An in-depth, finely detailed portrait of the German Army from its greatest victory in 1871 to its final collapse in 1918, this volume offers the most comprehensive account ever given of one of the critical pillars of the German Empire—and a chief architect of the military and political realities of late nineteenth-century Europe.
Written by two of the world’s leading authorities on the subject, Imperial Germany and War, 1871–1918 examines the most essential components of the imperial German military system, with an emphasis on such foundational areas as theory, doctrine, institutional structures, training, and the officer corps. In the period between 1871 and 1918, rapid technological development demanded considerable adaptation and change in military doctrine and planning. Consequently, the authors focus on theory and practice leading up to World War I and upon the variety of adaptations that became necessary as the war progressed—with unique insights into military theorists from Clausewitz to Moltke the Elder, Moltke the Younger, Schlichting, and Schlieffen. Ranging over the entire history of the German Empire, Imperial Germany and War, 1871–1918 presents a picture of unprecedented scope and depth of one of the most widely studied, criticized, and imitated organizations in the modern world. The book will prove indispensable to an understanding of the Imperial German Army.
A workman-like portrait of and narrative about the Imperial German Army that incorporates the best and latest historical research on all the contentious topics associated with that force. There are many who consider the pre-WWI German Army to be the best ever, and it certainly had its strong points, but it had weak ones as well, some of which were responsible for Germany's disastrous defeat, ending the dynasty that the army had sworn to uphold.
Some really interesting material about the imperial army - its social and political make-up, the theories it developed, and some of the personalities involved. The authors debunk a few myths and show the factual background that got exaggerated for others. can be a little dry at times though.
I can't fairly rate this. On the one hand, I learned a fair bit about the German side of WW1, for which I am very grateful. On the other, it was one hell of a slog, mostly because it's seriously hardcore military history (in which I'm not very interested) rather than conflict/war history (which fascinates me).
This book is an overview of the Great General Staff that prepared the German army for war and then conducted World War I as the supreme headquarters. It’s a fascinating read, especially concerning the pre war years where each Chief of the General Staff had wide latitude to ruminate and develop potential German strategy based on suppositions that Germany would fight France or Russia or both. The book also details the armies relationship to the Kaiser, who as the reigning German Emperor was in fact in charge of the Heer which in Germany of that time meant most of the state as well.
The most interesting part of the book to me was the sections on the development of the various deployment plans that were created by April of each year and were to be used in case of war. Up until 1913 the Germans developed two plans; one postulating a war with France and a holding action against Russia, the other with a war against Russia and a defensive attitude towed France. These plans detailed force structures and deployment schemes, but not actual war aims or strategies.
In 1913, the then Chief of the General Staff, Helmuth Von Molke the Younger, dropped the Russia only version, leaving Germany with a plan that mobilized the vast majority of forces against France and Belgium and a token holding force against Russia. Again, in April 1914, when the new plan was published it was just a variation on the previous years model. When war came in 1914 the Germans had only declared war against Russia, and really had no major reason to invade France. When the Kaiser asked if the plan could be modified to just mobilize against Russia, Moltke famously replied that he only had one plan, a plan that attacked France and just had enough forces to ward off the Russians from East Prussia. The Kaiser remarked that his uncle, the Great Moltke, would have had a different answer. Moltke then had a breakdown.
What a difference a war just against Russia would have made!
In any case, the book also takes the readers through the muddled execution of these plans through the war years to Germany’s eventual defeat and the end of the dynasty. The war years are very lightly covered, and then only from the Supreme Headquarters view.
A truly encyclopedic treatment of the most famous and notorious institution in Imperial German history: the Kaiserheer. The book is easily comprehensive enough and informed by the most recent scholarship to serve as a primary reference resource for those engaged in research or historical writing that involves the Imperial German military in almost any way (with the sole exception of colonial campaigns, which are quite strikingly ignored completely). It is also very well written, highly readable, and accessible to those with at least a rudimentary preliminary grasp of the topics, events, institutions, and individuals in Prusso-German military history c1871-1918. Hughes and DiNardo weigh in on just about every conceivable historiographical debate in modern German military history over the last century, offering some rather convincing revisions to many predominating points of consensus within the field. While the extraordinarily extensive and detailed treatments of each and every one of the Kaiserreich's prewar deployment and mobilization plans were a bit beyond the pale for this reader, for those with a more distinct taste for the Schlieffen Plan debate, there is much here ripe for close consideration (and, no doubt, some criticism). As a primer for those only moderately familiar with the Kaiserheer in the imperial period or during the Great War, interested in obtaining an updated, readable, and impressively comprehensive treatment of the topic, this is the book. As a bonus, the bibliography is quite an impressive roadmap to both primary and secondary literature in both Deutsch and English. As a nineteenth century military historian, I already know I'll be cracking this one open with great frequency in the future.
Comprehensive study on the Martial history of Imperial Germany, beginning with Von Clausewitz and ending with the 100 Days Allied offensive in the Western Front. It covers everything, from grand strategy and the related logistics, to small unit tactics and the experience of the average German soldier. It puts many of the more confusing aspects of German command in WWI into context and allows you to understand their decisions, in part due to the hard facts of their situation and also each individual's unique personality traits. I would recommend this to anyone with an interest in military history, especially if you're interested in Germany's storied past in military matters.
I can't, in good conscience, give a star rating to this book because I may not have been its intended audience. I believe this book was well researched and painstakingly crafted for academics of war, and I am merely a layperson with a somewhat strong interest in military history. I did learn a few things, but unfortunately most of the details did not lodge themselves securely in my brain.