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مأموریت در ایران
کتاب مأموریت در ایران، توسط ویلیام سولیوان، آخرین سفیر ایالات متحده آمریکا در ایران در بحرانیترین روزهای زمامداری خاندان پهلوی نوشته شده است. این کتاب با توجه به ویژگیها، موقعیت و نقش نویسنده آن در تحولات انقلاب ایران و نوع اطلاعات موجود در کتاب از اهمیت خاصی برخوردار است. کتاب بر اساس مشاهدات و شنیدههای مستقیم وی نوشته شده و بنا بر این میتواند در بردارنده نوع نگاه دولت آمریکا و برداشت مقامات کاخ سفید در رابطه با وقوع انقلاب اسلامی و در نهایت سقوط شاه باشد. عمده مطالب کتاب شرح وقایع، ملاقات و تماسهایی است که سولیوان در طول نزدیک به دو سال اقامتش در ایران با مقامات ایرانی و آمریکایی و حوادث مختلف ایران داشته است
سولیوان پس از چهار سال خدمت در فیلیپین، در اوائل بهار سال ۱۹۷۷ یعنی اولین ماههای دوران ریاست جمهوری کارتر، به سمت سفیر کبیر آمریکا در ایران گماشته شد. در آن زمان سفارت آمریکا در تهران فعالیت وسیعی داشت و بنا به گفته وی، تعداد کارکنان آن بالغ بر دو هزار نفر بود که با در نظر گرفتن اعضای خانوادهشان، تعداد آنها به پنج هزار نفر میرسید. هنگام ورود سولیوان به تهران بیش از سی و پنج هزار آمریکایی در ایران سرگرم کار بودند
سولیوان سفیری با ذهن باز و بدون تعصب بود. او ضمن تشریح وضعیت موجود و سیر حوادث منتهی به انقلاب ایران، به بررسی علل وقوع آن نیز میپردازد. علیرغم وجود پارهای تناقضات در متن خاطرات، او اطلاعات دقیق و با ارزشی در مورد شرایط اجتماعی، اقتصادی و نظامی ایران ارائه کرده و نگاه تحلیلی و گاه انتقادی به برخی مسائل این دوره به ویژه برنامههای اقتصادی و فرهنگی حکومت پهلوی دوم دارد
سولیوان پس از چهار سال خدمت در فیلیپین، در اوائل بهار سال ۱۹۷۷ یعنی اولین ماههای دوران ریاست جمهوری کارتر، به سمت سفیر کبیر آمریکا در ایران گماشته شد. در آن زمان سفارت آمریکا در تهران فعالیت وسیعی داشت و بنا به گفته وی، تعداد کارکنان آن بالغ بر دو هزار نفر بود که با در نظر گرفتن اعضای خانوادهشان، تعداد آنها به پنج هزار نفر میرسید. هنگام ورود سولیوان به تهران بیش از سی و پنج هزار آمریکایی در ایران سرگرم کار بودند
سولیوان سفیری با ذهن باز و بدون تعصب بود. او ضمن تشریح وضعیت موجود و سیر حوادث منتهی به انقلاب ایران، به بررسی علل وقوع آن نیز میپردازد. علیرغم وجود پارهای تناقضات در متن خاطرات، او اطلاعات دقیق و با ارزشی در مورد شرایط اجتماعی، اقتصادی و نظامی ایران ارائه کرده و نگاه تحلیلی و گاه انتقادی به برخی مسائل این دوره به ویژه برنامههای اقتصادی و فرهنگی حکومت پهلوی دوم دارد
199 pages, Paperback
First published November 1, 1981
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Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews
April 28, 2022
"شاه به بوتو نخست وزیر پاکستان خاطرنشان ساخت اتلاف منابع محدود مالی پاکستان برای رقابت اتمی با هند کار عبث و بیهوده ایست.و در ضمن به او افزود به فرض اینکه پاکستان بتواند با هزینه هنگفت یک یا دو بمب اتمی بسازد،فقط می تواند مثل شیاف از آن استفاده کند."
