Ý niệm hiện tượng học

by Edmund Husserl, Bùi Văn Nam Sơn (Translator)

Năm bài giảng về “Ý niệm hiện tượng học” (1907) có vị trí đặc biệt như là văn bản “xác lập” triết học Husserl, nơi triển khai lần đầu tiên khái niệm “quy giản hiện tượng học”, đặt cơ sở cho triết học như là một “khoa học nghiêm ngặt”. Và cũng là tác phẩm đầu tiên của Huserl được dịch ra tiếng Việt và chú giải cặn kẽ.
"Nếu không làm sáng tỏ được về đại thể ý nghĩa, bản chất, phương pháp và các giác độ chủ yếu của công cuộc phê phán lý tính, nếu không suy nghĩ chín chắn, không phác thảo, khẳng định và đặt cơ sở được cho một dự án như thế thì tôi không thể sống một cách đúng thật và chân thật. Tôi đã nếm trải đủ sự dày vò đau khổ vì sự không rõ ràng, vì nỗi hoài nghi dao động. Tôi phải đi tới một sự kiên định về nội tâm. Tôi biết rằng đây là chuyện đại sự và là tối đại vấn đề; tôi biết rằng bao nhiêu bậc thiên tài vĩ đại đã thất bại, và, nếu muốn sánh vai cùng họ, tôi ắt phải tuyệt vọng ngay từ đầu..."

Genres: Philosophy, Nonfiction, German Literature, Classics, Psychology, Theory, Logic

190 pages, Hardcover

First published January 1, 1907

About the author

Edmund Gustav Albrecht Husserl (Dr. phil. hab., University of Halle-Wittenberg, 1887; Ph.D., Mathematics, University of Vienna, 1883) was a philosopher who is deemed the founder of phenomenology. He broke with the positivist orientation of the science and philosophy of his day, believing that experience is the source of all knowledge, while at the same time he elaborated critiques of psychologism and historicism.

Born into a Moravian Jewish family, he was baptized as a Lutheran in 1887. Husserl studied mathematics under Karl Weierstrass, completing a Ph.D. under Leo Königsberger, and studied philosophy under Franz Brentano and Carl Stumpf. Husserl taught philosophy, as a Privatdozent at Halle from 1887, then as professor, first at Göttingen from 1901, then at Freiburg im Breisgau from 1916 until his 1928 retirement.

Reviews

[Mohammed Yusuf · Rating 3 out of 5]

إن من الظلم أن نختزل فكراً شمولياً معرفياً كالفينومينولوجيا في معنى اللفظة فقط , كتب صديقي علي تويتر بأنه قرأ سطرين علي الويكيبيديا عن معنى هذه الكلمة وهذا الفكر الفلسفي , لكن لا أظنه إستفاد شيئاً من وراء ذلك , ليست هنالك فائدة إلا التباهي من وراء هكذا معلومة , البعض يعد قراءة كتب كهذه ترفاً فكرياً إلا أنها تساعد في بناء كثير من المفاهيم , كثير من الرؤى إضافة للمعرفة كمعرفة بحد ذاتها

إن الفينومينولوجيا ليست تحمل معنى الظاهرة التي يعالجها الوعي فقط كما يتبادر بل إنها محاولة للم شمل ما تهافت من العلم التجريبي في نطاق تأصيل علمي و فلسفي , إن العلم التجريبي ومن كونه تجريبي متهافت إلى حد بعيد , وأنت لا تستطيع لملمة معظم الجزئيات فيه لتنحو بها نحو تصور معين , كما يغتبط به الكثيرين إن مشكلة العلم أنه لا ينفذ إلى الماهيات ولا يسأل نفسه عن الكيفيات اللهم إلا بالتي تحكم التجربة من شروط غير أن ما وراء ذلك لا يصل إلى الذات بقدر ما هي ذات لا موضوع مجرد منفصل عن سياقه

ولما كانت نظرية المعرفة هي أصل المعرفة , كان من الضروري البدأ بها من ناحية تساؤلية , ومن هنا يرجع هوسرل بتاريخ هذا العلم إلى ديكارت ويتحرك تبعاً لذلك نحو تكوين علم فلسفي لا مذهب فلسفي , مقترحاً منهج معين لسيره , إلا أن الكتاب كما هو يمثل شرح للفكرة كان يضع في أساسه العموم مع أمثلة شحيحة

من الملاحظ خلال قراءة الكتاب أن هوسرل أراد ترسيخ المفاهيم عبر الدروس حيث تتكرر الأسئلة وبيانها بين الدرس والآخر , كما أن التطور للفكرة كان حادثاً خلال هذه الدروس , حيث تظهر بعض المصطلحات الجديدة مع الأسئلة المجاب عليها

نصيحة : لمن يريد قراءة الكتاب , البدأ بالثبت التعريفي في آخره مهم والمقدمة تقدم القليل وتعقد الكثير فلا تحس بصعوبة الكتاب منها والأفضل قراءتها بعد نهاية الكتاب

[Xander · Rating 3 out of 5]

This is, by far, the clearest exposition of the phenomenological method by Husserl. Husserl is a terrible writer, the subjects he treats of are highly abstract and eccentric, and to top it off: the German language has a tendency to put sentences in sentences in sentences. A recipe for philosophical disaster.

Anyway, the English translation of Husserl's Idee zur Phänomenology (1907) is superb in that smooths a lot of the linguistic troubles. Also, Husserl's approach to his methodology is highly accessible in this book. Compared to his Ideen (1913), which was supposed to serve as the founding document and textbook for phenomenological study, this series of five lectures is aimed at a general exposition of his methodology. I have no clue as to the audience he lectured to, but judging by the style of exposition this was an introductory course.

The result is that the problem of his terrible writing is circumvented. We can read simple, structured lecture notes and access the key ideas in way that is much friendlier to the mind. (I used to get headaches when reading Husserl's later (and longer) works.) Also, the work is short, each lecture spanning about 7-8 pages. Which really helps in wrapping your head around certain concepts and using them as building blocks for further concepts.

So in all, I definitely recommend this book as the key text to read if one wants to understand Husserl's phenomenology. Usually, people recommend his Cartesian Meditations, but I found that work slightly less accessible in content as well as style of presentation. Also, in the latter work he reflects on his earlier phenomenological ideas which crystallized around the period 1906-1913, so perhaps it helps to start with this short work.

The method itself is fairly simple (in hindsight - but isn't everything?):

Step 1: put the world of objectivity in a temporary waiting room. In other words, all positive sciences - physics, physiology, psychology - as well as the subjective experiences and the psychological ego should be left alone until further notice.

Step 2: fully focus your attention on one conscious act at a time (metaphorically speaking - time is an objectivity as well) apart from the object of thought. Notice the duality of the act itself and its intentional relation. This relation is included in the reflection on the act itself.

Step 3: the expression of the conscious act in question includes general terms. These terms aren't derived logically from the reflection on the act, but part of the act itself. That is, universal essences are part of the 'seeing' of the phenomenon.

Step 4: as you repeat steps 1-3 with all sorts of conscious acts - thoughts, feelings, judgements, imaginations, etc. - you'll start to notice a set of general principles. Normally they're hidden in your thinking, but as you pay close attention, you'll notice them.

Step 5: following this method, you'll lay the foundation - of a priori essences and the different categories and principles of all sorts of objectivities - on which to build all the positivistic sciences.

Step 5 is the culmination of the phenomenological study. The goal is to chart all the essences of thinking, where these essences differ according to the different sorts of acts, and where the objectivities in question (i.e. that what the particular act is aimed at) are construed out of the essence of the act.

There are two problems you'll notice as you go along Husserl's path.

1. Every conscious act is one type of consciousness - again, there's cognition, emotion, imagination, judgement, etc. - and there is an infinity of objectivities. That is, we have numerous modes of thinking about an infinity of objectivities. The infinity-part is the problem, since it hints at the infinite progress of phenomenological study. It is a pattern that suits Husserl's career perfectly: in the period 1891 (the year of his first publication on Arithmetic) to 1939 (his death) he wrote almost continuously - daily he jotted down personal reflections almost obsessively. It's also why the phenomenological method is characterized by such a diversity of thinkers of such a diversity of backgrounds, all united in the endlessness of their phenomenological attempts.

