually devote much attention to uncertainty. But in the real world, the confidence Jim is justified in having that Pedro will both try and succeed in killing these 20 people if I refuse his request will be much lower than the confidence he’s justified in having that I will succeed in killing one person if I shoot. The greater confidence we can have in the immediate effects of our own actions, as opposed to the indirect effects of our choices, may often be a reason to act differently than an omniscient utilitarian would.
5. The best objection
I think the following thought experiment, which I’ll refer to as the fragile racists scenario, is Williams’s best argument against utilitarianism:
I think it’s worth comparing this to a couple other common thought experiments. Like “Torture vs. Dust Specks”,[15] it highlights how utilitarianism can require you to impose a huge cost on a small group in order to bestow a small benefit on a large group, if the difference in group sizes is big enough. The key extra element in the fragile racists case is the element of injustice: the connection between the cost and the benefit—the fact that the racists’ discomfort can only be relieved by harming the minority—exists because of a character flaw in the very people who would receive the benefit. A variant of the utility monster thought experiment[16] shares that element, if we imagine that the monster receives pleasure specifically because it enjoys the suffering of others; but the fragile racists case is less abstract and feels somewhat more like a plausible real-world situation. Those elements of injustice and relative plausibility make the fragile racists thought experiment especially pointed.
Williams brings up this case in order to pose a dilemma for utilitarians: should pleasure/pain that someone experiences due to their own irrational dispositions count when evaluating a state of affairs? (E.g. pleasure from doing something immoral, or pain from being in the presence of a person you are racist against.) If the utilitarian does count it, they’re led to the abhorrent conclusion in this thought experiment; if they don’t count it, they can’t use the “psychological effect” defense in the George and Jim cases above. I’m not concerned about the George and Jim cases, but my my meta-ethical view (see Sharon Hewitt Rawlette’s The Feeling of Value)[17] doesn’t leave room for considering the causes of a subjective experience when evaluating its intrinsic (as opposed to instrumental) value. So I can’t evade Williams’s thought experiment by saying the racists’ suffering doesn’t matter at all.
One solution might be to invoke value lexicality.[18] On this view it’s possible to have two kinds of bad things—say X and Y—such that some finite number of Xs is worse than even an infinite number of Ys. This lets you say the dust specks can never outweigh one person’s torture; the utility monster’s bliss can never outweigh anyone’s suffering; and no amount of “severely uncomfortable” people can outweigh the suffering caused by a purge.
But I’m skeptical of value lexicality, and it’s not a full solution anyway. You could adjust the thought experiment to specify that the subjective suffering the racists experience is just as intense as the suffering they’re planning to inflict on the minority. This variant lacks one of the strengths of the original thought experiment, because it’s a much more unrealistic or pathological scenario. But I think it highlights that the most potent part of the original scenario is the element of injustice, not the element of outweighing large harms with many small benefits.
And it’s an injustice with a particular structure:
- there’s a win-lose scenario (either the racists suffer or the minority does);
- the only thing preventing a win-win scenario is the attitudes of one group (everyone could live happily if the racists weren’t racist);
- the group making it a win-lose scenario is in a sense using an implicit threat of self-harm to tilt the cost/benefit analysis in their own favor (the only reason that placating the racists causes less overall suffering than the alternative is that the racists’ own brains are going to torment themselves if they don’t get their way)
Like an abusive partner threatening suicide unless their lover complies with their demands, the racists are effectively holding themselves hostage in order to blackmail the utilitarian decision-maker into deciding in their favor. In the real world, I think utilitarianism would generally tell us to reject such threats. The “precedent effect” that Williams dismisses in the George and Jim cases surely does apply in this case: appeasing the racists would incentivize everyone in the future who has the slightest racist inclination (or any other arbitrary and harmful inclination) to work themselves into as much of an emotional frenzy over it as they can. That sort of downward spiral is not at all conducive to the utilitarian goal of maximizing net happiness.
Of course, you could modify the thought experiment again and declare we magically know that this is the last time in history that any form of prejudice will arise, so the precedent becomes irrelevant. You can add as many such qualifications to the scenario as necessary to keep forcing attention back to the core issue: whether there are cases where utilitarianism would use the interests of the oppressor to justify oppression. But all these qualifications make the cases drastically less realistic. Unrealistic cases are still important, but have limitations. Our ethical intuitions are informed by what we know about the real world; if a theory (utilitarianism) gives a different answer than our intuitions on a question that requires us to imagine a radically different reality from the one we live in, it becomes hard to tell whether the issue is with the theory, or if it’s just difficult for us to prevent our background assumptions about the real world from leaking into our judgments about the imaginary one.