خاطرات سولیوان :"قالیچه چهل تکه ای بر روی آتش"
خاطرات سولیوان :"قالیچه چهل تکه ای بر روی آتش"
March 16, 2011
If not for American dependence on oil, the Middle East would not get near the level of interest that it generates. Iran in 1977 was no exception. William H. Sullivan’s assignment to the ambassador’s post in Iran appeared arbitrary, other than the need to put an esteemed ambassador in an oil rich country whose previous ambassador had resigned. In his Mission to Iran, Sullivan relays his experience as the American ambassador in an Iran that was largely misunderstood by President Carter’s administration. Throughout the book, Sullivan points out discrepancies in the Iran he had observed and the Iran the United States presumed existed. These presumptions led the United States to disavow Sullivan’s judgments while the country disintegrated into a state of civil disturbance.
Sullivan makes clear from the very beginning of the Mission to Iran that he had no real desire to be reassigned to Iran. His lack of background in Iran, along with an initial limited interest in the country, and no knowledge of Farsi are admitted. Because of this, Sullivan’s scrutiny of every element of Persian life, Iran’s leadership, and Islam itself, comes off as insincere and cynical. In one telling part of his account, Sullivan and his wife visit the holy city of Masshad, a pilgrimage site to the tomb of Shiite Imam Reza. Sullivan describes how pilgrims violently bash their heads on a gate in fits of passion over the buried holy man. It is only at this point, after shocked by what he saw, that Sullivan admits he needed to know more about the religion. The author’s disconnect with this culture comes off as crass not only in this instance but throughout the book as he often shares generalizations that he had about the Iranian people throughout this assignment.
Sullivan is fluent in sizing up his surroundings (he articulately shares the layout of Tehran as well as other relevant locations), but also disassembles every persona he encounters. In his first meeting with Shah Reza Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, he determines “…the external image of the haughty autocrat that had been cultivated by his court was not an accurate one. He was not truly cast to be a leader of men or the nation in time of crisis.” Sullivan does this throughout the book. This could reveal his candidness as an author, sharing general impressions, but could also be his way of pointing out glaring ineptitudes to heighten his argument on how foreign policy and governance in Iran should have been conducted. In this vein, Carter and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Zbigniew Brzezinski, have a disappointingly ambiguous and antagonistic role in Sullivan’s attempts to smooth the U.S. position in Iran’s transitional government.
Sullivan’s distaste for Brzenzinski is particularly scathing as Brzenzinski put what Sullivan considered an excessive amount of faith in the reliability of the Iranian armed forces as it concerned American causes. Ayatollah Khomeini’s return prompted the disintegration of then Prime Minister Bakhtiar’s military. As they began to attack a military facility with American Advisory group present, Sullivan had an emergency conference call with the State department, chaired by Brzenzki. In this state of urgency, Sullivan was continually asked what the prospects were of a coup d’état. When Sullivan implied they were slim, he was told that Brzenzinski did not find the comment “particularly helpful.” Scathingly, Sullivan asked if Brzenzinski needed the assessment translated in Polish. Later in the book, after Sullivan resigned his post, Sullivan digresses, “The feckless manner in which the Carter administration conducted its affairs continued, the erratic ambitions of Brzezinzski were unabated, and the failure to understand events in Iran were compounded. All of this, in November of 1979, led to the taking of the hostages in the American embassy and to a period of national humiliation unmatched in our history.” In so adamantly identifying a culprit, Sullivan detaches himself from the failures in American policy in Iran while assigning them gravid consequence.
The aforementioned lambasting aside, Sullivan does relay his early concerns with Iranian policies in productive manner. Some continuous concerns are the Shah’s forced industrialization program, the massive weapons purchases, and identification of the ignored civil unrest, among others. While Sullivan also expresses his willingness throughout the various stages of the Revolution to communicate with the subversive elements, especially as it is clear to him that the US supported Iranian government is crashing. What Sullivan does not do is give a clear synopsis of what happens beyond what he has had a part in. He gives a primer on the history of Persians and the Pahlavis, but Mission to Iran ceases as he resigns his position in Iran and accepts an offer to be president of the American Assembly. It is with this that Mission to Iran speaks neither of the crisis nor its legacy, but the crumbling of an American supported country as he saw it.
Sullivan makes clear from the very beginning of the Mission to Iran that he had no real desire to be reassigned to Iran. His lack of background in Iran, along with an initial limited interest in the country, and no knowledge of Farsi are admitted. Because of this, Sullivan’s scrutiny of every element of Persian life, Iran’s leadership, and Islam itself, comes off as insincere and cynical. In one telling part of his account, Sullivan and his wife visit the holy city of Masshad, a pilgrimage site to the tomb of Shiite Imam Reza. Sullivan describes how pilgrims violently bash their heads on a gate in fits of passion over the buried holy man. It is only at this point, after shocked by what he saw, that Sullivan admits he needed to know more about the religion. The author’s disconnect with this culture comes off as crass not only in this instance but throughout the book as he often shares generalizations that he had about the Iranian people throughout this assignment.
