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What Is Russia Up To in the Middle East?
The eyes of the world are on the Middle East. Today, more than ever, this deeply-troubled region is the focus of power games between major global players vying for international influence. Absent from this scene for the past quarter century, Russia is now back with gusto. Yet its motivations, decision-making processes and strategic objectives remain hard to pin down.
So just what is Russia up to in the Middle East? In this hard-hitting essay, leading analyst of Russian affairs Dmitri Trenin cuts through the hyperbole to offer a clear and nuanced analysis of Russia's involvement in the Middle East and its regional and global ramifications. Russia, he argues, cannot and will not supplant the U.S. as the leading external power in the region, but its actions are accelerating changes which will fundamentally remake the international system in the next two decades.
So just what is Russia up to in the Middle East? In this hard-hitting essay, leading analyst of Russian affairs Dmitri Trenin cuts through the hyperbole to offer a clear and nuanced analysis of Russia's involvement in the Middle East and its regional and global ramifications. Russia, he argues, cannot and will not supplant the U.S. as the leading external power in the region, but its actions are accelerating changes which will fundamentally remake the international system in the next two decades.
148 pages, Kindle Edition
First published November 10, 2017
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About the author
Dmitri Trenin
34 books12 followersDmitri Trenin is a Senior Associate of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Deputy Director of the Carnegie Moscow Center.
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April 8, 2018
What Is Russia Up to in the Middle East? by Dimitri Trenin is an examination of Russia's geopolitical relationship with the Middle Eastern region, with a particular focus on its participation in Syria's Civil War, and the implications for Russian strategy. The book examines this topic through a few categories; first it looks at Russia's history in the region, second its participation in warfare in the area, third its diplomatic presence, and fourth is economic/trading interests. The book looks at these issues from Russia's geopolitical viewpoint, and has very little to do with Western interests, which I enjoyed. Far from being biased, it offers a clear and concise examination of the topic at hand, and does not go into political or ideological differences or considerations. This book is all about the realpolitik.
Russia's history in the region is quite long. During its Imperial phase, Russia sought access to the Black Sea and became rivaled to the major power in the Middle East - the Ottoman Empire. The Russian's fought numerous wars with the Ottomans, looking to take territory in the Crimea and southern Ukraine, and expand their borders in the Caucasus Mountain borderlands. They also sought to extend their influence and control into Persia, and Central Asia, all lands dominated by Islamic tribes and states. Russia also sought to extend its authority and protect Greek Orthodox peoples in the region. This often led to ambitions of Empire in Eastern Europe, in areas like Greece, Serbia, Bosnia, Bulgaria etc (all Ottoman territory). The Russian's also had a stated aim of taking control of the Dardanelles and Istanbul to ensure access to the Mediterranean from the Black Sea. Finally, they wished to protect Orthodox worshipers in Jerusalem (also an Ottoman land), and a growing rivalry over worshiping rights in the City led to the Crimean War (1853-56), a direct confrontation between Russia on one side, and the Ottomans, France and Britain on the other.
After the collapse of the Russian Empire and the formation of the USSR, some geopolitical issues remained the same for Moscow, but much changed. The USSR, after stabilizing its new Empire, began to look at exporting Communist ideology abroad, and widely supported anti-Colonial movements in the Middle East. The USSR was an early supporter of Israel, for example, but fell out with them over issues like the Suez Canal crisis. This switched Moscow's interest to Arab actors in the region, and indeed, Moscow friendly polities arose in Egypt under Nasser, in Syria, Iraq and in Libya. Although these states were never purely Communist aligned, they were often Socialist, and more importantly, purchased weapons and technical expertise from the USSR. This became an important feature in early Cold War Middle Eastern politics for Moscow. As the decade waned, however, Moscow began to lose ground in the Middle East. Egypt fell to the West, Greece and Turkey went NATO, Iraq began to play both sides, Iran's revolution turned into an Islamic threat, and so on. Moscow's final nail came with its Afghan War, a disastrous operation to try and prop up a friendly regime in Kabul, but ending in a long and protracted quagmire. The USSR never recovered, and after its collapse largely withdrew from the region.
Cut to modern Russia. Right after the fall of the USSR, Russia was more concerned about ending conflicts on its borderlands than with anything in the Middle East. The region largely fell to US political control in the '90's. Even so, Russia was involved in two conflicts on the regions peripheries - the first in Turkestan, and the second in Chechnya (they fought two wars in Chechnya - nominally Russian territory). Geopolitics has changed for Russia. No longer an ideologically driven state, Russia is now primarily concerned with Islamic extremism on its borders, as Russia's 20 million Muslim population may offer security concerns if radicalized. This can be seen in Russian operations in Chechnya/Dagestan, and in Russia's internal political concessions to Russian Muslims. Therefore, Russia seems to have become a Conservative actor, looking to prop up regimes rather than see them collapse in order to stem the tide of extremist fighters conflict hoping in the region, and restrict the arms flows to radical group. Russia's second geopolitical ambition is to be seen once again as a great nation that can step out of the West's shadow. Russia was largely on side during the Libya conflict and the fall of Gaddafi in 2011, Russia saw Libya fragment into warring factions, destabilizing the region. Although Russia had some business ties in the area, it allowed NATO to establish a no fly zone over the nation, thus sealing its fate. The conflict is still ongoing in Libya seven years later, and Russia saw this collapse as proof that the West could not effectively engage in regime change in the region.
This holds true in Syria. Syria remained an important but periphery Russian partner. They purchased weapons and technical expertise from Russia, but that was about it. Russia had an old naval base in the country that was run on skeleton staff, and did not support the extreme domestic violence exacted by Assad on Syria's population. However, a collapse of Syria to Islamic State forces was out of the question for Russia, especially since domestic terrorists in Russia began to fly the IS banner. Russia also saw this as an opportunity to step out of the Western security umbrella. It had already initiated conflict in Georgia and Ukraine previously, and annexed the Crimean peninsula. Now was a good time to act. Russia became involved with the conflict after it became clear that Western/Turkish backed rebels were unable to defeat IS. Russia allied itself to Assad's regime and pro-government forces, as well as Shia militias supported by Iraq and Iran. They rebuilt there base in Syria, sent warships to the region, and provided air support for anti-IS and pro-government operations. This conflict largely propelled Russia into the sphere of important actor in the region, and many states, like Iran, Egypt, Qatar, Iraq and Turkey have all beefed up relations with Russia. Russia's war aims appear to be a stabilization of Syria, and an expansion of its reach into the Middle Eastern region. Although not always Assad's biggest fan (Russia's foreign Minister once quipped that Assad was no ally of Russia) they have even so extended political protection over Syria in the UN, and propped up the regime quite successfully through military operations.
On the diplomatic front, Russia seems to have the unique ability to play many sides in the region. Far from the dogmatic approach the US takes in the region, Russia's relations are mainly focused on simple gain-for-gain transactions. Nations may purchase arms from Russia, or seek political or military assistance. In exchange, they provide remuneration to Russia in an increasingly hostile world, and offer valuable alliances and diplomatic channels for Russia to operate. For example, Russia has deftly made friends with both Israel, who it purchases advanced technologies from, and Syria, whom it supports militarily. Russia recognizes both Israel and Palestine as sovereign states. It courts favour with both Kurdish militias, and is aligned with Turkey. It has convinced both Iran and Saudi Arabia to agree to cuts in oil production. It has supported Shia militias and gained favour with the regions largest Sunni state - Egypt. Russia's ties transcend any ideological concerns, and are focused on realpolitik gain. This gives them an element of honesty in a region used to big powers attempting regime changes, or collapsing states into anarchy and chaos and then leaving.
On the trade front, the Middle East is still a region mostly outside of Russian economic interests, although business ties are increasing. Russia has become increasingly interested and aligned with OPEC countries in terms of oil production policies, and Russian state oil companies are perennially involved in oil extraction across the region. Russia's main export to the region is weapons and arms, and this offers a good opportunity to test Russia's developing military technology and improve upon the deigns. Russia has arms export ties with many Middle Eastern nations, including Iran, Egypt, Algeria, Qatar and Turkey. Russia is also seeing the Middle East as an interesting tourism destination, and Russian tourists flock to Turkey, Egypt, Israel and the Arabian peninsula for vacations.
Trenin has written a clear and concise examination of Russia's interests in the region. The Syrian conflict has seen Russia emerge as a well respected player in the region, and has increased its military reach in the region through new basing contracts in Syria. It's main aim seems to be to prop up regimes and/or avoid complete collapse through gradual regime change, all a reaction to the collapse of Libya and the near collapse of Iraq and Syria that led to the growth of extremist groups like the Islamic State in the region. Russia's approach has been pragmatic and realpolitik, as it seeks to take the course of least resistance, and has deftly navigated the complex web of alliances and rivalries in the region for great gain. Far from seeming wishy-washy, Russia's business and political dealings in the region have been perceived as largely honest, and lacking the ideological or economic constraints that many Western nations use as bargaining chips. Russia has emerged from this conflict as a global player once again, exercising its veto rights in the UN security council, sending warships and troops overseas, and beefing up ties with regional actors throughout the Middle East. Trenin's book was interesting, nuanced and direct, and I can certainly recommend it as an excellent read on Russia focused geopolitics. I thoroughly enjoyed this book, and recommend a look for its timely analysis.
Russia's history in the region is quite long. During its Imperial phase, Russia sought access to the Black Sea and became rivaled to the major power in the Middle East - the Ottoman Empire. The Russian's fought numerous wars with the Ottomans, looking to take territory in the Crimea and southern Ukraine, and expand their borders in the Caucasus Mountain borderlands. They also sought to extend their influence and control into Persia, and Central Asia, all lands dominated by Islamic tribes and states. Russia also sought to extend its authority and protect Greek Orthodox peoples in the region. This often led to ambitions of Empire in Eastern Europe, in areas like Greece, Serbia, Bosnia, Bulgaria etc (all Ottoman territory). The Russian's also had a stated aim of taking control of the Dardanelles and Istanbul to ensure access to the Mediterranean from the Black Sea. Finally, they wished to protect Orthodox worshipers in Jerusalem (also an Ottoman land), and a growing rivalry over worshiping rights in the City led to the Crimean War (1853-56), a direct confrontation between Russia on one side, and the Ottomans, France and Britain on the other.
After the collapse of the Russian Empire and the formation of the USSR, some geopolitical issues remained the same for Moscow, but much changed. The USSR, after stabilizing its new Empire, began to look at exporting Communist ideology abroad, and widely supported anti-Colonial movements in the Middle East. The USSR was an early supporter of Israel, for example, but fell out with them over issues like the Suez Canal crisis. This switched Moscow's interest to Arab actors in the region, and indeed, Moscow friendly polities arose in Egypt under Nasser, in Syria, Iraq and in Libya. Although these states were never purely Communist aligned, they were often Socialist, and more importantly, purchased weapons and technical expertise from the USSR. This became an important feature in early Cold War Middle Eastern politics for Moscow. As the decade waned, however, Moscow began to lose ground in the Middle East. Egypt fell to the West, Greece and Turkey went NATO, Iraq began to play both sides, Iran's revolution turned into an Islamic threat, and so on. Moscow's final nail came with its Afghan War, a disastrous operation to try and prop up a friendly regime in Kabul, but ending in a long and protracted quagmire. The USSR never recovered, and after its collapse largely withdrew from the region.
Cut to modern Russia. Right after the fall of the USSR, Russia was more concerned about ending conflicts on its borderlands than with anything in the Middle East. The region largely fell to US political control in the '90's. Even so, Russia was involved in two conflicts on the regions peripheries - the first in Turkestan, and the second in Chechnya (they fought two wars in Chechnya - nominally Russian territory). Geopolitics has changed for Russia. No longer an ideologically driven state, Russia is now primarily concerned with Islamic extremism on its borders, as Russia's 20 million Muslim population may offer security concerns if radicalized. This can be seen in Russian operations in Chechnya/Dagestan, and in Russia's internal political concessions to Russian Muslims. Therefore, Russia seems to have become a Conservative actor, looking to prop up regimes rather than see them collapse in order to stem the tide of extremist fighters conflict hoping in the region, and restrict the arms flows to radical group. Russia's second geopolitical ambition is to be seen once again as a great nation that can step out of the West's shadow. Russia was largely on side during the Libya conflict and the fall of Gaddafi in 2011, Russia saw Libya fragment into warring factions, destabilizing the region. Although Russia had some business ties in the area, it allowed NATO to establish a no fly zone over the nation, thus sealing its fate. The conflict is still ongoing in Libya seven years later, and Russia saw this collapse as proof that the West could not effectively engage in regime change in the region.