2. According to Husserl the fundamental goal of phenomenology is the grasping of the essences of thoughts. These essences basically form the basis for both the common sense worldview as well as all the scientific theories. That is, through careful analysis of particular conscious acts you'll discover universal essences. After collecting these essences, you'll use them as a foundation for all the positivist sciences which study objectivities.

Husserl (sort of) quickly steps over this seemingly small step in his method, but the short and superficial treatment of it in Lecture V hides the fact that it really is a major one. According to Husserl, we 'see' universals in particular conscious acts. And this 'seeing' happens in the same pure reflection as the seeing of the conscious act and its intentional relation. Somehow these universal essences constitute the objectivities of our thought in perception and/or imagination.

It is unclear to me what Husserl exactly means. As said, he claims the objectivities of our conscious acts are construed out of pure (a priori) essences. But if these essences are really a priori then it seems we construe all the objects of our thoughts. And this would seem to lead us into idealism and, ultimately, solipsism - against which he fulminates throughout the lectures. This would mean that, returning to step 1, all the objectivities which we take for granted in everyday life and in science are constructions by our pure consciousness.

The (only?) alternative seems (to me?) to be that these universal essences, these primordial grounds for every existing objectivity, are Platonic ideas. This would lead us out of the trap of solipsism, since it would mean in our conscious acts we 'see' (or rather: grasp) universals existing somehow somewhere in an ideal reality - and this, supposedly, guarantees our belief in the fundamentalism of our conscious acts as regards the objective world and the sciences which study it. But in that case Husserl has to explain how it is possible that we, as pure consciousness in the phenomenological attitude, grasp transcendental essences while the whole phenomenological attitude consisted in bracketing all transcendent entities...

The only way out of this trap would seem to be to postulate pure consciousness as transcendental itself - leading into all sorts of further contradictions. The problem seems (to me) insurmountable. As soon as you bracket all objectivities as transcendental entities, it is of no use of using transcendental entities to build a self-evident epistemology...

(If anyone can point me a way out of these problems: please do. I tried to wrap my head around this the whole evening while pondering Husserl's Idee, I can't seem to find a way out of the conundrum...)

[T · Rating 4 out of 5]

Since this book is essential for understanding phenomenology, and the price on Amazon is astronomical for a <100 page book, I'll post my summary here;

Introduction - George Nakhnikian introduces Husserl's work as a revolutionary and novel method of philosophy, which will seem strange to those trained in the typical Western-analytic tradition. However, Husserl's novelty has not prevented his work from influencing a great range of philosopher's and schools of philosophy. Husserl rejects psychologism, and aims to explore consciousness without solipsism and extreme scepticism, which Cartesian doubt highlights.
These notes were written after Husserl's lectures, and many have slight alterations from what Husserl originally said. We assume he added things he missed out.

The Train of Thoughts in the Lectures - This is a method of cognition, which is a movement largely influenced by Descartes. We use eidetic abstraction (mental thought removed from any sense experience) to reach 'clear and distinct' perceptions (see Descartes' Meditations), through the indubitable cogitatio. Phenomenological reduction is used, but it doesn't prove things like inductive or deductively reasoning, which is just phenomena. Self-givenness only extends as far as the phenomenal field. A sound for example is heard, retained and recalled in the mind. This yields absolute data - appearance, and that which appears. Together, they're constituted in the mental processes. Husserl also rejects Descartes' semi-Platonism (Cartesian theory of ideas), instead claiming we don't know if things send 'representatives' to our consciousness. Husserl wants t understand constitution (how perceptions become mental images) and the essence and objectivity of perception. "...the common element is then in the methodology of the analysis of essences within the sphere of immediate evidence." (12).

Lecture 1 - Husserl contrasts natural thinking with philosophical thinking, as natural thinking takes cognition for granted. "Cognition is a fact of nature. It is the experience of a cognising organic being. It is a psychological fact. As any psychological fact, it can be described according to its kind and internatal connections, and its genetic relations can be investigated. On the other hand, cognition is essentially cognition of what objectively is; and it is cognition through the meaning which is intrinsic to it; by thinking is also already active in this relating" (15). Husserl explains that phenomenology is a critique of naturalistic cognition, it tries to get at the essence of things. He rejects scientific idealism (a la Hume). He invokes the spectre of contradictions, and sees scientific logic as failing. The philosopher must not take scientific discovery for granted, as he is critiquing cognition, and on a different path, using a different methodology.

Lecture 2 -Husserl questions how we can critique cognition, but rely undoubtedly on it. "Every intellectual process and indeed every mental process whatever, while being enacted, can be made the object of a pure 'seeing' and understanding, and is something absolutely given in this 'seeing'" (24). In other words, Husserl gives a Thomas Reid-like account of realism, or an atheistic Cartesian view. Our perceptions are a 'given', we can inspect and ponder them. "Without some cognition given at the outset, there is also no advancement of cognition. The critique of cognition cannot therefore begin. There can be no such science at all." (25-26). The problem is that cognition can transcend the 'givenness' of the senses. Transcendence is the 'riddle' of cognition. Therefore, Husserl is demonstrating that science cannot be the source of epistemology.

Lecture 3 - "Thus to each psychic lived process there corresponds through the device of phenomenological reduction a pure phenomenon, which exhibits its intrinsic (immanent) essence (taken individually) as an absolute datum." (35). Rather than jump to Descartes' proof of God, Husserl declares the "givenness of any reduced phenomenon is an absolute and indubitable givenness" (40). The principles of logic, ethics, and theories of value are dispensed with cognition being a priori self given. This is a critique of reason.

Lecture 4 - "We must clarify the teleological interconnections with cognition,/ which amount to certain essential types of intellectual forms" (46). We use phenomenological reduction to build, but rejects Humean empiricism. "The basic point is that one must not overlook the fact that evidence is the consciousness which is truly [a]' seeing' [consciousness] and which has a direct and adequate grasp of itself and that signifies nothing other than adequate self-givenness." (47). Phenomenological reduction removes loose evidence and 'mediate evidence', it entails no limitation to the cogito, but places limits on that which is 'self given'. "There are many sorts of objectivity and, correlatively, many sorts of so-called givenness. Perhaps the givenness of the existents in the sense of the so-called 'inner-perception', and again the givenness of the existents in the natural 'objectivising' sciences, is only one sort of givenness; while the others, although labeled as nonexistent, are still types of givenness. And it is only because they are, that they can be set over against the other sorts and distinguished from them in evidence." (51).

Lecture 5 - Husserl begins by looking at the complexity of memory, and the universality of the cogitatio. "Perception posits existence but it also has an essence which as content posited as existing can also be the same in representation." (55). "Thus a mode of givenness is displayed in the intuitions in imagination and the evident judgements which are grounded on them." (55). For Husserl we rely on consciousness and must use a kind of common sense realism to critique and build knowledge. We can, for example, look at a house and infer that it is made of bricks, from the basis of appearance. If we hallucinate or fantasise we only see an aspect of the object, but it is not there "'as a datum' of a sort of proper to experience." (57). We must consider essences and accept contradiction, change and predicates as a 'given'. "In givenness we see that the object is constituted in cognition." (59). There are forms of objectivity and consciousness is intentional. Cognition has 'teleological coherence', from here we corroborate and verify (60).

Please excuse any spelling mistakes, and comment if I've made any mistakes.

[Luís · Rating 3 out of 5]

The idea of phenomenology stems from a critique of natural knowledge, of the natural sciences, and attempts to develop "a specifically philosophical method and attitude of thought."
What I liked about it is a philosophy firmly rooted in modernity, which follows the theory of evolution and attempts to break away from the prevailing psychologism.

[Mimi · Rating 2 out of 5]

Husserl aims for a new science of the critique of knowledge that clarifies the essence of knowledge. He reaches for the possibility of metaphysics, as a science of being in the absolute and final sense. The outcome of this endeavour is a transcendental consciousness that is able to constitute objectivity, i.e. a science based on intuitive knowledge.

According to Husserl, positive sciences are not concerned with the critique of knowledge. It does not deal with real actualities, but rather with ideal possibilities that are valid in themselves and unquestioned from the very outset. Husserl argues for a philosophical method that distinguishes philosophy from the positive sciences. In this book he explains his preliminary thoughts on the possibility of knowledge.

First, Husserl outlines “the riddle of knowledge”:
- The problem of transcendence: how can consciousness (the thinking act) reach out beyond itself and make contact with an object? The objects of which we are conscious are ontologically distinct, i.e. the object itself is not a part of consciousness.
- The problem of correspondence: knowledge is a mental experience, it belongs to the knowing subject. How can knowledge be sure of its agreement with its object?

(1) The first requirement of a critique of knowledge: knowledge freed from transcendent knowledge

The cogitatio as an absolute givenness
Husserl first locates the sphere of immanence, that is, the intuitive knowledge of the cogitatio. The cogitatio is an absolute givenness, because it’s clear and certain that one doubts, perceives, judges, etc. He also calls this reflective thinking, or the reflective apprehension of the acts of consciousness: forms of thought that are realized in thinking are given insofar one reflects on them. Perception stands right before the eyes as something given and the same holds for every intellectual experience (no matter how they are given).

Phenomenological reduction
All knowledge must be placed in question, because knowledge contains within itself a problem, we do not know how it is possible that it makes contact with objectivity, i.e. the problem of transcendence (transcendence can be understood in twofold ways: the question of existence of the transcendent object or the ability of the relation to make contact with it.) No theoretical construct, empirical framework, psychology, biology, etc. can be used, everything is to be excluded.

The same goes for the ego, the world, and the experience of the ego as such. Here he does something interesting. Not only the (external) transcendence of objectivity must be excluded, the ego of the knowing subject also needs to be cleared out by suspending any (psychological) judgement. In this way the experiencing person that is part of that external world also falls under the reduction. He creates a 'second' (transcendental) consciousness. He also calls this pure consciousness.

It is unknown how perception makes contact with what is transcendent, but through the phenomenological reduction we can understand how it makes contact with what is immanent, because we directly see and grasp precisely what we intend in the seeing and grasping. Then reflection yields the pure phenomenon of any apperception as entities absolutely given and grasped in pure immanent seeing. This is no longer open to doubt, because it is given in consciousness itself.

Consequently, the problem of transcendence is solved by a theory of intentionality. Intentionality is the relation between the thinking act and objectivity. It contains something that can be apprehended within the pure phenomenon: the-relating-itself-to-something-transcendent, to refer to it in one way or another is an inner characteristic of the phenomenon.

(2) Second requirement: including insights into the essences

Then Husserl moves from the (reflective apprehension of its own) acts of consciousness to the following question: how can this type of knowledge also include insights into the essences of the acts of consciousness/knowing? These findings will then count as a priori truths. Research into essence is research into universals. The universal has the form of transcendence. By know Husserl already excluded all such knowledge, because it is problematic in itself (and can't be used in causal relation with each other), but he needs a solution for making general claims.

He says:
“The singular phenomenon of knowledge, coming and going in the stream of consciousness, is not the object of phenomenological determination. Phenomenology is directed to the "sources of knowing," to the general origins which can be seen, to absolutely given universals that provide the general criteria in terms of which the meaning and also the correctness of all our highly intricate thought is to be ascertained, and by which all the riddles concerning its objectivity are to be solved."

He finds that a purely immanent consciousness of universality can constitute itself on the basis of a seen and self-given particularity. Husserl calls this process “ideating abstractions”, this process secures the essence of a particular phenomenon that can be grasped. On the basis of a particular, an immanent consciousness of universality can be constituted. He gives an example of seeing the color red, it starts with (1) an intuition of red by attending to pure immanence, (2) then the phenomenological reduction is to be performed: all transcendental data must be excluded, so if the red is a dot on a piece of wood, the wood itself must be excluded, (3) then the meaning of red in specie becomes actualized in pure seeing this object of our intent, through which the universal can be seen, or: red in general.

This is how Husserl moves from the particular to redness in general. He justifies this process by stating that the relation of similarity between two singularities is a universal that is an absolute givenness. This is an analysis of essence and an investigation of universal states of affairs that are constituted within immediate intuition. These insights about the essence of the acts of consciousness (and acts of knowing) can then count as a priori truths. Knowledge belongs to the sphere of the immanence, so the aim is to find general objectivities of this consciousness. In this way a doctrine of essence of knowledge becomes possible.

(3) Third requirement: phenomenological solution for the problem of correspondence through the absolute givenness of the transcendent

First Husserl was more concerned with the immanence as an internal sphere of intuitive knowledge versus the external objectivity of transcendence, and how the thinking act can reach out and make contact with objectivity. He determined the givenness of intuition and objectivity. Now the focus shifts to how the givenness of objects are constituted in consciousness.

“Absolute givenness is an ultimate. Of course, one can easily say and maintain that something is absolutely given when it is not.”

So: while the physical object remains outside the act of knowing, the appearance of that object can be given in the reflective perceiving act that goes through the reduction. This givenness then is the key for the phenomenological solution of the correspondence problem. Husserl basically 'pulls' the transcendent into the immanent sphere through the criteria of absolute givenness. The relation between the thinking act and objectivity now no longer needs external research, but can be analysed and described in phenomenological terms.

In other words, essences or universals are transcendent, i.e. objectivity does not belong to consciousness, but phenomenologically they do if they can be given. These still do not become part of consciousness (not immanent in the real sense), but they do because they can be given (and thus become immanent in the phenomenological sense). Transcendent is now that which cannot be given, those things remain outside consciousness.

Consequently, things constitute themselves in the experience. The givenness of things means that they present themselves (or are represented) as such in these phenomena.

(He also mentions this does not mean that things “send their representatives into consciousness”. Rather, things exist in appearance, and are themselves given by virtue of appearance “to be sure, taken individually, they exist, or hold, independently of appearance -insofar as nothing depends on this particular appearance (on this consciousness of givenness)- but essentially, according to their essence, they cannot be separated from appearance”.)

Husserl calls this the wonderful correlation between the phenomenon of knowledge and the object of knowledge that reveals itself everywhere. A phenomenological investigation then becomes possible.

In short:
- The acts of consciousness are an absolute given. Intuitive knowledge is secured.
- The method of phenomenological reduction clears out all transcendental knowledge to yield a phenomenon that can be grasped in pure seeing through intentionality.
- Then he adds universals/essentials into this mix that can count as a priori truths. We can not only grasp particulars, but by researching them, also the universals/essences of knowing.
- Finally he solves the problem of correspondence. He does this by determining that there is a strict correlation between the appearance and that what appears.

Here are some thoughts

He solved the problem of transcendence by a theory of intentionality. Contact can be made by directing our intention to it. Grasping what appears becomes absolutely given in consciousness through the phenomenological reduction. He then constitutes these appearances in the consciousness as essences/universals by noticing particular appearances have stuff in common.

The problem of correspondence is met with a poor solution. Basically, the method of reduction yields an appearance, which is then a given because the setting aside of external knowledge ánd psychological judgement should guarantee a pure phenomenon. This appearance then functions as a bridge. He simply determines that there is a correlation between the appearance and the object itself. The gap in the relation between the thinking act and objectivity should be closed by such absolute givenness and thereby constituted in that same sphere of intuition for further investigation. I find it to be poor, because its aimed agreement with objectivity doesn't really leave the same domain (and the appearance is still related to the individual ‘reducing' subject). Husserl thinks differently, because the transcendental consciousness transforms any knowledge into a pure knowing, without depending on bodily human consciousness. But it does (imo).

Here is the thing, it also doesn’t surpass his solution for the problem of transcendence, it doesn’t provide much more than the very same solution, i.e. the phenomenological reduction. He only adds that absolutely given objectivity can be pulled into the sphere of immanence as long as it is adequately given, and thereby become part of it (even when it is not in the real sense).

The absolute givenness of things is the key to everything in his understanding. My main gripe with this is that it doesn’t seem to exclude anything and he does not burst out, he pulls everything in and then seems to close the door to the world he tries to agree with. Husserl seems to be developing a sort of hidden Platonism. A giveaway is when he says “Could a deity, an infinite intellect, do more to lay hold of the essence of redness than to "see" it as a universal?”.

Or maybe I became tired of reading his obscure texts all together. I had to scrape it all together back and forth throughout the text to make sense of it. This book was immensely obscure and difficult to read. I wouldn’t recommend it to anyone.