Sullivan is fluent in sizing up his surroundings (he articulately shares the layout of Tehran as well as other relevant locations), but also disassembles every persona he encounters. In his first meeting with Shah Reza Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, he determines “…the external image of the haughty autocrat that had been cultivated by his court was not an accurate one. He was not truly cast to be a leader of men or the nation in time of crisis.” Sullivan does this throughout the book. This could reveal his candidness as an author, sharing general impressions, but could also be his way of pointing out glaring ineptitudes to heighten his argument on how foreign policy and governance in Iran should have been conducted. In this vein, Carter and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Zbigniew Brzezinski, have a disappointingly ambiguous and antagonistic role in Sullivan’s attempts to smooth the U.S. position in Iran’s transitional government.
Sullivan’s distaste for Brzenzinski is particularly scathing as Brzenzinski put what Sullivan considered an excessive amount of faith in the reliability of the Iranian armed forces as it concerned American causes. Ayatollah Khomeini’s return prompted the disintegration of then Prime Minister Bakhtiar’s military. As they began to attack a military facility with American Advisory group present, Sullivan had an emergency conference call with the State department, chaired by Brzenzki. In this state of urgency, Sullivan was continually asked what the prospects were of a coup d’état. When Sullivan implied they were slim, he was told that Brzenzinski did not find the comment “particularly helpful.” Scathingly, Sullivan asked if Brzenzinski needed the assessment translated in Polish. Later in the book, after Sullivan resigned his post, Sullivan digresses, “The feckless manner in which the Carter administration conducted its affairs continued, the erratic ambitions of Brzezinzski were unabated, and the failure to understand events in Iran were compounded. All of this, in November of 1979, led to the taking of the hostages in the American embassy and to a period of national humiliation unmatched in our history.” In so adamantly identifying a culprit, Sullivan detaches himself from the failures in American policy in Iran while assigning them gravid consequence.
The aforementioned lambasting aside, Sullivan does relay his early concerns with Iranian policies in productive manner. Some continuous concerns are the Shah’s forced industrialization program, the massive weapons purchases, and identification of the ignored civil unrest, among others. While Sullivan also expresses his willingness throughout the various stages of the Revolution to communicate with the subversive elements, especially as it is clear to him that the US supported Iranian government is crashing. What Sullivan does not do is give a clear synopsis of what happens beyond what he has had a part in. He gives a primer on the history of Persians and the Pahlavis, but Mission to Iran ceases as he resigns his position in Iran and accepts an offer to be president of the American Assembly. It is with this that Mission to Iran speaks neither of the crisis nor its legacy, but the crumbling of an American supported country as he saw it.
April 8, 2016
This was well written and easy to follow. I was interested in Ambassador Sullivan's account of the events surrounding the Iranian Revolution. General Huyser was a personal friend of mine. It was interesting to read that in addition to General Haig, Sullivan felt the U.S. administration ignored his advice and was completely inept in the handling of the situation in Iran.