This holds true in Syria. Syria remained an important but periphery Russian partner. They purchased weapons and technical expertise from Russia, but that was about it. Russia had an old naval base in the country that was run on skeleton staff, and did not support the extreme domestic violence exacted by Assad on Syria's population. However, a collapse of Syria to Islamic State forces was out of the question for Russia, especially since domestic terrorists in Russia began to fly the IS banner. Russia also saw this as an opportunity to step out of the Western security umbrella. It had already initiated conflict in Georgia and Ukraine previously, and annexed the Crimean peninsula. Now was a good time to act. Russia became involved with the conflict after it became clear that Western/Turkish backed rebels were unable to defeat IS. Russia allied itself to Assad's regime and pro-government forces, as well as Shia militias supported by Iraq and Iran. They rebuilt there base in Syria, sent warships to the region, and provided air support for anti-IS and pro-government operations. This conflict largely propelled Russia into the sphere of important actor in the region, and many states, like Iran, Egypt, Qatar, Iraq and Turkey have all beefed up relations with Russia. Russia's war aims appear to be a stabilization of Syria, and an expansion of its reach into the Middle Eastern region. Although not always Assad's biggest fan (Russia's foreign Minister once quipped that Assad was no ally of Russia) they have even so extended political protection over Syria in the UN, and propped up the regime quite successfully through military operations.
On the diplomatic front, Russia seems to have the unique ability to play many sides in the region. Far from the dogmatic approach the US takes in the region, Russia's relations are mainly focused on simple gain-for-gain transactions. Nations may purchase arms from Russia, or seek political or military assistance. In exchange, they provide remuneration to Russia in an increasingly hostile world, and offer valuable alliances and diplomatic channels for Russia to operate. For example, Russia has deftly made friends with both Israel, who it purchases advanced technologies from, and Syria, whom it supports militarily. Russia recognizes both Israel and Palestine as sovereign states. It courts favour with both Kurdish militias, and is aligned with Turkey. It has convinced both Iran and Saudi Arabia to agree to cuts in oil production. It has supported Shia militias and gained favour with the regions largest Sunni state - Egypt. Russia's ties transcend any ideological concerns, and are focused on realpolitik gain. This gives them an element of honesty in a region used to big powers attempting regime changes, or collapsing states into anarchy and chaos and then leaving.
On the trade front, the Middle East is still a region mostly outside of Russian economic interests, although business ties are increasing. Russia has become increasingly interested and aligned with OPEC countries in terms of oil production policies, and Russian state oil companies are perennially involved in oil extraction across the region. Russia's main export to the region is weapons and arms, and this offers a good opportunity to test Russia's developing military technology and improve upon the deigns. Russia has arms export ties with many Middle Eastern nations, including Iran, Egypt, Algeria, Qatar and Turkey. Russia is also seeing the Middle East as an interesting tourism destination, and Russian tourists flock to Turkey, Egypt, Israel and the Arabian peninsula for vacations.
Trenin has written a clear and concise examination of Russia's interests in the region. The Syrian conflict has seen Russia emerge as a well respected player in the region, and has increased its military reach in the region through new basing contracts in Syria. It's main aim seems to be to prop up regimes and/or avoid complete collapse through gradual regime change, all a reaction to the collapse of Libya and the near collapse of Iraq and Syria that led to the growth of extremist groups like the Islamic State in the region. Russia's approach has been pragmatic and realpolitik, as it seeks to take the course of least resistance, and has deftly navigated the complex web of alliances and rivalries in the region for great gain. Far from seeming wishy-washy, Russia's business and political dealings in the region have been perceived as largely honest, and lacking the ideological or economic constraints that many Western nations use as bargaining chips. Russia has emerged from this conflict as a global player once again, exercising its veto rights in the UN security council, sending warships and troops overseas, and beefing up ties with regional actors throughout the Middle East. Trenin's book was interesting, nuanced and direct, and I can certainly recommend it as an excellent read on Russia focused geopolitics. I thoroughly enjoyed this book, and recommend a look for its timely analysis.