(There are other unrealistic aspects to the fragile racists scenario. I’m skeptical that a typical racist experiences much suffering when contemplating the targets of their racism. And the idea that whatever suffering they do experience would stop if the hated group were removed seems highly implausible; the hatred would just be transferred to another set of targets. Williams wants us to assume “that programmes to change the majority sentiment are likely to be protracted and ineffective”, but history suggests sentiments can and do change. Even if the process is “protracted”, the long-term benefits of people learning to get along would be enormous compared to dealing with every conflict by crushing one side.)
(crosspost; go here for footnotes)
The utilitarian contributor writes from a non-cognitivist perspective and thus “renounce[s] the attempt to prove the act-utilitarian system.”[1] I’ve spent a lot more time reading moral realists, so it was interesting to see this perspective. His goal is mainly to try to remove obstacles to belief in utilitarianism so that people’s natural attitudes can lead them there:
It is possible … that many sympathetic and benevolent people depart from or fail to attain a utilitarian ethical principle only under the stress of tradition, of superstition, or of unsound philosophical reasoning. If this hypothesis should turn out to be correct, at least as far as these readers are concerned, then the utilitarian may contend that there is no need for him to defend his position directly, save by stating it in a consistent manner, and by showing that common objections to it are unsound.[2]
I think that’s a sensible approach; my experience is that people’s problem with utilitarianism is not usually that they don’t grasp the motivation for it all, but rather that they think it has some problematic implications. Still, the anti-realist position remains a bit mystifying to me. If I thought my own ethical views were ultimately just arbitrary preferences, I think that belief would make me feel those preferences less strongly, and care less about whether other people shared them.
2. Deluded Sadist thought experiment
This thought experiment Smart mentions does a good job of drawing out one of the contentious implications of at least the hedonistic variety of utilitarianism:
Are there pleasurable states of mind towards which we have an unfavourable attitude, even though we disregard their consequences? In order to decide this question let us imagine a universe consisting of one sentient being only, who falsely believes that there are other sentient beings and that they are undergoing exquisite torment. So far from being distressed by the thought, he takes a great delight in these imagined sufferings. Is this better or worse than a universe containing no sentient being at all? Is it worse, again, than a universe containing only one sentient being with the same beliefs as before but who sorrows at the imagined tortures of his fellow creatures? I suggest, as against Moore, that the universe containing the deluded sadist is the preferable one.[3]
I think you can even make this thought experiment a little less abstract: many ordinary real people do take pleasure in suffering that they inaccurately believe others are undergoing. Some major religious traditions teach that most humans go to hell forever, and some adherents seem to (or claim to? or try to?) see this as a beautiful fact. If (unrealistically) this delusion had no harmful side effects, would the pleasure it gives those who believe it make it a desirable belief? I’m inclined, uncomfortably, to say yes.
3. Ordering states
The non-utilitarian contributor points out something I hadn’t really thought about before:
Although the non-consequentialist is concerned with right actions - such as the carrying out of promises - he may have no general way of comparing states of affairs from a moral point of view at all. Indeed … the emphasis on the necessary comparability of situations is a peculiar feature of consequentialism in general, and of utilitarianism in particular.[4]
Williams uses this as the basis for some unexpected psychosocial speculation. He thinks consequentialism starts to look attractive when societal changes force people to confront situations that were unthinkable in their traditional worldview—situations where they must choose among unacceptable choices.
It could be a feature of a man’s moral outlook that he regarded certain courses of action as unthinkable, in the sense that he would not entertain the idea of doing them … But, further, he might equally find it unacceptable to consider what to do in certain conceivable situations. Logically, or indeed empirically conceivable they may be, but they are not to him morally conceivable, meaning by that that their occurrence as situations presenting him with a choice would represent not a special problem in his moral world, but something that lay beyond its limits. For him, there are certain situations so monstrous that the idea that the processes of moral rationality could yield an answer in them is insane…
…Rationality he sees as a demand not merely on him, but on the situations in, and about, which he has to think; unless the environment reveals minimum sanity, it is insanity to carry the decorum of sanity into it. Consequentialist rationality, however … has no such limitations: making the best of a bad job is one of its maxims, and it will have something to say even on the difference between massacring seven million, and massacring seven million and one.[5]
Mostly I just think the bolded portion is a cute little aphorism. But Williams is making an interesting point that I missed at first. If I understand correctly, his concern is that confrontation with such insane situations in the modern world has reasonably pushed people to give up the notion “that there was nothing which was right whatever the consequences”[6], but that the leap to believing “the different idea that everything depends on consequences”[7] is a rash overreaction.
My reply would be simply that this is not why I’m a consequentialist. I didn’t think, oh no, I need a way to compare all situations, and latch on to consequentialism because it was the first suggestion I came across. Rather, I thought, what reasons are there for preferring one action to another, and consequentialist reasons seemed the most persuasive.
4. Integrity
Williams famously (or at least, famously enough for me to have heard of it before) complains that utilitarianism requires people to compromise their integrity. He gives two thought experiments to support this[8]; the gist is:
1. George must decide whether to take a job assisting a company whose business he believes to be immoral. Utilitarianism requires him to do it, because it would help his family, and because if he refuses then the job will go to someone who does it even more efficiently.
2. Pedro threatens to kill 20 people unless Jim kills one of them. Utilitarianism requires Jim to do it, since one death is clearly better than the same death plus 19 other deaths.
Williams says:
A feature of utilitarianism is that it cuts out a kind of consideration which for some … makes a difference to what they feel about such cases: a consideration involving the idea … that each of us is specially responsible for what he does, rather than for what other people do. This is an idea closely connected with the value of integrity.[9]
Williams considers a couple ways a utilitarian might try to argue that George shouldn’t take the job and Jim shouldn’t kill anyone: “the psychological effect on the agent”[10] and “the precedent effect”[11]. The former, as Williams notes, is most compelling in the George scenario, whereas:
In Jim’s case … his feelings might seem to be of very little weight compared with other things that are at stake. There is a powerful and recognizable appeal that can be made on this point: as that a refusal by Jim to do what he has been invited to do would be a kind of self-indulgent squeamishness.[12]
This gets near the heart of why I don’t find the Jim scenario to be a problem for utilitarianism. If I really knew that my choice would make the difference in whether 1 person or 20 people died, and I knowingly chose the route that would lead to 20 deaths in order to avoid myself having a particular causal relation to any of the deaths, it seems like I’m making a self-centered choice. And if caring about other people is one of my core commitments, then making such a self-centered choice feels like a betrayal of my own principles and a violation of my integrity!
Williams thinks this “squeamishness” line of argument only explains why Jim choosing to kill would make sense within a utilitarian worldview; he does not think it is an adequate response to a non-utilitarian who believes that choosing to kill would violate their personal integrity:
The 'squeamishness' appeal is not an argument which adds in a hitherto neglected consideration. Rather, it is an invitation to consider the situation, and one’s own feelings, from a utilitarian point of view.
The reason … one can be unnerved by the suggestion of self-indulgence in going against utilitarian considerations, is not that we are utilitarians who are uncertain what utilitarian value to attach to our moral feelings, but that we are partially at least not utilitarians, and cannot regard out moral feelings merely as objects of utilitarian value.[13]
First of all, yes we can, it’s just a question of whether we should. Part of the point of thought experiments is precisely to invite us to consider things from multiple viewpoints in order to evaluate which viewpoint is most compelling. Secondly, our moral feelings are highly affected by our moral beliefs, and both may change when we try considering the situation from an impartial perspective.
One last thing I want to say about these thought experiments, which applies widely to ethical thought experiments in general: the discussion don’t usually devote much attention to uncertainty. But in the real world, the confidence Jim is justified in having that Pedro will both try and succeed in killing these 20 people if I refuse his request will be much lower than the confidence he’s justified in having that I will succeed in killing one person if I shoot. The greater confidence we can have in the immediate effects of our own actions, as opposed to the indirect effects of our choices, may often be a reason to act differently than an omniscient utilitarian would.
5. The best objection
I think the following thought experiment, which I’ll refer to as the fragile racists scenario, is Williams’s best argument against utilitarianism:
Suppose that there is in a certain society a racial minority. Considering merely the ordinary interests of the other citizens, as opposed to their sentiments, this minority does no particular harm; we may suppose that it does not confer any very great benefits either. Its presence is in those terms neutral or mildly beneficial. However, the other citizens have such prejudices that they find the sight of this group, even the knowledge of its presence, very disagreeable. Proposals are made for removing in some way this minority. If we assume various quite plausible things (as that programmes to change the majority sentiment are likely to be protracted and ineffective) then even if the removal would be unpleasant for the minority, a utilitarian calculation might well end up favouring this step, especially if the minority were a rather small minority and the majority were very severely prejudiced, that is to say, were made very severely uncomfortable by the presence of the minority.[14]
I think it’s worth comparing this to a couple other common thought experiments. Like “Torture vs. Dust Specks”,[15] it highlights how utilitarianism can require you to impose a huge cost on a small group in order to bestow a small benefit on a large group, if the difference in group sizes is big enough. The key extra element in the fragile racists case is the element of injustice: the connection between the cost and the benefit—the fact that the racists’ discomfort can only be relieved by harming the minority—exists because of a character flaw in the very people who would receive the benefit. A variant of the utility monster thought experiment[16] shares that element, if we imagine that the monster receives pleasure specifically because it enjoys the suffering of others; but the fragile racists case is less abstract and feels somewhat more like a plausible real-world situation. Those elements of injustice and relative plausibility make the fragile racists thought experiment especially pointed.