December 5, 2017
روایت دست اول از فعالیت گسترده سفارت آمریکا در تهران در طول دو سال منتهی به انقلاب ایران، در فاصله سالهای ۱۹۷۷ الی ۱۹۷۹ میلادی
از متن کتاب
ص ۲۰ – در سال ۱۹۷۷ سی و پنج هزار آمریکایی در ایران زندگی میکردند. به استثنای قریب دو هزار نفر، بقیه وابسته به شرکتها و مؤسسات خصوصی آمریکایی بودند
ص ۲۳ – درآمد نفتی ایران به بیست و دو تا بیست و سه میلیارد دلار در سال رسیده بود. ولی نیروی کار ماهر برای استفاده و به کار انداختن این ثروت وجود نداشت
ص ۲۸ – سفارت آمریکا در تهران فعالیت وسیع و پردامنهای داشت. تعداد کارکنان آن به اضافه مأمورینی که در قسمت نظامی کار میکردند، بالغ بر دو هزار نفر میشدند که با اعضای خانوادههایشان به پنج هزار نفر میرسیدند. تعداد ایرانیان وابسته به سفارت هم به دو هزار نفر بالغ میشدند و نظارت مستمر بر کار همۀ آنها کار سادهای نبود
ص ۳۴ – به عقیدۀ بعضی از محققین و مورخین، ایرانیان هویت ملی خود را به قیمت انعطاف و انطباق خود با شرایط زمان حفظ کردهاند
ص ۳۸ – شاه نظرات خود را با یک انگلیسی سلیس و لحنی که صمیمی و صادقانه به نظر میرسید، بیان میکرد... من او را شخصیتی سوای آنچه قبلاً مجسم کرده بودم، یافتم. من در رفتار وی دبدبه و کبکبه و تکبری ندیدم... او خیلی آرام و به نرمی سخن میگفت، رفتارش ساده و صمیمی و متواضعانه بود و اصراری در قبولاندن نظرات خود به مخاطب نداشت
ص ۴۶ - در سال ۱۹۷۷ ایران در حدود سی و شش میلیون نفر جمعیت داشت و نیمی از این جمعیت زیر پانزده سال بودند
ص ۷۷ – صنعت نفت ایران در سال ۱۹۷۷ ظرفیت تولید شش میلیون و دویست هزار بشکه نفت در روز را داشت
ص ۱۴۳ – در پانزده سال گذشته استحکام پایۀ سلطنت، ایران را بر سر پا نگاهداشته و اکنون که پایۀ سلطنت سست شده، ناچار باید این ثبات با تحکیم پایۀ مذهب تأمین گردد
ص ۱۶۲ - ... دولت ایالات متحدۀ آمریکا مصلحت شخص شاه و مصالح کلی ایران را در این میبیند که هر چه زودتر ایران را ترک کند
از متن کتاب
ص ۲۰ – در سال ۱۹۷۷ سی و پنج هزار آمریکایی در ایران زندگی میکردند. به استثنای قریب دو هزار نفر، بقیه وابسته به شرکتها و مؤسسات خصوصی آمریکایی بودند
ص ۲۳ – درآمد نفتی ایران به بیست و دو تا بیست و سه میلیارد دلار در سال رسیده بود. ولی نیروی کار ماهر برای استفاده و به کار انداختن این ثروت وجود نداشت
ص ۲۸ – سفارت آمریکا در تهران فعالیت وسیع و پردامنهای داشت. تعداد کارکنان آن به اضافه مأمورینی که در قسمت نظامی کار میکردند، بالغ بر دو هزار نفر میشدند که با اعضای خانوادههایشان به پنج هزار نفر میرسیدند. تعداد ایرانیان وابسته به سفارت هم به دو هزار نفر بالغ میشدند و نظارت مستمر بر کار همۀ آنها کار سادهای نبود
ص ۳۴ – به عقیدۀ بعضی از محققین و مورخین، ایرانیان هویت ملی خود را به قیمت انعطاف و انطباق خود با شرایط زمان حفظ کردهاند
ص ۳۸ – شاه نظرات خود را با یک انگلیسی سلیس و لحنی که صمیمی و صادقانه به نظر میرسید، بیان میکرد... من او را شخصیتی سوای آنچه قبلاً مجسم کرده بودم، یافتم. من در رفتار وی دبدبه و کبکبه و تکبری ندیدم... او خیلی آرام و به نرمی سخن میگفت، رفتارش ساده و صمیمی و متواضعانه بود و اصراری در قبولاندن نظرات خود به مخاطب نداشت
ص ۴۶ - در سال ۱۹۷۷ ایران در حدود سی و شش میلیون نفر جمعیت داشت و نیمی از این جمعیت زیر پانزده سال بودند
ص ۷۷ – صنعت نفت ایران در سال ۱۹۷۷ ظرفیت تولید شش میلیون و دویست هزار بشکه نفت در روز را داشت
ص ۱۴۳ – در پانزده سال گذشته استحکام پایۀ سلطنت، ایران را بر سر پا نگاهداشته و اکنون که پایۀ سلطنت سست شده، ناچار باید این ثبات با تحکیم پایۀ مذهب تأمین گردد
ص ۱۶۲ - ... دولت ایالات متحدۀ آمریکا مصلحت شخص شاه و مصالح کلی ایران را در این میبیند که هر چه زودتر ایران را ترک کند
June 23, 2025
This obscure book is an excellent history told soon after the Iran Hostage Crisis of the Carter administration. Interesting to read, especially in light of historical events that have occurred since that time.
April 24, 2018
Sullivan's manipulative behavior can be seen in between the lines.
Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews