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Things That Bother Me: Death, Freedom, the Self, Etc.
An original collection of lauded philosopher Galen Strawson's writings on the self and consciousness, naturalism and pan-psychism.Galen Strawson might be described as the Montaigne of modern philosophers, endlessly curious, enormously erudite, unafraid of strange, difficult, and provocative propositions, and able to describe them clearly—in other words, he is a true essayist. Strawson also shares with Montaigne a particular fascination with the elastic and elusive nature of the self and of consciousness. Of the essays collected here, “A Fallacy of Our Age” (an inspiration for Vendela Vida’s novel Let the Northern Lights Erase Your Name) takes issue with the commencement-address cliché that life is a story. Strawson questions whether it is desirable or even meaningful to think about life that way. “The Sense of the Self” offers an alternative account, in part personal, of how a distinct sense of self is not at all incompatible with a sense of the self as discontinuous, leading Strawson to a position that he sees as in some ways Buddhist. “Real Naturalism” argues that a fully naturalist account of consciousness supports a belief in the immanence of consciousness in nature as a whole (also known as panpsychism), while in the final essay Strawson offers a vivid account of coming of age in the 1960s. Drawing on literature and life as much as on philosophy, this is a book that prompts both argument and wonder.
241 pages, Kindle Edition
Published March 13, 2018
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About the author
Galen Strawson
21 books75 followersGalen John Strawson is a British professor of philosopher and literary critic primarily workin the fields of mind, metaphysics, and free will.
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September 23, 2020
Galen Strawson's views probably seemed contrarian within the mainstream of philosophy in the late 90s - early 00s. Now, as far as I understand, he is a bit better accepted. In this book of essays, he presents his view on Freedom, Death, Self and Consciousness and the related theories he developed. The one of the main themes here is narrative vs episodic selfs and the related views on temporality and memory. Another interesting topic is analysis of the different views on the freedom of will and the ultimate responsibility. He shows the thinking in this area develops in circle (or in a spiral if we are more generous). He personally believes that there is no such thing as ultimate responsibility for someone's actions (The essay: "You cannot make yourself the way you are"). And consciousness - well, his main argument is against those materialists who consider consciousness as illusion due to the fact that it cannot be explained by physics. He believes that it is plain silly (the essay is simply called: "The silliest claim"). He thinks it is more likely we still have not learned the related physics.
Witty, lively collection of essays. Only minor complaint I have is that some of them overlap substantially with the others. But considering the subject matter, it rarely hurts.
Witty, lively collection of essays. Only minor complaint I have is that some of them overlap substantially with the others. But considering the subject matter, it rarely hurts.
October 10, 2018
I'm prejudiced in favor of Galen Strawson for at least three reasons. He writes clearly about difficult things. He enjoys the cold water in the face of the radically implausible conclusion. And I tend to agree with him strongly about some of those conclusions - in particular, his plain-spoken but powerful dismantling of modern philosophy of mind's "behaviorist hangover," the psychological eliminativism of Dennett et al.
(It's thrilling to hear a thinker of his calibre say something I always half-thought, but feared derision if I tried to articulate, in graduate school. The prevailing materialist / physicalist orthodoxy has it exactly backwards: we *know* about the existence and essential nature of the mental and *don't know* about the existence and essential nature of the physical. Maybe, pace Chalmers, we should be calling it "the Hard Problem of Stuff"?)
At its best, Strawson's style even reminds me of Russell a little - though that is too high a standard: hie writing lacks that degree of sensitivity to what needs and doesn't need further explaining.
For my own part, for example, I found all the material here on "narrativism and the self" strangely hard to follow - because GS seems to assume that the underlying distinction is clear to everyone from the outset. It's unclear to me, because I don't (think I) think of myself either as a narrativist or as a non-narrativist: I'm genuinely unsure what it is to have either of these views of oneself. And GS, lacking a good feel for concrete, novelistic description, seems not to notice that he doesn't give any clear examples.
Another small case in point. His panpsychism arises out of his naturalism: everything is physical; consciousness is something; so (intuition be buggered) consciousness is physical. But the first premise always seems to me less like the conclusion of an argument than like the sound of a fist being banged on the table. You can imagine someone on the cusp of C.19 science having a hard time with the idea that an electromagnetic field is physical. We now say that it is. But this isn't a matter of discovering that fields are made up of little hard things that make a noise when you bang them together: it's a matter of accepting a unified ontology of which fields are a legitimate part. (Sub-text: "How strange - there really is more in heaven and earth than was dreamed of in our natural philosophy.") He's right of course that (in ways we don't understand) consciousness is ditto. But this (again) just amounts to saying you can't respond to the weirdness of consciousness - any more than to the weirdness of quantum entanglement, say - by excommunicating it from science. "Everything is physical" just means "Everything that we accept as being part of the causal whole, like planets and fields and quanta and even consciousness, just IS, and everything we don't accept, like gods and ghosts, just ISN'T." The term "physical" is doing no non-rhetorical work.
Another question that kept floating around as I read this:
GS thinks consciousness is irreducibly known to exist, despite its mysterious nature; I agree. But he ALSO thinks that free will in the ordinary sense obviously does not exist - and yet, as he admits, our experience of our own free will is every bit as inescapable as (and seems strangely bound up with) our experience of our own consciousness. His arguments come down to an apparently persuasive "responsibility means infinite regress." But I wonder. Are we simply in the position of a those early c.20 philosophers who allegedly said "Einstein must be wrong; space and time just aren't the kind of thing that can bend each other! It's a category mistake."?
I just have this sneaking suspicion that - as with Dennettian behaviorism-gone-mad, the free will arguments could be another case of the conceptual tail wagging the philosophical dog.
(It's thrilling to hear a thinker of his calibre say something I always half-thought, but feared derision if I tried to articulate, in graduate school. The prevailing materialist / physicalist orthodoxy has it exactly backwards: we *know* about the existence and essential nature of the mental and *don't know* about the existence and essential nature of the physical. Maybe, pace Chalmers, we should be calling it "the Hard Problem of Stuff"?)
At its best, Strawson's style even reminds me of Russell a little - though that is too high a standard: hie writing lacks that degree of sensitivity to what needs and doesn't need further explaining.
For my own part, for example, I found all the material here on "narrativism and the self" strangely hard to follow - because GS seems to assume that the underlying distinction is clear to everyone from the outset. It's unclear to me, because I don't (think I) think of myself either as a narrativist or as a non-narrativist: I'm genuinely unsure what it is to have either of these views of oneself. And GS, lacking a good feel for concrete, novelistic description, seems not to notice that he doesn't give any clear examples.
Another small case in point. His panpsychism arises out of his naturalism: everything is physical; consciousness is something; so (intuition be buggered) consciousness is physical. But the first premise always seems to me less like the conclusion of an argument than like the sound of a fist being banged on the table. You can imagine someone on the cusp of C.19 science having a hard time with the idea that an electromagnetic field is physical. We now say that it is. But this isn't a matter of discovering that fields are made up of little hard things that make a noise when you bang them together: it's a matter of accepting a unified ontology of which fields are a legitimate part. (Sub-text: "How strange - there really is more in heaven and earth than was dreamed of in our natural philosophy.") He's right of course that (in ways we don't understand) consciousness is ditto. But this (again) just amounts to saying you can't respond to the weirdness of consciousness - any more than to the weirdness of quantum entanglement, say - by excommunicating it from science. "Everything is physical" just means "Everything that we accept as being part of the causal whole, like planets and fields and quanta and even consciousness, just IS, and everything we don't accept, like gods and ghosts, just ISN'T." The term "physical" is doing no non-rhetorical work.
Another question that kept floating around as I read this:
GS thinks consciousness is irreducibly known to exist, despite its mysterious nature; I agree. But he ALSO thinks that free will in the ordinary sense obviously does not exist - and yet, as he admits, our experience of our own free will is every bit as inescapable as (and seems strangely bound up with) our experience of our own consciousness. His arguments come down to an apparently persuasive "responsibility means infinite regress." But I wonder. Are we simply in the position of a those early c.20 philosophers who allegedly said "Einstein must be wrong; space and time just aren't the kind of thing that can bend each other! It's a category mistake."?
I just have this sneaking suspicion that - as with Dennettian behaviorism-gone-mad, the free will arguments could be another case of the conceptual tail wagging the philosophical dog.
April 1, 2018
A fun and thought-provoking book. These are mostly essays that are less “academic,” published in newspapers or magazines, but they make many of the same points, sometimes in the same language, as his more “scholarly” publications.
He focuses on three main points: the problem of free will, the problem of consciousness, and the odd craze that we must “tell stories” about our lives to live well.
I’ve sometimes given students Strawson’s essay about why we cannot have free will in the way we think we do, and it always gets the kind of furious response he describes in his introduction: they can’t refute it, so they become irrationally angry at Strawson. I would agree that he has shown that we cannot have free will or moral responsibility in the way we normally think we can. On the other hand, he is just wrong about the alternative—and his error is perhaps more harmful that the naive belief in free will.
I know he has made this point before, so somebody must have pointed out to him the enormous conceptual error he makes in discussing “experience,” which leads him to accept panpsychism. Can anyone really accept the claim that because humans have conscious experience we should consider it possible, even likely, that all matter has experience? Isn’t that just too obviously absurd? Certainly, experience is not a property of matter, the way mass is. It is a thing humans do: we have conscious experience. It is as if we were to say, since it is true that bees can make honey, we cannot rule out the honey-making character of all matter. Just because one kind of matter (us) does a certain kind of thing, doesn’t mean all matter must do likewise. And certainly to think of things being “experiential in character” or “experiential in nature” is just a category mistake. Experiencing is a thing that is done, not a property of matter (certainly dead bodies aren’t “experiential in nature” right?). This verbal slight-of-hand, not saying but implying that experience is of the same kind as mass or energy, is perhaps how he has gotten away with this claim. But the error here is too obvious to go unnoticed for long. Experience is a capability that arises because of our particular form, not something that inheres in our matter.
Strawson simply suggests that any alternative position to panpsychism would require a dangerous “radical emergence,” but it wouldn’t. Not unless you think that our conscious experience is something enormously special and important to the universe. The kind of “emergence” necessary is not more “radical” than the kind required for grain to ferment into beer, or water to expand when it freezes—just occurrences that are a result of the particular form some matter takes.
If anyone can explain to me why he is still making this absurd argument, why the ridiculous error hasn’t been soundly denounced, I’d like to hear about it!
Overall, though, an entertaining read, lots to think about, and as always Strawson writes well. Even when you’re disagreeing with him, it’s nice to read a philosopher who can explain himself so clearly.
He focuses on three main points: the problem of free will, the problem of consciousness, and the odd craze that we must “tell stories” about our lives to live well.
I’ve sometimes given students Strawson’s essay about why we cannot have free will in the way we think we do, and it always gets the kind of furious response he describes in his introduction: they can’t refute it, so they become irrationally angry at Strawson. I would agree that he has shown that we cannot have free will or moral responsibility in the way we normally think we can. On the other hand, he is just wrong about the alternative—and his error is perhaps more harmful that the naive belief in free will.
I know he has made this point before, so somebody must have pointed out to him the enormous conceptual error he makes in discussing “experience,” which leads him to accept panpsychism. Can anyone really accept the claim that because humans have conscious experience we should consider it possible, even likely, that all matter has experience? Isn’t that just too obviously absurd? Certainly, experience is not a property of matter, the way mass is. It is a thing humans do: we have conscious experience. It is as if we were to say, since it is true that bees can make honey, we cannot rule out the honey-making character of all matter. Just because one kind of matter (us) does a certain kind of thing, doesn’t mean all matter must do likewise. And certainly to think of things being “experiential in character” or “experiential in nature” is just a category mistake. Experiencing is a thing that is done, not a property of matter (certainly dead bodies aren’t “experiential in nature” right?). This verbal slight-of-hand, not saying but implying that experience is of the same kind as mass or energy, is perhaps how he has gotten away with this claim. But the error here is too obvious to go unnoticed for long. Experience is a capability that arises because of our particular form, not something that inheres in our matter.
Strawson simply suggests that any alternative position to panpsychism would require a dangerous “radical emergence,” but it wouldn’t. Not unless you think that our conscious experience is something enormously special and important to the universe. The kind of “emergence” necessary is not more “radical” than the kind required for grain to ferment into beer, or water to expand when it freezes—just occurrences that are a result of the particular form some matter takes.
If anyone can explain to me why he is still making this absurd argument, why the ridiculous error hasn’t been soundly denounced, I’d like to hear about it!
Overall, though, an entertaining read, lots to think about, and as always Strawson writes well. Even when you’re disagreeing with him, it’s nice to read a philosopher who can explain himself so clearly.
May 7, 2018
https://msarki.tumblr.com/post/173667...
Though much of Galen Strawson’s work in this book is beyond my complete understanding I enjoyed it immensely. There was much to ponder. What a surprise the last chapter was when Strawson turned autobiographical and shared his own memory of surviving the sixties and early seventies. Because of our similar age it was easy to feel a kinship with this English philosopher who has good taste in music, and this book inspires me to pursue other Galen Strawson titles. Below I have added the quotations I felt most striking to me. Perhaps the following notes will give you a reason to read this book as well.
…I feel close to Harold Brodkey when he writes that our sense of presentness usually proceeds in waves, with our minds tumbling off into wandering…
…I agree with the Earl of Shaftesbury: The metaphysicians…affirm that if memory be taken away, the self is lost. [But] what matter for memory? What have I to do with that part? If, whilst I am, I am as I should be, what do I care more? And let me lose self every hour, and be twenty successive selfs, or new selfs, “tis all one to me: so [long as] I lose not my opinion [i.e. my overall outlook, my character, my moral [identity]. If I carry that with me ’tis I: all is well…—The now; the now. Mind this: in this is all.
That apart. I think I agree with Marcus Aurelius, who is almost as repetitious as I am, although he may well have metaphysical motivations that I lack: Whether you live three thousand years or thirty thousand, remember that the only life you can lose is the one you are living now in the present…In this sense the longest life and the shortest come to the same thing, for life in the present is the same for all…One’s loss is limited to that one fleeting instant; one cannot lose either the past or the future, for no one can take from one what one does not have…So when the longest—and the shortest—lived among us die their loss is precisely equal, because the only life of which one can be deprived is life in the present, since this is all one has.
…One has options even when one is in chains, or falling through space. Even if one is completely paralyzed, one is still free to choose to think about one thing rather than another. There is, as Sartre observed, a sense in which we are condemned to freedom, not free to be free.
…Once can put the point by saying that in the final analysis the way you are is, in every last detail, a matter of luck—good or bad…
…As a philosopher I think the impossibility of radical free will, ultimate moral responsibility, can be proved with complete certainty. It’s just that I can’t really live with this fact from day to day…
…There’s a famous saying of Schopenhauer’s that goes like this: “A man can surely do what he wants to do. But he cannot determine what he wants.”
…Eddington’s assessment of the situation in 1928 is as true now as it was then: something unknown is doing we don’t know what…
…I’m inclined to agree with Sartre when he suggests in his novel La Nausée that self-storying, although inevitable, condemns us to inauthenticity, a kind of absence from our own lives…Human beings hold many views about themselves that have very little to do with reality…
Though much of Galen Strawson’s work in this book is beyond my complete understanding I enjoyed it immensely. There was much to ponder. What a surprise the last chapter was when Strawson turned autobiographical and shared his own memory of surviving the sixties and early seventies. Because of our similar age it was easy to feel a kinship with this English philosopher who has good taste in music, and this book inspires me to pursue other Galen Strawson titles. Below I have added the quotations I felt most striking to me. Perhaps the following notes will give you a reason to read this book as well.
…I feel close to Harold Brodkey when he writes that our sense of presentness usually proceeds in waves, with our minds tumbling off into wandering…
…I agree with the Earl of Shaftesbury: The metaphysicians…affirm that if memory be taken away, the self is lost. [But] what matter for memory? What have I to do with that part? If, whilst I am, I am as I should be, what do I care more? And let me lose self every hour, and be twenty successive selfs, or new selfs, “tis all one to me: so [long as] I lose not my opinion [i.e. my overall outlook, my character, my moral [identity]. If I carry that with me ’tis I: all is well…—The now; the now. Mind this: in this is all.
That apart. I think I agree with Marcus Aurelius, who is almost as repetitious as I am, although he may well have metaphysical motivations that I lack: Whether you live three thousand years or thirty thousand, remember that the only life you can lose is the one you are living now in the present…In this sense the longest life and the shortest come to the same thing, for life in the present is the same for all…One’s loss is limited to that one fleeting instant; one cannot lose either the past or the future, for no one can take from one what one does not have…So when the longest—and the shortest—lived among us die their loss is precisely equal, because the only life of which one can be deprived is life in the present, since this is all one has.
…One has options even when one is in chains, or falling through space. Even if one is completely paralyzed, one is still free to choose to think about one thing rather than another. There is, as Sartre observed, a sense in which we are condemned to freedom, not free to be free.
…Once can put the point by saying that in the final analysis the way you are is, in every last detail, a matter of luck—good or bad…
…As a philosopher I think the impossibility of radical free will, ultimate moral responsibility, can be proved with complete certainty. It’s just that I can’t really live with this fact from day to day…
…There’s a famous saying of Schopenhauer’s that goes like this: “A man can surely do what he wants to do. But he cannot determine what he wants.”
…Eddington’s assessment of the situation in 1928 is as true now as it was then: something unknown is doing we don’t know what…
…I’m inclined to agree with Sartre when he suggests in his novel La Nausée that self-storying, although inevitable, condemns us to inauthenticity, a kind of absence from our own lives…Human beings hold many views about themselves that have very little to do with reality…
February 4, 2021
A bit of a curate's egg, this one, with some sections stating the bleeding obvious and others dealing with topics that may well be of interest to Strawson but without any compelling reason to burden the rest of us with them. Given that the book does not follow a particularly rigorous philosophical method, and given the informal tone of most of the essays, one must assume that the intended reader is a layperson likely to be entertained or intrigued by Strawson's particular bete noires, but this must surely narrow the potential demographic. Who has heard of Strawson outside of philosophical circles? I have to confess that I found the final essay, an account of Strawson's "flower power" years, the most enjoyable, interesting, and sympathetic piece in the entire book. Which is not to say that I disagreed with much written elsewhere in the book, only that there was nothing in the book that might compel antagonistic readers to revise their opinions.
October 6, 2021
This collection of essays is a masterclass in identity. Galen Strawson is an accomplished analytic philosopher with the rare wisdom to train our focus on the source of all experience: the self. His points are incredibly well-researched, even when representing opposing views, and while his style is restrained by a “philosopher’s caution,” he manages to find quotes from literature that capture his ideas with elegance.
Strawson defines an entire range of temporal being from “endurers,” who feel they have long-term continuity, to “transients,” whose sense of self is as ephemeral as the present. Add varying degrees of form-finding, storytelling, and revision, and we have an entirely new spectrum of self-experience, like a personality chart for internalization. While leaving room for individual variability and our inherent oscillations, Strawson emphasizes the self as the transient subject of experience, and he contrasts this with our near-universal experience of self as a narrative, concluding that the story version of us leads to a skewed and inauthentic identity.
The implications of a transient self-experience cannot be overstated. Transients live one fleeting instant at a time. They need not fear death or loss, because they do not reach for the future with expectation. They need not regret the past, because it isn’t theirs. Fear and desire become meaningless. The transient state, when taken beyond Strawson’s philosophy to its fullest expression, sounds like enlightenment. Despite years of spiritual seeking, I have never before stumbled across a practice quite as rational, direct, and powerful as Strawson’s transience.
He also explores our sense of free will and presents a compelling argument against it based on the fact that we do not choose our own genetics or the environmental forces that shape us—we do not choose to be who we are. Our lack of self-determination and the “endlessly ramifying interdependence of everything” is strong evidence against our freedom. This leads us to the question of moral responsibility, because if we are not free agents, how can we be responsible for our actions? Strawson’s conclusion both fascinates and confuses me: one who is able to truly live in acceptance with their lack of moral responsibilities would shift from an attitude of morality to an attitude of aesthetic (page 128). If you understand this, please explain it to me. In the meantime, I think I’ll stick with Schopenhauer and the compatibilists: "Man is free to do what he wills, but he cannot will what he wills."
Finally, Strawson discusses consciousness itself, though his main objective seemed to be condemnation for deniers of phenomenal consciousness. I didn’t enjoy that part; it’s a bit of a rant. His argument leads inexplicably to panpsychism with only the briefest metaphysical examination. Considering I was led to Strawson from Bernardo Kastrup, an outspoken (and brilliant) Idealist, I was disappointed to find that idealism was not even considered.
Strawson concludes his book with an interesting episode from his youth as a British flower child. It was a strange end to an even stranger compilation. As a whole, I didn’t think the book made any sense. There is no consistent theme, and there is quite a bit of redundancy between essays. However, I would have put up with far worse for an introduction to his thoughts on transience. Additionally, as a man with a very poor memory, it was refreshing to hear his positive spin on a condition we share.
Strawson defines an entire range of temporal being from “endurers,” who feel they have long-term continuity, to “transients,” whose sense of self is as ephemeral as the present. Add varying degrees of form-finding, storytelling, and revision, and we have an entirely new spectrum of self-experience, like a personality chart for internalization. While leaving room for individual variability and our inherent oscillations, Strawson emphasizes the self as the transient subject of experience, and he contrasts this with our near-universal experience of self as a narrative, concluding that the story version of us leads to a skewed and inauthentic identity.
The implications of a transient self-experience cannot be overstated. Transients live one fleeting instant at a time. They need not fear death or loss, because they do not reach for the future with expectation. They need not regret the past, because it isn’t theirs. Fear and desire become meaningless. The transient state, when taken beyond Strawson’s philosophy to its fullest expression, sounds like enlightenment. Despite years of spiritual seeking, I have never before stumbled across a practice quite as rational, direct, and powerful as Strawson’s transience.
He also explores our sense of free will and presents a compelling argument against it based on the fact that we do not choose our own genetics or the environmental forces that shape us—we do not choose to be who we are. Our lack of self-determination and the “endlessly ramifying interdependence of everything” is strong evidence against our freedom. This leads us to the question of moral responsibility, because if we are not free agents, how can we be responsible for our actions? Strawson’s conclusion both fascinates and confuses me: one who is able to truly live in acceptance with their lack of moral responsibilities would shift from an attitude of morality to an attitude of aesthetic (page 128). If you understand this, please explain it to me. In the meantime, I think I’ll stick with Schopenhauer and the compatibilists: "Man is free to do what he wills, but he cannot will what he wills."
