From one of America’s leading scholars of Russia who served as U.S. ambassador to Russia during the Obama administration, a revelatory, inside account of U.S.-Russia relations from 1989 to the present
In 2008, when Michael McFaul was asked to leave his perch at Stanford and join an unlikely presidential campaign, he had no idea that he would find himself at the beating heart of one of today’s most contentious and consequential international relationships. As President Barack Obama’s adviser on Russian affairs, McFaul helped craft the United States’ policy known as “reset” that fostered new and unprecedented collaboration between the two countries. And then, as U.S. ambassador to Russia from 2012 to 2014, he had a front-row seat when this fleeting, hopeful moment crumbled with Vladimir Putin’s return to the presidency. This riveting inside account combines history and memoir to tell the full story of U.S.-Russia relations from the fall of the Soviet Union to the new rise of the hostile, paranoid Russian president. From the first days of McFaul’s ambassadorship, the Kremlin actively sought to discredit and undermine him, hassling him with tactics that included dispatching protesters to his front gates, slandering him on state media, and tightly surveilling him, his staff, and his family.
From Cold War to Hot Peace is an essential account of the most consequential global confrontation of our time.
”Putin and Putinism were not predetermined. Innate, structural forces did not produce Putin; Yeltsin selected Putin as his successor. The Russian people merely ratified Yeltsin’s choice. Putin did not rise to power through a groundswell of popular support for his leadership style or political program. He did not plot a path to the Kremlin over the course of decades. He had never participated as a candidate in an election until he ran for president in March 2000. He was simply in the right place at the right time.”
Boris Yeltsin had other choices. In fact, he had a wonderful choice of a successor in Boris Nemtsov, a man who reminded him of his own youthful enthusiasm. Nemtsov would have led Russia into embracing a more European identity and would have put the vestiges of the Soviet Union firmly in their past. By picking Vladimir Putin, he insured that Russia would look backwards to their past instead of forwards to their future.
I can remember when I first heard that this guy Putin was running for the Presidency of Russia. I thought to myself, who the hell is Putin?
So why did Yeltsin pivot away from Nemtsov and go with the more obscure Putin? What leverage did Putin have to be in this position at this particular moment in time? What did Yeltsin see when he looked into the flat, dead eyes of Vladimir Putin? Did Yeltsin know he was signing Nemtsov’s death warrant?
I first heard about Michael McFaul when he was asked to join President-elect Obama’s national security team in 2008. He was a bona fide Russian expert. He had spent a lot of time in Russia and decades teaching college students about Russia. When he started showing up on talk shows, I was impressed by his candor. He never sounded like a politician trying to score personal points or equivocating on what he believed. I liked his honest evaluation of history. Below is a great example.
”Reagan liked Gorbachev and Clinton liked Yeltsin not because these leaders shared American values or interests, but because these Russian leaders were weak. They did what we told them to do, because they had no other choice. They had no power to resist our hegemony: our expansion of NATO, bombing of Serbia, or invasion of Iraq. As Russia recovered from economic depression and the state collapse of the 1990s, the Kremlin acquired the means to push back.”
In that statement might also be a hint of why Yeltsin picked Putin. He might have been afraid that Russia was about to be swallowed politically and culturally by Europe. Russia was on the verge of becoming irrelevant in international affairs.
Really, if not for the fact that they have nuclear weapons, they would have been irrelevant a long time ago. Their GDP is not that impressive, and their government really doesn’t know how to get along very well with others. They lost their identity after the collapse of the Soviet Union and were struggling to find it again until Putin superimposed his idea of what his country was supposed to be on the whole of Russia.
Until the emergence of Putin, we were getting very close to guiding Russia towards being a Europeancentric government.
McFaul was the architect of the fabled RESET button. The idea was to forget the resentments of the past, let go of all the slights, real and imaginary, and begin again with a fresh slate. I scoffed at the idea. I thought Obama and his team were being naive. Putin could recite a long list of grievances with the US that stretches back well before he was born. He wasn’t going to let them go. He is a grudge holder, as we would soon see with Hillary Clinton in the 2016 elections. Of course, what I didn’t realize was that Putin was not technically in charge of Russia. Dmitry Medvedev had been elected President, and Putin was now in the secondary role of Prime Minister. It was hard for me to believe that Putin wasn’t still pulling the strings from the shadows.
Obama and Medvedev hit it off. Remember the cute Burger Summit when they went out for burgers together? We were making progress. Medvedev was not enamored with the past glories of the Soviet Union. He had his eye on taking Russia forward in a new direction. I was wrong. Maybe McFaul was onto something.
Then Putin decided after Medvedev’s one term in office that he wanted the Presidency back. Maybe he was tired of upchucking every time he saw Obama and Medvedev making kissy faces. What he wasn’t prepared for was that, with his announcement, there was rioting in the streets. The Russian people were not happy with his decision, and in his mind, it was the fault of Hillary Clinton, for some remarks she made, and the fault of the newly appointed Russian Ambassador...Michael McFaul.
Would Clinton love to have the power to influence the Russian people to riot against Putin? Hell yes! Does she? Hell no! But to a guy as paranoid and egotistical as Putin, these people could only be upset if they were manipulated by the evil empire to the west.
Needless to say, Putin made McFaul’s stay in Russia absolute hell, with a constant barrage of harassment against him, American personnel, and even the people who tried to visit him at Spaso House. There were nearly 500 instances of harassment against U.S. mission personnel from January to March of 2012. This is an unprecedented number. Did we retaliate by making things difficult for the American ambassador from Russia? We did not.
McFaul became the focus of a barrage of fake news, character assassinations, and sinister documentaries that portrayed him as a revolutionary rather than a friend of Russia. It was almost impossible to counter these negative attacks. McFaul did his best by starting a blog, sharing his life, and going on any news show that would have him to try and push back on some of this misinformation. ”I also tried to distinguish between our government’s disdain for authoritarian policies pursued by the Kremlin and my respect for the Russian people, culture, and history. The Kremlin hated that. As one person close to the Kremlin revealed to me, my obvious love for Russia and its people drove the Putin government nuts.”
So you will come away from this book believing that Putin is the only man standing between Russia and the US having a chance at lasting peace. Putin is the most destabilizing influence in international politics. He dreams of conquest and putting the old Soviet block back together. He wants to lower the Iron Curtain again. Russia is ready to move forward, but they will never do so until Putin is removed from power. Our problem isn’t Russia; it is Putin. How long will Russia have to wait? How long will we be caught in this Hot Peace?
McFaul had the distinction of being only the second American ambassador to be banned from Russia. He must have been doing something right.
I guess one doesn’t get to be ambassador to a nation important to our security concerns by being a shrinking violet. McFaul clearly is not that. Right from the start he admits that he sometimes mixed his academic concerns with activism. He thought the moment for the Russia’s transition to democracy was at hand, and he not only wanted to witness it, he wanted to midwife.
My biggest objection to this over-long memoir of McFaul’s time studying & serving as U.S. government apparatchik in Russia is that I didn’t learn anything. We hear beaucoup details of the results of McFaul’s tweets, meetings with dissidents, official meetings, but nothing stood out as new information. Except perhaps one thing.
I wasn’t aware that Putin appeared not to like the foreign policy side of his work running the government. While Medvedev was President of Russia (2008-2012), McFaul had a conversation with then-Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, who turned away any questions regarding foreign policy, referring them to Medvedev, while he appeared content to concern himself with military affairs, readiness, weaponry, etc. This could have just been Putin wisely not wanting to inadvertently wander outside his wheelhouse, compromising his stated role. Later he felt confident returning to role of president, and presumably still finds the foreign policy side difficult.
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is mentioned so seldom in McFaul’s memoir that this reader is curious. McFaul clearly felt he had the ear of President Obama…and didn’t waste time adding any layers to his reporting. He did speak later more effusively and extensively of John Kerry, who came after Secretary Clinton. It makes me think Kerry insisted upon being the intermediary between McFaul and Obama, as I would have done.
McFaul seems capable enough, but he is seriously loud when it comes to blowing his own horn. I am suspicious of anyone so sure of what another country should be doing politically. I’m afraid I agree that, within limits, we really shouldn’t interfere in other countries’ affairs. I don’t object to studying nascent movements of liberation and democratization, but I do have a problem with influencing the course of events in an overt way (or perhaps more importantly, in a covert way). No wonder Putin doesn't like him.
Of course McFaul should not be questioned by Putin & there is no moral equivalency with what McFaul did and what the Russian operatives did to influence our election. McFaul does give us examples of how the 'false news' narrative was happening in Russia a long time before it showed up in the U.S.--exactly the same kind of thing we are experiencing now with officials actually denying what they just said or did. Freaky. Who would have believed it? but it turns out to be effective.
I began reading this memoir but quickly realized I could not just sit there & handle the level of detail McFaul included. I switched to audio so that I could listen while working on other things (refinishing furniture, as it happens), and it was not the voice of the reader, L.J. Ganser, that made me peevish but the words that McFaul chose and the things he decided to tell us. I'm sure he is a perfectly nice person, but I'm also sure he would roll right over me.
Former Ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul has chosen a crucial moment in our relationship with Moscow to write his part memoir, narrative history, and analysis of what has transpired over the last twenty-five years between the United States and Russia. Today, it appears that relations between the two countries deteriorates each day as Russian President Vladimir Putin pursues his agenda, and President Donald Trump does nothing about Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election. However, McFaul argues in his new book, FROM COLD WAR TO HOT PEACE that by 2010 it appeared that American-Russian relations were improving as Presidents Barack Obama and Dimitri Medvedev had reached an important accord dealing with the reduction of nuclear weapons. This optimism came to a quick close as Putin returned to the presidency after four years as Prime Minister. The question must be raised – why did relations between Russia and the United States reach the depths of the Cold War seemingly overnight?
According to McFaul, the answer seems to lie in the reassertion of Russian power fostered by a new ideological conflict with the United States, one in which Putin’s autocratic government, “champions a new set of populist, nationalist, and conservative ideas antithetical to the liberal, international order anchored by the United States.” This order is in decline as Russian military, economic, cyber, and informational capabilities have expanded. Proxy wars in the Ukraine and Syria, and Russia’s audacious intervention into the 2016 election have created a situation that is not as dangerous as the worst moments of the Cold War, but certainly just as tense or more so. In trying to explain this massive shift in US-Russian relations, McFaul is uniquely qualified to provide insights. McFaul is a scholar of Russian history at Stanford University, in the past he worked with NGO’s that tried to create democratic institutions in Russia, he was a member of Obama’s National Security Staff, and finally was Ambassador to Russia. McFaul’s unparalleled knowledge and experience provide the background for his important new book.
McFaul provides insights from his early career as he worked as a “community organizer” in Russia for the National Democratic Institute, an American democracy promoting institution that assisted Democratic elements in Russia going back to 1991, to his later career as Ambassador to Russia. In between he offers an intimate portrait of the attempted evolution of Russian autocracy toward democracy, the ins and outs of developing national security policy, and the intrusive nature of being an American ambassador in Russia. Along the way McFaul examines his personal life, how his career impacted his family, and how they adapted to constant lifestyle changes. His portrait is a combination of his own world view, the theoretical approach of an academic, and the bureaucratic world of diplomacy. He conveniently offers the reader an escape hatch, stating the book is written in such a way that if certain parts become boring, he suggests that one could skip certain sections and not lose the continuity of the narrative.