Williams brings up this case in order to pose a dilemma for utilitarians: should pleasure/pain that someone experiences due to their own irrational dispositions count when evaluating a state of affairs? (E.g. pleasure from doing something immoral, or pain from being in the presence of a person you are racist against.) If the utilitarian does count it, they’re led to the abhorrent conclusion in this thought experiment; if they don’t count it, they can’t use the “psychological effect” defense in the George and Jim cases above. I’m not concerned about the George and Jim cases, but my my meta-ethical view (see Sharon Hewitt Rawlette’s The Feeling of Value)[17] doesn’t leave room for considering the causes of a subjective experience when evaluating its intrinsic (as opposed to instrumental) value. So I can’t evade Williams’s thought experiment by saying the racists’ suffering doesn’t matter at all.
One solution might be to invoke value lexicality.[18] On this view it’s possible to have two kinds of bad things—say X and Y—such that some finite number of Xs is worse than even an infinite number of Ys. This lets you say the dust specks can never outweigh one person’s torture; the utility monster’s bliss can never outweigh anyone’s suffering; and no amount of “severely uncomfortable” people can outweigh the suffering caused by a purge.
But I’m skeptical of value lexicality, and it’s not a full solution anyway. You could adjust the thought experiment to specify that the subjective suffering the racists experience is just as intense as the suffering they’re planning to inflict on the minority. This variant lacks one of the strengths of the original thought experiment, because it’s a much more unrealistic or pathological scenario. But I think it highlights that the most potent part of the original scenario is the element of injustice, not the element of outweighing large harms with many small benefits.
And it’s an injustice with a particular structure:
- there’s a win-lose scenario (either the racists suffer or the minority does);
- the only thing preventing a win-win scenario is the attitudes of one group (everyone could live happily if the racists weren’t racist);
- the group making it a win-lose scenario is in a sense using an implicit threat of self-harm to tilt the cost/benefit analysis in their own favor (the only reason that placating the racists causes less overall suffering than the alternative is that the racists’ own brains are going to torment themselves if they don’t get their way)
Like an abusive partner threatening suicide unless their lover complies with their demands, the racists are effectively holding themselves hostage in order to blackmail the utilitarian decision-maker into deciding in their favor. In the real world, I think utilitarianism would generally tell us to reject such threats. The “precedent effect” that Williams dismisses in the George and Jim cases surely does apply in this case: appeasing the racists would incentivize everyone in the future who has the slightest racist inclination (or any other arbitrary and harmful inclination) to work themselves into as much of an emotional frenzy over it as they can. That sort of downward spiral is not at all conducive to the utilitarian goal of maximizing net happiness.
Of course, you could modify the thought experiment again and declare we magically know that this is the last time in history that any form of prejudice will arise, so the precedent becomes irrelevant. You can add as many such qualifications to the scenario as necessary to keep forcing attention back to the core issue: whether there are cases where utilitarianism would use the interests of the oppressor to justify oppression. But all these qualifications make the cases drastically less realistic. Unrealistic cases are still important, but have limitations. Our ethical intuitions are informed by what we know about the real world; if a theory (utilitarianism) gives a different answer than our intuitions on a question that requires us to imagine a radically different reality from the one we live in, it becomes hard to tell whether the issue is with the theory, or if it’s just difficult for us to prevent our background assumptions about the real world from leaking into our judgments about the imaginary one.
(There are other unrealistic aspects to the fragile racists scenario. I’m skeptical that a typical racist experiences much suffering when contemplating the targets of their racism. And the idea that whatever suffering they do experience would stop if the hated group were removed seems highly implausible; the hatred would just be transferred to another set of targets. Williams wants us to assume “that programmes to change the majority sentiment are likely to be protracted and ineffective”, but history suggests sentiments can and do change. Even if the process is “protracted”, the long-term benefits of people learning to get along would be enormous compared to dealing with every conflict by crushing one side.)
(crosspost; go here for footnotes)
April 21, 2021
This book consists of a "for" essay by Smart, and an "against" essay by Williams. For each essay, its style resembles the spirit of its content. Smart carefully but steadily builds up a utilitarian thesis. He writes very clearly, often summarising previously made points, and he aims to follow an obvious narrative throughout his essay. The character of utilitarianism, that it is simple, obvious, and rational, finds its sibling in the stylistic character of Smart's essay.
Williams seems to attach comparatively little worth to clarity. He enjoys being somewhat indirect and elusive. This may generally be the bane of comprehensive critiques per se: if it is not just one premise of one argument that one is attacking, then one is doomed to have a somewhat random structure for the non-directly interrelated points one wishes to make. An example of Williams' indirect method is found in a footnote in which he claims that Smart's utilitarian conception of a 'good' person constitutes a rather 'relaxed standard': "thus the well-known difficulty of finding ten good men in Sodom (Genesis 18-19) should perhaps not have arisen, unless Sodom had an exceedingly small population." Williams' criticism of utilitarianism mainly boils down to his point that utilitarianism is too "simple-minded" to account for the "complexities of moral thought". Thus, we see the character of his moral thought, that it should be more complex and less straightforward than utilitarianism can provide foundations for, represented in the style of his writing: complicated and indirect.
Nevertheless, this little book is a seriously enlightening read on such a controversial topic. Part of my objections towards William's style arise from my having to write about utilitarianism for my Cambridge philosophy exams next month; and the examiners most insistently value 'clear, analytic arguments'. For that, Smart is much more helpful than Williams. On the other hand, if one is merely interested in utilitarianism, and wishes to read a challenging, thought-provoking, and at times entertaining little book on it, then I highly recommend this one - part of you must have enjoyed Williams' ironic footnote.
Williams seems to attach comparatively little worth to clarity. He enjoys being somewhat indirect and elusive. This may generally be the bane of comprehensive critiques per se: if it is not just one premise of one argument that one is attacking, then one is doomed to have a somewhat random structure for the non-directly interrelated points one wishes to make. An example of Williams' indirect method is found in a footnote in which he claims that Smart's utilitarian conception of a 'good' person constitutes a rather 'relaxed standard': "thus the well-known difficulty of finding ten good men in Sodom (Genesis 18-19) should perhaps not have arisen, unless Sodom had an exceedingly small population." Williams' criticism of utilitarianism mainly boils down to his point that utilitarianism is too "simple-minded" to account for the "complexities of moral thought". Thus, we see the character of his moral thought, that it should be more complex and less straightforward than utilitarianism can provide foundations for, represented in the style of his writing: complicated and indirect.
Nevertheless, this little book is a seriously enlightening read on such a controversial topic. Part of my objections towards William's style arise from my having to write about utilitarianism for my Cambridge philosophy exams next month; and the examiners most insistently value 'clear, analytic arguments'. For that, Smart is much more helpful than Williams. On the other hand, if one is merely interested in utilitarianism, and wishes to read a challenging, thought-provoking, and at times entertaining little book on it, then I highly recommend this one - part of you must have enjoyed Williams' ironic footnote.
August 18, 2025
As someone who prior to reading this book, looked unfavorably upon Utilitarianism, both essays had the effect of further convincing me that it should fall into further disrepute. Bernard Williams describes Utilitarianism as ultimately simple-minded in that it is incapable of dealing with the moral complexities that one is faced with in practice. This notion is affirmed in one’s reading of J. J. C. Smart’s essay as he descends into arguments in an attempt to accommodate the nuances of reality. This is not say that one’s moral system is in any way capable of being bullet proof, though we should certainly wish it to be. But surely to suggest that with enough simplifying assumptions the consistent utilitarian, operating in a society of like minded utilitarians, can adopt a strategy such that utility can be maximized in expectation is to go too far. I note that Smart makes the point that such strategies and formulations of situations are likely only useful insofar as they provide theoretical insight, but therein lies the issue at the heart of Utilitarianism—it operates only in theory.
I had heard of Williams essay prior to reading this and while it found it a compelling, I will say that beginning with a Nietzsche quote led me to believe that there would be more denial of the Utilitarian premise that happiness (or more generally utility) is what we should be maximizing. That is not to say that he doesn’t make this point; his section on integrity indeed argues that Utilitarianism risks not assigning value to those projects that give meaning to lives. But it was not incredible central to his argument, or not central to the degree I expected it to be. And to the extent that I am sympathetic to Nietzsche’s philosophy, I had hoped that the entire critique would be more or less along those lines, but then again some of the more pointed criticisms he made are only possible from what I’ll call (and to some degree objectively is) a more standard view of morality.