[Αβδυλλα Aωαςhι · Rating 3 out of 5]

مراجعة كتاب *فكرة الفينومينولوجيا*
للفيلسوف الألماني *إدموند هوسيرل*

هذا أول كتاب أقرأه لهوسيرل - الفيلسوف الألماني الذي عرف بتأسيس *فلسفة الظاهريات* ( وهي لفظة مشتقة من الظاهرة) بالانجليزية Phenomenon و لذلك تُرجمت للعربية بالفينومونولجيا.

*مستقبل اللغة بين التعريب و الترجمة*

طبعاً في البداية سأعيد ذكر اعتراضي على الترجمة لكلمة فينومونولوجيا ، مشيراً للفرق بين الترجمة و التعريب و هو فرق جداً جوهري حيث إن كثرة استخدام التعريب يؤدي لإغراق قاموس اللغة الأصلي بكلمات غريبة عن النظام الأبجدي و النظام الصوتي لذات اللغة.

بالمثل كلمات (بيولوجيا ، فيزيولوجيا، سيكولوجيا.. الخ) استخدم فيها التعريب و لكن الأغنى لغوياً و معرفياً أن تستخدم الترجمة فنقول ( أحياء، فيزياء، علم النفس ).

الترجمة العربية بحاج�� لتطوير مدرستها بحيث تعيد بناءها على قاعدة تنبع من أصل اللغة كما هي حال مدرسة اللغة الفرنسية في الترجمة على سبيل المثال، طبعاً مع كامل إدراكي للصعوبات الناتجة بسبب السبق العلمي و المعرفي و غياب دور المؤسسة الحاضنة.

*عن الكتاب*

الكتاب يستخدم لغة فلسفية مجردة و صعبة بعض الشيء لتوضيح الفكرة دون الأمثلة ، حيث يبدو أن هوسيرل يصر هنا على تقديم عصارة فكرة فلسفة الظاهراتية بأقل عدد ممكن من الكلمات.

تقوم فلسفة الظاهراتية على كونها إحدى فروع نظرية المعرفة ( الابسيتمولوجيا) من حيث ماهية المعرفة التي نكتسبها و هل هي فعلاً معرفة حقيقية أم ظاهرة ليس إلا.

سيكتشف المتأمل في المناهج الفلسفية أن جوهر الفكرة ليس جديد على المدارس الفلسفية التي عرفها تاريخ الفلسفة و لكن الصياغة اللغوية هي بشكل مختلف لتقديم نظرية جديدة بعض الشيء ، فعلى سبيل المثال نرجع لعبارة شوبنهاور *العالم تمثلي * لفهم ماهية الخبرة المعرفية/ الابسيتمولوجية التي نمتلكها من حيث كونها معرفة محدودة بما تستوعبه حواسنا. صحيح أن شوبنهاور لم يقصد أن يخصص كتابه للابستمولوجيا و لكن طبيعة الفلسفة هي أن تدور حول الحرم المقدس للمعرفة التي نمتلكها فتعريها و تكشف لنا عنها، و مع ذلك هي مغامرة خطيرة فرغم المناهج الفلسفية التي حاولت تعرية جوهر المعرفة سنجد أنفسنا غريبين أمام ما نعتبره معرفة مفروغ منها في كل جانب من جوانب الحياة.

في المقابل يقول هوسيرل أن المعرفة هي ظاهرة و إذا اتبعنا النسق الفلسفي التقليدي الذي يقسم القضية الفلسفية إلى ذات و موضوع ، فإن المعرفة بالموضوع هي خارج الذات من ناحية ارتباطها بالموضوع ( و هذه هي الظاهرة الان التي لا نستطيع أن نسبر كنه حقيقتها) : بمعنى أن الموضوع ( أي موضوع نود التأمل فيه / على سبيل المثال الفضاء و الكواكب ) هو قائم خارج ذاتنا و ما يربطنا به هو ذلك التصور الذي سنسميه معرفة و اختلف الفلاسفة في هذا الرابط و هنا هوسيرل يقدم نظريته حول أن معرفتنا بالموضوع هي الظاهرة .

و لكن في نفس الوقت المعرفة هي جزء أصيل من الذات - و هنا نشير لفلسفة كانط و بحثه في القبلية a prioriوما أثبته من معارف قبلية تعرفها الذات قبل تعرضها للموضوع الخارجي.

بإمكاني أن أقول أن جوهر الكتاب هو تأمل في المعرفة بما هي معرفة و علاقتها بالحواس و الحدس و مدى قابليتها للثقة و التحقق إذ ستبقى في نهاية المطاف مجرد ظاهرة "أي تظهر لنا" بخصوص المواضيع التي نتأملها.

سأحيل القراء لكتابيّ المفكر الفرنسي *إدغار موران* "المنهج" حيث يتحدث بالتفصيل عن المعرفة و حدودها و العقبات الماثلة أمامها و أهم إشكالاتها كبديل لهذا الكتاب ، حيث لا أنصح بقرائته لغير المهتم.

عبدالله عواجي
٣١ يناير ٢٠١٧

[Kamakana · Rating 4 out of 5]

230318: so i decided to read this short work by hs because 'ideas' seems too long, too complex, but the four is more for the idea than the writing: hs is not a fluid writer but then these are lecture notes. maybe in person it would be easier to follow. though it is said an intro to phenomenology i would suggest reading on hs and his particular innovation of phenomenology, rather than starting here... his last big work Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology is much easier to read but it is best to start with say Edmund Husserl: Philosopher of Infinite Tasks by natanson or Husserl's Phenomenology by zahavi...

[Andrew]

I can safely say that I did not get this. There was a lot of rereading sentences, two or even three times over, with more questions than answers on my end. What can I say, the older I get, the less patience I have with this kind of high-octane German philosophy, all of Hegel’s abused children. The ideas themselves are intriguing, even if I have trouble with phenomenology as a rigorous intellectual approach. I still don’t think I gave this a fair shake. Maybe I’ll come back to it, but boy it’s a tough ask, despite the massive influence Husserl had on philosophy in both the analytical and continental traditions.

[Micah Gill · Rating 5 out of 5]

We can’t perceive the world the way it really is because the world is outside of, or transcends, us. When we look out at the world, our senses/mind/unconsciousness/biases/past experiences/societal influences intermingle with reality and form a complex relationship that is difficult to disentangle. The end product of this relationship is what Husserl calls the “phenomenon,” or the picture of the world that we actually perceive but is quite different from reality. Sure, this image or painting is influenced by reality, but it is also influenced by those other forces I mentioned (e.g mind, biases). Instead of seeing and knowing the real world, we see and know phenomena.

In our day-to-day lives and in the natural sciences, we just kind of assume that we get to “know” things, that somehow our mind wraps itself around some aspect of reality and now it “knows” it. What is the process of knowing something, though, anyway? Once we ask this question and pair it with our earlier insight that the real world is outside of/transcends us, then we quickly realize that knowing things is a lot more complicated than we initially thought.

If we’re going to be confident that we actually know what we think we do, we can’t start with that which is outside of us. We have to start with the stuff that is already inside of, or “immanent,” to us and our consciousness. Well, what things are immanent to us? Just about the only things that are actually immanent to us are phenomena, those mind-pictures. The practice of admitting the limits of our knowledge and trying to figure out all that we actually know through phenomena is called, by Husserl, “phenomenology.” Hence, the title. In that inquiry, the process of sticking to what we actually know (what is immanent to us) instead of all the stuff that our mind has already polluted (what is transcendent to us) is called the “phenomenological reduction.” If we’re going to do phenomenology right, we have to perform and maintain the phenomenological reduction in our analysis.

In The Idea of Phenomenology, Husserl doesn’t do a ton of phenomenological inquiry; this text is mainly for introducing Husserlian phenomenology, framing the problems it seeks to solve, and providing the rationale behind how Husserl will conduct phenomenological inquiry for the rest of his career.

"Once reflection on the relation between knowledge and the object is awakened, abysmal difficulties open up. Knowledge, the thing taken most for granted in natural thinking, suddenly stands before us as a mystery."

[Danny Druid · Rating 5 out of 5]

Husserl's genius is that he describes WHAT IS HAPPENING to you right now. He breaks down and describes the pure phenomena, the self-evident evidence. Without ideology, without ulterior motive, without anything that can block the course of honest investigation and true sight. His book is very technical but that is only because he is describing things which are intrinsically very difficult to understand because they are on the fringe of human understanding. He repeats himself a lot as well, and while the reader may find this frustrating at first he really has to do it in order for the realizations of what he is saying to sink in and so that the reader does not get lost in his complex and unorthodox argument.