McFaul offers a series of meaningful observations throughout the book. For example, as the democracy movement took hold in Russia in 1991 under Boris Yeltsin, the Bush administration supported the more conservative Gorbachev. Gorbachev would allow the Berlin Wall to come down, withdraw Soviet troops from Afghanistan, allowed the reunification of Germany, and did not oppose Operation Desert Storm against Iraq. Despite this, Yeltsin garnered 60% of the popular vote, and Gorbachev position become mostly honorific. Another example is McFaul’s belief that the KGB was adamant that his work with the democracy NGO was a front for the CIA and helps explain Putin’s hatred of McFaul almost twenty years later. Further, McFaul argues that the United States did not do enough to assist the Russian economy in 1993 and by not doing so contributed to the economic collapse which was then blamed on Russian proponents of democracy.
Once the Obama administration took office in 2009 McFaul oversaw the new policy of a “reset” with Russia as a means of improving US security and economic objectives. With President Medvedev in power strides were made, but even as progress occurred everyone was aware that Putin was still the “power behind the Russian throne.” Throughout the book, no matter how intense the material becomes, McFaul does attempt to lighten the mood with humor and how his family was faring. McFaul describes the almost tortuous detail that went into the preparation of American foreign policy, an approach that does not contrast well with President Trump’s “fly by the seat of his pants” approach. Obama’s goal was to cooperate with Russia on issues of mutual interest, without downplaying our differences, a fine line to walk particularly after Russia invaded Georgia.
McFaul was always “in the room where it happened” in all the meetings between Obama and Medvedev, and later with Putin. He was the “note taker” – the memorandum of conversation in all meetings and is a prime source that witnessed the collapse in relations. Once Putin resumed the Presidency the contempt between him and Obama was readily apparent. After Obama’s first meeting with Putin it was quite clear the “reset” with Russia was at an end. Despite the downturn in relations Putin did go along with sanctions against Iran and UN action against Kaddafi in Libya. But this cooperation was short lived when Kaddafi was captured and executed. According to McFaul, the overthrow of Kaddafi was too much for Putin who argued he supported UN action to save the people of Benghazi, not regime change.
Perhaps McFaul’s most important chapter is “Putin Needs an Enemy-America, Obama, and Me.” The chapter offers the underpinning of Putin’s disdain for McFaul and the United States in general under Obama. This disdain would foster Russian actions during the 2016 presidential election as Putin hoped to elect Donald Trump who would then alleviate Obama’s economic sanctions against Russia. Putin’s hatred of McFaul was unprecedented in that it led to overt harassment, sometimes becoming physical, a media campaign against him personally to disparage everything about him including his sexuality, and being followed and spied upon constantly. McFaul’s overall theme rests on the idea that American policymakers hoped that Putin’s anti-Americanism would recede after the 2012 Russian elections. Surprisingly it did not as there was a strategic shift in the Kremlin’s orientation. It was launched in response to Obama’s actions, his belief that Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was responsible for demonstrations against his rule, but more importantly, to increase his personal popularity as a means of weakening his western oriented opponents.
For Putin, the United States was an enemy, not a partner, he saw Washington as a promotor of regime change everywhere, including Russia, and he blamed the United States for everything bad in the US and Russia. McFaul’s insights seem dead on as we watch Putin’s support for Bashir Assad in Syria, and the regime in Teheran. For Putin any regime change of an autocratic leader is a direct threat to him. The United States continued to try and maintain some semblance of the “reset” as McFaul recounts, but this policy was doomed because of Putin’s hardened attitude.
McFaul spends a great deal of time on the Syrian quagmire that rages on to this day. McFaul criticizes the Obama administration for not pushing harder for Assad’s ouster in 2011. We could have armed the moderate opposition in a serious way just as soon as the political standoff turned violent. Obama’s refusal to enforce the red line over chemical weapons made the US look weak and the president allowed himself to be played by Putin who supposedly got Assad to get rid of 98% of his chemical weapons. We seemed to have overestimated Putin’s influence over Assad, however, for Moscow, Chechnya was the model where Putin supported Ramzan Kadyrov’s brutal tactics in order to remain in power. We continue to witness this approach in Syria on a daily basis.
According to McFaul, thirty years of improved Russian-American relations ended in 2010 in part because of balance of power politics, American actions, some of which were in error, and Russia’s inability to consolidate democracy, integrate itself into the west, and reorient its own domestic politics. No matter the cause of the end of the “reset,” we must deal with the offshoot of that policy in the Ukraine, Syria, and Russian-Iranian relations. McFaul left Moscow with a feeling of incompleteness as his life’s goal of improving relations had to be put on hold, and it interesting that McFaul left Russia at the same time Putin annexed Crimea and moved into eastern Ukraine.
McFaul’s monograph is an important contribution to the plethora of material that has tried to explain US-Russian relations over the past three decades. McFaul’s approach is clear, scholarly, and personal and should answer the questions surrounding the down turn in US-Russian relations that began in 2010, and the implications of the Trump presidency as we try and cope with Putin’s continued aggressiveness against American domestic and foreign interests.
You won't need me for a summary of this book. Goodreads provides a sufficient overview of its basic contents. Instead, I'll give my general thoughts.
For someone like myself (whoever that might be), I find this memoir invaluable. Even though I work as office staff in a political science department at a university, my main interest in taking on more reading of political material of late has much more to do with just being an average citizen. Feeling very confused about what the hell has been happening in our country, I set out to read up on the different avenues that might help me get a better grasp of why we are where we are.
You can see from my recent reading list that I've wanted to look at things from various different angles - from material about Trump to the Koch Brothers to the American people themselves, etc. Collectively, it's been an eye-opening and often gut-wrenching experience.
Like everything else I've read, 'From Cold War to Hot Peace' is a very specific angle: this time, the viewpoint of an American ambassador. That's what takes up the second half - the more 'dramatic' part - of this book. The first half details McFaul's job as foreign relations expert (on Russia) for Obama's administration. I'm not taking anything away from the first half in saying that, overall, it's a more academic read than the second half; it would be a sorry thing if the worth of material were to rest with its dramatic potential. But - for me, anyway - the first half was a tougher read: it covers a lot of negotiation processes and it takes in a lot of people in a wide range of capacities. It's a lot to absorb.