Finally, Strawson discusses consciousness itself, though his main objective seemed to be condemnation for deniers of phenomenal consciousness. I didn’t enjoy that part; it’s a bit of a rant. His argument leads inexplicably to panpsychism with only the briefest metaphysical examination. Considering I was led to Strawson from Bernardo Kastrup, an outspoken (and brilliant) Idealist, I was disappointed to find that idealism was not even considered.
Strawson concludes his book with an interesting episode from his youth as a British flower child. It was a strange end to an even stranger compilation. As a whole, I didn’t think the book made any sense. There is no consistent theme, and there is quite a bit of redundancy between essays. However, I would have put up with far worse for an introduction to his thoughts on transience. Additionally, as a man with a very poor memory, it was refreshing to hear his positive spin on a condition we share.
August 7, 2018
Galen Strawson seems to have the great gift for talking straight. For example, this is how he knocks off free will:
Premise 1: Everything you do, you do as a result of who you are; the you that is made up of all the genetics, nature, nurture, influences, loves, fears, etc.
Premise 2: There is no way you had or have any control over what effect these influences have on you, and no way to change anything without that change being as a result of who you are (see premise 1).
Therefore, there’s no such thing as free will.
The book is a collection of essays compiled over more than twenty years, and is utterly fascinating whether you particularly like philosophy or not. Fantastic read.
Premise 1: Everything you do, you do as a result of who you are; the you that is made up of all the genetics, nature, nurture, influences, loves, fears, etc.
Premise 2: There is no way you had or have any control over what effect these influences have on you, and no way to change anything without that change being as a result of who you are (see premise 1).
Therefore, there’s no such thing as free will.
The book is a collection of essays compiled over more than twenty years, and is utterly fascinating whether you particularly like philosophy or not. Fantastic read.
April 27, 2021
Interessantíssima coleção de ensaios sobre o Eu ("Self"), a morte, a possibilidade de livre-arbítrio, e consciência. Apesar da diversidade de tópicos (não tão diversa, no final das contas), Strawson sempre tem algo de interessante a contribuir nesses debates, posto na forma de escrita bastante acessível e ainda sim altamente informativa (mesmo que arrogante em alguns momentos, o que geralmente apenas resulta em um efeito cômico).
Segue um breve resumo do conteúdo.
Os ensaios 1, 2 e 8 focam no Self e particularmente na discussão acerca de narratividade, o que pode ser entendido sob a forma de narratividade psicológica (a tese de que pessoas têm naturalmente a disposição de conceberem suas próprias vidas como narrativas) ou sob a forma de narratividade ética (a tese de que enxergar nossas vidas desta maneira é uma condição para ter uma vida frutífera e feliz). No primeiro ensaio Strawson argumenta que, entre as várias condições especiais para haver uma experiência fenomenológica de si mesmo como um eu (distinto de mim como ser humano completo), não estão continuidade, nem personalidade. Ao longo de sua argumentação ele introduzirá uma distinção no fenômeno de experiência de si: pessoas transitórias são aquelas que não tendem a se identificar com seu eu no passado, nem no futuro (portanto, não enxergam seu eu como algo que existe continuamente através do tempo), enquanto pessoas duradouras enxergam seu eu como algo contínuo, se identificando com o passado e o futuro. Essa distinção será crucial para a argumentação de Strawson contra as teses de narratividade psicológica e ética, afirmando não somente que várias pessoas não vivem suas vidas narrativamente, mas que a proposta de viver narrativamente pode ter consequências desastrosas em diversos contextos.
O ensaio 3 lida com o tópico de morte. Nele, Strawson argumenta contra a tese de que a morte pode constituir um tipo de mal como perda. Apesar de alguns filósofos acreditarem que a morte não é um mal intrínseco, ela pode ser um mal comparativo na medida em que nos priva de experiências futuras boas que a vida pode nos oferecer (Shelly Kagan é um defensor desta visão, em seu Death). Strawson acredita que isso não é possível, sustentando que nós (mesmo se formos pessoas transitórias ou duradouras, ou qualquer coisa no meio do espectro) não somos o tipo de ente do qual pode ser dito que suas experiências futuras lhe pertencem. Mas se o futuro não é uma propriedade nossa, nós não perdemos nada ao morrer e, portanto, a morte não pode sequer constituir um mal comparativo como perda. Junto com isso, Strawson também defende a visão mais ampla de que, levando em conta que estou vivo, a minha vida não será melhor ou pior se ela durar mais ou menos do que o esperado. Ao longo do artigo, ele responde objeções que frequentemente partem de premissas fenomenológicas, analisando a relação e implicações de seu argumento com fenômenos como arrependimento, luto, depressão, e visões similares sobre a morte como os argumentos de Epicuro e Lucrécio.
Os capítulos 4 e 5 (o último sendo apenas uma entrevista) discutem livre-arbítrio. Aqui, Strawson defende a visão de que o problema determinismo-livre-arbítrio é simplesmente um debate mal concebido, pela razão de que a negação de nossa liberdade não requer uma consistência com qualquer posição determinista e indeterminista. A abordagem de Strawson é mostrar que livre-arbítrio é uma impossibilidade puramente através de uma análise a priori do conceito, tentando derivar uma conclusão absurda (especificamente, ele se utiliza de um argumento de regresso infinito). O argumento em sua forma simples é o seguinte: livre-arbítrio tem como correlato lógico a noção de responsabilidade moral última (o que deve ser entendido como o tipo de responsabilidade que torna justificável qualquer recompensa ou punição sobre alguma de suas ações). Para sermos fundamentalmente responsáveis por nossas ações, devemos ser responsáveis pelo modo como somos (em outras palavras, devemos ser "causa sui"). Mas (e aqui entra o argumento de regresso infinito, que não detalharei) não podemos ser causa sui e, portanto, não podemos ser fundamentalmente moralmente responsáveis. Portanto, livre-arbítrio é uma impossibilidade. No entanto, Strawson também dá razões para acreditarmos que este argumento não fará grande diferença na nossa experiência de liberdade radical em situações cruciais de escolha, apesar de considerar a possibilidade no final da entrevista, na qual ele também considera algumas objeções possíveis à sua posição.
Os ensaios 6 e 7 discutem o tópico de consciência, especialmente a possibilidade de sustentar uma posição fisicalista conjuntamente com a existência da consciência enquanto fenômeno natural/físico. O alvo de Strawson nestas discussões são os chamados "materialistas eliminativistas", que buscam eliminar a consciência como entidade legítima, baseando-se no raciocínio de que ela não pode ser entendida como fenômeno natural/físico. Entende-se aqui que há uma assunção que poderíamos chamar de "naturalista" quanto à realidade: não existem fenômenos sobrenaturais, i.e. fenômenos não físicos no mundo. Mas Strawson acredita que este "naturalismo" dos eliminativistas é uma farsa; uma farsa que deriva de erros fundamentais: o de supor que há uma incompatibilidade entre a experiência consciente e o físico (o que é sustentado por uma outra assunção, a de que sabemos o suficiente sobre o físico para estarmos justificados em acreditar nesta incompatibilidade), e o de que, portanto, a consciência não pode existir como fenômeno natural. Contra isso, Strawson afirma que um verdadeiro naturalismo metafísico não só reconhece a realidade última de experiências como fenômenos naturais/físicos, mas reconhece que não há nada no nosso entendimento atual do físico que nos permita descartar a ideia de que ele seja fundamentalmente experiencial (ou, talvez, parcialmente experiencial). A segunda ideia se apoia numa forma de realismo estrutural epistêmico sobre o conhecimento físico (encontrado em autores como Russell e Eddington, os quais Strawson frequentemente cita): tudo aquilo que as ciências físicas podem nos oferecer são verdades expressas em termos de relações matemáticas e estruturais, mantendo-se quieta diante da questão da natureza intrínseca de seus objetos. Portanto, é uma tolice tentarmos nos basear na física para tentarmos argumentar uma incompatibilidade entre o físico e o experiencial; e, como o único fenômeno cuja existência parece a mais certa para nós são nossas experiências (este é, de fato, o ponto de partida de todo naturalismo real para Strawson), há ao menos alguma razão para considerarmos seriamente a possibilidade do físico ser fundamentalmente experiencial. Isso é uma forma de pampsiquismo puro (apesar de Strawson conceder a possibilidade do físico ser compatível com formas não-puras de pampsiquismo). Strawson acredita que aceitar esse pampsiquismo é a melhor opção (dado que, para ele, postular entidades não-experienciais teria um custo ontológico exacerbado, devido ao fato de serem apenas assunções inverificáveis, em contraste direto com o experiencial), mas mantém a questão em aberto, e apenas se limita a afirmar que, ao contrário do que os eliminativistas pensam, a visão de que a consciência experiencial é uma ilusão é a afirmação mais boba de nossos tempos.
O último capítulo é um breve ensaio autobiográfico de Strawson, contando algumas de experiências de adolescência durante o fim dos anos 60. Nada intelectualmente enriquecedor, mas é um modo agradável de fechar a coletânea.
No geral, eu fiquei bastante satisfeito com o livro. Creio que todos os debates são postos de maneiras instigantes, e que Strawson avança posições bastante plausíveis, apesar de difíceis em engolir (com a exceção, talvez, das teses anti-narratividade), com argumentos bem sutis. Alguns comentários que posso adicionar por enquanto: (1) a defesa da distinção transitório/duradouro é muito boa, apesar de eu ficar suspeito com a crença de Strawson de que isso poderia ser um bom guia para chegarmos a uma concepção ontológica robusta do Self. Infelizmente, ele não desenvolve essa parte em nenhum dos ensaios sobre o self, então terei de procurar outras fontes. (2) A defesa pampsiquista de Strawson parece depender de certas assunções meta-ontológicas, e eu creio que não são assunções universalmente aceitas (apesar de atraentes). Penso nas implicações que a rejeição dessas assunções teria para o argumento de Strawson. De qualquer modo, apesar de sua defesa do pampsiquismo ser surpreendente e impressionante, eu tendo a pensar que devemos ficar com a conclusão mais modesta de que, no fundo, talvez nunca saberemos o que realmente há por trás das cortinas. Mas que graça há em parar por aí?
Segue um breve resumo do conteúdo.
Os ensaios 1, 2 e 8 focam no Self e particularmente na discussão acerca de narratividade, o que pode ser entendido sob a forma de narratividade psicológica (a tese de que pessoas têm naturalmente a disposição de conceberem suas próprias vidas como narrativas) ou sob a forma de narratividade ética (a tese de que enxergar nossas vidas desta maneira é uma condição para ter uma vida frutífera e feliz). No primeiro ensaio Strawson argumenta que, entre as várias condições especiais para haver uma experiência fenomenológica de si mesmo como um eu (distinto de mim como ser humano completo), não estão continuidade, nem personalidade. Ao longo de sua argumentação ele introduzirá uma distinção no fenômeno de experiência de si: pessoas transitórias são aquelas que não tendem a se identificar com seu eu no passado, nem no futuro (portanto, não enxergam seu eu como algo que existe continuamente através do tempo), enquanto pessoas duradouras enxergam seu eu como algo contínuo, se identificando com o passado e o futuro. Essa distinção será crucial para a argumentação de Strawson contra as teses de narratividade psicológica e ética, afirmando não somente que várias pessoas não vivem suas vidas narrativamente, mas que a proposta de viver narrativamente pode ter consequências desastrosas em diversos contextos.
O ensaio 3 lida com o tópico de morte. Nele, Strawson argumenta contra a tese de que a morte pode constituir um tipo de mal como perda. Apesar de alguns filósofos acreditarem que a morte não é um mal intrínseco, ela pode ser um mal comparativo na medida em que nos priva de experiências futuras boas que a vida pode nos oferecer (Shelly Kagan é um defensor desta visão, em seu Death). Strawson acredita que isso não é possível, sustentando que nós (mesmo se formos pessoas transitórias ou duradouras, ou qualquer coisa no meio do espectro) não somos o tipo de ente do qual pode ser dito que suas experiências futuras lhe pertencem. Mas se o futuro não é uma propriedade nossa, nós não perdemos nada ao morrer e, portanto, a morte não pode sequer constituir um mal comparativo como perda. Junto com isso, Strawson também defende a visão mais ampla de que, levando em conta que estou vivo, a minha vida não será melhor ou pior se ela durar mais ou menos do que o esperado. Ao longo do artigo, ele responde objeções que frequentemente partem de premissas fenomenológicas, analisando a relação e implicações de seu argumento com fenômenos como arrependimento, luto, depressão, e visões similares sobre a morte como os argumentos de Epicuro e Lucrécio.
Os capítulos 4 e 5 (o último sendo apenas uma entrevista) discutem livre-arbítrio. Aqui, Strawson defende a visão de que o problema determinismo-livre-arbítrio é simplesmente um debate mal concebido, pela razão de que a negação de nossa liberdade não requer uma consistência com qualquer posição determinista e indeterminista. A abordagem de Strawson é mostrar que livre-arbítrio é uma impossibilidade puramente através de uma análise a priori do conceito, tentando derivar uma conclusão absurda (especificamente, ele se utiliza de um argumento de regresso infinito). O argumento em sua forma simples é o seguinte: livre-arbítrio tem como correlato lógico a noção de responsabilidade moral última (o que deve ser entendido como o tipo de responsabilidade que torna justificável qualquer recompensa ou punição sobre alguma de suas ações). Para sermos fundamentalmente responsáveis por nossas ações, devemos ser responsáveis pelo modo como somos (em outras palavras, devemos ser "causa sui"). Mas (e aqui entra o argumento de regresso infinito, que não detalharei) não podemos ser causa sui e, portanto, não podemos ser fundamentalmente moralmente responsáveis. Portanto, livre-arbítrio é uma impossibilidade. No entanto, Strawson também dá razões para acreditarmos que este argumento não fará grande diferença na nossa experiência de liberdade radical em situações cruciais de escolha, apesar de considerar a possibilidade no final da entrevista, na qual ele também considera algumas objeções possíveis à sua posição.
Os ensaios 6 e 7 discutem o tópico de consciência, especialmente a possibilidade de sustentar uma posição fisicalista conjuntamente com a existência da consciência enquanto fenômeno natural/físico. O alvo de Strawson nestas discussões são os chamados "materialistas eliminativistas", que buscam eliminar a consciência como entidade legítima, baseando-se no raciocínio de que ela não pode ser entendida como fenômeno natural/físico. Entende-se aqui que há uma assunção que poderíamos chamar de "naturalista" quanto à realidade: não existem fenômenos sobrenaturais, i.e. fenômenos não físicos no mundo. Mas Strawson acredita que este "naturalismo" dos eliminativistas é uma farsa; uma farsa que deriva de erros fundamentais: o de supor que há uma incompatibilidade entre a experiência consciente e o físico (o que é sustentado por uma outra assunção, a de que sabemos o suficiente sobre o físico para estarmos justificados em acreditar nesta incompatibilidade), e o de que, portanto, a consciência não pode existir como fenômeno natural. Contra isso, Strawson afirma que um verdadeiro naturalismo metafísico não só reconhece a realidade última de experiências como fenômenos naturais/físicos, mas reconhece que não há nada no nosso entendimento atual do físico que nos permita descartar a ideia de que ele seja fundamentalmente experiencial (ou, talvez, parcialmente experiencial). A segunda ideia se apoia numa forma de realismo estrutural epistêmico sobre o conhecimento físico (encontrado em autores como Russell e Eddington, os quais Strawson frequentemente cita): tudo aquilo que as ciências físicas podem nos oferecer são verdades expressas em termos de relações matemáticas e estruturais, mantendo-se quieta diante da questão da natureza intrínseca de seus objetos. Portanto, é uma tolice tentarmos nos basear na física para tentarmos argumentar uma incompatibilidade entre o físico e o experiencial; e, como o único fenômeno cuja existência parece a mais certa para nós são nossas experiências (este é, de fato, o ponto de partida de todo naturalismo real para Strawson), há ao menos alguma razão para considerarmos seriamente a possibilidade do físico ser fundamentalmente experiencial. Isso é uma forma de pampsiquismo puro (apesar de Strawson conceder a possibilidade do físico ser compatível com formas não-puras de pampsiquismo). Strawson acredita que aceitar esse pampsiquismo é a melhor opção (dado que, para ele, postular entidades não-experienciais teria um custo ontológico exacerbado, devido ao fato de serem apenas assunções inverificáveis, em contraste direto com o experiencial), mas mantém a questão em aberto, e apenas se limita a afirmar que, ao contrário do que os eliminativistas pensam, a visão de que a consciência experiencial é uma ilusão é a afirmação mais boba de nossos tempos.
O último capítulo é um breve ensaio autobiográfico de Strawson, contando algumas de experiências de adolescência durante o fim dos anos 60. Nada intelectualmente enriquecedor, mas é um modo agradável de fechar a coletânea.
No geral, eu fiquei bastante satisfeito com o livro. Creio que todos os debates são postos de maneiras instigantes, e que Strawson avança posições bastante plausíveis, apesar de difíceis em engolir (com a exceção, talvez, das teses anti-narratividade), com argumentos bem sutis. Alguns comentários que posso adicionar por enquanto: (1) a defesa da distinção transitório/duradouro é muito boa, apesar de eu ficar suspeito com a crença de Strawson de que isso poderia ser um bom guia para chegarmos a uma concepção ontológica robusta do Self. Infelizmente, ele não desenvolve essa parte em nenhum dos ensaios sobre o self, então terei de procurar outras fontes. (2) A defesa pampsiquista de Strawson parece depender de certas assunções meta-ontológicas, e eu creio que não são assunções universalmente aceitas (apesar de atraentes). Penso nas implicações que a rejeição dessas assunções teria para o argumento de Strawson. De qualquer modo, apesar de sua defesa do pampsiquismo ser surpreendente e impressionante, eu tendo a pensar que devemos ficar com a conclusão mais modesta de que, no fundo, talvez nunca saberemos o que realmente há por trás das cortinas. Mas que graça há em parar por aí?
March 9, 2020
Not quite sure how to rate this. I heard Strawson interviewed and was intrigued by his insistence that he does not have a good autobiographical memory. I would say the same thing but, by the end of the book I realize it means something different for me. Strawson is a confirmed materialist naturalist, but parts way with philosophers who do not believe consciousness is real, and on the other hand, who believe our conscious experience is intrinsically and necessarily narrative. But his tools are philosophical, not psychological, and as such he relies as much on his own idiosyncratic experience as those he is challenging, leaving himself open for the reader to challenge him in turn.
All the same this is a thought-provoking book that examines and challenges the notion of the narrative sense of self, explores ideas about death and determinism. Some of the essays are excellent and engaging, but a few are too long and pedantic, sometimes even irritating. As such it is uneven, but as I am working on my own memoir project yet uncertain about what one can ever know about one's own life, I found a great deal to stimulate my thinking and writing.
All the same this is a thought-provoking book that examines and challenges the notion of the narrative sense of self, explores ideas about death and determinism. Some of the essays are excellent and engaging, but a few are too long and pedantic, sometimes even irritating. As such it is uneven, but as I am working on my own memoir project yet uncertain about what one can ever know about one's own life, I found a great deal to stimulate my thinking and writing.
July 6, 2018
The things that bother Strawson are by no means trivial. He deals here with the illusory nature of the self, 'real naturalism', which he claims inherently opens the door for panpsychism, and the illusion of free will, among other topics. Strawson’s approach is clear and engaging despite the heady ontological topics being discussed here. He comes across as humble and forthright, in almost equal measure. This is something that shouldn’t be trivialised by any means, philosophy can often be oblique, and when it is, it loses its power of engagement.
Perhaps one of the more affecting essays here is Strawson’s case against ‘narrativism’ (the idea of viewing one’s life as a narrative). He argues that this view and the second normative ethical claim which typically ensues, (the claim that one in fact must view one’s life as a story in order to live a rich rewarding life) are unconvincing and don’t hold true for the majority of people. Strawson, somewhat curiously, claims to have little to no autobiographical memory and largely shares Updike’s idea that “I have the persistent sensation, in my life... that I am just beginning”. He goes some way toward exploding the reader’s idea of their own memory and I found the piece left me with considerable food for thought.
Strawson may have the affect of coming across cold and detached in some of his work (especially the harrowingly named ‘I have no future’), but he assures us he is no more emotionally void than the rest of us. In fact he makes the point that each of us assumes our lens through which we see the world is not only the most valid, but the most virtuous. His resounding declaration to this assertion is, ‘nonsense’. People may live fully developed, virtuous fulfilling lives, without any real sense of propositional or autobiographical memory, without caring about ‘non-existence’ or being annihilated in the morning, without assuming personal agency, and without caring about the future. It’s a strangely refreshing outlook whether you agree or not. This supposed sense of detachment is further rebuffed in the final essay, an endearingly personal yet scattered account of British educational institutions and coming of age during the 60's counterculture (admittedly written with great reluctance on Strawson’s part).
The collection is also packed to the gills with jibes at philosophers themselves and quotations from an array of Strawson’s philosophical and literary opponents and contemporaries, both past and present. Many of the arguments here are as old as the discipline of philosophy itself and as such, have fallen in and out of favour within the broader philosophical and literary community. Galen sides with Schopenhauer in this regard, who declared that truth, “granted only a short victory celebration between the two long periods of time when it’s condemned as paradoxical or disparaged as trivial”. In the end, if he's achieved what all philosophers aim to achieve at some level, the things that bother Galen Strawson will now be bothering you too, whether you like it or not.
Perhaps one of the more affecting essays here is Strawson’s case against ‘narrativism’ (the idea of viewing one’s life as a narrative). He argues that this view and the second normative ethical claim which typically ensues, (the claim that one in fact must view one’s life as a story in order to live a rich rewarding life) are unconvincing and don’t hold true for the majority of people. Strawson, somewhat curiously, claims to have little to no autobiographical memory and largely shares Updike’s idea that “I have the persistent sensation, in my life... that I am just beginning”. He goes some way toward exploding the reader’s idea of their own memory and I found the piece left me with considerable food for thought.
Strawson may have the affect of coming across cold and detached in some of his work (especially the harrowingly named ‘I have no future’), but he assures us he is no more emotionally void than the rest of us. In fact he makes the point that each of us assumes our lens through which we see the world is not only the most valid, but the most virtuous. His resounding declaration to this assertion is, ‘nonsense’. People may live fully developed, virtuous fulfilling lives, without any real sense of propositional or autobiographical memory, without caring about ‘non-existence’ or being annihilated in the morning, without assuming personal agency, and without caring about the future. It’s a strangely refreshing outlook whether you agree or not. This supposed sense of detachment is further rebuffed in the final essay, an endearingly personal yet scattered account of British educational institutions and coming of age during the 60's counterculture (admittedly written with great reluctance on Strawson’s part).
The collection is also packed to the gills with jibes at philosophers themselves and quotations from an array of Strawson’s philosophical and literary opponents and contemporaries, both past and present. Many of the arguments here are as old as the discipline of philosophy itself and as such, have fallen in and out of favour within the broader philosophical and literary community. Galen sides with Schopenhauer in this regard, who declared that truth, “granted only a short victory celebration between the two long periods of time when it’s condemned as paradoxical or disparaged as trivial”. In the end, if he's achieved what all philosophers aim to achieve at some level, the things that bother Galen Strawson will now be bothering you too, whether you like it or not.
April 7, 2022
a very enjoyable and fun reading. Strawson writes in a very clear way about very odd, peculiar, and difficult topics. My highlights goes to chapters 1, 2, and 6. These were my favorite pieces from the book.
June 22, 2020
I really liked the essays that are about the self and I haven't been as excited about something I read since I discovered Rorty. Unfortunately, there are other essays that are less interesting, especially the critique against eliminative materialism which seems quite trivial (and possibly misleading?), though I know that his answer would have been “I wish it was trivial”. The last more biographical essay was also not very interesting. He is no Montaigne but the essays about the self and maybe free will (somewhat trivial also) are worth reading. I 'll just write my thoughts; it might look like a summary but I am not as faithful to the text as I usually am.
Strawson invites us to think about the thing we identify with, this window of the world that we have. We all know that we have a body that we are enclosed in, but it seems that this “window” that is me, can be distinguished from it. He asks us to focus on this window. Is there a distinct feeling of being me? Some kind of personality that we can detect that maybe changes as we change? For me (and him) the answer is clearly “no”, but others can feel it.
More importantly, do we experience long-term continuity of this window or not? Most people will immediately say yes, but he insists that he is not one of them and he has many examples of people that seem to not feel it either. He thinks there is a spectrum between people who are “endurers” and people who are “transients”. The second kind do not identify with their past or their future self. They still are moral, have friends and know they have continuity in some form, but this knowledge is theoretical and not something “felt”. He says similar things about people who are narrative or not and about the form, storytelling and revision of these narratives. Needless to say, the popular idea is that “we, humans, are story-tellers” and all that. Once again, every theory that tries to find some “x” that is essential to all humans fails and has to label the rest of them as abnormal or mad.
I need to observe more with these things in mind, though I might be leaning towards transients. I certainly don't identify with my past at all and see these past experiences just as something that happened to that that is "me" (see my “about” page here, or my excitement about exactly this idea here (both well before hearing anything about this topic), but my future self is another matter, even though I am known for saying “if my future self changes his habits and runs out of money, he is not me anymore so I don't care about him” and getting weird looks. There is a difference between imagining yourself as you are now in a future situation and imagining your future “self” in a future situation. I do the first which makes me more worried about the near future -at least-, more than the above sentence might show. In any case it doesn't matter.
Strawson goes as far as saying that a painless death (instant annihilation) doesn't directly harm that person, but only indirectly, because of some desires that he might had and by inflicting pain to those he loved (this reminds me of the sleeping, friendless person that kept coming up to some debates with David Benatar). As he writes “I am, ploddingly, simply not a thing of such a kind that the life and experience it will have if it doesn’t now die can be rightly thought of as a possession of which it can be deprived. One might as well think that life could be deprived of life ... It’s simply a mistake”. I 'd agree but I am just too weird because I am not afraid of death either. I don't think this is something that can be really argued about and calling it a mistake seems a little over the top. I am not so sure that he offered arguments for applying it even to the “endurers” but as he frequently says, he doesn't hope to convince anyone. In fact, in another very entertaining essay, he makes fun of philosophers about being ready to adopt any idea, no matter how ridiculous it is and holding it dearly. Of course he might be too one of those philosophers.
About free will, he says that there can't be free will if by that we mean a person who is completely free and responsible about his actions as that would mean that she is a causa sui. Every act depends on who I am and that in turn depends on events beyond my control. The compatibilists, then, change the definition of free will to something that's not free will. People can choose and change but that's not the issue, as the part that decides to change are beyond their complete control. If you say that that part too was a past creation of yours, repeat until infancy. I agree with him that the free will “problem” is pretty clear and has been solved. There can't be ultimate free will, only knock-off ones. As the title says “luck shallows everything”. At the same time, it's ridiculous to ask the impossible so maybe free will should mean the one that's accessible.
A final topic is an attack on eliminative materialism, reductionist behaviorism, and Denett in particular. He says that you can be a proper physicalist and still have no problem with consciousness or the mental. They are clearly physical too. He blames the philosophers (I would certainly add some contemporary physicists, unlike the pre-50s ones who actually respected philosophy) who don't realize that our theories, the math and all that, describe reality but they don't tell us anything about the nature of it. The distinction here is similar to a word and the thing or, better, to a computer simulating rain and asking from it to make water fall. There is no problem with the phenomenal character of consciousness, then, because it's a categorical mistake to ask from physics to describe “what it feels like to taste salt or see red or feel pain”. We know that we have experience of these things and even if physics indeed doubted them (which they don't) this experience would have priority. This makes him positively inclined to panpsychism, as there is nothing fundamentally non-physical to making consciousness more widespread that we assume that it is.
He really makes fun of Dennett and the passages he cites are worth making fun of, though I am not sure whether there is some missing context. I haven't read Dennett, but I know he is influenced by Sellars so if I understand correctly, the claim is not that we are all zombies and consciousness doesn't exist and nobody has ever felt pain (he actually has quotes from Dennett saying these things) but that we do experience those things but they are simply creations of our brain that have nothing to do with how things are fundamentally, meaning outside of the brain. At least that's what I hope Dennett's claim is. It's still kind of bad, for me basically arbitrary trusting logic and math over your experience but it's not ridiculous.
Strawson invites us to think about the thing we identify with, this window of the world that we have. We all know that we have a body that we are enclosed in, but it seems that this “window” that is me, can be distinguished from it. He asks us to focus on this window. Is there a distinct feeling of being me? Some kind of personality that we can detect that maybe changes as we change? For me (and him) the answer is clearly “no”, but others can feel it.
More importantly, do we experience long-term continuity of this window or not? Most people will immediately say yes, but he insists that he is not one of them and he has many examples of people that seem to not feel it either. He thinks there is a spectrum between people who are “endurers” and people who are “transients”. The second kind do not identify with their past or their future self. They still are moral, have friends and know they have continuity in some form, but this knowledge is theoretical and not something “felt”. He says similar things about people who are narrative or not and about the form, storytelling and revision of these narratives. Needless to say, the popular idea is that “we, humans, are story-tellers” and all that. Once again, every theory that tries to find some “x” that is essential to all humans fails and has to label the rest of them as abnormal or mad.
I need to observe more with these things in mind, though I might be leaning towards transients. I certainly don't identify with my past at all and see these past experiences just as something that happened to that that is "me" (see my “about” page here, or my excitement about exactly this idea here (both well before hearing anything about this topic), but my future self is another matter, even though I am known for saying “if my future self changes his habits and runs out of money, he is not me anymore so I don't care about him” and getting weird looks. There is a difference between imagining yourself as you are now in a future situation and imagining your future “self” in a future situation. I do the first which makes me more worried about the near future -at least-, more than the above sentence might show. In any case it doesn't matter.
Strawson goes as far as saying that a painless death (instant annihilation) doesn't directly harm that person, but only indirectly, because of some desires that he might had and by inflicting pain to those he loved (this reminds me of the sleeping, friendless person that kept coming up to some debates with David Benatar). As he writes “I am, ploddingly, simply not a thing of such a kind that the life and experience it will have if it doesn’t now die can be rightly thought of as a possession of which it can be deprived. One might as well think that life could be deprived of life ... It’s simply a mistake”. I 'd agree but I am just too weird because I am not afraid of death either. I don't think this is something that can be really argued about and calling it a mistake seems a little over the top. I am not so sure that he offered arguments for applying it even to the “endurers” but as he frequently says, he doesn't hope to convince anyone. In fact, in another very entertaining essay, he makes fun of philosophers about being ready to adopt any idea, no matter how ridiculous it is and holding it dearly. Of course he might be too one of those philosophers.
About free will, he says that there can't be free will if by that we mean a person who is completely free and responsible about his actions as that would mean that she is a causa sui. Every act depends on who I am and that in turn depends on events beyond my control. The compatibilists, then, change the definition of free will to something that's not free will. People can choose and change but that's not the issue, as the part that decides to change are beyond their complete control. If you say that that part too was a past creation of yours, repeat until infancy. I agree with him that the free will “problem” is pretty clear and has been solved. There can't be ultimate free will, only knock-off ones. As the title says “luck shallows everything”. At the same time, it's ridiculous to ask the impossible so maybe free will should mean the one that's accessible.
A final topic is an attack on eliminative materialism, reductionist behaviorism, and Denett in particular. He says that you can be a proper physicalist and still have no problem with consciousness or the mental. They are clearly physical too. He blames the philosophers (I would certainly add some contemporary physicists, unlike the pre-50s ones who actually respected philosophy) who don't realize that our theories, the math and all that, describe reality but they don't tell us anything about the nature of it. The distinction here is similar to a word and the thing or, better, to a computer simulating rain and asking from it to make water fall. There is no problem with the phenomenal character of consciousness, then, because it's a categorical mistake to ask from physics to describe “what it feels like to taste salt or see red or feel pain”. We know that we have experience of these things and even if physics indeed doubted them (which they don't) this experience would have priority. This makes him positively inclined to panpsychism, as there is nothing fundamentally non-physical to making consciousness more widespread that we assume that it is.
He really makes fun of Dennett and the passages he cites are worth making fun of, though I am not sure whether there is some missing context. I haven't read Dennett, but I know he is influenced by Sellars so if I understand correctly, the claim is not that we are all zombies and consciousness doesn't exist and nobody has ever felt pain (he actually has quotes from Dennett saying these things) but that we do experience those things but they are simply creations of our brain that have nothing to do with how things are fundamentally, meaning outside of the brain. At least that's what I hope Dennett's claim is. It's still kind of bad, for me basically arbitrary trusting logic and math over your experience but it's not ridiculous.
January 6, 2019
The first portion of the collection is four stars. The latter half recapitulates a lot of the ideas from the first half of the book. I came across Strawson a couple of years ago, I don't entirely remember why or how, but he had an essay about the narrative life. Strawson claims that people who insist on a narrative, story-telling life for all are wrong. For Strawson claims that he, like many others, doesn't experience life narratively. Rather, he feels very distant from his past, as though it had happened to someone else, and very distant from his future. Thus, he feels that he is creating the self anew constantly as opposed to using a lengthy narrative spectrum. I also enjoyed learning a bit about brain science, such as the fact that we can only hold 3 seconds worth of information at a time. Ie, we have roughly 3 seconds in our active memory before it gets filed away one place or another. As someone who lives non-narratively, I found Strawon's essay to be a relief when I first read it, and I quite enjoyed this collection of essays.
February 13, 2023
excruciatingly bad, could not finish
June 17, 2020
There was quite a good thematic continuity to this book and to the philosophical perspective he promotes on various subjects from free will, to the self, to consciousness. However, I find myself disagreeing with him at various points along the way. And, most of my criticism comes down to the fact that he always tries to revert to safety with his view of naturalism, that he distinguishes from pure materialism as naturalism.