Highly recommended to people who like philosophy.

[Nicole]

I read this as part of a course in phenomenology, and the whole subject simply blew me away. I had never expected a philosophy to so closely dovetail with modern science, but phenomenology goes hand in hand with the psychology and neurology of how our sense systems work. Husserl's lectures were clear and concise with examples that were both common and well articulated. As with most of phenomenology some lesson in German is needed as many of the words created by Husserl and other phenomenologists (like Heidegger) are compounds of multiple German words which do not translate as a unit.

The Idea of Phenomenology is definitely an excellent step to take in beginning a study of this branch of philosophy, and was just as enjoyable as it was enlightening.

[Lady An ☽ · Rating 4 out of 5]

Para entender los conceptos de Ontología, y las características de los objetos, su clasificación y diferencia.

[Mark Moon · Rating 2 out of 5]

Needlessly obscure and repetitive. A few good points, poorly presented.

[Mohamedridha Alaskari محمد رضا العسكري · Rating 3 out of 5]

لن يكون هذا الكتاب سهلا للقارئ، وقد يكون كذلك للذوي الاختصاص..

الفينومينولوجيا تعني علم الظاهرة، وهي امتداد للابستمولوجيا - اي البحث العلمي للمعرفة.

فكرة الكتاب ببساطة هي عن كيفية تحديد المنهج المعرفة وذلك عن طريق الظاهرة من خلال الوعي بشقيه الوعي الذاتي والوعي الخارجي، اي وعي الانسان بوجوده ووجود ماحوله. ويتلخص هذا الكتاب بخمس محاضرات وثلاث ضمائم تتناول مواضيع الظاهرة مثل؛ موافق الفكر الطبيعي وموقف الفكر الفلسفي والشك عند ديكارت ولغز المعرفة والمنهج الفلسفي للتحليل الماهية والوعي بالزمان ومواضيع اخرى ويرى هوسرل ان الاساس الجديد للمعرفة هو علم صرف.

لمن يريد التعمق بالفلسفة الظاهراتية (الفينومينولوجيا) انصحه بقراءة كتابين وهما: الكينونة والعدم لجان بول سارتر و كتاب الكينونة والزمان لمارتن هايدگر الذي يعتبر تلميذ هوسرل الفذ.

[Paige McLoughlin · Rating 5 out of 5]

So much of our understanding of the nature of things is second-hand inference. What I like about the phenomenology of Husserl is he strips away inferences and deals with what is manifest to an individual's experience. This perspective gets down to the raw essentials of first-person experience and builds from there. We may know the number of potatoes in a sack but this is different than actually seeing the potatoes. So much of what we take for granted the whole substructure of our knowledge is the inferences from second-hand sources and theoretical understandings of expert specialties which is very different than the raw experience manifest to our perceptions. This philosophy clears the decks and tries to build something fresh.

[Jesse · Rating 3 out of 5]

I had the clear and distinct intuition that I was being sold a new Platonism grounded on the example of the phenomenon of Red. I like the idea of "phenomenological reduction" as a practice, though, if not something that can ever be completed.

[Wiranto Partosudirdjo · Rating 5 out of 5]

Ini adalah buku ke 3 yang merubah hidup saya dikarenakan buku ini mengajarkan cara berpikir fenomenolgis. Fenomena dalam bahasa Indonesia berarti gejala atau bisa juga indikasi. Jadi cara berpikir femonologis adalah cara berpikir dengan mengamati gejala-gejala yang muncul kepermukaan sehingga object yang kita amati seolah-olah menceritakan diri mereka sendiri apa sebenarnya object tersebut.

Filsafat adalah kerangka berpikir dan semata-mata mengandalkan akal untuk menguraikan atau menjelaskan persoalan-persoalan manusia maupun peristiwa alam secara mendalam sampai kepada akar permasalahan. Oleh karena itu filsafat hanya ada diantara manusia yang berakal. Berlainan denang agama yang ada dogma-dogma yang absolut yang bersifat sepenuhnya kepercayaan, dalam filsasat tidak pernah ada dogma. Dengan akalnya manusia bisa memikirkan dan mempertanyakan apa saja tanpa batas. Oleh karena itu dalam filsatat tidak akan pernah terjadi kebenaran yang mutlak, semuanya akan mengalir sesuai dengan meningkatnya kemampuan daya pikir manusia.

Pada masa sebelum ada cara berpikir fenomenologis, cara berpikir manusia dibagi dua kutup yang berawanan 180 drajat yaitu: idealisme dan realisme.

Kaum idealisme menilai object atau benda-benda maupun peristiwa yang terjadi disekitarnya berdasarkan ide-ide yang dikembangkan dalam pikirannya yang kemudian ide-ide ini membentuk semacam "frame of reference" yang secara subjective dipahami sebagai kebenaran. Dalam memandang dunia sekitarnya seorang idealis akan memakai acuan "frame of reference" yang merupakan ide-ide dalam pikirannya. Oleh karena itu seorang idealis biasanya juga sangat subjective dalam menilai dunia sekitarnya.

Sedangkan kebalikannya kaum realisme, melihat object atau benda-benda maupun sesuatu peristiwa yang ada adalah sesuai dengan keadaan nyata benda tersebut yang secara object bisa diraba, diukur atau punyai nilai objective tertentu. Kalau tidak bisa dibuktikan bahwa benda itu nyata dan punya nilai atau ukuran tertentu maka benda itu tidak pernah ada. Oleh karena itu orang-orang realisme cenderung kepada atheisme yang tidak percaya adanya Tuhan karena Tuhan tidak bisa diLihat secara nyata. Realisme ini yang sangat berpengaruh di Eropa pada masa revolusi industri yang sumbangannya kedunia adalah kemajuan "science & technology".

Pada sekitar awal abad ke 20, walaupaun revolusi industri terus bergerak, beberapa filsuf di Eropa seperti Edmund Hursell (1859 - 1938) mulai meragukan kehandalan cara berpikir realisme yang seolah-olah tidak ada satupun dialam ini yang tidak bisa dijelaskan dengan ilmu pengetahuan alam, karena ternyata apapun yang telah ditemukan, persoalan-persoalan dasar manusia tidak pernah bisa diselesaikan. Tidak semua hal bisa diselesaikan dengan ilmu pengetahuan alam.

Edmund Hursell mempeRkenalkan fenomenologi yang belakangan dikembangkan menjadi eksistensialisme. Cara berkipir femonoligis ditekankan dengan pengamatan terhadap gejala-gejala dari suatu object. Kalau seorang realist menilai benda dengan cara melihat bentuk, ukuran dan nilai suatu benda maka seorang fenomenologist melihat benda dengan gejala-gejala yang muncul dari benda karena benda itu ada berdasarakan gejala-gejala yang timbul dari benda itu sendiri, kita hanya menangkap gejala-gejala tersebut. Benda tersebut bercerita tentang dirinya dengan memancarkan gejala-gejala, dengan menangkap gejala terebut kita bisa menangkap esensi benda tersebut. Semua benda punya pancaran gejala-gejalanya sendiri-sendiri, kita akan bisa lebih memahami benda tersebut apabila kita menganggap benda sebagai subjek yang menceritakan diri sendiri melalui gejala-gejala yang memancar darinya. Contohnya: kalau kita melihat kursi, kursi itu sendiri memancarkan gejala-gejala bahwa dia itu kursi bukan meja, kita hanya perlu menangkap gejala yang muncul dari kursi tersebut dan kita tidak akan salah gejala-gejala yang muncul dari kursi itu bahwa kebenarannya dia itu kursi, bukan benda yang lain.

Jelas cara berpikir ini adalah cara berpikir yang radikal berbeda dengan cara berpikir idealist maupun realist. Idealisme memahami alam sekitarnya melalui manusia sebagai subject dengan ide-ide pikirannya, object disimpulkan sepenuhnya tergantung dari ide-ide pikiran. Realisme memahami benda kalau benda itu nyata berdasarkan ukuran atau nilai. Sedangkan fenomenologi menganggap object sebagai subject yang bercerita kepada kita melalui gejala-gejala yang timbul darinya.