Its lynchpin, however, is what keeps the first half fascinating. Before McFaul became ambassador Putin was not president; Medvedev was - and, even though Medvedev's presence and actions were more cosmetic (ultimately Putin still pulled the strings), we begin to see real hope that a 'reset' being orchestrated largely by Obama and McFaul will grow to fruition.
But that doesn't happen. An election takes place around the time that McFaul is elevated to ambassador - and, from that time on (the book's second half), a sort of hell (the 'hot peace') begins.
One of the major strengths of McFaul's book is his representation of personalities. He views people (especially the main players during his tenure as ambassador) with seemingly accurate and incisive fairness. His observations are wonderfully in-depth. I learned a lot more about Obama (and the struggles of diplomacy in general) from reading this book - and I certainly learned a whole lot more about Putin. (In Bill Browder's book 'Red Notice', we mainly learn that Putin wants to kill Browder but he's portrayed as a shadow figure - here, we get a particularly vivid and detailed portrait of Putin's character and his ways of operating. None of it is pretty and all of it is instructive. The man is insane... at the very least, a paranoid and insecure wreck who systematically destabilizes in labyrinthine ways.)
McFaul takes us from his college days as an idealist through to the days Americans (and the world) are currently facing with Trump and Putin dominating the political landscape. Throughout, McFaul remains pragmatic (as much as is humanly possible) - and he ends his book on a hopeful message. He believes we will make it through these dark days, that we will survive both Trump and Putin.
I like being given hope; I like having it. I appreciate McFaul's effort here in suggesting (and encouraging) that we maintain it.
This is a great perspective on U.S. interest/involvement in Russian democracy. Chronicles individual Americans' role in the fall of the Soviet Union/brief flirtation with Russian democracy and the authoritarian rise of Putin. Spotlights the failure of the United States in funding a peace in Russia by supporting its economic reforms after the end of the Cold War. A mistake that has had long term consequences. An evaluation of our Russian foreign policy is very important considering what has happened in the past few years and this American perspective is strongly recommended.
Disclaimer: I am a Stanford University alumnus and have heard Ambassador McFaul speak as a panelist with other Hoover Institution stalwarts like Larry Diamond, Francis Fukuyama and James Mattis on several occasions . McFaul writes fondly about his undergraduate days and teaching career in Palo Alto - a sentiment which admittedly resounds favourably with me. Nevertheless, I will attempt to compose an objective, unbiased review.
It is tempting to question McFaul's qualifications as Ambassador to Russia. Although he had studied Russia, previously lived there for several years and spoke the language, he admits he is not a career diplomat. A scholar, political appointee, and Obama supporter - yes, but when he agreed to move into Spaso House in Moscow, he had to learn his foreign service chops by the seat of his pants. So if you want diplomatic treatise full of foreign policy jargon with citations of statutes and protocols, this is not your book. You can read massive volumes like "Present at the Creation" by Dean Acheson, George Schultz's "Turmoil and Triumph" or anything by Henry Kissinger. If you get through these books and get inspired to take up bodybuilding, you can use the books in place of dumbbells. They are massive, heavy reads..
Not to say "From Cold War to Hot Pace" is concise. It is a rambling first person account but his digressions are quite informative and entertaining. McFaul talks about his youth in Montana, his undergraduate years, his fascination with Russia, his meetings with the candidate and soon to be President Obama and his intermural skirmishes with the State Department, NSA and Defense over policy. There is plenty of casual name-dropping, political legerdemain and skirmishing with the likes of Soviet Presidents Medvedev and Putin and Foreign Minister Lavrov.
Where a few other Goodreads reviewers have accused the Ambassador of narcissism and self-promotion, this reviewer sees a candid tell-all that does an outstanding job summarizing the challenges and futilities of U.S. Russia Post World War II foreign policy. As the primary architect of the Reset policy towards Russia, McFaul provides a detailed account of the promises and early wins during President Medvedev's tenure -- START, arms control, fair trade and counterintelligence. This contrasts sharply with the disappointments and setbacks after the ascension of Vladimir Putin. MacFaul accepts responsibility for some of the losses but argues that Putin has reverted to a more nationalistic, autocratic, and anti-populist stance that demonizes America and aspires to rebuild the Russian Empire so carelessly abandoned by Gorbachev and Yeltsin.
His take on Putin and early predictions were validated repeatedly. The Reset got rusty. Medvedev was banished into obscurity and the siloviki (old KGB stalwarts) took over.
McFaul puts his political orientation and predilections out there. Admittedly, he is a huge Obama fan and bestows glowing accounts of the latter's decisions and oratory. Despite this bias, McFaul comes across as someone with strong convictions and visions. He wanted to make a difference in US policy during his stint as Ambassador. His descriptions of the majestic Spaso House, the luxuries of chauffers and Moscow night life suggest that he could have easily spent his tenure living it up. Instead, he pursued a bold agenda and drew the wrath of his Russian hosts.
This book offers plenty of Deep State intrigue and cases of outright betrayal but the author makes a sincere effort to state the Russian case (as odious as it might seem). Yes, Putin went into Georgia, Ukraine and Crimea but didn't the US circumvent the UN and go rogue on Iraq, Egypt and Libya? (not that anyone agrees with this but according to McFaul, this is the Putin Line). McFaul's history of the conflict between both superpowers over Syria and the fate of Assad alone makes the book worth reading.
Distinguishing this book from the memoir of another American diplomat and Stanford colleague - "No Higher Honor" by Condoleeza Rice, McFaul is more open to compromise and confessional about his own failures. Condi squares off against the likes of Rumsfeld and Cheney and threatens to resign. McFaul seems more adaptible and capable of forging consensus.