The problem is that he relies very heavily on a tautological and changing definition of naturalism depending on what the latest science articles might have to say. It is good to be informed by science. But, it seems more that he is trying to use science as a shield to hide his own, at times, dubious ontological position behind. The good thing about many naturalists is that they are consistent in line with a materialist ontology. Good, because this makes them clear and predictable, though, to my mind, terribly wrong. Galen Strawson, though, has a much more chameleon like definition of naturalism that changes depending on the subject at hand.
For instance, when talking of free will, his argument amounts to saying that if we have responsibility for something we have to have responsibility for everything, including our very emergence into existence, otherwise somewhere in the chain luck, as he says, would swallow it all. If at some point we are reliant on luck in having a strong mind, or constitution, or whatever, however far back we have to go back for that lucky and arbitrary genesis, we cannot then claim moral credit for having free will in relation to those things.
It seems good, when combined with a materialistic, deterministic naturalism where we are determined from the outside, and that is the kind of naturalism he draws upon here to defend this view.
Unfortunately, in a later chapter he defends the existence of consciousness, appealing to a different kind of naturalism. One where we are sure of it from the inside, and connects it up with something like a panpsychic view of nature.
Well and good, a common view, however if he would apply this panpsychism consistently to the free will discussion, he would see that it is actually quite easy with that kind of view of nature to imagine how an entity could be responsible for everything in its own existence, including its own genesis. For, if it is entities with minds all the way down and all the way up, then there is no point at which those entities are arbitrarily formed from the outside by an event of luck.
This vacillation between an external naturalism and a more internal one allows Strawson to stay very much in touch with common sense, but not in touch with a consistently applied ontology. And it is his inconsistency on this latter notion that concerns me. Alongside his over reliance on the use of purely anecdotal arguments. So many times, in his critique of the narrative view of the self, his argument reduces to a personal anecdotal assertion that he does not have this narrative view of himself and so it is not important. But, what if most people do have it, and what if you have it yourself in subtle ways without realising because you have not engaged in the right kind of reflection?
I am willing to grant that he has searched well and genuinely and not found any narrative self in his own experience, but it still falls flat as a general philosophical argument. When you combine this with his weak and vacillating view of naturalism, you get a flavour of his strategy for coming at all philosophical problems. He makes some good points along the way by using this approach. But also, some big problems are underplayed.
For instance, he talks of the denial of consciousness as the silliest claim, and refutes it easily with his own experiences and his version of panpsychic naturalism, but in the process I think he fails to appreciate how strong a tidal pull the view of denying consciousness has, due to a particular dominant consensus narrative view of reality that has a grip on many people's minds. Maybe the narrative will never fool him, or some others, but it can fool many and they are not likely to be drawn out of their view by isolated individuals calling them out based on their own experience. They have the authority of tradition and consensus among loads of people backing them up. And I think he underplays how that can lead to people ignoring, undermining denying, or not even fully seeing their own experience of something. A person can be so clouded by an ideological or narrative perspective, and take much heart and confidence from the amount of people sharing that view with them, that an isolated individual talking about his anecdotal experience is not going to be able to overcome the force of that. They will strongly affirm the emperor has clothes on when he has none, and it feels like the only way to counter that belief is to dissect their whole belief system piece by piece, applying critical reason at every stage. In this way the imposing and intimidating authority of the viewpoint can be overcome.
The problem is that he relies very heavily on a tautological and changing definition of naturalism depending on what the latest science articles might have to say. It is good to be informed by science. But, it seems more that he is trying to use science as a shield to hide his own, at times, dubious ontological position behind. The good thing about many naturalists is that they are consistent in line with a materialist ontology. Good, because this makes them clear and predictable, though, to my mind, terribly wrong. Galen Strawson, though, has a much more chameleon like definition of naturalism that changes depending on the subject at hand.
For instance, when talking of free will, his argument amounts to saying that if we have responsibility for something we have to have responsibility for everything, including our very emergence into existence, otherwise somewhere in the chain luck, as he says, would swallow it all. If at some point we are reliant on luck in having a strong mind, or constitution, or whatever, however far back we have to go back for that lucky and arbitrary genesis, we cannot then claim moral credit for having free will in relation to those things.
It seems good, when combined with a materialistic, deterministic naturalism where we are determined from the outside, and that is the kind of naturalism he draws upon here to defend this view.
Unfortunately, in a later chapter he defends the existence of consciousness, appealing to a different kind of naturalism. One where we are sure of it from the inside, and connects it up with something like a panpsychic view of nature.
Well and good, a common view, however if he would apply this panpsychism consistently to the free will discussion, he would see that it is actually quite easy with that kind of view of nature to imagine how an entity could be responsible for everything in its own existence, including its own genesis. For, if it is entities with minds all the way down and all the way up, then there is no point at which those entities are arbitrarily formed from the outside by an event of luck.
This vacillation between an external naturalism and a more internal one allows Strawson to stay very much in touch with common sense, but not in touch with a consistently applied ontology. And it is his inconsistency on this latter notion that concerns me. Alongside his over reliance on the use of purely anecdotal arguments. So many times, in his critique of the narrative view of the self, his argument reduces to a personal anecdotal assertion that he does not have this narrative view of himself and so it is not important. But, what if most people do have it, and what if you have it yourself in subtle ways without realising because you have not engaged in the right kind of reflection?
I am willing to grant that he has searched well and genuinely and not found any narrative self in his own experience, but it still falls flat as a general philosophical argument. When you combine this with his weak and vacillating view of naturalism, you get a flavour of his strategy for coming at all philosophical problems. He makes some good points along the way by using this approach. But also, some big problems are underplayed.
For instance, he talks of the denial of consciousness as the silliest claim, and refutes it easily with his own experiences and his version of panpsychic naturalism, but in the process I think he fails to appreciate how strong a tidal pull the view of denying consciousness has, due to a particular dominant consensus narrative view of reality that has a grip on many people's minds. Maybe the narrative will never fool him, or some others, but it can fool many and they are not likely to be drawn out of their view by isolated individuals calling them out based on their own experience. They have the authority of tradition and consensus among loads of people backing them up. And I think he underplays how that can lead to people ignoring, undermining denying, or not even fully seeing their own experience of something. A person can be so clouded by an ideological or narrative perspective, and take much heart and confidence from the amount of people sharing that view with them, that an isolated individual talking about his anecdotal experience is not going to be able to overcome the force of that. They will strongly affirm the emperor has clothes on when he has none, and it feels like the only way to counter that belief is to dissect their whole belief system piece by piece, applying critical reason at every stage. In this way the imposing and intimidating authority of the viewpoint can be overcome.
January 1, 2021
A particular favorite
June 16, 2024
AN ANALYTICAL PHILOSOPHER LOOKS AT THESE KEY ISSUES
Galen John Strawson (born 1952) is a British analytic philosopher who teaches at the University of Texas, Austin, and previously taught at the University of Reading, the City University of New York, and Oxford University. (He is also the son of philosopher P. F. Strawson.)
He wrote in the Preface to this 2018 book, “Most of these pieces are attempts to find better ways of expressing thoughts drafted initially for an audience of professional philosophers… I’ve adjusted most of these pieces in minor respects, and I’ve imported a number of sentences from other work. They don’t hang grandly together, but they connect in potentially useful ways…. Twenty years ago, new pieces on large themes were relatively rare, and not always easily available. Things are different today.”
He adds in the Introduction, “These pieces are about free will and consciousness as well as death, and about that it is to be a genuine ‘naturalist’ in the philosophical sense---someone who doesn’t believe in anything supernatural. They’re about the idea of the self, the sense of having or being a self, the sense of the self in time, the ‘narrative’ outlook on life, and… the unlimited nature of human credulity. There’s a mildly polemical element in the pieces about ‘narrativity’… because they’re written against what seems to me to be an oppressive consensus… [that] anyone who lives their life in a way that is even remotely well adjusted necessarily lives in in a ‘narrative’ fashion… I’ve been touched by all those who have, over the years, thanked me for putting the opposing case.” (Pg. 15-16)
In the first essay, he explains, “By the ‘sense of the self’ I mean---at last---the sense that people have of themselves as being, specifically, a mental presence, a mental someone… that it distinct from all its particular experiences, thoughts, hopes, wishes, feelings, and so on… I’m not claiming that the sense of the self automatically incorporates belief in an immaterial soul, or in life after bodily death. It doesn’t. Philosophical materialists who believe as I do that we’re wholly physical beings, and that human consciousness evolved by purely physical processes, have as strong a sense of self as anyone else.” (Pg. 15)
But he acknowledges, “experience of the self as a specifically mental thing certainly needn’t involve any belief in an immaterial soul. But it does incorporate elements that make that belief come rather naturally. The mental self can easily seem to exist self-sufficiently in a sphere of being quite other than that described by physics… and this helps to explain how natural it is to think of the self as a specifically mental thing.” (Pg. 17)
He argues, “I don’t think that the brevity of the ‘conscious now’ necessarily contribute to the sense of hiatus or newness. Our experience could resemble a narrow beam of light sweeping smoothly and continuously along… the self can certainly be felt to persist throughout a period of time that includes a break or hiatus, and its temporal extent may appear very different in different contexts of thought. (Fear of death raises interesting questions.)” (Pg. 42-43)
He states, “Human beings are self-conscious in a strong sense which I’ll call ‘full self-consciousness’; they can think of themselves specifically AS themselves… I can express the distinction I have in mind as follows: Sometimes, when one is thinking of oneself in the fully self-conscious way, one experiences or conceives of oneself as a whole human being… At other times one experiences/conceives oneself primarily as an inner mental presence of ‘self.’ One has what I’ll call ‘self-experience.’ In both cases one is thinking of oneself, and one is thinking of oneself specifically as oneself in the fully self-conscious way, but the second, inner-mental-presence way of thinking of oneself if importantly different from the whole-human-being way.” (Pg. 76-77)
He asserts, “Suppose you are someone who struggles to be morally responsible, and make an enormous effort. Well, that too is a matter of luck. You’re lucky to be someone who has a character of a sort that disposes you to be able to make that sort of effort. Someone who lacks a character of that sort is merely unlucky… In the end, luck swallows everything: this is one way of conveying the fundamental respect in which there can be no ultimate responsibility. In this sense, no punishment or reward is ever ultimately just or fair, however, natural or useful or otherwise humanly fitting or appropriate it may be or seem.” (Pg. 106) He continues, “the facts are clear. One can’t be ultimately responsible for one’s character or mental nature in any way at all. [Various writers] are not quite right insofar as they say … that ‘character is destiny,’ for external circumstances are also part of destiny. But the basic point is good, and final, when it comes to the question of free will and ultimate moral responsibility.” (Pg. 108-109)
In a conversation with Tamler Sommers, he says about Hitler, etc., “I can’t really accept it myself---I can’t live it all the time. If someone harmed or tortured or killed one of my children, I’d feel everything almost everyone else would feel. I’d probably have intense feelings of revenge. But these feelings … In the end [are] small and self-concerned. Only the grief would last… There’s another thing to say about the Hitler case. Our sense that he must be held to be wholly and utterly responsible for what he did is both cognitive and emotional, and it usually seems to us that these two factors can’t possibly come apart… Nevertheless, I think they can come apart. Many of our emotional responses can stay in place when we confront the fact that there is no ultimate moral responsibility… I think even the more emotionally intense desires for revenge and retribution, say, can be felt in a way that does not presuppose ultimate moral responsibility.” (Pg. 116-117)
He asserts, “[some] philosophers cleave to a conception of the natural according to which experience isn’t and can’t be a natural phenomenon. So they endorse the Denial. The problem is not that these philosophers take naturalism to entail materialism: I believe they’re right to do so. The problem is that---like Descartes---they claim that conscious experience can’t possibly be wholly physical… And since they think that everything that exists is natural, and that everything natural is physical, they’re obliged to conclude that experience doesn’t really exist. So they are … ‘eliminativists’ about consciousness, although many of them conceal this by using the word ‘consciousness’ to mean something that has nothing essentially to do with consciousness.” (Pg. 140-141)
He contends, “I take it that reality … is entirely PHYSICAL. I’m a physicalist naturalist, a materialist naturalist. I don’t believe there’s any nonphysical concrete reality … and here I’m going to assume that this is right. I’m also going to take it that physicalism and materialism are the same thing, although there’s more to physical reality than matter. And I’m going to put ethic aside.” (Pg. 154)
He goes on, “But I don’t for a moment think that … the human science of physics, can fully characterize the nature of concrete reality, even in principle… One could introduce the term ‘physicalists’ to name those who believe that physics can in principle fully describe or characterize the physical.” (Pg. 160)
This book will be of interest to those wanting an analytical perspective on such issues.
Galen John Strawson (born 1952) is a British analytic philosopher who teaches at the University of Texas, Austin, and previously taught at the University of Reading, the City University of New York, and Oxford University. (He is also the son of philosopher P. F. Strawson.)
He wrote in the Preface to this 2018 book, “Most of these pieces are attempts to find better ways of expressing thoughts drafted initially for an audience of professional philosophers… I’ve adjusted most of these pieces in minor respects, and I’ve imported a number of sentences from other work. They don’t hang grandly together, but they connect in potentially useful ways…. Twenty years ago, new pieces on large themes were relatively rare, and not always easily available. Things are different today.”
He adds in the Introduction, “These pieces are about free will and consciousness as well as death, and about that it is to be a genuine ‘naturalist’ in the philosophical sense---someone who doesn’t believe in anything supernatural. They’re about the idea of the self, the sense of having or being a self, the sense of the self in time, the ‘narrative’ outlook on life, and… the unlimited nature of human credulity. There’s a mildly polemical element in the pieces about ‘narrativity’… because they’re written against what seems to me to be an oppressive consensus… [that] anyone who lives their life in a way that is even remotely well adjusted necessarily lives in in a ‘narrative’ fashion… I’ve been touched by all those who have, over the years, thanked me for putting the opposing case.” (Pg. 15-16)
In the first essay, he explains, “By the ‘sense of the self’ I mean---at last---the sense that people have of themselves as being, specifically, a mental presence, a mental someone… that it distinct from all its particular experiences, thoughts, hopes, wishes, feelings, and so on… I’m not claiming that the sense of the self automatically incorporates belief in an immaterial soul, or in life after bodily death. It doesn’t. Philosophical materialists who believe as I do that we’re wholly physical beings, and that human consciousness evolved by purely physical processes, have as strong a sense of self as anyone else.” (Pg. 15)
But he acknowledges, “experience of the self as a specifically mental thing certainly needn’t involve any belief in an immaterial soul. But it does incorporate elements that make that belief come rather naturally. The mental self can easily seem to exist self-sufficiently in a sphere of being quite other than that described by physics… and this helps to explain how natural it is to think of the self as a specifically mental thing.” (Pg. 17)
He argues, “I don’t think that the brevity of the ‘conscious now’ necessarily contribute to the sense of hiatus or newness. Our experience could resemble a narrow beam of light sweeping smoothly and continuously along… the self can certainly be felt to persist throughout a period of time that includes a break or hiatus, and its temporal extent may appear very different in different contexts of thought. (Fear of death raises interesting questions.)” (Pg. 42-43)
He states, “Human beings are self-conscious in a strong sense which I’ll call ‘full self-consciousness’; they can think of themselves specifically AS themselves… I can express the distinction I have in mind as follows: Sometimes, when one is thinking of oneself in the fully self-conscious way, one experiences or conceives of oneself as a whole human being… At other times one experiences/conceives oneself primarily as an inner mental presence of ‘self.’ One has what I’ll call ‘self-experience.’ In both cases one is thinking of oneself, and one is thinking of oneself specifically as oneself in the fully self-conscious way, but the second, inner-mental-presence way of thinking of oneself if importantly different from the whole-human-being way.” (Pg. 76-77)
He asserts, “Suppose you are someone who struggles to be morally responsible, and make an enormous effort. Well, that too is a matter of luck. You’re lucky to be someone who has a character of a sort that disposes you to be able to make that sort of effort. Someone who lacks a character of that sort is merely unlucky… In the end, luck swallows everything: this is one way of conveying the fundamental respect in which there can be no ultimate responsibility. In this sense, no punishment or reward is ever ultimately just or fair, however, natural or useful or otherwise humanly fitting or appropriate it may be or seem.” (Pg. 106) He continues, “the facts are clear. One can’t be ultimately responsible for one’s character or mental nature in any way at all. [Various writers] are not quite right insofar as they say … that ‘character is destiny,’ for external circumstances are also part of destiny. But the basic point is good, and final, when it comes to the question of free will and ultimate moral responsibility.” (Pg. 108-109)
In a conversation with Tamler Sommers, he says about Hitler, etc., “I can’t really accept it myself---I can’t live it all the time. If someone harmed or tortured or killed one of my children, I’d feel everything almost everyone else would feel. I’d probably have intense feelings of revenge. But these feelings … In the end [are] small and self-concerned. Only the grief would last… There’s another thing to say about the Hitler case. Our sense that he must be held to be wholly and utterly responsible for what he did is both cognitive and emotional, and it usually seems to us that these two factors can’t possibly come apart… Nevertheless, I think they can come apart. Many of our emotional responses can stay in place when we confront the fact that there is no ultimate moral responsibility… I think even the more emotionally intense desires for revenge and retribution, say, can be felt in a way that does not presuppose ultimate moral responsibility.” (Pg. 116-117)
He asserts, “[some] philosophers cleave to a conception of the natural according to which experience isn’t and can’t be a natural phenomenon. So they endorse the Denial. The problem is not that these philosophers take naturalism to entail materialism: I believe they’re right to do so. The problem is that---like Descartes---they claim that conscious experience can’t possibly be wholly physical… And since they think that everything that exists is natural, and that everything natural is physical, they’re obliged to conclude that experience doesn’t really exist. So they are … ‘eliminativists’ about consciousness, although many of them conceal this by using the word ‘consciousness’ to mean something that has nothing essentially to do with consciousness.” (Pg. 140-141)
He contends, “I take it that reality … is entirely PHYSICAL. I’m a physicalist naturalist, a materialist naturalist. I don’t believe there’s any nonphysical concrete reality … and here I’m going to assume that this is right. I’m also going to take it that physicalism and materialism are the same thing, although there’s more to physical reality than matter. And I’m going to put ethic aside.” (Pg. 154)
He goes on, “But I don’t for a moment think that … the human science of physics, can fully characterize the nature of concrete reality, even in principle… One could introduce the term ‘physicalists’ to name those who believe that physics can in principle fully describe or characterize the physical.” (Pg. 160)
This book will be of interest to those wanting an analytical perspective on such issues.
June 8, 2018
The one essay that really sticks with me is "I Have No Future" which i've read 2.25 times because if i'm going to respond to its ideas, i'll need to be sure i understand them. I'd like to hear Strawson speak on its ideas because then i might be able to get out of my own way. I suspect that's true of the whole collection of essays, generally, because i typically felt as though he was making assertions for which i found no supporting arguments.
But 4 stars because he managed to challenge some cornerstone ideas about what it is like to be human, notably the subtitular items death (no harm to us), free will (don't have any), consciousness (it's really Real) and the self (more than one sense of it).
Even if my beliefs didn't change, his ideas made me rethink or think anew.
But 4 stars because he managed to challenge some cornerstone ideas about what it is like to be human, notably the subtitular items death (no harm to us), free will (don't have any), consciousness (it's really Real) and the self (more than one sense of it).
Even if my beliefs didn't change, his ideas made me rethink or think anew.
November 19, 2018
Strawson's writing is easy to read; but I didn't feel any emotional or intellectual connection to it.
June 18, 2019
Essays on, well, death, freedom, the self, etc, by a philosopher who writes clearly and cites widely.
Want to read
January 20, 2024SO true galen
December 1, 2022
Galen Strawson writes interestingly on a variety of topics, though not all fit neatly into the history of philosophy. The title, Things That Bother Me, suggests that he means to be provocative, and he often succeeds in offering counterintuitive points of view.
Galen is the son of P.F. Strawson, the prominent Oxford philosopher, whose book, Individuals, I read in graduate school. P.F. Strawson is also the author of a well known paper, Freedom and Resentment, which argues that moral responsibility is a matter of the reactive attitudes we have toward other people’s actions. This finesses the issue of free will. A person may or may not have been able to do otherwise than he did, but our reactive attitudes criticize the reasons or motives he had for acting, and this is all we need to ascribe moral responsibility.
Galen takes a different point of view, arguing that we cannot be morally responsible for our actions, in some hard sense, because we cannot determine who we are. There are always extraneous factors of heredity and environment which make us who we are, and since we cannot determine these, we cannot be responsible for what we do.
It seemed to me that this is an interesting father-son conflict, and I wondered what differences there might be between them to lead to their different conclusions. They are of different generations (P.F. Strawson is now deceased), and their philosophical training had differences. P.F. was trained at Oxford, with its ordinary language orientation, while Galen was trained at both Oxford and Cambridge, the latter having a logical analysis orientation. Galen also studied Eastern philosophy, including Buddhism. There is also the possibility of a father-son emotional issue. Could it be that the son was out to show up the “old man”?
Galen addresses the issue, “I don’t think there is anything Oedipal going on.” He also says that “Derek Parfit [a British philosopher famous for his work on personal identity] once said he thought my view was closer to the truth than my father’s, but that my father’s paper would be the one that would live on. I think he was right.”
Here are some of the views which I called “provocative.” He argues that we do not have a continuous sense of our self. If we are talking about our consciousness of self, then we may not be aware of our self for more than a few seconds at a time. If we think of our sense of our self over the period of a lifetime, not everyone can think of themselves as a single self throughout. Galen argues that his own experience is “episodic” in that he thinks of himself in earlier periods of his life as “a different person” and not as the person acting in the present moment. This is in contrast with people who have a “narrative” experience of themselves, who he acknowledges are a majority, and who think of themselves as one continuous self throughout their life.
This leads to another “provocative” view: The widespread idea that one’s sense of self is created by constructing a narrative of one’s life, is not only wrong, but also not desirable. In support of his position he cites Sartre (for example in his novel Nausea), who says that anyone who is playing a role in life is not acting authentically. He also points out how often we are mistaken about who we think we are (what flaws we might have, for example). This is an interesting argument, but I think he loses sight of the effort we make to try to get the story right, when we try to tell the narrative of our life. We may be self-deceived, but we revise the narrative as we go along, to try to make sense of it.
I enjoy Galen’s writing enormously for its “provocative” ideas, especially when I disagree with him. And I am happy to follow an intergenerational tradition of philosophical argument.