Pengaruh fenomnologi saat ini pada ilmu sosial adalah dengan adanya jajak pendapat yang mencoba menangkap secara benar apa yang dipikirkan oleh kelompok masyarakat dengan masyarakat tersebut memancarkan pendapatnya sendiri dan ditangkap dengan jajak pendapat.

Sedangkan pada ilmu pengetahuan alam, adanya sensor-sensor penangkap gejala alam untuk menerangkan benda tersebut melalu gejala-gejala yang ditimbulkan.

Yang menyenangi ekplorasi cara berpikir, direkomendasikan membaca buku ini, kelihatannya tejemahan bahasa Indonesia sudah ada.

[Taha · Rating 4 out of 5]

husserl 45 bin sayfaya yakın yazmış fenomenolojik yöntemi anlatmak için bu kitap 60 sayfa, yanında bin tane kaynak taramadan hiçbişi anlamazdım

[mohab samir · Rating 4 out of 5]

لا يزال هوسِرل يجاهد لترسيخ مبدأ يعيد النظر فى المعرفة بعامة ويسمح بنقدها فى كل لحظة لدرأ الشك عنها وتوكيدها بناء على أسس متينه . وبعد أن سعى فى بحوثه المنطقيه لرسم خريطة للعقل النظرى وإرساء المنطق المحض الذى ينطبق علي كل معيش للإدراك بعامة ، يرغب هنا فى تلخيص فكرته عن الفينومينولجيا ( وعملية الرد الفينومينولوجى ) كمنهج لإجابة السؤال الرئيسى لإمكانية المعرفة . الفينومينولوجيا كحل فلسفى وتاريخى لإشكالية المعرفة ، أى كنظرية فى نقد العقل النظرى ، وفى الشروط القبلية للمعقولية والصدق والحقيقة .
ولهذه النظرية الفينومينولوجية بنية تركيبية تهتم بمعالجة ثلاثة مقولات هى المعرفة ، ومعناها ، وموضوعها ، وهى البنية التى تسمح باستقرار الموضوع بعامة ، بالاضافة الى الموضوع فى المعرفة . اى ما يحدد سائر وجوه الموضوع الوجودية والمنطقية والميتافيزيقية . كما تسمح بتأهيل العقل النظرى لأمتلاك قدرات تأويلية تتعلق بمراجعة الوجود فى العلوم الطبيعية التى لا تتمتع بالحس النقدى فى أساسها . فقد أثبت الموقف الطبيعى ( والسيكولوجى خصوصاً ) بالإضافة الى الموقف المنطقى الميتافيزيقى قصورهما عن إتمام هذه المهمة ، أى مهمة إرساء أسس المعرفة ونقدها .
ولذلك يهتم هوسرل بقضية التركيب القبلى للأحكام فى علاقته بالقصدية التى للوعى الخالص ( وهى القضية الأساسية الخاصة بالمشكلة والتى أعجزت كانط ) . لكنه يعيد صياغة القضية فى صورة تسمح لضم كامل تاريخ الفلسفة الحديثه ولتشمل كافة القضايا المتعلقة بالوجود بعامة .
يبدأ هوسِرل كما بدأ ديكارت بالشك فى نظام المعرفة ليصل الى الإنعطاء المطلق والبداهة المباشرة للأنا أفكر او للفكر بعامة بمختلف أشكاله ، ثم يعلن وجوب تحول الشك إلى نقد يتعلق بمواضيع الفكر وأشكال المعرفة فى إنعطائها للفكر ، ولكنه يؤكد على وحدة النقد العقلى لا إنفصاله وتقسيمه ( نظرى وعملى ) ، ويؤكد على أولوية وشمولية البُعد النظرى فى نقد العقل ذاك كنظرية فى المعرفة ( نظرية النظريات ) . ولا يغفل كون هذه النظرية نسقية ( كما فعل هيجل ) ويهتم بإعادة بناء هذا النسق بشكل منهجى يعمل على صلاحية النظرية لكافة المعارف والمعيشات الممكنة ويسمح بالانتقال التدريجى من الإنعطاء المطلق للفكر إلى الإنعطاء والبداهة المباشرين للكليات ، ونهاية بالانعطاء غير المباشر لمعطيات التجربة الواقعية او التخيلية المفردة .
ويؤكد هوسِرل أن المسألة لا تختص بالمعرفة الإنسانية ( معرفة نسبية وقابلة للشك ) وإنما بالمعرفة يعامة ( كنظام للوجود ) من دون أن يداخلها أى وضع وجودى يجعلها تتعلق بذات تجريبية أو بعالم واقعى . وأنه يجب أن نتبين كون المشكل الحقيقى فعلا هو ( إعطاء المعنى الذى فى المعرفة إلى أقصى حد ) ، وكذلك إشكال الموضوع بعامة والذى ما كان له أن يوضع لولا التضايف الذى يجمعه فى النهاية بمعرفة ممكنة . ويؤكد أن هذا الإشكال لا حل له إلا فى دائرة البداهة المحضة والإنعطاء المطلق الذى هو المعيار النهائى .

[Korhan Günsor · Rating 5 out of 5]

Fenomenoloji terimini en çok Hegel, metafizik açımlamalarında hatta "Tinin Fenomenolojisi" gibi kitap başlıklarında kullansa da Husserl nedense yeni bir bilimin ilanı olarak yayınladığı; Göttingen Üniversitesindeki derslerinden derlenen bu sansasyonel kitapçığında Hegel'den hiç ama hiç bahsetmez. Çünkü Fenomenolojiyi metafizik gibi deneyüstü ya da deney dışı bir yöntem olarak ele almaz hatta Kant'ın metafiziği dışlamasını daha ileri götürüp, metafiziği sonlandırarak Felsefeye, tamamen somut şeyler üzerine düşüncede, hatta tüm doğal bilimler, etik ve psikolojiye rehberlik etmede yeni bir başlangıç verme amacı güder. Ama materyalizmin de idealizmle olan sınırlarındaki çalışmalardan bahsetmektedir. Hatta bir idealist filozof olan Descartes'in büyük "cogito ergo sum" (düşünüyorum öyleyse varım) ispatından yola çıkarak sırf o deyişteki "cogito" ile ve tamamen "cogitationes" yani düşünceler içerisindeki imgelerin üzerine bir takım işlemlerden sürekli söz eder, durur. İdealizm sınırına bulanıklaşıncaya dek iyice yaklaşmış olduğu için de Kantçılar tarafından Fenomenolojiye, "utangaç metafizik" diye isim takılmasına mani olunamamıştır. Çünkü Kant, nesnelerin bir dış duyumu olan "fenomen"lerin asla nesnelerin özünün tam bilgisini yani "numen" 'ini veremeyeceğini kendi felsefi sisteminde tanım olarak oturtmuştur. Fenomenoloji sansasyonel bir şekilde Kantçı "numen" ve "fenomen" tanımlarını birbiriyle yer değiştirmiş ve sırf sınırlı insan duyumuyla tanrısal bir ex-nihilo yaratımın (yoktan var etme) özünün bilinebileceğini iddia etmektedir. Kant'ın kavramlarında yer değiştirme belki vardır ama öyle bir tanrısallığa ulaşılmasındaki iddia, Fenomenolojinin mutlaklık değil de yönelimsellik içermesi yüzünden pek de geçerli değildir. Husserl, Descartes'in "cogito ergo sum" ile ulaştığı noktadan sonra geri adım atarak ruh-beden düalistliği şeklindeki Kartezyen görüş olarak felsefede yanlış yöne saptığı, bunun Kant tarafından sadece durdurulduğu, Hegel tarafından bu düalizmin diyalektik ile iyileştirilmeye çalışıldığını söyler. Kendisi ise Fenomenoloji sayesinde "cogito ergo sum" ile ulaşılan noktayı daha da ileriye götürmenin yolunu göstermiştir.
Sırf Fenomenoloji üzerine yazdığı 40 cilt, 45 bin sayfa olan "Husserliana" külliyatı (kitaplardan biri bildiğimiz noktalı virgül sembolünün onlarca sayfalık fenomenolojisini içerir) ; 20. yüzyılın başında sönme noktasına gelmiş Felsefeyi canlandırmış canlandırmasına ama birer Fenomenolog olarak kendilerini adlandıran takipçileri, bu yeni bilimi olduğu gibi değil de daha çok kendi düşüncelerine göre yorumlamışlar. En kötüsü de Musevi olduğu için; Nazi dönemine denk gelen son yıllarında çeşitli itibar suikastlarına, ayrıyeten eski öğrencisi büyük filozof Heidegger tarafından öğretisinin revizyona uğramasına tanık olur ve 1938'de vefat eder.. Neyse ki Heidegger daha sonraları; kendi felsefesinin bir revizyondan çok, Husserl'in çalışmaları ve öğretisi sayesinde geliştirdiği ayrı bir sistem olduğunu şükran duygularıyla belirtip hak ve itibarını Husserl'e geri verir. Haksız yere saklı kalan Fenomenoloji tekrar Felsefenin gündemine girmiş ve bu yeni bilim fikri; metoduyla da içeriğiyle de Felsefeye ilgiyi arttırmaya başlamıştır. Sartre, Merleau Ponty, Foucault gibi büyük filozofları Fenomenolog yapan Fenomenoloji öğretisi Felsefeyi henüz tam kesinlikte bir bilim oldurmasa da "metabasis"'i engelletmiş yani antropoloji, psikoloji ve nöroloji gibi insan düşüncesiyle ilgili daha modern disiplinlerden kadim Felsefe disiplinini ayırtmış ve bunlarla beraber diğer tüm disiplinlere de öncelletmiştir.
Bu somut bilimlerdeki tümsel öncelletme nasıl olmaktadır? İster deney ya da tecrübeye birebir şahit olan çıplak duyularla, ister teleskop, radar vs gibi teknolojik araçlarla verilmiş olsun; ister matematik, geometri gibi soyutlamalardan ister çeşitli psikolojik verilerden, hatta rüyalardan ya da anılardan verilmiş olsun; Fenomen bilgi nesnesinden bilince ulaşan en son öğe olarak ele alınmaktadır da ondan. Fakat bu kadar bilgi içerisinde berraklık, karmaşıklık ve vurgu olarak fenomenlerin bir hiyerarşisi de olacaktır. Görülen kırmızı renk ile anımsananın arasındaki gibi ama fenomen bilincimizde her türlü verilmiş olarak yer almaktadır. Fakat bu yer alma boş bir kutudaki çeşitli eşyalar gibi değildir, yaşantılardaki öğeler gibidir. Kutu ya da torbada değil; Fenomen bilince verilirken o yaşantıda anında ya da anımsanırken daha sonra yapılan refleksiyonda yer almaktadır. Örnek olarak; kırmızı fenomeni, kırmızıyı görmeği görmekte yer almaktadır. Ama her bilgi kırmızı gibi basit bir şey değildir ve Fenomenoloji karşılaştırır, ayrım yapar, bağlar, ilişkiye sokar, parçalara böler, öğelerine ayırır. Ama her şeyi saf görme, kendi kendini düşünen düşünce yani refleksiyonla yapar o refleksiyonda saklar. Fenomenoloji nesneleştirici bilimin başladığı yerde ise biter çünkü matematikleştirme ya da kuramsallaştırma gibi işler başka disiplinlere aittir.