It is this personal touch that makes the book so readable - how he balanced his career aspirations with the challenge of raising his family away from home first in Washington D. C. and later in Moscow; the ad hominem attacks on his reputation and character from Russian apparatchiks and political opponents; the intramural competition to sit in important meetings and influence policy and the ordeal of engaging with less than trustworthy counterparts. He drills down into the minutiae - slamming vodka shots, eating lousy food in Russan restaurants, the multiple delays and inconveniences imposed by Russian officials (including Putin's aggravating habit of being late to meetings), and the latter's efforts to reign in this dangerous fluent Russian speaker who he was convinced had a plan to overthrow the Kremlin. The Russians' monitoring and harassment of McFaul extended to his family and staff. It is no surprise he became an official enemy of the State and had his future travel to Russia restricted. Without spoiling the experience of reading this book, it does offer a compelling portrait of Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin as one very paranoid, power-hungry autocrat with a very clear agenda. McFaul has joined the exclusive club of Soviet critics - Gary Kasparov, Bill Browder- who have riled Putin so much that expulsions, travel bans and red notices are sought.
The final chapter leaves readers with the chilling observation that Comrade Putin's influence is far from over particularly in the Age of Trump. If you want a realistic take on modern Russian politics and diplomacy, look no further.
тут тримається потужний саспенс на запитанні «хтось йому скаже чи до нього дійде?». автор свято переконаний, що в Росії можлива демократія, громадянське суспільство та свобода слова, і от розповідає, як намагався їм посприяти, будучи послом США за часів Обами (і Мєдвєдєва/Путіна в Росії).
але книжка корисна, щоби зрозуміти середньостатистичне закордонне «та треба просто поговорити і все пройде», яке розбивається об безліч порушених Росією перемовин і угод, але дивом далі стоїть. витвережує.
This is a long hard slog on what should be a very interesting topic - the decline of Russian/US relations under the rise of the new autocratic Vladimir Putin. All the elements are there from an author who was there when the Soviet Union broke up and who eventually would becomes Obama's policy advisor on Russia and his Ambassador. Where it goes wrong is narrative. It is all over the place. Chapters are not chronological and material flows between them instead of presenting coherent material. It is a badly edited nightmare that is also boring to read. The epilogue is when the writing brightens up and you get some action in discussing Putin's role in the election of Trump.
For the rest of the book I found it hard to care and also inherently clear why Putin is so successful and the US is a mess. If McFaul is the expert then there is no chance. He spends all his time thinking at the wrong level. He thinks that events unfold around Putin and that Putin responds and that is how the relationship evolves. All of his prose is about events and there is not enough focus on the man who lies at their centre. This is naive stupidity. You are ignoring the Putin shaped elephant in the room.
Putin ALWAYS has a goal in mind and that is his nationalistic defence of Russia and his attempts to restore its power to that of the Soviet Union. That is his reason for existence. If he is being nice to you and playing weak and compromising it is because it serves that purpose at that time and with the opportunities he has, but the second his hand is stronger he is going to reveal his real intentions and you will see the real Putin.
McFaul thought that the thawing of relations in the reset was a natural part of the development of Russian democracy as Medvedev rose and Putin fell back and that is the core mistake of the book. Putin is a ruthless, Machiavellian and Lavrov is his henchman. Anyone thinking that you can ever reason with him and that you can persuade him to do something he doesn't want to do is deluded. All through the book it is clear how Putin was building up his hand ready to play the US. In Syria and the Ukraine he built a situation that was a lose-lose for the Americans and they didn't even see the trap coming.
Putin is the new Bismark intent of destroying the International Systems founded after World War II, the same way as Bismark destroyed the Congress of Vienna that maintained European peace after Napolean. In the end a new international system will arise and the autocratic Putin will fall but I rather suspect, like the author that it will be through natural processes and old age and definitely not through US foreign policy.
Well, he certainly has a lot to say. The book is written in a fairly engaging style and was a pleasant read. I think my main gripe with this book is with the author rather than with the book itself. However, the whole text is so laced with his value judgements and voice that that represents a big problem with the book as well.
I also noticed another review complained about how frequently he talks about "writing a memo" or "sending an email expressing his view" but not about actually working to implement these views. I have to agree with that, but I think it might be more a function of his job than anything else. This book could have easily cut out 200 pages or so, though. He really is not as important as he thinks he is. If you're reading this book to see "An American Ambassador in Putin's Russia" as the cover promises, you will be disappointed. If you want to learn about McFaul, the Obama-Clinton (and co.) understanding of Russia more generally, or the goals of and motivation behind the Reset policy, this book is probably good for you. But you probably should just read the chapters of interest rather than wasting your time with the whole thing.
This is a hard book for me to review. It is well written, albeit it somewhat overly chatty at times (for my tastes), and I confess to skimming quite a bit of the first half where the author discusses his younger back-history and how his life led him to Russia and eventually into Obama's administration and ambassador to Russia. It took quite a while to get to that point, and my main interest in reading this was learning more about Putin and Russia under Putin. By the time the book got to Russia's Putin, my mind was a bit wearied from all that came before and...well...fast changing events in this new world of ours sent my interest elsewhere.
I bought this book originally because at the time of its publication, Vladimir Putin had just suggested that Trump send McFaul over to Russia to be interrogated and Trump didn't immediately denounce this outrageous and frightening idea. I thought buying the book would be a good way to express solidarity with McFaul, but I didn't necessarily think I'd read a lot of it. I did read it through, though. It held my interest because McFaul writes from a unique viewpoint, having worked both in Washington DC as Obama's Russia expert, and then going on to become the U.S. ambassador to Russia. He worked with both the more moderate Medvedev and the autocratic Putin in their positions as Russian president. I have rarely been given such a clear glimpse into the way people inside government think about issues and how many factors come into play in trying to steer the right course, not always successfully.