April 3, 2024
این کتاب به تاریخچه حضور روسیه در خاورمیانه از فروپاشی شوروی سابق تا چند دهه اخیر پرداخته که فراز و نشیب های زیادی به خود دیده. روس هایی که در دوره شوروی نفوذ بالایی در خاورمیانه ( مخصوصا کشور های عربی منطقه) داشتن و با فروپاشی شوروی درسال ۱۹۹۱ و کمی بعد بهار عربی تمام این نفوذ از دست رفت.
در این کتاب با چگونگی برگشت روسیه به خاورمیانه از پایان دهه نود تا به امروز آشنا میشیم؛ هرچند کمی روسکی پسند که دلیل اون روس بودن شخص نویسندس:-)
در این کتاب با چگونگی برگشت روسیه به خاورمیانه از پایان دهه نود تا به امروز آشنا میشیم؛ هرچند کمی روسکی پسند که دلیل اون روس بودن شخص نویسندس:-)
March 7, 2019
A nice short sweet book detailing the historical role of Russia in the Middle East and how Russia has pursued a more engaged role in the region over the last decade after having been gone for almost a generation. At moments the book is a bit too fond of the RUssian POV and makes one think that Eisenhower was only marginally involved in forcing the UK, France and Israel out of the Suez compared to Krushev.
April 29, 2021
A succinct 144pages, this 2018 book sketches Russia's inheritance from the Soviet Union, in the middle east, and outlines Russia's involvement in geopolitics there, in Syria especially, but also more widely.
A good read, helping keep in mind how global politics is done.
Quite affirmative about the position of Russia to influence events in the middle east, but pragmatic about Russia's limitations, as is Moscow.
Mostly exporting weapons, grain, uranium and tourists (the middle east doesn't really need Russian oil or gas).
A good read, helping keep in mind how global politics is done.
Quite affirmative about the position of Russia to influence events in the middle east, but pragmatic about Russia's limitations, as is Moscow.
Mostly exporting weapons, grain, uranium and tourists (the middle east doesn't really need Russian oil or gas).
July 9, 2018
Short but important!
April 9, 2018
Excellent
I read this immediately after Trenin's first essay Should we fear Russia? As a resident of Lebanon I've tried to get to grips with Russia's role in Syria by reading newspapers and journals.But no one has summarised Russia's intervention more clearly and comprehensively than you..Again, bravo Mr Trenin! You seem to have the knack of simplifying concepts for the layman.Please keep those essays coming! Many many thanks once again.
I read this immediately after Trenin's first essay Should we fear Russia? As a resident of Lebanon I've tried to get to grips with Russia's role in Syria by reading newspapers and journals.But no one has summarised Russia's intervention more clearly and comprehensively than you..Again, bravo Mr Trenin! You seem to have the knack of simplifying concepts for the layman.Please keep those essays coming! Many many thanks once again.
December 26, 2017
Dmitri Trenin is the Director of the Carnegie Moscow Center and in this timely and fascinating book that provides a much-needed counterpoint to Western media thought pieces that made me rethink my assumptions about Russian international policy, he examines Russia’s history and interests in the Middle East to assess its impact in the region and its wider strategy on the global stage.
March 27, 2019
This is quite an interesting book. very informative as The author did quite an intensive research on the subject involving political, economical aspects.
January 25, 2022
3.5 stars
May 27, 2018
This book is less than 200 pages but it packs a punch. I'd been trying to learn what Putin/Russia was gaining by intervening in Syria, and learned much more about what motivates Putin to take an active role in the complex tangle that is Middle Eastern geopolitics and socioeconomics. Americans are accustomed to their vast mainland, with Canada up north and Mexico, South and Central America to the south. Trenin's descriptions of Russia in the Middle East will spin your head, especially as it's taken on the role of "paragon of pragmatism," with no full enemies and no full allies. Much is at stake here for the USA.
Displaying 1 - 10 of 10 reviews