Kitapçıkta özellikle vurgulanmasa da Fenomenoloji 3 ana metoda dayanmaktadır ve bu metotlarla epistemolojisini ön kabullerle bir çerçeve içine alıp metafiziğe sapmaya karşı sınırlandırmaktadır:
Epokhe-Askıya Alma (Aşkın yani zihnin dışındaki, dış dünya ile ilgili her türlü bilimsel ya da inançsal yargıların paranteze alınması, fenomenolojik indirgeme )
Yönelimsellik (Bilinç bir şeyin bilincidir. Bilginin kaynaklarının niyetler olarak kategorize edilmeleri. Yani bilincin hangi niyetleri sonucu bu bilgilerin açığa çıktığının araştırılması.)
Konstitüsyon-Kurmak (Bilgi nesnesinin 1 ve 2 numaralar gözetiminde elde edilen bilgilerle bilinçte bir fenomen olarak tekrar kurulması)
Sonuçta sırf arzu, kaçınma, sevgi, nefret, özlem, merak gibi yönelimlerin anlık yaşantılarla olan bileşikleri yüzünden bile bilgi nesnesinden alınacak fenomen miktarı sayısızdır. Teoride, bir bilgi nesnesinden içerdiği atom sayısınca hatta daha fazla fenomen elde edilebilir. Her bir perspektif bize farklı bir fenomen verebilir ki bu da atomsal boyutta sayısızdır. Fakat Husserl'e göre asıl amaç fenomenlerin ötesindeki idelerdir. Sonsuzluk içerisinden kesin ve değişmez bağlantılara, bazı kabullere, idealleştirmelere belki de matematikteki gibi asimptotik benzeri işlemlerle ulaşmak olmalı. Eski bir matematikçi olan Husserl'in, Felsefenin de matematiksel bir kesin bilim olmasının Fenomenoloji ile önünü açmaya çalıştığı söylenmektedir. Fenomenoloji ile fenomenler arasındaki bağlantılar çalışılıp aynen sayılar gibi kesin idelerin Felsefede de oluşturulması Husserl tarafından amaçlanmaktadır. Fakat takipçilerinden hemen hemen hiçbiri böyle bir sürece kalkışmamıştır. Hala daha onun yayınlarının sansasyonel heyecanının verdiği ilhamı ve motivasyonu yeterli bulmakta başka başka yollarda felsefi arayışlarını sürdürmektedirler.

[André Carreira · Rating 3 out of 5]

From the conception of transcendental developed by Kant, Husserl sets out to conceive a positive approach for philosophy. This positive approach focuses on the essence of phenomenal data, of the immediately given, to provide a study of what constitutes life in its immanent sense.
Since I have to read it for an assignment due New Year's Eve it's really a burden, but the content itself is interesting if you're into transcendental philosophy.

[Mohammed · Rating 3 out of 5]

مدخل ممتاز للفينومينولوجيا.

[Francisco Barrios · Rating 5 out of 5]

Para Husserl la misma posibilidad de que el conocimiento pueda alcanzar un objeto (esta taza blanca que está justo ahora frente a mí, sobre el escritorio) fuera de su esfera de inmanencia es algo problemático. Sin embargo, la pregunta misma del cómo esto es posible cae dentro del conocimiento mismo; por lo tanto ¿cómo podríamos llevar a cabo un estudio crítico del problema de la posibilidad del conocimiento si el conocimiento mismo está en entredicho?

Es así que para abordar el problema de la posibilidad misma del conocimiento, debemos llevar a cabo una purga (Husserl usa el término "reducción") de cualquier trascendencia que pudiera entrar en juego (la existencia misma de los objetos de estudio del conocimiento científico, por ejemplo).

Sin embargo, el fenómeno del conocimiento mismo escapa al problema de la trascendencia: en cualquier cogitatio, el objeto no está fuera del conocimiento ni de la conciencia. Está dado "en el sentido de la absoluta autodonación de algo puramente intuido" [p. 102].

(Empero no es posible demostrar esta afirmación "objetivamente": tendríamos que echar mano de posiciones trascendentes para ello. Razón por la cual Husserl apela a la "percepción clara y distinta" del cogito cartesiano para asegurarse de dicha donación fundamental y hacer uso de ella en su crítica del conocimiento).

De este modo es posible establecer un análisis del conocimiento que a su vez se valida y nos indica cómo proceder metodológicamente: la "reducción" (fenomenológica) nos situará en la esfera no solo de las cogitationes, sino de la autodonación pura, de la evidencia pura, sin caer en supuestos trascendentemente objetivantes. Es a partir de aquí que debemos preguntarnos sobre el problema "verdaderamente importante" [p. 136] sobre los diferentes modos de donación auténtica, como formas mediante las cuales se constituyen en la conciencia intuitiva los diferentes modos de objetualidad y sus interrelaciones como "donación última de sentido del conocimiento".

Como puede apreciarse, Husserl se encontraba a medio camino entre la fenomenología descriptiva de sus Investigaciones lógicas (1900) y la fenomenología trascendental de Ideas I (1913). Como quiera que sea, la introducción, las notas, el glosario y el aparato crítico de la traducción de Jesús Adrián Escudero hacen de esta edición LA edición de este brillante texto husserliano. Imperdible.

[Hayden Berg · Rating 4 out of 5]

The first few lectures are incredible, the later ones (possibly because I loaded it all into one day) were a bit more scattered and confusing.