McFaul was Ambassador to Russia during the Obama Administration. Mostly with Secretary Hillary Clinton. He left shortly after John Kerry began. McFaul was dedicated to Russian democracy and was chosen for the “reset” era. While trying to jump start Russian democracy by appealing to the Russian people and proposing American values. Putin ended up playing hardball with the tactics and Maginsky, Snowden and Crimea. When Obama backed down after saying that American fire power would be used if Assad in Syria used chemical weapons. Hate over Clinton and concerned over a stronger NATO upset Putin. McFaul also discusses Trump’s relationship with Putin in and afterward.
A VERY biased opinion by a former community organizer appointed Ambassador to Russia during the Obama administration. It definitely turned me off ... I was looking for more straight facts, not his political viewpoint.
(The English review is placed beneath the Russian one)
Когда нацисты хватали коммунистов, я молчал: я не был коммунистом. Когда они сажали социал-демократов, я молчал: я не был социал-демократом. Когда они хватали членов профсоюза, я молчал: я не был членом профсоюза. Когда они пришли за мной — заступиться за меня было уже некому.
Не смотря на то, что я полностью разделяю взгляд автора на Путина и всю его клику, а также его взгляд на трансформацию России в клептократическое государство под руководством коррумпированного вождя, я не могу сказать, что книга была мне интересна. Возможно, причиной является, помимо прочего, что большинство оценок в отношении путинской России, для меня не является чем-то новым и неожиданным (в отличие от тех же американцев, которые определённо не следят за новостями, поступающими из России через оппозиционные СМИ). Я хочу сказать, что те, кто регулярно смотрели ролики сделанные командой Навального или кто смотрел различные интервью на YouTube канале Фейгин Live, давно в курсе той ситуации в России, которую обрисовывает автор. Однако с другой стороны, многим книгам, которые фактически пишут о том же, как например «Несовременная страна. Россия в мире XXI века» и «Контрреволюция: Как строилась вертикаль власти в современной России и как это влияет на экономику», я поставил высшую оценку. Так почему? Дело в том, что книга From Cold War to Hot Peace написана довольно бюрократическим языком, а если быть точнее, автор очень много пишет о тех или иных совещаниях, на которых он присутствовал, будучи сотрудником администрации Обамы. Вот это читать было невероятно скучно, ибо все эти бюрократические трения меня не интересовали и не интересуют совсем. Кто там что сказал, на встречи Обамы с Медведевым, меня тоже как-то не очень интересует, ибо конечный результат был виден даже тогда, когда сохранялась иллюзия президента Медведева, как якобы реально независимого от ОПГ «Озеро», игрока. Однако в России уже тогда для многих была очевидна вся эта игра с фальшивым президентом Медведевым. Ну да, некоторые шаги были предприняты определённо им самим, но в целом ситуация не менялась и что самое главное, не могла измениться, ибо это была монолитная система выстроенная Путиным, что означает, что все надежды на улучшение отношений с западным миром и в особенности с США, т.е. та самая перезагрузка, были изначально созданы в Кремле чтобы запутать американцев. Лично я думаю, это был кремлёвский фейк, цель которого, получить максимальное количество уступок от американцев, в свою очередь не сделав ни одной существенной в ответ. Так что причитания господина Michael McFaul довольно наивны. Странно было не увидеть, что уже тогда Россия представляла полностью ��формировавшуюся диктатуру на подобие африканских диктатур. В итоге, все эти описания автором, как он пытался запустить перезагрузку с Россией и «как жаль, что этого не случилось», кажутся мне крайне странными от человека который позиционирует себя в качестве эксперта по России, ибо настоящий эксперт должен был видеть уже тогда с какой страной он имеет дело, т.е. во что превратилась Россия за время правления Путина.
Однако в книге есть и очень интересные моменты. Мне было интересно читать историю того, что происходило с автором в России, пока он был послом США. Это было довольно забавно, особенно его опыт общения с русскими через социальные сети. Но тут есть одна проблема: социальными сетями пользовались тогда либо хорошо образованные люди, которые часто являются западниками либо оплаченные кремлём тролли. Я хочу сказать, что господин Michael McFaul общался в большинстве случаев не с типичным гражданином России, а с очень особой категорией. Поэтому трудно сказать, насколько господин посол понял «глубинный народ», ибо даже мне, живущему в Москве, трудно заявить, что я понимаю, что думает «глубинный народ» в России. Были ли шансы у автора этой книги познакомиться со всем спектром мнений в отношении США в России? Я так не думаю, ибо как пишет автор, Кремль делал всё возможное для того, чтобы превратить пребывание Michael McFaul в настоящий ад. И как мне кажется, ему это удалось. Однако что автор не упомянул и что логически вытекает от подобной политики Кремля в отношении высокопоставленного чиновника США, так это то, что это типичная поведение подворотни, можно сказать, питерской подворотни, бандитов, в отношении интеллигента. Однако это уже для многих россиян не является новостью. А вот то, что автор не сказал об этом в своей книге, что он не осмелился назвать бандита бандитом, говорит не в пользу автора. В конце концов, и американцам стоит понять, ЧТО за люди стояли у руля власти в России.
First they came for the Socialists, and I did not speak out - Because I was not a Socialist. Then they came for the Trade Unionists, and I did not speak out - Because I was not a Trade Unionist. Then they came for the Jews, and I did not speak out - Because I was not a Jew. Then they came for me - and there was no one left to speak for me.