I had heard of Williams essay prior to reading this and while it found it a compelling, I will say that beginning with a Nietzsche quote led me to believe that there would be more denial of the Utilitarian premise that happiness (or more generally utility) is what we should be maximizing. That is not to say that he doesn’t make this point; his section on integrity indeed argues that Utilitarianism risks not assigning value to those projects that give meaning to lives. But it was not incredible central to his argument, or not central to the degree I expected it to be. And to the extent that I am sympathetic to Nietzsche’s philosophy, I had hoped that the entire critique would be more or less along those lines, but then again some of the more pointed criticisms he made are only possible from what I’ll call (and to some degree objectively is) a more standard view of morality.
August 15, 2025
By the time the book was written, ‘a vast literature’ had amassed on the subject of utilitarianism. It is very much a product of that time. Utilitarianism had come to be stale and highly technical, and so is the book.
Smart’s defence of utilitarianism is not aimed at the general reader but at one who is deeply familiar with the complications that utilitarianism has thrown up. It is an attempt to contort the theory into a shape that will resolve those problems. From the very first page, he is straight into mind-numbing technicalities, and at no point does he give a compelling, positive case in favour of utilitarianism. For the general reader, there is nothing whatsoever of value to be got from reading his essay.
Assessing Williams’s essay is more complicated. Certainly parts of it are much more stimulating than Smart’s. He gives a famous thought experiment in which Jim, a visitor to an Indian tribe, can either watch twenty prisoners being shot as part of a ceremony, or, in honour of his visit, shoot one visitor himself and allow the others go free. Like any good thought experiment, it clarifies the issues and focuses the mind on the ethical question.
The strength of utilitarianism is that it distills fraught moral quandaries down to an almost irresistible calculus of which action leads to more happiness, but Williams does a very convincing job of showing that preserving the ‘integrity’ of the agent is also of moral significance. For all its technical sophistication, utilitarianism comes out looking very crude.
But like Smart, Williams cannot help getting bogged down in tedious technicalities for large sections of his essay. Maybe to defeat utilitarianism you have to talk like a utilitarian, but there is no doubt in my mind that a much less esoteric presentation of the arguments could have been given without sacrificing any rigour. I imagine modern textbooks have done just that.
Smart’s defence of utilitarianism is not aimed at the general reader but at one who is deeply familiar with the complications that utilitarianism has thrown up. It is an attempt to contort the theory into a shape that will resolve those problems. From the very first page, he is straight into mind-numbing technicalities, and at no point does he give a compelling, positive case in favour of utilitarianism. For the general reader, there is nothing whatsoever of value to be got from reading his essay.
Assessing Williams’s essay is more complicated. Certainly parts of it are much more stimulating than Smart’s. He gives a famous thought experiment in which Jim, a visitor to an Indian tribe, can either watch twenty prisoners being shot as part of a ceremony, or, in honour of his visit, shoot one visitor himself and allow the others go free. Like any good thought experiment, it clarifies the issues and focuses the mind on the ethical question.
The strength of utilitarianism is that it distills fraught moral quandaries down to an almost irresistible calculus of which action leads to more happiness, but Williams does a very convincing job of showing that preserving the ‘integrity’ of the agent is also of moral significance. For all its technical sophistication, utilitarianism comes out looking very crude.
But like Smart, Williams cannot help getting bogged down in tedious technicalities for large sections of his essay. Maybe to defeat utilitarianism you have to talk like a utilitarian, but there is no doubt in my mind that a much less esoteric presentation of the arguments could have been given without sacrificing any rigour. I imagine modern textbooks have done just that.
March 30, 2024
Thought I would read this so as to save myself from becoming an unthinking utilitarian. Glad I did so. Williams critique of utilitarianism is exceptional, though I still think there is a lot to be said for it (the writings of Peter Singer and Parfit would probably provide the best counters). My main takeaway was simple: the problem with utilitarianism is that it allows for negative responsibility: we can be responsible for actions that arose from our inaction, in a very general sense. What this means, then, is that we become subject to the whims of the causal nexus (i.e., the set of causal choices that we have) that we find ourselves in, leading us to be buffeted around by things that are beyond our control, all for the sake of maximising utility. Not being very clear, but it would be easier to just read the book. In a rush.
September 29, 2025
Super important for history of utilitarianism. Not really a book so much as two long essays, partially connected, about utilitarianism. Bernard Williams’ essay is justly famous. J. J. C. Smart’s essay is underrated compared to Williams’, but in my view he’s really crippled by non-cognitivist meta ethics. Basically, he thinks moral sentences aren’t descriptive assertions about how things should be; they’re merely expressions of how the speaker feels or wants others to behave. This does not sit easy with utilitarianism, which is a very demanding claim about what is genuinely valuable and how people should relate to that value (i.e., maximize it).