Takeaways:

-Perception, memory, expectation, etc. are all subjective experiences that belong to us as perceiving subjects. It is entirely on the basis of these mental experiences that we mediately posit ‘reality’ and determine truths about that reality and our existence.

-We can divide experience into two basic categories:

Internal, Imminent Experience: This is what Husserl believes we can know, through the logic of the Cogito, without a doubt. Our own, subjective experiences are known clearly and indubitably.

External, Transcendent Experience: This is where the problem lies for Husserl. While we can make assumptions of understanding in connection to our own internal, immanent experience, that knowledge cannot transcend us. We cannot lay claim to know that which exists outside of us. This gives rise to the question: “how can experience, so to speak, go beyond itself?” (27).

Phenomenology, then, is the science of pure phenomena. Husserl has constituted, “a phenomenology of knowledge as the theory of the essence of pure phenomena of knowing” (36). Phenomenology is no longer a question of how can "I" access the objective world and gain knowledge, but how can the objective world and knowledge be attained by pure consciousness.

I'm intrigued by Husserl's arguments and the way they'll be taken up by later phenomenologists as well as their relationship to Descartes' Meditations. I'd like to also read through this more carefully later on!

[Ahmet Bakir Sbaai]

يتكون الكتاب من خمسة دروس ألقيت في جامعة غوتنجن عام 1907، يعلن هوسرل أن الهدف من هذه الدروس هو تأسيس القاعدة الفلسفية لأعماله الفينومينولوجية، وضبط المفاهيم العامة التي يقوم عليها عمله الوصفي. ينطلق الكتاب من التمييز بين موقفين أساسيين للفكر، هما "المقام الطبيعي" و"المقام الفلسفي"، يعنى هوسرل بالأخير منهما.
يمر مسار التفكير في هذه الدروس عبر ثلاثة مستويات:
- يتناول المستوى الأول مسألة إمكان المعرفة في حد ذاتها، مستلهما الكوجيتو الديكارتي، يتقدم هوسرل خطوة أبعد. حيث يميز بين "المحايثة" و"المفارقة"، حيث المعرفة المحايثة هي المعرفة الحاضرة للوعي، أما المفارقة فهي ما هو خارج الوعي. يركز الطور الأول على ضرورة "الردّ الفينومينولوجي" (إبوخيه) (έποχή) كمنهج للوصول إلى المعرفة الأولى.
- في المستوى الثاني من الاعتبار الفينومينولوجي يتم رفع مفهوم "المحايثة الفعلية" التي لم تعد تعني مجرد وجود في وعي الفرد، بل محايثة في وعي الفرد وفي الوعي البشري. هنا يتم تحقيق "الرد الفينومينولوجي" بشكل أعمق، حيث يتجاوز المفهوم النفسي التجريبي. هذا الطور يهدف إلى استخلاص "المعطيات المطلقة" وهي ما يعطى للوعي مباشرة.
- يتناول المستوى الثالث من الاعتبار الفينومينولوجي سؤال كيف يمكن للمعرفة أن تتحقق، مؤسسا لمفهوم "الظاهرة" (φαινόμενον).

[Andrea · Rating 4 out of 5]

Un ottimo testo per avvicinarsi al pensiero di Husserl, ancor più rispetto a La filosofia come scienza rigorosa. Il filosofo austriaco articola il programma della Fenomenologia in cinque lezioni piuttosto lineari, nonostante certi tecnicismi e stravolgimenti di parole e concetti possano cogliere impreparati coloro che non hanno alcun tipo di base riguardo alla disciplina filosofica esposta.

Si affrontano, sostanzialmente, tutti i perni portanti delle successive riflessioni di Husserl:
1. Nella prima lezione si delinea il prospetto di compiere una critica della conoscenza in termini scientifici, progetto che Kant, a detta di Husserl, non è riuscito a completare, perdendosi nelle antinomie antropologiche e psicologiche.
2. Nella seconda lezione si affronta il primo gradino della conoscenza fenomenologica, ovvero l'epoché, la sospensione del giudizio nei confronti della conoscenza, con l'intento di superare ogni forma di scetticismo relativistico e "ritornare alle cose stesse". Attraverso essa, Husserl riconosce pregi e difetti della psicologia.
3. Nella terza lezione si tratta del metodo, ovvero della "riduzione fenomenologica" e del concetto di giudizio.
4. Nella quarta lezione Husserl espone "l'intenzionalità", ovvero il fatto che la coscienza sia sempre coscienza di qualcosa, cioè sempre in relazione con un oggetto, con una "datità".
5. Nella quinta e ultima lezione, invece, il filosofo delinea il termine "prensione d'essenza" (Wesenserfassung) e descrivendo le relazioni soggetto-oggetto nei confronti della realtà spaziale e temporale delinea il punto d'avvio per quelle che saranno le sue ricerche successive.

Per tutti gli interessati ad Husserl e la Fenomenologia, se non volete necessariamente partire con un testo di critica, queste cinque lezioni, nonostante la difficoltà alle volte relativa alla terminologia adottata, è un ottimo punto d'avvio.

[Alex Obrigewitsch · Rating 3 out of 5]

Read this as part of a reading group. I would have liked a less introductory level text, as the interesting developments and applications of transcendental phenomenology are only broached and introduced here. That being said, this is perhaps the most accessable of Husserl's texts that I have come upon for someone with no prior experience seeking to get into phenomenology. But if you have some idea about phenomenology and its operations, the I would suggest Husserl's Cartesian Meditations instead, where you get deeper and more substantial analyses.

As an introduction, this short text left me with more questions than answers. This might be something praiseworthy in a philosophical work, in that it incites us to question and thought, but this text doesn't really offer a rich enough explication of means so as to attempt these questions. What gives the givenness of phenomena? What grants phenomenality? Husserl closes with this question of givenness, but offers nothing in terms of guiding threads for questioning.

On to the Ideas I suppose...

[Benjamín · Rating 3 out of 5]

Creo que este libro ha sido una de las lecturas más difíciles que he tenido en mi vida. Si Husserl hubiese tenido en consideración a sus lectores, su filosofía sería mucho más conocida. La fenomenología tiene tesis muy interesantes y difíciles de clasificar dentro de la historia tradicional de la filosofía, pero es impresionante lo complejo que pueden hacer el trabajo para quienes se interesan por ello.
Ciertamente esto parece que va en contra de los mismos autores, pues una mala escritura quiere decir que alguien no piensa de manera clara. A veces me parecían garabatos apresurados y eso tiene como consecuencia que parezca que Husserl va avanzando por medio de tropezones, en vez de una exposición sistemática y coherente. Es como ir chocando con los muebles para ir avanzando. Algo que está presente en prácticamente la mayoría de los filósofos de esta corriente.
Recomiendo buscar algo más simple o comentarios de otros intérpretes al libro antes de lanzarse a estas cinco lecciones.

[Slava Skobeloff · Rating 4 out of 5]

Husserl's known to be a pretty frustrating, lengthy and tedious writer, so I guess I should be glad the book is (mercifully) only sixty pages long. Overall a very, very simple exposition--Husserl has a tendency to be quiet slow in giving his ideas. Lots of famous early notions from phenomenology, from intentionality (from Brentano), the constitution of objects, eidetic reduction, phenomenological reduction (epoché/bracketing). Also the opposition to the idea of positing an ego (since the ego is transcendent--> falls under the phenomenological reduction) despite Husserl later on becoming an idealist, positing the transcendental ego as the centre.

Serves as a fairly simple introduction to phenomenology if albeit a bit short, and again, due to Husserl's tendency to drag out his texts it at the same time makes it slightly tedious but also simple (?) I suppose.

[Elia Mantovani · Rating 1 out of 5]

Apart from the very tough style, which make penetrating within the essay very hard, I miss the point of the whole phenomenological reduction. Descartes and Hume showed that our senses are not reliable, and that everything we believe could be a deception. Husserl's reply seems going this way: let's suspend our ontological commitment to everything, and understand epistemology as the cogntion of phenomena, which we can perceive but cannot ground from an ontological point of view. In my view, such a manouvre degrades epistemology, missing entirely the very spirit of the subject: what the point in describing hallucinations and optical illusions, while we renounce any interest in checking whether what appears is actually true?