Although I share the author's view of Putin and his entire clique, as well as his view of the transformation of Russia into a kleptocratic state under a corrupt leader, I cannot say that I found the book interesting. Perhaps the reason is, among other things, that most of the assessments regarding Putin's Russia are nothing new and unexpected to me (unlike those same Americans who certainly do not follow the news coming out of Russia through the opposition media). My point is that those who have regularly watched the videos made by Navalny's team, or who have watched the various interviews on Feigin Live's YouTube channel, have long been aware of the situation in Russia that the author outlines. But on the other hand, many books that actually say the same thing, like "Putin's Counterrevolution" and "Putin's Kleptocracy: Who Owns Russia?", received the highest rating. So why? The thing is that From Cold War to Hot Peace is written in a rather bureaucratic language, or to be more precise, the author writes a lot about various meetings he attended when he was in the Obama administration. This was incredibly boring to read because all this bureaucratic back-and-forth didn't interest me and doesn't interest me at all. Who said what there at the meetings between Obama and Medvedev doesn't interest me much either because the end result was visible even back then when the illusion of President Medvedev as an allegedly independent player from the Ozero organized crime group was upheld. But the whole game with the fake President Medvedev was already obvious to many people in Russia at the time. Well, yes, some steps were definitely taken by him, but, in general, the situation did not change and, most importantly, could not change because it was a monolithic system built by Putin, which means that all hopes of improving relations with the Western world and especially with the United States, i.e., the reset, were originally created in the Kremlin to confuse the Americans. Personally, I think it was a Kremlin fake, designed to get as many concessions as possible from the Americans, in turn not making any significant ones in return. So Mr. Michael McFaul's lamentations are rather naive. It was strange not to see that even then Russia represented a fully formed dictatorship in the likeness of African dictatorships. In the end, all these descriptions by the author about how he tried to launch the reset with Russia and "what a pity it didn't happen" seem to me extremely strange from a man who positions himself as an expert on Russia, for a real expert should have seen already then what country he was dealing with, i.e. what Russia has turned into during Putin's rule.
However, there are some very interesting points in the book. I found it interesting to read the story of what happened to the author in Russia while he was the U.S. ambassador. It was quite funny, especially his experience with the Russians through social media. But here's the problem: Social media was either used by well-educated people back then, who were often Westerners, or by trolls paid by the Kremlin. My point is that Mr. Michael McFaul was not communicating with a typical Russian citizen in most cases, but with a very special category. Therefore, it is difficult to say how much Mr. Ambassador understood the common people, for even I, who lives in Moscow, find it difficult to claim that I understand what the common people in Russia think. Did the author of this book have a chance to become acquainted with the full range of opinions regarding the United States in Russia? I don't think so, for as the author writes, the Kremlin did everything it could to make Michael McFaul's stay a living hell. And as it seems to me, he succeeded. However, what the author didn't mention, and what logically follows from such a policy of the Kremlin towards a high-ranking US official, is that this is typical behavior of street gangsters, you might say, St. Petersburg street gangsters, towards an intellectual. However, this is no longer news to many Russians. But the fact that the author did not say so in his book, that he did not dare to call a bandit a bandit, does not speak in favor of the author. After all, Americans should also understand WHAT kind of people stood at the helm of power in Russia.
My motivation for reading this book was the fact that I've seen Michael McFaul as a guest commentator on MSNBC numerous times, & have been impressed by his articulate & wise observations about the Russian influence on Trump & his campaign, etc. McFaul is a superb intellectual, extremely knowledgable, both book-wise & experience-wise, about Russia. He writes well, & his humanness & humor show. As an academic lured into U.S. government service for 5 years in the Obama administration, he has more than paid his dues, both in the work he has done & in the humiliation & mean-spiritedness which many, especially Putin & even some U.S. government officials, have inflicted upon him. It's obvious that he's delighted to be back in the classroom at Stanford, but also that he's truly disappointed & anguished over the fact that, as he says, he's a "persona non grata" in Russia, banned from traveling there, thanks to autocrat Vladimir Putin, and that the things he worked so hard for have been destroyed by Putin.
I was impressed with McFaul's scholarly presentation about decades of struggle between Russia & the U.S., but equally so about his passionate interest, from a very early age, in finding a way to be part of the effort to get the two countries at least to speak to each other, with a hope of going beyond that to some form of cooperation. McFaul was the brains behind the so-called "Reset" while Obama & Dmitry Medvedev were in office. A great deal was accomplished to fulfill some of McFaul's, and Obama's, dreams. There's a whole past history leading up to that time, too detailed to even mention here. McFaul gives a good summary of how that history unfolded, down to the time he had to leave Russia in 2014. It really is essential in understanding how the U.S. got to where it is today. He offers, at the end of the book, his understanding of where the two countries stand, vis à vis each other, but he also includes some interesting observations about these past two years of the "Trump era" & Trump's & the country's relationship with Putin. One thing he leaves no doubt about: Trump has no real comprehension of the way Putin truly views him, namely, as a "loser" & as a pawn whom Putin continues to use in order to degrade the democracy of our country. McFaul does this in an impressively restrained way.
McFaul also says that he had to be prodded a bit by his editors to use the "I" word more in this book. He apparently took the hint, because he uses it a lot! -- not that most of it isn't deserved. He really has contributed much more to the relationship of the two countries than many, perhaps most, people give him credit for. Nevertheless, he sometimes comes across as desperately needing to make sure that the reader knows & acknowledges what he's accomplished. The other thing is that, despite the reality that he is a scholar, sometimes he goes overboard on that to the point of confusion, and sometimes, I felt to the point of repetitiveness.
Nevertheless, this is a long, but good read, and for me at least, it helps me understand the current situation so much better.
McFaul's remarkable book is a combination of firsthand world history and autobiography. Surely no one is better informed regarding the realities of what have happened in the domain of US-Russian relations from pre-Gorbachev to the current day than Michael McFaul. Not that I'm that much of an expert myself to judge anyone else qualified. It's one of those things where if there were another contender, the general populace would know who that is.
The book is unusual for its first person narrative -- justified because Michael McFaul has been involved in what has happened between the two nations at the top levels: as a student living in Moscow at the time the Soviet Union broke up, as a prolific Stanford scholar, and as a prominent Obama team member, including his time in Moscow as the US ambassador to Russia.