Galen is the son of P.F. Strawson, the prominent Oxford philosopher, whose book, Individuals, I read in graduate school. P.F. Strawson is also the author of a well known paper, Freedom and Resentment, which argues that moral responsibility is a matter of the reactive attitudes we have toward other people’s actions. This finesses the issue of free will. A person may or may not have been able to do otherwise than he did, but our reactive attitudes criticize the reasons or motives he had for acting, and this is all we need to ascribe moral responsibility.
Galen takes a different point of view, arguing that we cannot be morally responsible for our actions, in some hard sense, because we cannot determine who we are. There are always extraneous factors of heredity and environment which make us who we are, and since we cannot determine these, we cannot be responsible for what we do.
It seemed to me that this is an interesting father-son conflict, and I wondered what differences there might be between them to lead to their different conclusions. They are of different generations (P.F. Strawson is now deceased), and their philosophical training had differences. P.F. was trained at Oxford, with its ordinary language orientation, while Galen was trained at both Oxford and Cambridge, the latter having a logical analysis orientation. Galen also studied Eastern philosophy, including Buddhism. There is also the possibility of a father-son emotional issue. Could it be that the son was out to show up the “old man”?
Galen addresses the issue, “I don’t think there is anything Oedipal going on.” He also says that “Derek Parfit [a British philosopher famous for his work on personal identity] once said he thought my view was closer to the truth than my father’s, but that my father’s paper would be the one that would live on. I think he was right.”
Here are some of the views which I called “provocative.” He argues that we do not have a continuous sense of our self. If we are talking about our consciousness of self, then we may not be aware of our self for more than a few seconds at a time. If we think of our sense of our self over the period of a lifetime, not everyone can think of themselves as a single self throughout. Galen argues that his own experience is “episodic” in that he thinks of himself in earlier periods of his life as “a different person” and not as the person acting in the present moment. This is in contrast with people who have a “narrative” experience of themselves, who he acknowledges are a majority, and who think of themselves as one continuous self throughout their life.
This leads to another “provocative” view: The widespread idea that one’s sense of self is created by constructing a narrative of one’s life, is not only wrong, but also not desirable. In support of his position he cites Sartre (for example in his novel Nausea), who says that anyone who is playing a role in life is not acting authentically. He also points out how often we are mistaken about who we think we are (what flaws we might have, for example). This is an interesting argument, but I think he loses sight of the effort we make to try to get the story right, when we try to tell the narrative of our life. We may be self-deceived, but we revise the narrative as we go along, to try to make sense of it.
I enjoy Galen’s writing enormously for its “provocative” ideas, especially when I disagree with him. And I am happy to follow an intergenerational tradition of philosophical argument.
October 9, 2018
I very much enjoyed this collection of occasional essays written for various popular, rather than academic, periodicals. Strawson covers a number of topics, though there is considerable overlap, as some of the essays approached the same topic in slightly different ways. For instance, debunking the narrativity of one's life appeared three times. Other topics concerned free will, death, and consciousness.
While Strawson is careful to explain all his terms, he is not averse to using literary allusion, common-sense illustration, and personal experience/expression as means to convey his larger arguments. His is a very persuasive voice, and while he's got a few axes to grind, his presentation remains grounded in a winning objectivity.
His discussion of free will was thorough, and while it leads ultimately to the fact that we cannot do anything other than what we do (ie, we have no free will), we live in a world where the idea of no ultimate moral responsibility is repugnant. The argument about consciousness/experience being a real thing struck me as being more a pulling back of the curtain on the discipline of philosophy itself, that there are different schools of thought and much debate between them. In this particular instance Strawson lobs arguments against the Naturalists to defend the proposition that consciousness/experience is a real thing, which he acknowledges even a five-year-old already knows.
The topic that most intrigues me, because I understand the psychology behind it least, is the premise that all people do (or should) construct narratives of their lives, and, further, that in doing do so they make their lives more complete, satisfying, and moral. In three separate approaches to this topic, Strawson posits different terms for those who do construct narratives and those who do not (endurant versus transient, diacronic versus synchronic, and at least one other "duelism" I've forgotten). Strawson maintains that this cannot apply to everyone, as he himself does not construct a narrative about his life, sees in fact that his existence is a series of events in which various selves were involved but not necessarily all having some fixed narrative wholeness.
As I say, I found the narrativity discussion most intriguing, because I believe my own life story is a ramshackle affair, with an incredible number of discontinuities and no discernible narrative arc, other than participation in the general youth, adulthood, old age milestones. And, like Strawson, my memory is and has always been shaky and unreliable, and the future for me remains, as ever, a mystery. While allowing that some people may naturally be story tellers, he maintains that there are pernicious aspects to insisting everyone toe the diachronic line. Reading these essays happily coincided with reading Iris Murdoch's Under the Net, a novel and author that Strawson refers to in relation to this discussion.
This is a very smart and readable book. I was sorry to have so quickly come to its end (as there was no more opportunity to observe how Strawson relieves himself of mental irritants).
While Strawson is careful to explain all his terms, he is not averse to using literary allusion, common-sense illustration, and personal experience/expression as means to convey his larger arguments. His is a very persuasive voice, and while he's got a few axes to grind, his presentation remains grounded in a winning objectivity.
His discussion of free will was thorough, and while it leads ultimately to the fact that we cannot do anything other than what we do (ie, we have no free will), we live in a world where the idea of no ultimate moral responsibility is repugnant. The argument about consciousness/experience being a real thing struck me as being more a pulling back of the curtain on the discipline of philosophy itself, that there are different schools of thought and much debate between them. In this particular instance Strawson lobs arguments against the Naturalists to defend the proposition that consciousness/experience is a real thing, which he acknowledges even a five-year-old already knows.
The topic that most intrigues me, because I understand the psychology behind it least, is the premise that all people do (or should) construct narratives of their lives, and, further, that in doing do so they make their lives more complete, satisfying, and moral. In three separate approaches to this topic, Strawson posits different terms for those who do construct narratives and those who do not (endurant versus transient, diacronic versus synchronic, and at least one other "duelism" I've forgotten). Strawson maintains that this cannot apply to everyone, as he himself does not construct a narrative about his life, sees in fact that his existence is a series of events in which various selves were involved but not necessarily all having some fixed narrative wholeness.
As I say, I found the narrativity discussion most intriguing, because I believe my own life story is a ramshackle affair, with an incredible number of discontinuities and no discernible narrative arc, other than participation in the general youth, adulthood, old age milestones. And, like Strawson, my memory is and has always been shaky and unreliable, and the future for me remains, as ever, a mystery. While allowing that some people may naturally be story tellers, he maintains that there are pernicious aspects to insisting everyone toe the diachronic line. Reading these essays happily coincided with reading Iris Murdoch's Under the Net, a novel and author that Strawson refers to in relation to this discussion.
This is a very smart and readable book. I was sorry to have so quickly come to its end (as there was no more opportunity to observe how Strawson relieves himself of mental irritants).
May 4, 2025
An amiable collection of philosophical essays about free will, death, naturalism (anti supernaturalism), selfhood, consciousness, and narrativity (the idea, which Strawson opposes, that the self only comes to exist by its being narrated). I found Strawson’s views understandable and persuasive, and only occasionally did I find them obvious, obscure, or tiresome. The last essay, “Two Years’ Time,” is Strawson’s personal reminiscences of his teenage years (late Sixties and early Seventies) exploring drugs, sex, and religion.
Strawson's straightforward logic and clear vision are sometimes dazzling, leading to sublime passages such as this one:
Philosophy can often be dry, scholarly, and impersonal, but Strawson’s essays are warm, personal, and approachable. I enjoyed them.
Strawson's straightforward logic and clear vision are sometimes dazzling, leading to sublime passages such as this one:
"It's helpful to consider children, because they already have a very clear idea of what is the question. Ask them about the color they see—some shade of red—when they shut their eyes and look at a light, and then cover their eyes and watch the red grow dim. They know the color isn't out there in the world. They know—to put it simply—that it's just 'in their minds.'"
Philosophy can often be dry, scholarly, and impersonal, but Strawson’s essays are warm, personal, and approachable. I enjoyed them.
August 8, 2022
A collection of essays on three main themes: Strawson's disagreement that life is always experienced as, and is given meaning by being experienced as, a narrative; his opposition to the belief that we have free will; and his conviction that conscious experience is a physical affair, and the panpsychism that appears to follow from this conviction. He does a pretty comprehensive job on the first two questions, but I found his treatment of the third rather unconvincing, and wondered if he wasn't doing what he accuses others of, namely "looking-glassing", that is, defining or using a term in such a way that it excludes that term's actual meaning; he refuses to accept the normal distinction between "physical" and "non-physical".
There's an autobiographical sketch at the end which shows what fun experiences are afforded to those privileged to attend a school such as Winchester.
There's an autobiographical sketch at the end which shows what fun experiences are afforded to those privileged to attend a school such as Winchester.
June 28, 2025
A friend recommended me to read this philosophy book, saying that he agreed with Galen Strawson on everything. I largely agreed with him as well, perhaps, as you’d expect from a philosopher, he is so good at arguing his case. The book is repetitious, as Strawson acknowledges, but full of treasure and marvellous quotes; Strawson is well read. And I enjoyed his last chapter in which he lets his hair down and describes his wild, drug-taking days at Winchester College.
I produced three bogs from the book, an above-average haul.
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I produced three bogs from the book, an above-average haul.
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July 20, 2020
You may disagree with many of Strawson's arguments, you might even question the relevance of his arguments at times. But I think that's the best thing about these essays, they are engaging in the way all philosophical texts should be. It's hard not to ask questions whilst reading this book, doubt what the author is suggesting and even rethink some of your own ideas.
Strawson's writing is accessible, making them an ideal introduction for anyone unfamiliar with the philosophical discussions they address. Many of the issues considered are relevant to everyone, regardless of how much interest one has in philosophy, or they are at least issues which we have all considered at some point. This book is a great place to start with Galen Strawson and I look forward to reading more of his work.
Strawson's writing is accessible, making them an ideal introduction for anyone unfamiliar with the philosophical discussions they address. Many of the issues considered are relevant to everyone, regardless of how much interest one has in philosophy, or they are at least issues which we have all considered at some point. This book is a great place to start with Galen Strawson and I look forward to reading more of his work.
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June 7, 2024Interesting philosophy from 1990s. uses the botheration machine to list and example things finds disturbing.
Interesting section on self and what it means in various views.
Mostly it is a puzzle though most of us act regularly as if we know who or what our self is.
"If there is a sing against life, it consists perhaps not so much in despairing of life as in hope for (or indeed fearing) another life and in eluding the implacable grandeur of this life.
Another book I need to think on for some time.
Interesting section on self and what it means in various views.
Mostly it is a puzzle though most of us act regularly as if we know who or what our self is.
"If there is a sing against life, it consists perhaps not so much in despairing of life as in hope for (or indeed fearing) another life and in eluding the implacable grandeur of this life.
Another book I need to think on for some time.
February 13, 2021
Cantankerous philosopher, arguing for a wider range of human differences in the experience of consciousness beyond the universalizing view of continuous, narrative, story-self-authored-as-meaning. And counter-positions on what a materialist view that doesn't try to explain away or deny conscious experience implies for morality, fate, death, etc. Enjoyable for clear thought and how often he deftly turns to literature's depictions of author or character's inner states as evidence.
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