I have lots more thoughts, and not time to work them out here.
I have lots more thoughts, and not time to work them out here.
July 12, 2017
Fascinating exploration of utilitarianism that made me think deeply about a few things:
* How alike are all the forms of utilitarianism?
* How practical is it to measure and compare utilities?
* Is utilitarianism the tool with which to accomplish its goal? Or must it necessarily fail to bring about optimific circumstances?
Smart was the more consistent writer, but Williams (despite the occasional lack of clarity) had all the best remarks. I remain a utilitarian even after reading it, but I perhaps have a better understanding of the potential pitfalls of my chosen ethical system.
* How alike are all the forms of utilitarianism?
* How practical is it to measure and compare utilities?
* Is utilitarianism the tool with which to accomplish its goal? Or must it necessarily fail to bring about optimific circumstances?
Smart was the more consistent writer, but Williams (despite the occasional lack of clarity) had all the best remarks. I remain a utilitarian even after reading it, but I perhaps have a better understanding of the potential pitfalls of my chosen ethical system.
January 19, 2025
A classic for-and-against treatment of the viability of utilitarianism: Smart leads off with a non-cognitivist case for utilitarianism that's mostly written for people who already agree with him. He has some inventive thought experiments ("is it okay to be a sadist if I only ever torture imaginary beings?") that make you wonder if he's doing ethics for imaginary people. In fact, that is the thrust of Williams' response. Utilitarianism collapses in on itself when applied to real people and real conflicts.
December 7, 2021
The critique of Williams is very much worth reading. Not sure if its 100% convincing but definitely one of the most solid arguments against utilitarianism. (Like a lot of people i didn't read the part by Smart.)
November 12, 2016
It's true that Smart's is the more clearly written essay, but Williams' is far more philosophically interesting.
July 11, 2020
one of the top books of the 70s for Ethics
Cambridge 1973
Cambridge 1973
January 14, 2025
Half of this book was GREAT!
February 27, 2017
A fairly simple introduction to and debate around utilitarianism and its merits, or lack thereof. I found Smart to be clear and honest in his defence of utilitarianism, and thought that Williams' arguments were generally lacking much impact. Still, a pleasant and easy read.
April 28, 2010
This slim book was assigned reading in a philosophy course on ethics I took in college. It consists of two essays. J. J. Smart's "An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics" and Bernard William's "A Critique of Utilitarianism." I remember when I was first introduced in school to the subject of ethics, I was basically presented with two alternatives--Kant's Categorical Imperative and Utilitarianism. The case that sticks in my mind was the hypothetical, what if you could save a million lives by torturing to death one innocent? (Or to put it differently, would you allow a million lives to be lost rather than torture one human being.) Crudely put, a utilitarian would say, bring on the torture--the greatest good for the greatest number is what matters! While someone following Kant would say consequences do not matter--they are independent of right and wrong and we have to do right and damn the consequences. I found parts of each view appealing--and unappealing. I care about individual rights--and I care about consequences.
Eventually I'd find other ways of grounding ethics more congenial, but my point is Utilitarianism is one of the basic ethical options presented to people and is enormously influential--it shouldn't be ignored, however one might feel about it. And it deserves a more nuanced consideration than say, the caricature of it in Dicken's Hard Times, where it's presented as rigid and emotionally arid. Smart's defense presents many of the questions and problems with the philosophy: "Act-Utilitarianism and Rule-Utilitarianism" and "Average Happiness versus Total Happiness" among others. Still, Smart's arguments remind me why I find so much of Utilitarianism repugnant:
If it were known to be true, as a question of fact, that measures which caused misery and death to tens of millions today would result in saving from greater misery and death hundreds of millions in the future, and if this were the only way in which it could be done, then it would be right to cause these necessary atrocities.
Or as Lenin put it, "If you want to make an omelet, you must be willing to break a few eggs." Ah, so many millions of "eggs" broken by justifications of the sort above--and no tasty omelets.
So, in case you cannot guess, I do find Williams' arguments against Utilitarianism much more convincing and in that regard particularly the chapter "Integrity" that I think gets to the heart of a lot of my problems with Utilitarianism.
Eventually I'd find other ways of grounding ethics more congenial, but my point is Utilitarianism is one of the basic ethical options presented to people and is enormously influential--it shouldn't be ignored, however one might feel about it. And it deserves a more nuanced consideration than say, the caricature of it in Dicken's Hard Times, where it's presented as rigid and emotionally arid. Smart's defense presents many of the questions and problems with the philosophy: "Act-Utilitarianism and Rule-Utilitarianism" and "Average Happiness versus Total Happiness" among others. Still, Smart's arguments remind me why I find so much of Utilitarianism repugnant:
If it were known to be true, as a question of fact, that measures which caused misery and death to tens of millions today would result in saving from greater misery and death hundreds of millions in the future, and if this were the only way in which it could be done, then it would be right to cause these necessary atrocities.