My expressions of own views regarding what has gone on are necessarily constrained by my personal stance of neutrality regarding political affairs -- neutrality in the same sense that a few central European countries maintained during World War II even though bedlam and threats had erupted all around them. But the facts are there for all to see, and are well presented and documented in this thoroughly engaging book on a subject that is not within my usual scope of interest.
On that point I'll add that my interest was piqued to some degree by the fact that the author is the nephew of one of my oldest friends, a former close colleague I've known since we were teenagers. This friend alerted me to the reputation of his esteemed nephew (then as a Stanford scholar) a number of years ago. Therefore I knew well who he was when he was appointed to be an ambassador, whereas most people except those who follow political affairs quite closely had never heard of him. Now he appears in the news almost daily.
I highly recommend this book to anyone looking for a truly unique perspective into modern US-Russia relations. Michael McFaul is not only one of the leading academics on Russia and the former Soviet Union but also served on the NSC and then as the US-ambassador to Russia. The most apt comparison for McFaul (and one that McFaul tacitly hints at a few times throughout the book) is George Kenan, another man a greatly admire. Hearing about McFaul's experiences with Russia from his times as an undergrad, a PhD student, a professor, and then eventually as a presidential advisor and political appointee is truly riveting. His insights on major players like Putin, Medvedev, Lavrov, Nemtsov, etc as well as key events (namely Arab Spring, Syrian civil war, and Crimea) have left an impact on me and my opinions. I have read many of Ambassador McFaul's books and academic articles, but this was undoubtedly my favorite. I also suggest not skipping the epilogue at the end about Trump + Russia--it is also interesting and takes on a unique and thoughtful perspective.
This is a strange book to read c. six years after it came out and following the Salisbury attack, invasion of Ukraine, murder of Navalny etc. It’s one part a fairly standard political biography which focusses on McFaul’s time in government under Obama and what Russia policy 2009-14 involved. Unsurprisingly his conclusion is that early optimism about the Reset was justified and that the Reset paid dividends before Putin returned to power.
The more interesting bit is that he ends the book very explicitly being optimistic - even post-Crimean invasion - about Russia’s trajectory over the next 50 years, based largely on a combination of academic evidence about societies being more open as they grow richer and the fact that even now, Russia has improved over the last 50. He may be right, albeit it’s not where the view of Russia in 2024 is. But it’s been a while since I read anything that is basically infused with Obama-era optimism and it felt quite strange remembering just how different it felt from wheee things are today.
Ambassador McFaul’s memoir is intelligent and engrossing. He provides us with his decades of knowledge and experience as an academic in Russian history, politics and affairs, shared his wisdom in the Obama White House, and Obama’s Ambassador to Russia in Moscow. He reads and speaks fluent Russian. His interest and love of Russian began in high school in Montana in 1979. He began studying in Russia in college in the 80’s. His book is well-written and lucid, charting the course of his experience in pushing for democratization in autocratic regimes, applying that in his academic articles, books, and then his White House memos , policy papers, and presidential briefings, and then in his engagements with Russian leaders optimistically working from the “reset” he authored during the first year of the Obama administration. McFaul is smart and honest with himself and, I think, with the reader, with the accomplishments during his time in the Obama administration, it’s setbacks, particularly when Putin became President, and when accepting that it was time to go home. This is an interesting and fulfilling book. I hardily recommend it especially for those interested in political science, diplomacy, Russian relations, and 20th century history. I read it because of my interest in Russian history in the 20th century and recent U.S. - Russian relations. This book fulfilled my goal.
McFaul discusses civil society and Putin in modern Russia. Another great book describing this is:
Masha Gessen, THE FUTURE IS HISTORY:HOW TOTALITARIANISM RECLAIMED RUSSIA
An excellent, in-depth, insightful journey through the past few decades of American-Russian interaction by a man, academic and Russophile, who had a front seat for events from glasnost to Reset and beyond. I highly recommend this blend of memoir, history, and political science narrative to anyone seeking to understand current events and what has led our two countries to our current Hot Peace.
(I also recommend following former ambassador McFaul on social media, where he is always humorous and insightful.)
25. Or it could be titled “Everything you might want to know about Russia but were afraid to ask”. When the Berlin Wall fell I had high hopes that the Soviet Union as it separated into the individual countries would all become democracies, how little I understand about how difficult that would be. The author was in the midst of it all and why things didn't turn out quite as was hoped. This work is his account of what happened... the rise of Putin, the Oligarchs and so much more. I thought it explained a good deal and unfortunately Putin cannot and should not be trusted. Highly recommend reading.
I was searching for a book that could educate me on the history of US / Russian relations and this caught my eye. Not only does it provide a great lesson on this history, but it gives a fantastic insider view of how American policy towards Russia was shaped in the modern era. Ambassador McFaul particularly provides a thoroughly documented account of Putin's rise, consolidation of power, and ground work for the current crisis in Ukraine.
Направду один з небагатьох фахівців США у справах московії. Колишній посол США в Московії доволі чітко бачить натуру президента рф і загалом пояснює відносини двох країн за останні тридцять років. Відносини, які мають глобальне значення і водночас відчувається сум автора книга щодо не завжди сильної позиції його країни, що призводило до поганих наслідків. Один з них ми вже відчуваємо майже 10 років.
Excellent historical perspective from Gorbachov up until now. Definitely helped me understand our relationship with Russia more clearly. Also, very impressed with the never ending, hard working attempts to engage with Russia diplomatically in efforts to spread democracy globally.
Excellent reference and background information on the US relationship with Russia. Michael McFaul’s experience and perspective make him a national treasure.
I wanted to read this book as I’ve been feeling torn from international affairs by constant coverage by media of COVID and our presidential election, Trump’s continued antics, and seemingly little else. I was looking for insight into why & what Putin is as I admit 7 to 10 years ago I was focused on my professional life and an overwhelming opportunity at that time. The book gave me what I was after and more. I appreciate Ambassador McFaul’s perspective and service.