Or as Lenin put it, "If you want to make an omelet, you must be willing to break a few eggs." Ah, so many millions of "eggs" broken by justifications of the sort above--and no tasty omelets.
So, in case you cannot guess, I do find Williams' arguments against Utilitarianism much more convincing and in that regard particularly the chapter "Integrity" that I think gets to the heart of a lot of my problems with Utilitarianism.
December 12, 2015
Neat little volume, read primarily for Bernard Williams' argument against direct utilitarianism. Briefly, B. Willies argues that because direct (act) utilitarianism can in fact incorporate rules of thumb that there is little reason for us to resort to indirect (rule) utilitarianism (which he more or less discards). Among other things, B. Willies claims that because direct utilitarianism is committed to the moral principle that only actions have moral value (insofar as they produce favorable consequences), it is incapable of properly accounting for the moral motivations of individuals that have non-instrumental projects or commitments that conduce to happiness. Since the direct utilitarian cannot accommodate noninstrumental projects, they omit a serious source of value (++ serious hedons) in their felicific calculations, thereby rendering them fairly useless IRL in terms of action-guidance.
B Willies' biggest claim is that any consistent direct utilitarian will eventually have to concede that happiness (+ hedons) is often better achieved without applying the theory. In this way, utilitarianism advises against itself and becomes self-effacing.
B Willies' biggest claim is that any consistent direct utilitarian will eventually have to concede that happiness (+ hedons) is often better achieved without applying the theory. In this way, utilitarianism advises against itself and becomes self-effacing.
December 15, 2008
This is one of the better books on the topic, for Utilitarianism, or ethics, or philosophy in general; specifically for Utilitarianism, this is probably the best book to get introduced to the topic. J.J.C. Smart and Bernard Williams each take half the book to explain Utilitarianism as they understand it, and to argue pro (Smart) and con (Williams). The book is rather short, small, and easy to read. Smart and Williams each do justice the topic by discussing relevant issues and common problems/complaints put to utilitarianism.
As with most philosophy books, this probably will not sway you from whatever believes you have (nor necessarily should it), but it should give you plenty to consider and help you to make a more informed argument, regardless of what you believe. It is written in plain English with good examples and cases to illustrate each side.
As with most philosophy books, this probably will not sway you from whatever believes you have (nor necessarily should it), but it should give you plenty to consider and help you to make a more informed argument, regardless of what you believe. It is written in plain English with good examples and cases to illustrate each side.
November 4, 2017
Just finished the JJC Smart portion of this book. I read the Williams half last year. Far from being a defender of Utilitarianism, Smarts half is at best, an equivocal apology for it, in spite of its many flaws, that Smart himself openly admits to. He is especially concerned with Kantian critiques, in spite of the fact that he repeatedly says he's coming from a non-cognitivist position. Smart's thought experiments are classroom favourites today, but I'm with Williams on this on. Trolley dilemmas are at best, fun puzzles; at worst, misleading wastes of time.
January 7, 2017
An excellent presentation of two takes on the two sides of the argument. Although not as technical as a typical journal article, I wouldn't recommend this to anyone as a first step into utilitarian theory. The book best for those who are at least vaguely familiar with the theory's basic claims and problems. Smart has provided an very useful annotated bibliography that's worth the price of admission on its own.
June 12, 2011
Two fine writers cover a lot of ground in a small number of pages. (Except for one small detour Smart takes into game theory, it's amazingly concise.) This serves as a fantastic counterexample for those who think philosophy is the province of blather and not making sense. Utilitarianism is easy to bash, but Williams treats it fairly, and Smart's essay is worth thinking about.
November 24, 2022
cogently and thorough arguments presented by both smart and williams. i found smart's arguments both persuasive and humane, in contrast to the typical vulgarity of other prominent utilitarians (i.e. singer). i ultimately found williams' criticisms more persuasive however: his discussion of integrity and the importance of the individual's projects being the most convincing and profound.
October 19, 2007
Smart is clearer, but Williams makes some good points (especially the odd position of utilitarianism being a theory which seemingly entails that people should really seldom use itself).
December 31, 2007
Minor Classic
February 23, 2009
Philosophical hogwash at its finest. The "against" section by Bernard Williams in particular is a superb example of the sheer inanity of the analytic tradition.
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